

# The Internationalization of the Coup in Burkina Faso

By Jolade Omede,<sup>1</sup> Arinze Ngwube,<sup>2</sup> and Christie Okoroafor<sup>3</sup>

## Abstract

The article explores the political issues in the September 2015 military coup in Burkina Faso that was led by General Gilbert Diendere. Coming only a few weeks prior to a much-anticipated general election the coup plotters dissolved the transitional government that had been in place since the unexpected resignation of Blaise Compaore in October 2014. This article takes a retrospective view of the Burkinabe coup, and analyzes how it was precipitated by lingering political and economic crisis following President Compaore's 27 years rule. It concludes, by way of alternative futures, that the only way to prevent coups is for African leaders to promote and strengthen democracy and pursue people-friendly socio-economic policies within the framework of good governance, accountability and transparency.

Keywords: Coup d'état, Burkina Faso, Democracy, Leadership

## Introduction

During the first three decades after independence, military coups took place across most African states except for Botswana, Djibouti, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Namibia and South Africa (Schraeder, 2000). With time, however, experiences began to show that military regimes were only a shade different from their civilian counterparts when it comes to governance. Rather than help resolve Africa's emerging socio-economic and political problems, military governments compounded the challenges facing governance and security in the continent. For example, on 30<sup>th</sup> October 2014, the people of Burkina Faso took to the streets to protest attempts by their long-serving president, Blaise Compaore, to extend his 27-year rule by engineering an amendment to the constitution to extend his stay in power. Described as the "Black African Spring" (The Guardian, 2014), the civil revolt in Burkina Faso was strikingly like the short-lived Arab Spring revolts of 2011 and 2012 during which ordinary citizens vehemently rose in protest against authoritarianism and oppressive regimes across North Africa. During the violent protests in Burkina Faso, President Compaore resigned and fled the country on the 31<sup>th</sup> of October 2014, leaving behind a political vacuum that elements within the military exploited to stage a coup the

---

1 Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria; Email: medajol@yahoo.com

2 General Studies Unit, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State Nigeria Email: Arinze.ngwube@fuoye.edu.ng

3 Directorate of Library Services, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria  
Email: christieokoroafor@yahoo.co.uk

following day, 1<sup>st</sup> November 2014. The Chief of Defence, General Honoré announced his assumption of power, only to be followed by another broadcast in which Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida of the elite presidential guard announced himself as Head of state. Although the two developments may have signalled deep divisions within the military, the hierarchy managed to unite and rally themselves behind Zida, who they confirmed as Head of state.

Even at that, the actions of the Burkina military clearly contravened Article 43 of the Constitution requiring the President of the National Assembly to assume power in an acting capacity upon the resignation of the President, and to call for an election within 60 to 90 days. The actions of the military were also a violation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of the African Union (AU) as well as the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In broader terms, the coup exposed the weak roots of democracy, and the reality that the military remains a formidable force, despite the widely held view that military coups have become part of the relic of the political history of Africa (Birikorang, 2013).

Significantly, local and international groups, especially the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and ECOWAS promptly condemned the military takeover and called for a swift return to democratic rule. The AU threatened to impose sanctions on the junta if it failed to hand over power to a civilian-led transitional government by 18 November 2014. ECOWAS, on the other hand, was at variance with the AU by calling on the international community to tarry awhile in imposing sanctions, and to give the regional effort led by President Macky Sall of Senegal a chance to find a political solution to the impasse. With the two key African institutions not being able to agree on how to relate to, or deal with the junta in Ouagadougou, it is pertinent to raise some key questions. First, how much of the political crisis, starting with the unexpected resignation of President Compaore, was anticipated? Second, to what extent did the early warning mechanisms of ECOWAS and the AU pick up ominous signs of an impending political stalemate, and how did key stakeholders respond to the situation? In answering these questions, this article reflects on the remote and proximate factors that precipitated the political crises in Burkina Faso. It is organized into five key sections, starting with that on conceptual clarifications and a synopsis of coups in Africa; second is an overview of the political economy of Burkina Faso on the eve of the coup; the third section discusses the circumstances and evolution of the 2014 Coup, followed by section four, which reflects on the effects of the coup on state-society relations in Burkina Faso, and lastly, the conclusion.

