Alternative Connectivity Initiatives towards Africa and Possible Approaches by Ethiopia to Access into the Pledged Resources

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Abstract

Investing in infrastructure has diverse benefits to Ethiopia by easing the transport of goods from place to place and facilitating the movement of people across the country. Its reach to the wider world can also be harnessed by the development of modern infrastructure that connects Ethiopia with its neighbors. Though no one denies the relevance of connectivity in boosting the economy and helping Ethiopia get out of poverty, it is also clear that Ethiopia has apparent infrastructure financial gap to satisfy its needs. Finding out potential financial sources for infrastructure is therefore an essential move for Ethiopia and it is also plausible to solicit fund from the available external sources. This research aims to assess the available funds for connectivity initiatives mainly from the outside source. Three connectivity initiatives from China, EU and Japan were selected for the assessment of financial related concerns. As a case study qualitative research, it identified the Belt and Road Initiative from China, Global Gateway from European Union and Quality Infrastructure from Japan for detail analysis. Data were collected from interview and other secondary sources. In the finding, the first two initiatives from China and EU seem very relevant for the development endeavors of Ethiopia. However, benefiting from China needs long term strategy as there are critical problems at the moment, these include the lack of new infrastructure project lists from the Belt and Road Initiative to Ethiopia and matters related to debt management. There is also a challenge to tap into the fund from EU as there are governance related challenges. The availability of funds on one side and the challenges beforehand on the other side means Ethiopia has to design a short term and long term strategy.

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Introduction

Connectivity, though an ancient practice and an instrument of development especially since Industrial Revolution, has now become an essential foreign policy tool for states with strong economic capability to advance their economic and geopolitical interests. Connectivity helps to connect peoples and their products found in different places. States use to build roads, railway lines, maritime ports, airline ports, optical fiber cables and electric grids to create market and social links. The economic benefit of connectivity is immense by facilitating easy movement of goods and services. The more the trade interaction is eased, the better chance of economic growth and integration between states. Goods and services can be transported from places of production and surplus into where there is better market. But, the necessary infrastructure to transport may not be available up to the expectations. In other cases, political choices and decisions may determine the direction of infrastructure investment. In other words, the economy is not the only determinant factor in the establishment of connectivity. Political variable becomes more stringent especially where there is rivalry between nations that have the adequate finance necessary for infrastructure investment.

Connectivity as a political discourse has got prominence in the international studies today as a result of the intervention of China through Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI). It is an initiative made public in 2013 with the intention to develop selected growth corridors from across the world and to reduce the cost and time of transporting goods and services. China allocated huge amount of money for the implementation of the project. The BRI involves Silk Road and Maritime route initiatives on land and on the seas respectively. The BRI initiatives is still an ongoing project and so far, states like Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Ethiopia and other states have benefited from the Initiative. The BRI is not immune from criticism by associating it with geopolitical interests of China. It is criticized basically because political interests are far weightier than economic efficiency of each projects (Zhang, 2018).

The Chinese approach of connectivity was soon followed by Japan as well. Japan and China had enjoyed a bilateral relations based on mutuality and partnership in the years following 1972 to 2010. Japan as the second global economy was supporting China to develop its economy and created strong economic interaction in the form of investment and trade. However, when China emerge as a bigger economy than Japan, the relations between the two turned into a rivalry than cooperation. Japan tried to come up with its own plan of connectivity called Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) in 2016 with the aim to invest especially in the ASEAN region and partly in Africa. The initiative by Japan is also influenced by its political world view as it is witnessed in the effort to integrate QII with G7 and G20 standards and norms. At the same time, the connectivity initiative is the continuation of its vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), largely a reflection of resistance to the rising influence of China in the region. Japan also view India, the rival of China, as its strategic partner to achieve the FOIP aspirations (Prakash and van der Putten, 2021).

European Union also came up with an alternative to BRI especially towards Africa called Global Gateway. The initiative planned to mobilize about €300 billion for connectivity projects across the world. About half of it is pledged to be invested in Africa for the years between 2021 and 2027. EU makes it clear from the very beginning that the initiative is an alternative finance to China. In this case, it is possible to say that EU is late comer as far as connectivity in Africa is concerned. EU wants to invest on infrastructure following its political values and human rights principles (Teevan and etal, 2022).

