A Critical Analysis of Jurgen Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality: Exposing Some of its Unadmitted Ethical Assumptions

Abstract

This paper defends the claim that Habermas’s distinction between the moral and the ethical depends on some un-stated assumptions that he is not willing to accept. One of the assumptions concerns the presumption of the equality of the discourse participants; the other implicit assumption in his discourse theory of morality concerns the issue of reciprocity and symmetrical power relations. He takes each discourse participant as free to initiate a dialogue and to challenge the validity claims of discourse participants. Such assumptions undermine Habermas’s commitment for ethical neutrality and his rejection of the substantive notions of truth. He argues that although our everyday interactions are pervaded by distortions and asymmetrical power relations there are operative principles such as reciprocity and symmetrical power relations inherent in language. The question precisely is: why should we take the principles that are inherent in language for granted? It appears as though Habermas has a pre-given reason to endorse the principles in question. By disapproving the use of threat, coercion and intimidation in the process of argumentation, and instead by insisting for the employment of, among others, symmetrical relation, Habermas is affirming the claim that humans are beings that command each other’s respect. But the question precisely is, why do they command each other’s respect? It appears that we cannot commit ourselves to this claim without affirming a given ontology of the human and Habermas is exactly doing that.