

The Effect of Federalism on Policy Outcomes in Ethiopia

Nigussie Daba*

Abstract

Federalism can impact on numerous areas of policy outcome, such as policy innovation, democracy, accountability, and corruption. This article explores how it influences policy outcomes in Ethiopia, doing so by comparing the Ethiopian federation with the multinational federations of Switzerland, Belgium, and India. Drawing on Worldwide Governance Indicators, other secondary sources, and interviews, the article highlights how federalism influences policy outcomes in those federations and, in view of this, analyses the Ethiopian case. It finds that, although federalism has contributed to local self-governance and social and cultural policy, it has not improved policy outcomes such as popular participation and accountability, peace and security, governmental efficacy, the rule of law, and control of corruption. This is largely due to the existence of a unified party-political organisation and a lack of trust between state and society. Thus, Ethiopia needs to draw lessons from the Swiss, Belgian, and Indian federations in order to enhance the positive effect of federalism on policy outcomes.

Keywords: federalism, policy outcomes, governance indicators, multinational federation, Ethiopia

1. Introduction

The vertical organisation of government can influence numerous areas of policy outcome, including “government accountability, corruption, democratic stability and policy innovation” (Schakel, 2015, p. 1). Power-sharing and economic structures between the centre and regions in federations influence policy outcomes (Kleider & Toubeau, 2022). By dividing the powers of the governments at both of these levels so that no one group or government could control all of them, federalism aims to protect individual freedom (Kincaid, 2011; Watts, 2008). Federalism may influence policy outcomes in different ways (Schakel, 2015). According to Kincaid (2011) and Watts (2008), the principles of equity, innovation, efficiency, and democracy are all linked to federalism. Kincaid adds that, in part because federalism disperses power and imposes opposing constraints on the powers of governments, modern democratic federalism is typically associated with market economies, given that these strictures safeguard property and other rights.

Where minority groups claim institutional and legal assurances that let them affect the decision-making procedures of legislative, executive and judicial bodies, then territorial and non-territorial autonomy and rights that can contribute to popular participation in policy-making processes as well as to the peace and stability of the nation may be conferred to them (Fleiner & Fleiner, 2009). As a result of such values of federalism, policy outcomes stand to be improved since federalism can accommodate communal diversity in plural

* PhD candidate at the Centre for Federalism and Governance Studies, College of Law and Governance, Addis Ababa University. Email: dabanigussie@gmail.com

societies. Federalism gives the public a greater number of ways in which to interact with the government, and, in the event that one government is unresponsive, greater opportunities to appeal to other governments. Further benefits of having several administrations include preventing centrifugal inclinations toward anarchy and centripetal tendencies toward monopoly. In addition, this gives citizens access to a variety of information sources and viewpoints on public policy matters that might not be availed by political parties or the media (Kincaid, 2011).

This article examines how federalism influences policy outcomes in Ethiopia. Its research questions are the following: What are the contributions of federalism to different policy areas in Ethiopia? What are the main failure areas of policy in Ethiopia? And what are the reasons for the lowest scores that the country obtains in governance indicators? Extant studies on federalism and public policy provide a robust foundation for this research since they have covered a multitude of federal systems. Analysing the effect of federalism on policy outcomes in Ethiopia in particular may add to this literature and enhance the understanding of problems and prospects that other emerging federations face in regard to improving their policy outcomes. The article thus examines Ethiopia's federal system in the light of policy outcomes identified in comparative studies of multinational federal countries.

Previous studies of this kind – by Cheru (2018) on urban policy autonomy, Shewakena (2014) on urban land lease policy, Brown & Teshome (2007) on chronic poverty policies, and Keeley & Scoones (2000) on environmental policy in Ethiopia – have focused on sectoral policies. In turn, the present article explores (as mentioned) the relationship between federalism and policy outcomes in the Ethiopian federation, doing so by comparing the Ethiopian case with the advanced multinational federations of Belgium, Switzerland, and India. The study is thus comparative in its design and aimed at generating a depth of information that could help shed light on the dynamics of Ethiopian federalism and public policy. The purpose of comparing Ethiopia with these federations in terms of the impact of federalism on policy results is to highlight how federalism influences policy outcomes in their cases and, in view of this framework, to analyse the Ethiopian case. The intention is also to draw some lessons from the three comparator federations, as they are successful in managing and accommodating diversity, have remained democratic, and are effective in devolving power and policy-making.

The research conducted for the article was based on a mixed-methods approach. Qualitative data were collected in interviews with 10 key informants, who were drawn from federal and regional government offices and civil society organisations; these informants were deemed knowledgeable about policies and the federal system on the basis of their experience, political position, or professional capacity. In addition, published and unpublished information sources, such as constitutions and policy documents, were reviewed.

As regards quantitative data, these consisted of various indices. The first group of indices are the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators in relation to voice and accountability; political stability and lack of violence; efficacy of government; regulatory quality; the rule of law; and control of corruption. The indicators take the form of performance scores – ranging from -2.5 (poor)

to 2.5 (strong) – and cover a period of six years (2017–2022). In addition, the research utilised the 10 years of data (spanning the period 2010–2019) that inform the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). It also drew on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2017–2022; the CPI assigns scores from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The results of the interviews (qualitative data) were then compared and integrated with the results of the indices (quantitative data) to make findings in answer to the research questions.

In view of the themes above, this article has four sections. The first is this introduction, while the second sets out the theoretical framework of the study. The third section discusses the research results pertaining to the contribution of federalism to diverse policy areas in Ethiopia, compares policy performance across federations, draws lessons for Ethiopia, and reflects on the contradictory trends that have arisen in debates about the nature of its federalism – and future. The last section makes concluding remarks.

2. Federalism and public policy

Federalism is characterised by a constitutional allocation of policy competences across levels of government, as well as by bicameralism, regional representation in a federal upper house, and the existence of a federal adjudicator (Watts, 2005, p. 12). It is essentially about the territorial decentralisation of governance since it diffuses policy power by creating several points of access to the policy field. Comparative studies highlight the significance of such government structures as factors that account for cross-country disparities in terms of both the level and the dynamics of policy formulation (Obinger et al., 2005). Federalism is characterised, too, by a process of partnership, collaboration, and bargaining in the formulation of policy (Yimenu, 2022, p. 5; Hueglin & Fenna, 2015, p. 35; Elazar, 1987, pp. 67–68). For there to be genuine federalism and subnational autonomy, federal design – as set out in a constitution – needs to be matched with federal process (Elazar, 1987, p. 67).

The theory of federalism thus turns around the issues of constitutional structure, process, and territory. In this interplay, there may be political situations where a federal structure is not reinforced by adequate federal process, which could result in gaps between what is prescribed in law and what obtains in practice. Consequently, policy-making in multilevel systems is complex in view of the fact that policy debates, deliberations, and negotiations require collaboration, partnership, and consultation among policy actors and institutions at all levels.

