A Study of the Decision-Making Process and the Strategies of Ethiopia\'s Foreign Policy (1974-1991), with Particular Emphasis on Ethio-US Relations

Abstract

This article explores the structures and patterns of decision-making as well as perceptions, intentions and ensuing actions of Ethiopia’s foreign policy during the 1974-1991 period. It demonstrates that decision making responsibility in foreign policy was concentrated in the hands of Mengistu Haile Mariam, despite the existence of specialized government agencies. It also stresses that Ethiopia’s political independence and the preservation of its territorial integrity were the foremost foreign policy goals. It then presents the strategies adopted to mitigate threats to these goals including the creation of strong military force and alliance with the Soviet Union. Moreover, it addresses the United States’ interests in the Horn of Africa, which had a relatively important strategic value owing to its proximity to the Persian Gulf’s abundant oil deposits and key oil routes. It advances the argument that United States policy in the Horn of Africa aimed primarily at countering any expansion of Soviet influence by securing military bases in allied states and providing them military aid. The article finally notes that relations between Ethiopia and the United States had three phases. The first phase saw military supplies from the United States to Ethiopia maintained and even increased initially, while the second phase witnessed a deterioration of bilateral relations as Ethiopia overtly aligned with the Soviet Union. In the third phase, Ethiopia attempted vainly to normalize its relation with the United States.