Managing Mali's Transitional Agreement through the Politics of Insecurity

Abstract

This paper examines how insecurity affects transitional governance in Mali following the military
coups of 2020 and 2021, asking whether it merely constrains democratisation or actively shapes the
transition's political outcomes. Drawing on securitisation theory and frameworks for negotiating in
fragile states, it develops the concept of the politics of insecurity to explain how security narratives
are strategically deployed by Malian transitional leaders, armed groups, and international actors. The
paper engages qualitative political analysis of transitional arrangements, institutional reforms, and
security discourses within Mali’s post-coup context. The findings demonstrate that persistent jihadist
violence, territorial fragmentation, and intercommunal conflict have been instrumentalised to justify
delayed elections, expand executive and military authority, and restructure civil-military relations,
which affect the success of the transitional agreement. Armed groups such as jihadists and separatists
have similarly leveraged instability to strengthen their negotiating positions, while international
actors’ prioritisation of counterterrorism has often reinforced securitised governance. The paper
contributes to scholarship and policy frameworks on post-coup governance and fragile-state
transitions by demonstrating that insecurity is not only a backdrop to political transition but also a
central political resource that shapes institutional design and power consolidation in Mali and beyond.