An increase in the adoption of federalism as a mode of governance helps states with geographically concentrated, diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious identities to prevent the over-concentration of authority and resources, provide chances for democratic involvement, and improve service delivery and democratic resilience (Bulmer, 2017; Wlezien and Soroka, 2011). According to Béland & Chantal (2004), federalism shapes regional characteristics and generates both restrictions and opportunities for interest groups and policy-makers. Such federal arrangements may lead to contending policy outcomes between federal and sub-national governments. More localized policy decisions are likely to be better understood and monitored by the public, as

well as attract their attention.

Policy decentralisation is the key method by which the centre positively influences federal values. Federalism enhances representation by giving constituent units the freedom to implement policies and laws that reflect the diverse preferences of their respective regions. Federalism also promotes democracy by facilitating citizen oversight and power over governments. Every electorate's vote counts more in regional governments, and participation and engagement are therefore more prevalent (Wlezien & Soroka, 2011).

Such constitutionally established regions could protect the choice to decentralise is itself, given that defending federal policy decisions is the primary function of such institutions (Inman, 2011). Conversely, centralising policy decisions invariably entails substituting the policy preferences of regional and local authorities for those of central elites (Dye, 2017). A command economy, for instance, puts the ability of sub-unit governments to make policy to the test because such a system limits autonomy due to centralised planning, with regional policy choices being constrained by the centre's expanding responsibilities in economic planning, welfare administration, and interstate trade (Kincaid, 2011; Duchaceck, 1987). Much like a federal arrangement, a market economy also operates in non-centralised ways. Thus, so long as the federal system has a free-market economy, federalism could lead to increased regional autonomy through the involvement of the private sector and constituent units (Yimenu, 2021, Kincaid, 2011; Duchaceck, 1987).

An opposing argument is that unitary government is a more efficient means than federalism of formulating and implementing macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal policy, because centralised control of decision-making enables more effective choice of macroeconomic objectives, less dispersion in the application of policy tools, and a higher level of economic policy management. Moreover, the centre may readily advance the shared interests of the general public and working class (Keman, 2000). Globalisation and a free-market economy may indeed weaken regional autonomy while strengthening federal autonomy (Lazar, Telford & Watts, 2003, p. 4; Scharpf, 1996, pp. 361–63). Overall, federalism could limit redistributive policies while increasing macroeconomic policy outcomes beneficial only to the private sector.

On the other hand, federalism is key in various policy matters such as inter-governmental relations, public administration, political parties and representation, interest group organisation and mediation, social policy, and regional integration and development (Lancaster & Hicks, 2000). Federal institutions are expected to enhance the representation of different groups in federal government (Wlezien & Soroka, 2011) and ensure policy decentralisation and policy decentralization in turn gives federalism's valued results.

Both federations and decentralised systems bring government closer to the people and support democratisation (Ahmad & Brosio, 2006). Policy decentralisation is essential for federalism to function well in terms of the economy and civil liberties; by contrast, the decentralisation of policy competences is not easy to achieve in unitary states and could be accomplished only by permission. Constitutionally recognised regional states also afford a more significant protective barrier for policy decentralisation than unitary states. Federalism is a multidimensional rather than a single institutional feature: it

creates large policy diversity, given that it assigns power and resources to regional governments (Kleider & Toubeau, 2022) which enable them to make independent decisions, thus widening divergence among policy alternatives.

Federalism requires democracy since policy decentralisation under an authoritarian regime cannot meaningfully enhance rights and economic performance (Inman, 2011). However, decentralisation does not lead automatically to greater policy divergence, as is evident in the fact that the extent of the policy divergence stemming from decentralisation differs among nations and policy fields. In addition, decentralisation's centrifugal tendencies may be minimised by centripetal institutions, particularly those which facilitate policy coordination among regions (Kleider & Toubeau, 2022). Nevertheless, decentralised policy-making has a distinct role to play in enhancing societal capacity to uphold property rights as well secure civil and political rights, which could result in better economic performance by the private sector. Indeed, contemporary democratic federalism has usually been linked in part to market economies, as it diffuses power and places neutralising limits on governmental authorities (Kincaid, 2011).

Centralised government, it has been argued, is not a suitable means of dealing with complex policy in large nations, even ones without regional diversity, as they differ from federal systems in their structure and in their process of policy decision-making (Keman, 2000). Hence, federalism results in variation of policy performance and, the role of regional states in policy-making differs from federation to the next (Segatto & Béland, 2021). Federalism consists of institutions that use decentralised institutions and party politics to shape the interdependence of fiscal, administrative, and political matters across government echelons. This improves the capacity of regions to influence federal policy through shared-rule institutions and party-politics. Federalism enables policy diversity, divides policy authority, helps to manage conflicts, and enhances political participation as well as policy experimentation and innovation (Dye, 2017). The regions may shape national policy through participation. Party-political systems, the distribution of fiscal authority between federal and regional governments, and power dynamics all affect policy decisions. In countries with power-sharing arrangements such as in Germany, federations go through a protracted process of obtaining agreement before relying on regional compliance. By contrast, federations under systems with powers separation (those characterized by dual nature), such as Canada, have a lot of room for independent judgment but are unable to compel regions to adhere to their budgetary policy (Kleider & Toubeau, 2022). These procedures ultimately determine how federalism affects the outcomes of policy-making. Thus, unlike centralised government, decentralized institutions in federations influence policy outcomes.

Public responsiveness to policy is a critical element of effective policy development, and assumes the existence of a monitoring public, that is, one which successfully notices what officials do in practice. Such monitoring, accompanied by quick, constructive public reaction, is vital both for enabling informed public preferences and for motivating policy-makers to take those preferences into account. Public responsiveness, in other words, generates inputs into policy development that make public participation meaningful for policy-makers as well as the public itself. Representative democracy thus hinges on public

responsiveness to policy: the more powerful the public responsiveness is, the more it is the source for representation (Wlezien & Soroka, 2011).

If decision-making authority is placed at the level of governance most appropriate for the situation, policy decisions and their execution might be strengthened and made more successful (Anton, 1989 cited in McLain, 1995). But federalism may also diminish the association between public opinion and policy. The presence of several levels of governments could create a more complex information setting and negatively affect public responsiveness. Governmental measures are more complicated to distinguish as a result of the direct participation in a policy area by various levels of governments. In addition, institutional characteristics in which lines of responsibility are blurred make it challenging for citizens to hold officials accountable (Wlezien & Soroka, 2011).

If each level of government stays within its confines and respects the power of the other, however, citizens can hold each level distinctly accountable for its actions. While a single autonomous body could be attracted to misuse its power, federalism affords a valuable safeguard by sharing power amongst multiple, rival sovereigns. Such a division of autonomy leads to stability and peace in societies divided by strong linguistic or ethnic cleavages. Rodden (2006) also emphasises the benefits of information and intergovernmental competition. Hence, decentralised, multilevel systems of government are likely to offer citizens more of what they want from government, at less cost, and with greater responsiveness and accountability than centralised systems.