## Coups in Africa: Concept, Context, and Empirical Issues

There is substantial literature on military coup d'état, mostly underscoring its importance and centrality to understanding political change, for good or bad, in Africa. Luttwak (1968: 12) describes coups as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder”. Based on this conception, they [coup d'états] exclude the use of the military as the sole actor responsible for the illegal action, contrary to the view of Ferguson (1987). Huntington (1981) has placed coups in three categories: “breakthrough”, “guardian”, and “veto”. The mention of the word “coup d'état”, according to him, tends to be met with stares of bewilderment, fear, anger, or even panic. This, perhaps, explains the contrasting reactions to coups: on the one hand, the consequences of unconstitutional removal of a government are severe as perpetrators face charges of treason and death; and, on the other hand, a successful coup mostly has to be persuaded to revert to the status quo ante of civilian democratic governance.

It is important, therefore, to put some of the outcomes of military coups in perspective (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Stone, 2004; Svobick, 2012). An early work by Jackman (1978) attributed coups d'états that took place in the new states of Africa from 1960 to 1975 to three broad reasons, namely social mobilization or “modernization”, cultural pluralism, and political factors (i.e. political party systems and mass participation). According to him, social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group had destabilizing consequences for newly established states in sub-Saharan Africa. He further argued that a multiplicity of political parties could as well be destabilizing whereas single-party dominance has had a stabilizing effect on post-independence governments.

Johnson, Slater, and McGowan (1984: 622) found that “states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have maintained or restored some degree of political pluralism have experienced fewer military attempted coups, and coup plots, than have states with the opposite set of characteristics”. In other words, as they concluded, some measures of positive economic performance, such as a high level of productive employment, robust economic growth, sound export performance (ratio of export–imports to GNP), and diversified commodity exports, are also critical determinants of if a coup would take place.

In attempting to evaluate the internal factors leading to a coup, McBride (2004) as well as Collier and Hoeffler (2007) focused on the military as an institution in the context of coups and political instability. According to McBride (2004), the military intervene in politics for reasons of personal greed, being motivated by the quest to gain and exercise state power. Collier and Hoeffler, in turn, highlight the interdependence between the

risks of a coup (plotted, attempted, or successful) and the level of military spending at any time, drawing examples from Mauritania and Chad. They found that in countries with low coup risk governments respond by reducing military spending whereas those with high coup risk tend to increase military spending.

In the immediate post-colonial era, several military coups, attempted, failed, and successful, occurred in different parts of Africa. While part of the blame for its recurrence at that time was placed on outside political interference during the Cold War era, the frequency of military coups could not be divorced from the fragility of political systems across the continent, which made many countries susceptible to long-drawn and mostly violent political contestations that invariably provided the alibi for military incursions into politics. By the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the United States emerged as the sole superpower, the world witnessed the re-assertion of western liberalism that privileged the market and multiparty democracy. With this, military and one-party civilian regimes quickly became anachronistic and unconstitutional and in their stead, emerged a new clamour for multiparty democracy. Paradoxically, the dust is yet to settle as early democratic gain made by a number of African countries seem to be shrinking with increased incidences of unconstitutional changes in government. Apart from the countries listed in Table 1 below that have experienced military coups, several others, such as Burundi; have experienced constitutional stalemates and crises of political succession.

**Table 1. Trends in Military Coups in Africa (1999-2013)**

Côte d’Ivoire	1999
Guinea- Bissau	2003 (2008, 2012)
Mauritania	2005, 2008
Guinea	2008
Madagascar	2009
Niger	2010
Mali	1999, 2010, 2012
Egypt	2013

*Author’s Compilation, 2017*

Abrupt policy changes of the type leading to, or following military coups can be destabilizing because the cost to the losers are very high, even fatal. For example, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that democratization occurs when the cost of redistribution to the elites diminishes and that of repression increases. This is because of the consequences redistribution has on regime choice; democracy being pro-majority and thus more redistributive than autocratic. However, inequalities between groups exacerbate the conflict of interests, raising the stakes for the ruling elites to

maintain the status quo and others to pursue reforms. The elites and their cronies in fragmented and unequal societies have a strong interest in maintaining the status quo as they have much more to lose from adverse policy changes because of the large income gap between them and majority of citizens.

It is of interest to note, that any effective redistribution policy in a society with large numbers of low-income earners would considerably damage the individual as well as collective interests of the elite class. This allows members of the ruling elite, in an unequal and divided society, to remain in government to maintain influence over policy. This situation might, however, cause marginalized and excluded segments to find motivation to plan the overthrow of incumbent power holders to prevent further welfare losses. It is not surprising that one of the consistent factors precipitating coups is the failure of democracy characterized by acute and festering political crises in Africa.