What makes China, Japan and EU similar is that they consider connectivity is an essential element in which they can cooperate with Africa. The amount of money allocated for the projects are not only immense but also have the potential to fill the financial gaps African countries have for the development of infrastructure. The economic growth that Ethiopia experienced since 2001 is highly intertwined with the investment on infrastructure.[1] In those years, asphalt roads and railway lines were constructed with the vision to connect the capital city with other major cities and its only sea outlet, Djibouti. The sources of infrastructure finance were mainly from China and other nations (d'Orey and Prizzon, 2017). For about a decade and a half, the flow of investment finance and development in the construction of infrastructures were praised by

[1] A country profile data reported by Global Infrastructure Hub and the World Bank, 2023. Accessed at [Ethiopia - Set your infrastructure policies in the right direction (gihub.org)]

different states and development institutions. Through time, the accumulated loans created debt burden upon Ethiopian economy though the finance gap still persists. The three initiatives can serve as important source of finance for Ethiopia too if projects are carefully selected and properly managed. This research, therefore, tries to identify the available resources from the three initiatives that are essential to Ethiopia. This is further analyzed in reference with the conditions attached to each initiative, the possible draw backs of accessing the resources and the challenges that may occur in the aggregation of interest after each project.

Methodological Issues

The research is a qualitative case study research based on both primary and secondary data. Three of the initiatives were taken as cases for detail study and later to make detail analysis. Necessary data were collected from government reports, news outlets and publications and from primary sources like interview and field visit. The primary sources are those who believed to have an expert knowledge on each of the countries that have connectivity initiatives. The researcher has also got the chance to travel to Xinjiang province, the heart of BRI, in China and also visited the middle corridor by travelling to Azerbaijan.

Connectivity Initiatives by China, Japan and EU

Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI)

Few years before China launched the BRI in 2013, its regional and global posture was changing. Since the economic opening up was initiated by Deng, the support from America and Japan was phenomenal to gear its economy towards take off. For US, an economically advanced China was supposed to be peaceful and friendly. The intention of US during cold war was creating a strong counter-balancing state against Soviet Russia. The dominant thinking in the immediate aftermath of the cold war was that US had emerged unrivaled great power and globalization would easily help to integrate any growing economy, including China, to the US-led system. The policy of Japan towards the engagement of China was driven by the expectation that a growing China would easily conform into the regional status quo. Japan was expecting China to be a peaceful rising economy without any intention and action that might challenge the regional order established since the end of World War II (Nagy, 2020). As an island state having developed economy, any change in the Indo-Pacific region is considered as an economic and security threat to Japan.

The rising China, on the other hand, was emerging with a new vision of regional and global order. In the years between 2010 and 2013, China outpaced both Germany and Japan to become the second largest economy next to US. It was also entering into a boundary dispute with Japan in the East China Sea and with other littoral states to the South China Sea. These moves antagonized China with states like Japan and others. The Shinzo Abe government was actually critical to the rise of China and its consequential behavior in the surrounding region. He was trying to organize states that share the threat of China with the agenda of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). China's foreign relation in its eastern direction was deeply troubled because of its territorial claims. 'Thus, implementing the BRI was part of a strategic "China Goes West" proposal to de-escalate head-on conflicts in Maritime Asia by intensifying connectivity on Eurasia' (Ye, 2022).

The economic environment at the global level was also changing though the reality in China was different from what was happening in the world. Following the 2006-08 financial crisis mainly in the west, the world had passed through frequent economic crisis up until 2010. Some major economies were introducing protective national economic policies disregard of the notion of globalization. Even though the global dynamics had a reversal effect to the economic miracle of China, it remained in a better position. The remaining question to the Chinese policy makers was on the how about of navigating through the changing global fortunes and the disturbed foreign relations with its eastern and southern neighbors without compromising its economic performances. The "industrial overcapacity and weakened momentum for high-speed economic growth [was] necessitating a broader international cooperation for larger overseas markets" (Zhang, 2018: 2).