3. Federalism and policy outcomes in Ethiopia

3.1 Federalism's contribution to different policy areas

Federalism is supposed to enable decentralisation of power, diversity management, policy innovation and diffusion, and conflict resolution (Kleider & Toubeau, 2022; Dye, 2017; Kincaid, 2011; Watts, 2008; Duchaceck, 1987). In Ethiopia, it has also allowed many ethnic groups to develop and use their own languages in wider public administration, courts and schools, to promote their cultures, and to establish local self-government structures. By granting these groups political and territorial autonomy, the federal arrangement legitimised politically organised ethno-national organisations. Thus, ethnic-based federalism provided the fundamental institutional framework for addressing the politico-administrative, socio-cultural, and linguistic goals of the country's ethno-national communities (Van der Beken & Dessalegn, 2020; Fiseha, 2019).

With federalism having taken administrative procedures down to the local level, it has also helped to regionalise and localise public administration.⁴⁷ Additionally, the ruling elites supported infrastructural development in remote regions so as to incorporate them into the centre (Abbink, 2000). Although the goal of the centre's participation in the regions was to integrate them into the centre, infrastructure in the regions expanded more rapidly than elsewhere as a result of agricultural investment and major construction projects such as highways and dams (Yimenu, 2022 & 2021). Hence, federalism contributed

47 Interviewee from the Ethiopian Public Administration Association, February 2022, Addis Ababa.

to regional integration and development in Ethiopia. Areas of social policy such as health, education, language, drinking-water supply, and services are decentralised to the regions, albeit that top-down information flow and the centre’s hierarchical control through coordination and budgetary instruments have remained strong.⁴⁸

However, federalism has not enabled Ethiopia’s regional states to be innovative in policy-making. Although it is believed that regional states have a stake in federal policies, their role in such policies is very much limited. Interviewees noted the similarity in policies at federal and regional level. Most laws and policies formulated by the regions are similar to those of the federal government, in addition to which regions are tasked with implementing federal policies.⁴⁹ Regions also participate in the federal policy-making process informally through line ministries.⁵⁰ As an interviewee explained, however, they do not have access to influence federal policy-making; instead, the regions participate by correspondence and at the will of the centre. Even regional constitutions are merely imitations of the federal Constitution, seldom with any changes made (Nigussie, 2017).

3.2 Intergovernmental relations in the Ethiopian federation

Governments are often criticised for failing to coordinate their decision-making during periods of crisis management even though such coordination would make for a more effective crisis response (Schnabel & Hegele, 2021). The experience of certain federations indicates that federalism can improve intergovernmental relations (IGR), both vertically and horizontally, by empowering federal and regional governments to work jointly. For instance, the German federation instituted intergovernmental conferences at which Länder governments gather, with or without the federal government, and where officially binding decisions may be taken (Hooghe et al., 2016). The Swiss cantons also engage among themselves in IGR through which they can influence the decisions of the federal government.⁵¹

In the case of Ethiopia, its current politico-administrative crisis highlights the need for a strong, principle-based means of collaboration among various levels of government and their respective institutions. The regions are supposed to influence the federal policy-making process and the centre’s exercise of the powers assigned to it since they are fellow members of a federation’s system of shared rule. However, unlike their peers in the German and Swiss federations, regional states in Ethiopia do not have institutions of their own in which all of them gather, nor do they wield any real influence on federal policy-making. As for Ethiopia’s House of Federation, is a non-legislative body and, unlike other federations such as Germany and Switzerland, it does not represent the regions – instead it represents nations and nationalities.

Horizontal IGR among states (of whatever federation) is important, as it helps them propose different policies that can benefit their regions, rather than sim-

48 Ibid.

49 Interviewee from the Policy Studies Institute, December 2022, Addis Ababa.

50 Ibid.

51 A director at the House of Federation, December 2022, Addis Ababa.

ply depend on federal policies.⁵² The assurance that regions can participate in federal policy-making functions is a significant function of federal systems. This purpose can be achieved by the formal representation of regions in federal institutions such as the upper house – as Swenden (2006) observes, “The best-known institution for channelling regional interests into the centre is that of the second chamber” (p. 190). The Senate of the United States is an integral part of the federal legislature. Similarly, the Swiss Senate, in which cantons can participate in federal policy-making and other federal matters, has equal powers with the Swiss House of Representatives. The German Bundesrat, where the states join in making and implementing federal policy, accords them both a participatory role as well as a self-protective function, given that they have an absolute veto over all federal legislation involving administration by the Länder. The German Bundesrat and Swiss Senate are adequately powerful second chambers, and their composition enables them to fulfil the duty of accommodating subnational representation (Swenden, 2006).

In Ethiopia, what has hindered initiatives by the regions is that, ever since the establishment of the federation in 1995, the same ruling party – a strongly centralised organisation – has dominated all of the country’s regional and federal political institutions, including the House of Federation.⁵³ Unlike the Swiss federation, where differences among the party systems found in one region to the next are almost as pronounced as those among the parties at the national level (Armingeon, 2000), in Ethiopia one and the same political party has predominated in all regional states and in all federal institutions. Again, in Belgium, by contrast, the party system is not only diverse, but also devolved to the country’s two language groups, Flemish and French (Swenden, 2006). Such multi-party-political systems with many parties must cooperate to create coalition governments since the parties have little chance of winning power alone. In India, the federal government’s control of economic policy has declined, paving the way since 1991 for regions to make their own policies.

The consequences of Ethiopia’s dominant-party structure have been far-reaching. Its ruling party’s long stay in power, combined with its ideology and practice, have had a profound, centralising influence on the operation of the federal system and the exercise of the constitutionally declared rights of ethnic groups (Yimenu, 2022), given the stifling implications this has had for regions’ participation in federal policy-making. This is notwithstanding the momentous changes of 2018, which saw the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) reconstitute itself as the Prosperity Party: the latter’s political offices have been used increasingly to enforce the centre’s interests and intrude on regional autonomy.⁵⁴

With the country’s federal system having been hampered in this way, the result has been poor governance underlain by an absence of trust between the state and the public.⁵⁵ Thus, the federal structure has played an inadequate role in enhancing IGR given the present severe conflicts between regions. In addition, because contradictory narratives are so common among historians, politicians,

52 An official at the House of Federation, December 2022, Addis Ababa.

53 Interviewee Policy Research Institute, December 2022, Addis Ababa.

54 Interviewee from the House of Federation, December 2022, Addis Ababa.

55 Official at the Ethiopian Public Administration Association, February 2022, Addis Ababa.

activists, and, most lately, the wider public, these divisive factors too have had a substantial impact on the country's political discourse (Kelecha, 2023).

