Sub-national Constitutional Autonomy and Institutional Innovation in Ethiopia

Abstract

The major rationale behind the introduction of multi-national federalism in Ethiopia
was the accommodation of the country’s considerable societal diversity in
order to guarantee peace and stability and prevent state disintegration. One of
the excellent – but understudied – mechanisms of diversity accommodation Ethiopian
federalism has to offer is the significant constitutional autonomy or space
reserved by the federal constitution to the federal constituent units or regions.
Due to its supremacy, the federal constitution provides the framework for the regional
constitutional arrangements, but this framework leaves substantial space
to the regions to design their own arrangements adapted to the realities of their
polities. One of the areas where the regions enjoy considerable constitutional
space is the design of the regional government structure and institutions. The
federal constitution contains very limited provisions related to the regional legislature
and executive, providing the regions with considerable discretionary power
to decide on the structure, composition, powers and responsibilities of their
legislative and executive institutions. Regional constitutional space is much more
restrained when it comes to the regional judiciary since the federal constitution
contains rather detailed provisions related to the structure of regional courts and
the appointment and removal of regional judges.
This paper aims to investigate to what extent Ethiopia’s regions have
made use of this autonomy and designed institutions that reflect and are adapted
to their respective societal realities. The paper will do this by comparing the
regional government institutions as entrenched in the constitutions of the nine
regions. The research findings demonstrate that seven out of the nine regional
constitutions have incorporated similar institutional arrangements with regard
to the regional legislatures and executives. Yet, interesting divergences inducedby distinct regional societal features and political considerations can also be
observed. Whereas seven regions have so far only taken cautious steps towards
region-specific institutional arrangements, a remarkable use of constitutional
space can be found in the constitutions of the Harar and Southern Nations, Nationalities
and Peoples regions. Both constitutions include unique arrangements
related to the legislature and executive, which are designed to accommodate the
specific ethnic configuration of the concerned regional polities. Due to the supremacy
of the federal constitution and its provisions on the regional judiciary,
the regional constitutions contain uniform provisions in this regard. Yet, since the
federal constitution has nothing to say about the mechanism of regional constitutional
review, the regional states are at liberty to come up with their own constitutional
review mechanisms. Unfortunately, all regions – with the exception of
the SNNPR – have adopted similar arrangements, which have been inspired by
the federal mechanism and are affected by similar flaws. Regional states have
therefore failed to use their constitutional space to design creative arrangements
that offer alternative – and more promising – mechanisms of constitutional review.
The paper therefore concludes with the observation that although the regions
are increasingly making use of their constitutional autonomy, they have
surely not exhausted its potential for institutional innovation.