The realization of the necessity to invest in the Eurasia landmass in its course towards global dominance is another policy motive in China to launch BRI. The policy making circle of China are well-cognizant of looking to the west both in its domestic development policy and foreign policy.[2] The eastern part of China has long been the centre of development and innovation since it embraced economic reform late in the 1970s. The growth disparity between the east and the west became very wide to the extant it required state intervention. BRI is thus a state policy intervention to help the western part of the country integrate with the national economy. BRI is introduced to the northwestern China autonomous region of Xinjiang not only as a railway infrastructure. It is an integrated policy intervention targeted towards improving urban infrastructure and digital connectivity, transforming the impoverished rural life condition of the community and economic and political integration of the west with the mainland China.

Stretching to the west further extends to the entire Eurasia landmass and also consider geopolitical calculations. From the Chinese geostrategic lectures, one can easily understand that Chinese foreign policy makers are revitalizing the century old geopolitical 'heartland' theory by Mackinder. It is the theory that considers Eurasia as the center of the world and controlling this landmass is an essential prerequisite to control the world. To control Eurasia on the other hand requires controlling the heartland of Eurasia land mass, i.e. Central Asia. By making Xinjiang the center of the BRI infrastructure projects, the policy makers have established a vision of controlling Central Asia while making the geographic area under its sphere of influence in order to advance into global dominance. This implies to the point that "BRI is simultaneously a political and economic project China, through its economic projects, also wants to increase its influence in the states situated along the BRI" (Winkler, 2023: 109).

China launched Silk Road Economic Belt from Kazakhstan and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road from Indonesia in 2013. The absence of official document about the initiative, at the time it was launched, prevented concerned researchers from properly understanding the details of the initiative. In 2015, however, China disclosed a vision document. It makes clear that China

[2] The researcher has got a chance to visit the Western part of China called Xinjiang state for three weeks in October 2023. In his stay, he had visited the major connectivity corridors and attended seminars and lectures in which most of the lectures and presentations pinpointed the relevance of the BRI to the western part of the country. BRI is largely considered as a development policy intervention to transform the life condition of the people living in Xinjiang. But geopolitical calculations are also widely discussed in the lectures.

launched the BRI just to cope up with the profound changes across the world mainly due to the financial crisis, the slow pace of economic recovery and the change in the international trade and investment environment. It made clear that "China's economy is connected with the world economy. China will stay committed to the basic policy of opening-up, build a new pattern of all-round opening-up, and integrate itself deeper into the world economic system" (China, 2015).

The economic motive behind launching BRI is associated with China's ambition towards economic globalization. Economic opening up and foreign trade in the globalized economy have always been hailed to bring dramatic economic progress in China. For Zhu Min, the forces of globalization began to be threatened since the 2008 global financial crisis. It was soon followed by mass protest and state collapse in the Middle East and refugee crisis in Europe. In the face of subsequent uncertainties, globalization has shown decline. The crisis of globalization means the crisis in economic growth, erosion in global division of labor and internationalization of production and a decline in the free flow of capital at the global level which China does not want to tolerate it. BRI comes at the time of great global economic upheaval, "characterized by great developments, profound changes and major adjustments, the Belt and Road Initiative infuses new drive for the progress of globalization while offering a Chinese solution for resolving problems" (Min, 2018: 318). BRI can therefore be taken as a Chinese drive towards the economic integration China with the wider world. It is a policy instrument to penetrate aggressively to the economies of other nations through better infrastructure both on land and the seas.

The BRI on land followed three directions. The first refers to the transport network to connect China with Europe through central Asia and Russia. The second crosses central and west Asia to connect China with Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. The third direction starts from China and goes to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Corresponding to the focus areas of connectivity directions, three development corridors on land were identified: (1) China-Mongolia-Russia, (2) China-Central Asia-West Asia, and (3) China-Indochina. The Maritime Silk Road stretches towards Europe and Southern Pacific by crossing water bodies like the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The corresponding growth corridors for the Maritime Silk Road are the China-Pakistan economic corridors and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor. These development corridors are targeted to 'promote "hard connectivity" in infrastructure and "soft connectivity" through harmonized rules and standards, to ensure unimpeded channels for cooperation in trade and investment, and to develop Silk Road e-commence' (Jinping, 2022: 571).