3.3 Comparing Ethiopian outcomes with selected federations

In comparison to the other three federations (Switzerland, Belgium, India), Ethiopia's score for "voice and accountability", which gauges the extent of public engagement in the governance of various political and economic concerns, was the worst (negative) for 2017–2022 (see Table 1 further below). Switzerland scored the highest for this indicator, followed by Belgium and India. Unlike India's score, which decreased, Ethiopia's score for the period improved.

"Political stability and absence of violence", which measures the likelihood of a state's being subverted or ousted by illegal or violent means (such as terrorism and politically motivated violence), was also assessed. Ethiopia's score for this governance indicator put it in the lowest (negative) position. The Indian federation also achieved a low score, albeit somewhat higher than Ethiopia's. The data indicate that the Swiss federation is the most stable, with an absence of violence, followed by the Belgian federation. Switzerland is an example of a "multinational federation" (Elazar, 1997, p. 252). It has survived thanks mostly to its federalist institutions, which have allowed it to accommodate the diversity of its cultures and religions (D'Amato, 2010). In Belgium, the devolution of policy autonomy to the regions improved the effectiveness of governmental policies, transformed policy-making, and reduced hostilities between the Flemish and French communities (Wouters, Kerckhoven & Vidal, 2014).

However, the trend shows that the Ethiopian situation is worsening when compared with other federations in terms of political stability and non-violence. The lowest scores (-2.07 and -2.04) were recorded in 2021 and 2022, respectively. This was in view of the fact that the country experienced high levels of violence in 2021 given that civil war had erupted between the federal government and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 2020 (Raleigh, 2022). In 2022, the warring parties concluded a peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, but tension between the Tigray and Amhara regions continued in the border areas of Welkait, Humera, Tselemt, and Raya.

These contested areas had been under the Tigray region prior to 2020, but when war broke out between the federal government and TPLF, Amhara ethno-nationalists occupied them and placed them under the control of the Amhara authorities. The latter were worried, nevertheless, that peace talks between the federal government and TPLF would include a resolution to place the areas back under the jurisdiction of the Tigray regional government. Before the negotiations were announced, a crackdown in May 2022 resulted in the arrests of journalists and Amhara ethno-nationalists, leading to speculation that the Amhara region might lose control of the areas. The problem – still unresolved at the time of writing (August 2023) – has created tension between the two regions in particular and within the country in general.

To complicate matters further, hostilities are ongoing between the federal government and Fano paramilitary group in the Amhara region, which

prompted the declaration of a state of emergency. Meanwhile, conflicts in Oromia, Gambela, and Benishangul-Gumuz also pose challenges to stability. Continuing insurgencies have placed these regional governments under strain and depleted federal security resources. For example, only a few weeks after the federal government declared that it had neutralised the OLA/OLF-Shane after extensive military operations in April, the rebel group assaulted Gimbi, Gambela, and Dembi Dolo in June.

Democracy and violence, it may be said, are mutually antithetical, noting that violence can take physical, structural, or psychological forms. The more the democracy, the less the violence; the more the violence, the less the democracy. The ideal democracy is the rule of complete non-violence; conversely, experience shows that coercion, militarisation, and dictatorship vitiate democratic institutions and processes, leading eventually to a withering away of democracy (Naidu, 2006). Political stability and high levels of violence, by implication, point to the attrition, or absence, of democracy. By this reasoning, the data in Table 1 would indicate that Switzerland and Belgium are more democratic than India and Ethiopia. This in turn highlights that, since it does not permit free elections, an authoritarian, dominant-party system is not suitable for the operation of federations (Wheare, 1946, 48, cited in Yimenu, 2022). As Dardanelli (2010) argues, democracy can thrive without federalism, but federalism cannot thrive without democracy.

In federations, deficits in democracy could result from authoritarianism, the nature of the regime, and the presence of a dominant party. Currently, both India and Ethiopia are characterised by such dominant-party rule. India's party system has realigned itself around the growing dominance of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Following the elections held in 2019, the BJP has pursued policies deepening the federation's centralisation in political, administrative, and fiscal areas, a trend epitomised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's slogans that repeatedly call for "one nation, one constitution", "one nation, one tax", "one nation, one grid", "one nation, one mobility card", or "one nation, one election" (Aiyar & Tillin, 2020). For instance, in keeping with this trend and the constitutional changes that have accompanied it, the region of Jammu and Kashmir was deprived of its sovereignty and reduced to a union territory (Gagnon, 2020).

Similarly, since the Prosperity Party came to power in Ethiopia in 2018, the federal government has taken a variety of authoritarian measures that serve to further centralise the country in spite of its federal arrangement. These include the removal of leaders in regional government – evident, for example, in the Prime Minister's call for the resignation of former officials of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) – the use of command posts in different regions to suppress public protests, and the jailing of opposition leaders. Actions like these adversely affect regional self-rule and the overall democratisation of the federation (Fiseha, 2022 & 2023). Under the circumstances, security forces become tools of repression, and democratic policing deteriorates into regime policing in the interests of ruling-party goals, invariably with little to no accountability or regard for human rights (Fiseha, 2022).

Public security is the basis for seeking after higher objectives such as democracy, economic development, and good governance (Leuprecht, 2010, cited in

Fiseha, 2022). In this regard, economic governance is, after security governance, a government's second-most essential duty. The main failure area of the Ethiopian government, though, is in the top-priority one of ensuring the safety and security of its citizens. The state must indeed be protected against both internal and external foes, and has the right to use force to protect itself, as its duty is to uphold law and order and safeguard citizens and property (Afroz, 2020). Moreover, for a viable, durable federation to be built, all people need to identify themselves with, and have allegiance to, their own regional state as well as the country, with individuals and goods permitted open mobility from region to region – as Hicks (1978) notes, these are the basic requirements for a sturdy federation. However, the outbreak of violence in 2021 in numerous regions of the country plunged it into a civil war, in the process disrupting, among other things, the nation's free movement of money and labour.⁵⁶

Among other things, indeed: Raleigh (2022) points out that thousands of civilians were displaced, that multiple high-fatality incidents of violence against civilians took place, and that infrastructure was destroyed in the regions of Tigray, Amhara, and Afar. In the latter half of 2021, more than 680 deaths occurred in Oromia and, in Amhara and Afar, some 3,200, with the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recording at least 270 deaths among civilians (Raleigh, 2022). Ethiopian security forces were at the time also in combat (as noted) the OLA/OLF-Shane rebel group in Oromia, as well as with other rebels in Benishangul-Gumuz region in 2021.

Thus, the conflict that began in 2020 in the Tigray regional state quickly raged into one affecting the entire country. When diverse groups interact, there may be hostile and destructive conflicts which could lead to political power struggles because the policy actors involved in interactive governance may not have similar thought. Social and political actors also tend to form identity through opposition by constructing friend-enemy partitions (Torfing et al., 2012). In consequence, while violent ethnic conflicts have rocked the country in the last many years, they have intensified since 2018 due to a sharp escalation of competing ethno-nationalisms (Yusuf, 2022). With its 12 regional states and more than 80 linguistic communities, Ethiopia faces growing ethnic divisions that have cost many lives and threaten to lead the federation into disintegration.

The collapse of the EPRDF and emergence of a continuous rhetorical battle have aggravated the conflict in Ethiopia. Since 2018, the federal arrangement has faced daunting challenges, with the ruling Prosperity Party having failed to lead the country through a peaceful political transition and instead becoming itself a major contributor to the spread of violence (Yusuf, 2022; Fiseha, 2022). Regime and party fragility have not only created favourable circumstances for this to occur, but also – given the lack of unity within the new ruling party – made conflict resolution a difficult prospect. Indeed, in the wake of the country's change of government in 2018, the Prosperity Party has deepened policy shifts towards the centralisation of the federation. Much like Narendra Modi, his counterpart in India, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's speech-

56 Interviewee from the Planning and Development Bureau of the SNNPR, March 2023, Hawassa.

es have stressed the ideas of “one nation” and *medemer* (convergence) rather than diversity. Such a policy shift by the party has weakened the fundamentals of unity by reawakening deep-rooted animosities (Donelli, 2022).

Hence, the organisation of the party system and arrangement of political forces are important factors in federal-state interactions. Moreover, the conflict’s ethnic dimension has been fuelled by the divisive rhetoric and propaganda of political parties.⁵⁷ The consequence has been an increase in violence and human rights violations by combatant groups, in addition to which increases in the price of essential goods and the depletion of the country’s already-scarce economic resources in order to fund military operations have seen standards of living decline.⁵⁸

Minority groups in various regional states face mounting challenges, too, in the form of legal, political, and administrative discrimination, given that the federation has been unable to balance the right of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-rule with the protection of intra-regional ethnic minorities – this in a country where several regional constitutions empower some groups only to disempower others. For example, the constitutions of Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray do not enable non-indigenous groups to participate in the respective regions’ political and economic decisions (Fiseha, 2017); these constitutions disproportionately empower certain indigenous groups, to the extent that others are left politically disempowered and unable to exercise their constitutional right to self-rule (Dessalegn & Tsegawe, 2020).

In order to build a strong, effective nation, a federation should seek to resolve minorities’ issues in areas such as governance and service delivery by upholding their constitutional rights and including them and their aspirations in the collective endeavour (Afroz, 2020). The Ethiopian federation, however, has merely tentatively appeased resentments between ethnic groups rather than addressing them fully – a situation which has led to an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, and the territories of the former SNNPR.

As regards the key questions of equitable governance and service delivery, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators are once again a source of comparative insight. Measures of government effectiveness and regulatory quality were used to gauge states’ capacity to design and carry out comprehensive public policies. “Government efficacy” assesses the quality of the public and civil services, the degree of their independence from political meddling, the calibre of policy creation and execution, and the legitimacy of the administration’s adoption of such policies. “Regulatory quality”, in turn, has to do with a state’s ability to design and apply sensible laws and rules that support the growth of the private sector.

Here, the World Bank (2023) ranked Ethiopia the lowest on both government

57 Much of the disputation is between those ethno-nationalists who want to preserve and democratise the existing multinational federation and those who seek to change it into a form of geographical federalism (Kelecha, 2023).

58 An official from the Planning and Development Bureau of the SNNPR, April 2023, Hawassa.

effectiveness and regulatory quality when compared with the three other federations for 2017–2022.

Switzerland's score was the highest, followed by Belgium and India (see Table 1). This indicates that the Swiss federation has more effective government, as well as better public services and regulatory systems, than Belgium, India, and Ethiopia. It can design and carry out wide-ranging policies and rules that enhance the private sector. Thus, unlike the Swiss and Belgian federations, the Ethiopian federation has not seen improvement in the government's ability to design and execute sound policies and rules that enable growth of the private sector.

Other indicators in the World Bank study are “rule of law” and “control of corruption”. These measure public and governmental respect for institutions regulating social and economic matters. As regards “rule of law”, the likelihood of crime and violence, as well as the effectiveness of contract administration, property rights, the police, and the courts, are taken as indicators of how far actors trust and uphold the laws of the community. “Control of corruption” refers to the extent to which public power is used for private gain, and relates to both small- and large-scale corruption, as well as the “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. In these two performance areas, Ethiopia achieved a singular distinction: its scores were the lowest when compared with the three federations (see Table 1).

It is said that federal governance increases efficiency in both the public and private sectors of the economy because it gives citizens the option to select their desired package of public goods at the most affordable price. Choice through mobility ensures a better match between citizen preferences and public funding, and acts as a check on corruption and inefficiency in government (Inman, 2011). Federalism offers people a variety of opportunities to run for office, engage in politics, influence policy-makers, monitor the government, hold it to account, and exercise power over their lives and communities (Kincaid, 2011).

When Ethiopia was compared with the advanced federations of Switzerland, Belgium, and India, it ranked last for the period 2017–2022. Yet, in terms of its CPI ranking for the same period, it ranked higher than Kenya and Nigeria, though lower than South Africa (see Table 2 further below). In the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Ethiopia was ranked 31st among 54 African countries, obtaining a score of 46.6 per cent in overall governance performance in 2019 improving by 6.7 points over the decade (2010–2019). By comparison, South Africa was ranked sixth, scoring 65.8 per cent and seeing a decline (-0.9) for the same decade. Kenya was ranked 14th, with a score of 58.5 per cent and an improvement of +3.7 for the period. With a total governance score of 45.5 per cent and a decline of -1.6, Nigeria stood at 34th for the decade.

Informants from Addis Ababa, Oromia, and the SNNPR⁵⁹ said that federal and regional leaders in Ethiopia are interlinked through an informal network cre-

59 A director at the Oromia Urban and Housing Development Bureau, November 2022, Addis Ababa; an official at the SNNPR Planning and Development Bureau, March 2023, Hawassa; a director at the Addis Ababa education bureau, March 2023, Addis Ababa

ated for the purpose of receiving financial benefits and gaining political power. They noted that if regional leaders do not accept instructions from officials at the centre, they are ultimately fired from their positions – a circumstance to be avoided, given that some officials receive exceptional per diem and benefits.⁶⁰ A directive on the remuneration of appointees to the Addis Ababa City Administration stipulates that officials are entitled to both an allowance and government house. For instance, the mayor and deputy mayors are paid 9,000 birr and 8,000 birr, respectively, in housing allowances, a benefit over and above a well-furnished house from the federal government’s housing corporation.⁶¹ These benefits (excluding the monthly salary) are by far greater than what a regular government employee earns on average in Ethiopia (8930 Ethiopian birr). Informants suggested that, in view of these inducements, officials are prone to be motivated by careerist self-enrichment, making and mis-making laws and regulations to benefit themselves or others connected to them.