The BRI has even gone beyond Eurasia landmass in its 10 years of experience on the ground. In the second Belt and Road Forum, 2019, leaders from Africa and Latin America were also participating. The annex to the Communique of the conference shows that there are lots of projects other than the initially anticipated ones. New economic corridors in Africa and Latin America and also in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific are also added to the list. What is new in the conference was that the issue of quality has got new attention. The Communique indicates that future BRI projects will consider environmental concerns, quality issues and transparent governance. The government seems consistent on the issue of quality even in recent years (China, 2019).

Even though Africa as a continent and the nations within the continent have not been pinpointed to be part of the economic corridors in the 2015 policy document, many African nations joined the Initiative to get benefitted. At the tenth year anniversary of BRI, China disclosed the list of projects and the countries benefited from the Initiative (Jinping, 2022). As far as Africa is concerned, it identified the projects Africa experienced so far. First, policy coordination at the bilateral and multilateral level has been considered as essential mechanism towards large scale connectivity. South Africa's Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan and Egypt's Suez Canal Corridor Project are bilateral policy coordination mechanisms as Forum of China-Africa Cooperation is a multilateral policy coordination forum. The Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization has also been established in 2022 to deal with the arbitration of BRI related disputes. Second, two railway line projects in east Africa, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti and the Mombasa-Nairobi lines, are important infrastructure connectivity in Africa. Third, the Lekki Deep-Sea Port in Nigeria is the only maritime connectivity project in Africa.

The momentum of BRI, however, was not as it was in the early years of its inception. It is limited by different factors. The COVID-19 pandemic and China's response was challenging for the success of the BRI initiative. The zero-COVID policy thwarted the decades of rapid economic growth in China and diverted the attention of the state to shift towards the inside. Before it fully recovered from the consequences of the pandemic, it has to face with the challenges associated with the Russia-Ukraine war. In those years, some of the BRI projects failed to be accomplished in the planned period of time. The high speed railway line in Indonesia is a case in point where the project took many years and only accomplished by 2023. For most, BRI is not considered as an infrastructure project that is based on transparency and accountability. Many criticized China for using BRI as an instrument of establishing dependency of the finance recipient states.

Quality Infrastructure by Japan

The Chinese approach of connectivity was soon followed by Japan as well. Japan and China had enjoyed a bilateral relations based on mutuality and partnership in the years following 1972 to 2010. Japan as the second global economy was supporting China to develop its economy and created strong economic interaction in the form of investment and trade. However, when China emerge as a bigger economy than Japan, the relations between the two nations turned into a rivalry than cooperation. Japan tried to come up with its own plan of connectivity initiative called Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) in 2016 with the aim to invest especially in the ASEAN region and partly in Africa. It is called 'quality' because it is based on clearly stated principles. These principles are: maximizing the positive impact of infrastructure to achieve sustainable growth and development; raising economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost; integrating environmental considerations in infrastructure; building resilience against natural disasters; integrating social considerations in infrastructure investment; and strengthening infrastructure governance.

The 2023 report of QII indicates that, so far, Japan has allocated very limited amount of finance in the years between 2017 and 2023. It says, in 2023, "an additional 54 grants were approved for a total of $14.2 million, bringing the total number of grants awarded through the QII Partnership tenure (FY17-FY23) to 229 for a total value of $64.1 million" (World Bank, 2023). In comparison with the $1 trillion invested by China through BRI, the Japanese QII is very insignificant and beyond comparison. Looking from the perspectives of the beneficiaries as well, the Japanese connectivity initiative does not address too many countries as BRI is. In Africa, Japan channeled small portion of fund through QII for World Bank financed railway project in Egypt, digital connectivity in Chad and drainage infrastructure in Benin.

The initiative by Japan is also influenced by its political world view as it is witnessed in the effort to integrate QII with G7 and G20 standards and norms. At the same time, the connectivity initiative is the continuation of its vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), largely a reflection of resistance to the rising influence of China in the region. It is a foreign policy orientation since the second decade of the 21st century by Japan that aims to protect the Indo-Pacific region from the rising influence of China. As a maritime nation, any change in the status quo of the larger Indo-Pacific water body has believed to have a catastrophic impact upon the maritime security and the import-export trade of Japan. Japan also view India, the rival of China, as its strategic partner to achieve the FOIP aspirations (Prakash and van der Putten, 2021).