Since it is impossible to hold key regional positions without the support of the federal elite, the latter act as patrons by granting positions (Paulos, 2007, p. 263; Fiseha, 2019, p. 169). Regions are not supported by the central ruling party’s fragile architecture (Yimenu, 2022). This implies a patron-client relationship between the federal ruling elites and their regional counterparts, but it also denotes a collaboration between unequal parties. Local elites remain loyal to their patrons, which helps them gain clients. An informal client-patron relationship of this kind develops as a result of the party discipline and organisation that are required for the efficient execution of all top-level decisions.

According to Paulos (2007), clientelism in Ethiopia makes regional leaders more accountable to federal officials than to their constituents. When compared with Africa’s three constitutionally devolved systems of government, Ethiopia came third after South Africa and Kenya but ahead of Nigeria in overall governance performance, based on the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG); it was also the only state to have improved in all 16 sub-categories over the period. Hence, Ethiopia’s score on governance performance is low not only in comparison to the advanced federations of Switzerland, Belgium, and India, but also in comparison to several of its peers in Africa.

Table 1: Comparison of Ethiopia with the Swiss, Belgian and Indian federations

3.4 Lessons from multinational federations

Governance indicators/federations	Year					
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Switzerland						
Voice and accountability	1.56	1.58	1.50	1.54	1.55	1.62
Political stability and non-violence	1.26	1.33	1.32	1.19	1.13	1.16
Government effectiveness	2.05	2.03	1.94	2.01	2.03	2.05

60 A director at the Addis Ababa education bureau, March 2023, Addis Ababa.

61 A directive issued by the Addis Ababa City Administration in 2020 to improve the housing allowances of its officials.

Regulatory quality	1.88	1.80	1.66	1.59	1.73	1.62
Rule of law	1.92	1.92	1.90	1.82	1.81	1.75
Control of corruption	1.98	2.00	1.98	2.08	1.99	2.01
Belgium						
Voice and accountability	1.34	1.32	1.31	1.28	1.28	1.29
Political stability and non-violence	0.43	0.40	0.47	0.54	0.61	0.58
Government effectiveness	1.27	1.26	1.14	1.12	1.13	1.23
Regulatory quality	1.24	1.27	1.29	1.35	1.34	1.25
Rule of law	1.35	1.37	1.37	1.36	1.33	1.35
Control of corruption	1.44	1.46	1.48	1.48	1.48	1.50
India						
Voice and accountability	0.39	0.35	0.27	0.15	0.11	0.05
Political stability and non-violence	-0.76	-0.99	-0.77	-0.81	-0.62	-0.57
Government effectiveness	0.07	0.30	0.16	0.41	0.28	0.37
Regulatory quality	-0.24	-0.21	-0.14	-0.11	-0.08	-0.05
Rule of law	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	0.11
Control of corruption	-0.27	-0.21	-0.28	-0.27	-0.29	-0.32
Ethiopia						
Voice and accountability	-1.43	-1.17	-1.06	-1.04	-1.07	-1.05
Political stability and non-violence	-1.68	-1.28	-1.31	-1.17	-2.07	-2.04
Government effectiveness	-0.71	-0.62	-0.62	-0.55	-0.61	-0.75
Regulatory quality	-1.02	-0.97	-0.90	-0.96	-0.93	-0.95
Rule of law	-0.45	-0.43	-0.47	-0.39	-0.61	-0.62
Control of corruption	-0.56	-0.48	-0.41	-0.46	-0.40	-0.44

Source: World Bank (2023)

Table 2: CPI ranking of selected federations (2017–2022)

Country	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Belgium	16	17	17	15	18	18
India	81	78	80	86	85	85
South Africa	71	73	70	69	70	72
Switzerland	3	3	4	3	7	7
Kenya	143	144	137	124	128	123
Nigeria	148	144	146	149	154	150
Ethiopia	107	114	96	94	87	94

Source: Transparency International (2017–2022)

Ethiopia could learn from Switzerland and Belgium with regard to voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, seeing as the two federations achieved high scores on these indicators. In particular, it should draw lessons from the Swiss federation, which demonstrated the strongest performance in all of the dimensions of governance.

Switzerland has a highly federalised institutional system, and it allows institutions as well as regional parties a high level of administrative and political

autonomy. As previously noted, cantons can partake in central policy-making and other federal matters in the Swiss Senate, which also has equal powers with the Swiss House of Representatives. In the Swiss federation, new policies must pass through the Nationalrat (lower house) and the Ständerat Regional Council (upper house), yet could be directly vetoed by a general referendum with 50,000 signatures. Both councils also have equal legislative powers, including in regard to the selection of taxes and tax rates (Hicks, 1978).

The Swiss federal system, which provides substantial policy power to sub-national units, has enabled the peaceful co-existence of diverse groups and helped for compromise among political forces beyond simple majorities (D'Amato, 2010). The units can exercise policy autonomy in experimentation with several methods in diverse policy areas and attempt to influence decision-making at the federal level (Belser, 2022; D'Amato, 2010). These are all good lessons for Ethiopia.

As for Belgium, many areas of developmental policy – including roads, broadcasting, agriculture, mineral resources, primary, secondary and higher education, culture, local government, and social services – are controlled by its regions. Devolving policy powers like these to the regions has helped Belgium minimise conflict between the Flemish and French groups, as well as enhance policy-making processes and improve the public policies so developed (Wouters, Kerckhoven & Vidal, 2014). The Belgian regions also engage in central policy-making, since all central policies require the implicit approval of the Flemish- and French-speaking groups – a fact which makes for harmonious relations between them. Put differently, the centre cannot approve policies without the agreement of the two groups. In addition, the centre also plays a leading role in adjusting the allocation of policy competencies through the bicameral federal legislature (Swenden, 2006).

Ethiopia can thus learn from Belgium regarding effectiveness of government, voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, devolution of developmental policies, conflict management, and the participation of unit governments in federal policy-making.

Turning to India, its performance in all the indicators is also better than Ethiopia's, though it is low in comparison to the other two federations. From the data in Table 1, it is clear that the Indian government is more effective and accountable than the Ethiopian. India is seen as a model nation, given its gradual move to a more accountable and effective federation that promotes regional aspirations and accommodates differences (Kumar & Swenden, 2017), particularly before Modi's coming to power. Indian federalism has also made the public direct participants in governance by improving state-society relations. So, Ethiopia can learn from India too, specifically with regard to voice and accountability and government effectiveness – the governance and policy outcomes in which it scored relatively better than other indicators.

3.5 Contradictory trends in conceptualizing Ethiopian federalism

Fundamental problems about the nature and structure of the state as a political institution, and the social and political content of the nation as a national society, have arisen in Ethiopia as a result of the complexity of cultural and

political developments since the 1960s. In the process, the country has become polarised between those seeking greater regional autonomy and those who want to keep a more centralised system. One group regards Ethiopia as a united country with a common heritage, while the other thinks of it as a land of unequal nations (Kelecha, 2023).

The process of state-building is regularly disputed from these entrenched, contradictory positions, both of which are attempts to answer the question: What is Ethiopia, and what should it become? The federal system has become, in short, a topic of strong debate. A majority of people in Ethiopia support federalism, but are divided on what type of federalism – ethnic or geographical – it should be (Blanchard, 2021). The discussion has shifted from whether a nation should have a federal system of governance to what kind of federalism should exist.

The argument between those who want to preserve and democratise the current multinational federation and those who want to replace it with geographical federalism appears to be focused in large part on institutional architecture. In the broader context of the country's political history, this dichotomy between the two factions is relevant, but recently a number of perspectives have emerged along the spectrum between them such as “inclusion, moderation and cohesion” (Yusuf, 2020:5). Such divergent and contradictory narratives on the country's federal structure may sometimes lead to conflicts, and affect the federal system in enhancing policy outcomes and governance performance.

4. Conclusion and recommendations

The study examined the effect of federalism on policy outcomes in Ethiopia. It aimed to address the following research questions: What are the contributions of federalism to different policy areas in Ethiopia? What are the main failure areas of policy in Ethiopia? And what are the reasons for the lowest scores that the country obtains in governance indicators? It was indicated in the study that regional states in Ethiopia do not have their own institutions in which all regional states gather and that they do not exert any real influence on federal policy-making. The House of Federation is non-legislative, and it represents not the regions but nations and nationalities. Hence, the federal system seems to play an inadequate role in enhancing IGR, given the current strong conflicts between regions. Moreover, in Ethiopia, federalism has not allowed the regional states to innovate policies, as most of the policies are similar at both the federal and regional level.

The findings show too that Ethiopia achieves scores below those of the multinational federations of Switzerland, Belgium, and India on indicators of voice and accountability, political stability and non-violence, regulatory quality, and rule of law. Although federalism in Ethiopia has made contributions to certain policy areas such as social and cultural affairs and local self-governance, it has not reduced corruption, has not facilitated genuine popular participation, and has not improved governance in general. The predominance of the federal government has led to the centralisation of the federation, giving it an authoritarian character. The lack of political stability and the presence of high levels of violence indicate an absence of democracy.

One may conclude, then, that the Ethiopian government is neither strong in itself, nor successful in achieving national policy goals such as reducing corruption, enhancing public participation, policy innovation, and creating a democratic system. This is due largely to the long-remaining ruling party's centralised structure, the inability of the federal government to ensure political stability, and the absence of trust between the government and society. The Ethiopian federal system is a case in point of how intra-party politics can usurp and stultify federal institutions. Antagonistic rhetoric too has had an important effect on historical and political discourse, as it has become predominant among historians, politicians, activists, and lately, the general public.

Ethiopia can therefore draw lessons from the Swiss, Belgian, and Indian federations in terms of improving effectiveness of government, accountability, rule of law, control of corruption, peaceful co-existence, and building trust between state and society. The government should give priority to political stability, peace and security, and should negotiate with the rebel groups to bring lasting peace to the country. Democratic institutions such as courts and anti-corruption commissions should be strengthened so as to control corruption and enhance accountability.

The findings of this study have practical implications for policy-makers and political leaders in diverse societies. Leaders in multinational federations should prioritise policies which are promotive of peace and stability, democracy, the rule of law, and control of corruption. Governments in multinational federations should focus on IGR, on developing trust between government and society, and on negotiation and democratic governance. They should also prioritise building strong democratic institutions that respect the rule of law and the rights and dignity of all citizens. Leaders in diverse societies should prove their commitment to democratic values and promote lasting peace in their countries.

References

- Abbink, J. (2000). Violence and the crisis of conciliation: Suri, Dizi and the state in south-west Ethiopia. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 70(4), 527–550.
- Afroz, M. D. (2020). Federalisation and good governance for nation building. *The Journal of International Issues*, 24(4), 32–43.
- Ahmad, E., & Brosio G. (Eds.), (2006). *Handbook of fiscal federalism*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Aiyar, Y., & Tillin, L. (2020). “One nation,” BJP, and the future of Indian federalism. *India Review*, 19(2), 117–135.
- Armingeon, K. (2000). Swiss federalism in comparative perspective. In U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt (Ed.), *Federalism and political performance*. London: Routledge.
- Béland, D., & Vergnolle de Chantal, F. (2004). Fighting “big government”: Frames, federalism, and social policy reform in the United States. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 29(2), 241–264.
- Belser, E. M. (2022). *Managing the coronavirus pandemic in Switzerland*:

- How federalism went into emergency mode and struggled to get out of it. In N. Steytler (Ed.), *Comparative federalism and Covid-19: Combating the pandemic*. New York: Routledge.
- Bhargava, R. (2006). The evolution and distinctiveness of India's linguistic federalism. In Turnton, D. (Ed.), *Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Blanchard, L. P. (2021). Ethiopia's transition and the Tigray conflict. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <https://crsreports.congress.gov/R46905>
- Brown, T., & Teshome, A. (2007). *Implementing policies for chronic poverty in Ethiopia*. Chronic Poverty Research Center and ODI.
- Cheru, T. H. (2018). *Regional autonomy of policy-making and implementations in the Ethiopian Federation: A comparative study on the formulation and implementations of urban policy in the Amhara and SNNPR states since 1991* (PhD thesis, Addis Ababa University).
- D'Amato, G. (2010). Switzerland: A multicultural country without multicultural policies? In S. Vertovec, & S. Wessendorf (Eds.), *The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*. New York: Routledge.
- Dardanelli, P. (2010). Federal democracy in Switzerland'. In M. Burgess & A. G. Gagnon (Eds.), *Federal democracies*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Dessalegn, B., & Tsegawe, E. (2020). Equal treatment of citizens in the constitutions of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. In C. Van der Beken & B. Dessalegn (Eds.), *Alternative approaches to ethnocultural diversity management at sub-national levels: Ethiopia in comparative perspectives*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University School of Law.
- Donelli, F. (2022). The Ethiopian crisis: A dangerous precedent for future conflicts. Expert brief, regional politics.
- Duchaceck, I. D. (1987). *Comparative federalism: The territorial dimension of politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Dye, T. R. (2017). *Understanding public policy*. New York: Pearson Education.
- Elazar, D. J. (1987). *Exploring federalism*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (2022, 9 April). Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-peace-observatory-weekly-2-8-april-2022-enam>
- Fiseha, A. (2009). The system of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Ethiopia: In search of institutions and guidelines.
- Fiseha, A. (2017). Intra-unit minorities in the context of ethno-national federation in Ethiopia. *Utrecht Law Review*, 13(1), 170.
- Fiseha, A. (2019). Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia, *I•CON*, 17(1), 151–176.
- Fiseha, A. (2022). Federalism, devolution and territorially-based cleavages in Africa: Does institutional design matter? In C. Fombad, A. Fiseha, & N. Steytler (Eds.), *Contemporary governance challenges in the*

horn of Africa. London: Routledge.