Global Gateway by EU

European Union has initiated the Global Gateway connectivity initiative to advance the integration within Europe and with the wider world which is to be functional in the years between 2021 and 2027. It has an ambition of investing around €300 billion in the specified time limit. Global Gateway is presented as an alternative to the BRI since the latter is criticized for creating imbalance relationship between China and finance receiving nations which by default is creating debt burden. To get out of this type of problem, the Global Gateway will offer it's financing under fair and favorable terms in order to limit the risk of debt distress. It will help build sustainable infrastructure with the support, skills and the finance needed to operate it. Without proper transparency, good governance and high standards, projects can be badly chosen or designed, left incomplete or be used to fuel corruption. This not only stunts growth and deprives local communities but it ultimately creates dependencies, which can limit countries' ability to make decisions. (European Commission, 2022a)

Global Gateway is a value-driven initiative on the basis of the following principles: democratic values and high standards; good governance and transparency; equal partnership; green and clean; security-focused; and catalyzing private sector investment (ibid). EU placed priority for issues of democracy and transparent and effective governance to channel the funds. It is also an energy and climate sensitive in selecting the beneficiary of the connectivity initiative. The participation of the private sector is encouraged in the financing and implementation of the connectivity projects.

About €150 billion is expected to be invested in Africa in the areas of transport infrastructure, energy transition, and digital connectivity. Eleven transport connectivity projects are identified from across Africa. From West Africa, countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Niger will benefit through the Abidjan-Lagos, Abidjan-Ouagadougou, Dakar-Abidjan and Cotonou-Niamey infrastructure projects. The connectivity projects of Libreville/Kribi/Douala-N'Djamena and Douala/Kribi-Kampala in central Africa will touch upon Gabon, Equatorial

Guinea, Cameroon, Chad, São Tomé and Príncipe, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, and Uganda. From East Africa the beneficiary states from the Mombasa-Kisangani and Dar es Salaam - Nairobi – Addis Abeba – Berbera – Djibouti connectivity projects are supposed to be Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland. From northern and Eastern Africa, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda will be connected in a Cairo-Khartoum-Juba-Kampala transport infrastructure. In southern Africa, Mozambique, South Africa, Eswatini, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia are also expected to benefit from Maputo-Gaborone-Walvis Bay and Durban-Lusaka connectivity projects. (European Commission, 2022b)

The possibilities available for Ethiopia to tap into the available finance

The Chinese BRI and the European Union's Global Gateway infrastructure initiatives can be taken as important sources of finance for Ethiopia's need. Though the focus of BRI is still on Central Asia and South East Asia, it is also expanding its scope of reaching out some African nations. The past ten years of experience of the BRI also provided that China has had an intent to invest in Africa. The Global Gateway is crystal clear as far as its intention to Africa is concerned. It proposed to invest around €150 billion for eleven infrastructure projects in Africa, one being specifically important to Ethiopia. The project that is designed to connect Djibouti and Berbera with the rest of East Africa through Ethiopia makes the later one of the beneficiary of the project. It has also the potential to provide alternative outlet to the sea for the land locked Ethiopia.

The problem, however, is the prevailing polarized interests and conditions the two initiatives set before any state get benefitted. BRI expected beneficiaries to satisfy the global ambition, both political and economic, of China. As it is trying to expand its influence in the changing global order, China wants to get political allegiance in exchange for infrastructure financing through BRI. The global economic ambition is related with integrating with Chinese economy. Those infrastructures are supposed to connect the Chinese economy with better places of market or else raw material rich areas. There is a strong belief that globalization is declining since 2008 and China is there to reverse back the de-globalization trajectory. The BRI, in short is used to correct the problem within globalization. Though the place of Africa in the globalized world is minimal, China is trying to invest in it. In this case, Ethiopia, as an economic power house in the Horn of Africa and as one of the emerging giant economies in Africa, can deal with China for further infrastructure finance.