- Fiseha, A. (2023). Tigray: A nation in search of statehood? *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 1–47.
- Fleiner, T., & Basta Fleiner, L. R. (2009). *Constitutional democracy in a multicultural and globalised world* (English translation from the German 3rd revised edition *Allgemeine Staatslehre* by Katy Le Roy).
- Gagnon, A. G. (2020): Multinational federalism: Challenges, shortcomings and promises. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 31(1), 99–114.
- Hicks, U. K. (1978). *Federalism, failure and success: A comparative study*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A. H., Niedzwiecki, S., Chapman Osterkat, S., & Shair-Rosenfield, S. (2016). *Measuring regional authority: A post-functional theory of Governance*, Volume I. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hueglin, T. O., & Fenna, A. (2015). *Comparative federalism: A systematic inquiry* (2nd ed). North York, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.
- Inman, R.P. (2011). Federalism's values and the values of federalism. In J. Kincaid (Ed.), *Federalism*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Keeley, J., & Scoones, I. (2000). Knowledge, power and politics: The environmental policy-making process in Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38(1), 89–120.
- Kelecha, M. (2023). Political and ideological legacy of Ethiopia's contested nation-building: A focus on contemporary Oromo politics. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 1–24.
- Keman, H. (2000). Federalism and policy performance: A conceptual and empirical inquiry. In U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt (Ed.) *Federalism and political performance*. London: Routledge.
- Kincaid, J. (2011). Introduction: Alternative models, constitutional foundations, and institutional features of federal governance. In J. Kincaid (Ed.), *Federalism*, Vol II. London: Sage Publications.
- Kleider, H., & Toubeau, S. (2022). Public policy in multi-level systems: A new research agenda for the study of regional-level policy. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 32(3) 1–29.
- Kumar, C. S., & Swenden, W. (2017). Continuity and change in contemporary Indian federalism. *Indian Review*, 16(1), 13.
- Lancaster, T. D., & Hicks, A. M. (2000). The impact of federalism and neo-corporatism on economic performance: An analysis of eighteen OECD countries. In U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt (Ed.) *Federalism and political performance*. London: Routledge.
- Lazar, H., Telford, H., & Watts, R. L. (2003). Divergent trajectories: The impact of global and regional integration on federal systems. In H. Lazar, H. Telford, & R. L. Watts (Eds.), *The impact of global and regional integration on federal systems: A comparative analysis*. Montreal, QC, & Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- McLain, R. J. (1995). Who decides? Policy processes: Federalism, and ecosystem management. A Concept Paper for the Eastside Assessment Team.
- Naidu, M. V. (2006). Indian democracy: A case study in conflict resolution and peace building. *Peace Research*, 38(2, Special Issue), 71–97.

- Nigussie, D. (2017). Public policy making at sub-national level in Ethiopia: The case of Oromia Regional State (MA thesis, Addis Ababa University).
- Obinger, H., Castles, F. G., & Leibfried, S. (2005). Introduction: Federalism and the welfare state. In H. Obinger, S. Leibfried, & F. G. Castles (Eds.), *Federalism and the welfare state: New world and European experiences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oromo, A. (2022, 24 June). Sagantaa Oduu fi Dhimmota Wayitaawoo daqiiqaa 15. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/afaanoromoo/bbc_afaanoromoo_radio/w3ct3157
- Paulos, C. (2007). *What one hand giveth, the other hand taketh away: Ethiopia's post-1991 decentralization reform under neo-patrimonialism*. Maastricht: Shaker Publisher.
- Raleigh, C. (2022). Ethiopia: Deep roots to a complicated conflict hinder options for peace. In T. Lay, R. Kishi, C. Raleigh, & S. Jones (Eds.), *10 conflicts to worry about in 2022: Ethiopia, Yemen, The Sahel, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Haiti, Colombia, and Myanmar*. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.
- Rodden, J. A. (2006). *Hamilton's paradox: The promise and peril of fiscal federalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schakel, A. H. (2015). Policy making in multilevel systems: Federalism, decentralisation, and performance in the OECD countries. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 25(2), 203–204.
- Schnabel, J., & Hegele, Y. (2021). Explaining intergovernmental coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic: Responses in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 1–33.
- Scharpf, F. W. 1996. Can there be a stable federal balance in Europe? In J. J. Hesse & V. Wright (Eds.) *Federalising Europe? The costs, benefits, and preconditions of federal political systems*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Segatto, C. I., & Béland, D. (2021). Federalism and decision making in health care: The influence of subnational governments in Brazil. *Policy Studies*, 42(3), 308–326.
- Shewakena, B. (2014). *Public policymaking in post-1991 Ethiopia: The case of urban land lease policy* (Master's thesis, Addis Ababa University).
- Swenden, W. (2006). *Federalism and regionalism in western Europe: A comparative and thematic analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Transparency International (2017-2022). *Corruption Perception Index (CPI)*, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022>
- Torring, J. B., Peters, G., Pierre, J., & Sorensen, E. (2012). *Interactive governance: Advancing the paradigm*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Van der Beken, C., & Dessalegn, B. (2020). The role of international and national human rights systems in the protection of regional minorities in Ethiopia. In C. van der Beken & D. Beza (Eds.), *Alternative approaches to ethno-cultural diversity management at sub-national levels: Ethiopia in comparative perspectives*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University, School of Law.
- Watts, R. L. (2005). *A comparative perspective on asymmetry in federations*. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University.
- Watts, R. L. (2008). *Comparing federal systems* (3rd ed.). London: Mc

Gill-Queen's University Press.

Wlezien, C., & Soroka, S. N. (2011). Federalism and public responsiveness to policy. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 41(1), 31–52.

Wouters, J., Van Kerckhoven S., & Vidal, M. (2014). The dynamics of federalism: Belgium and Switzerland compared, Working Paper No. 138.

World Bank (2023). The worldwide governance indicators, aggregate governance indicators (1996 – 2021). Retrieved from www.govindicators.org

Yimenu, B. G. (2022). Measuring and explaining de facto regional policy autonomy variation in a constitutionally symmetrical federation: The case of Ethiopia, 1995–2020. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 1–27.

Yimenu, B. G. (2021). Implementing federalism in a developing country: The case of Ethiopia, 1995–2020. University of Kent.

Yusuf, S. (2022). Constitutional design options for Ethiopia: Managing ethnic divisions. ISS Monograph 204.

□□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□
□□□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□ (2012) □ □□□ □□□