Another important feature of the BRI finance is related with its source. The Chinese state is the only player in deciding the destination of BRI finance. This implies to the fact that strong bilateral ties with China can be used as a warranty to get more finance. This has been observed in the financial relations of Ethiopia and China in the past decade. China invested a lot in Ethiopia, even beyond its capacity to payback, at the time the bilateral relations was assumed to be good and, still now, the two nations are negotiating for the extension of loan repayment period for the already matured debts. Political deal plays key role in the Chinese finance.

The Global Gateway, on the other hand, requires transparent governance for the purpose of avoiding corruption and debt transparency. Issues related with human rights are also important requirements to get finance from the initiative. The participation of the private sector as an alternative source of finance is another feature which differentiates it from the Chinese BRI. There are still opportunities for Ethiopia to solicit fund from Global Gateway. First, EU has showed an interest to invest in Ethiopia. This is observed in the list of projects that it is planning to finance across Africa. The East African corridor is up to the interest of Ethiopia to connect with Djibouti, Somaliland and Kenya. Second, EU is a new comer with such gigantic infrastructure development projects. Thus, it may exert necessary commitment to showcase its friendliness to Africa. Ethiopia is a type of friend that cannot be ignored by EU since it has big size of territory and population. Its location also plays critical role in an effort to connect East African nations.

In an effort to tap into the resources availed by the two initiatives, it is plausible to organize efforts through short-term and long-term strategies.

The short-term strategy: in the short-term, Ethiopia can profit a lot if it concentrates its effort towards Global Gateway. Ethiopia has been given with an opportunity to work with EU through Global Gateway. By negotiating with EU about their conditions, it seems there is a possibility to kickoff policy coordination efforts. The only challenge that may hinder Ethiopia from benefitting from the initiative could come from the strict conditions of transparency and governance requirements. The following policy measures can be taken from the Ethiopian side to solicit fund from Global Gateway:

Expression of interest: Ethiopia needs to publicly announce its interest to work with EU for the implementation of the Global Gateway projects, especially to the one that is proposed to connect Ethiopia with Djibouti, Berbera and Nairobi.

Commissioning a national taskforce to work with EU connectivity projects: Ethiopia may need to establish a national taskforce that facilitates the negotiation, policy coordination and implementation of the projects.

Collaborating with EU in its effort towards democracy and good governance: EU may need to be clear about the democratization process in Ethiopia. The later has to therefore engage EU in order to develop mutual trust.

Long-term strategy: Ethiopia may benefit from China in the long-term. Though China has an interest on Africa, the amount of money that it wants to invest in Africa and its priority infrastructure projects are not clear. The same is also true for its future projects in Ethiopia. No project is yet proposed worth to be invested in the foreseeable future. The terms of bilateral engagements at the moment are dominated by debt management issues. To get additional infrastructure finance from China, thus, requires long-term planning that may be realized after the debt problems are solved. China also wants to see a growing and stable Ethiopia to be integrated into the Chinese economy. Ethiopia, therefore, has to devise a strategy that is intended to solicit infrastructure finance after debt problems are addressed.

Conclusion and the way forward

The discussion so far shows that political developments are essential factors both in advancing and restricting connectivity initiatives. This led one to think the relevance of the nature of inter-state relations even in the 21st century. When states forge peaceful relations and work towards globalization and regionalism, it becomes a fertile ground for launching connectivity initiatives. But, there are times inter-state relations are disturbed by boundary dispute and hegemonic rivalry. Unexpected economic shocks and pandemics also affect the prospect of any state to go through connectivity. So, any effort towards connectivity need not forget to consider the nature of power distribution at the global and regional level. Possible economic shocks and project management gaps have to also be part of the equation while planning to pursue new connectivity networks.

Major economies of the world are investing a lot in order to connect with others. In this case, the Chinese BRI, the EU's Global Gateway initiative and the Quality Infrastructure Investment by Japan are important initiatives observed in the 21st century. These initiatives one way or another have opportunities to Ethiopia. EU and China would be important source of finance for Ethiopia in the short-term and in the long-term respectively. Those initiatives can play instrumental role in filling the financial gap that developing nations like Ethiopia is wrestling with.

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