Democracy has been interpreted and applied in different ways across the continent, mostly based on the whims and caprices of politicians and ruling elites. Larry Diamond (1990) offered three variants of regimes based on the political realities in Africa. First, is that in which there are regular intervals of meaningful political competition among individuals and organized groups for government positions, and without the use of force; (ii) an inclusive political process such that no major (voting age) social group is excluded; and (iii) one in which sufficient levels of civil and political liberties exist to ensure and/or guarantee the integrity of political competition and participation (Diamond, 1990). The flipside of a semi-democratic regime is one in which a substantial degree of political competition and freedom exists, but the effective power of elected officials is significantly limited at the same time that political competition is restricted, just as freedom and fairness of elections is compromised in ways that impact negatively on electoral outcomes. In the latter situation, civil and political liberties are limited to the extent that some people are unable to organize and express themselves freely according to their political orientation and interests. Finally, the third typology is that of an authoritarian regime in which little or no meaningful political competition or freedom exists.

From Diamond's typology, many African states may only be able to lay claim to democracy in theory whereas the practice of it is farfetched as majority of them are semi-democratic. In other words, they have accepted democracy, but democratic principles such as the freedom of speech, human rights, and the conduct of free and transparent elections have not been strictly adhered to or allowed to thrive. Thus, even though most African people embraced multiparty democracy (as opposed to one-party or military rule) at the end of the Cold War, it is evident that democracy has not yielded the much-expected dividends, especially in terms of promoting and guaranteeing human

security precisely because large segments of the population in many states lack access to subsidized socio-economic opportunities, while incumbent regimes have mostly failed to improve their welfare and living standards.

In concluding this section, it is important to ask whether public opinion and popular enthusiasm is enough to prompt, not the least justify, organizing a coup. If the answer is no, the next logical question would be to ask what options citizens have when they are unable to remove, by democratic means, an undemocratic or authoritarian regime bent on perpetuating itself in power by undermining the constitution? It is possible, tentatively, that as options for peaceful change are foreclosed, open and tacit support for unconstitutional change in governments might become expedient. Most of Africa's coups from the late 1990s onwards have therefore occurred against the backdrop of widespread public disenchantment and protests directed at making a clean break from a troubling political order, albeit for a limited period, in order usher in reforms. Of course, whether African militaries themselves understand and interpret their role as guarantors of constitutional order is another debate entirely.

### **Burkina Faso: Political Economy and the Context of the 2014 Coup**

With its capital in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso is a landlocked West African country with a size of approximately 274,200 square kilometres (or 105, 900 square miles). It is surrounded by six countries: Mali to the north; Niger to the east Benin Republic to the south-east; Togo and Ghana to the south; and Côte d'Ivoire to the south-west. By 2014 estimates, the country's population was around 17.3 million, out of which 46% are known to live below the poverty line (Burkina Faso Population projection, 2014). In spite of the country's turbulent political history, evident in a succession of four military coups in 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1987, a period of relative political stability was witnessed under President Blaise Compaoré as he made a clean break from the Marxist revolutionary paradigm of Thomas Sankara, and embraced neo-liberal orthodoxy that brought about improved economic growth, albeit a short-lived one. Between 2000 and 2006, Burkina Faso's gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 6%, and by 2012 reached double-digits of 10%. Despite these promising indicators, however, Burkina Faso remained at the bottom of the ladder, ranking only 181 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index, and by extension, one of the world's poorest (United Nations, 2014).

The landlocked nation is heavily dependent on international aid, attracting on average in excess of US\$13 billion in international development assistance per annum (Dorrie, 2012). Unfortunately, the death of one of its major financial benefactors, Muammar Gaddafi, during the Libyan uprising in 2011 dealt a devastating blow to Compaoré's

regime, and repeated- but unfulfilled- promises of positive change allowed public distrust to grow (BBC News, 2014). The frustrations and disquiet were largely manifested in mass protests and labour unrest. For example, earlier in December 1998, the murder of the investigative journalist Norbet Zongo sparked major demonstrations. Zongo was investigating the killing of the driver of Francois Compaoré, the younger brother and special adviser of the former president (BBC News, 2014). This was followed by violent protests and strikes throughout the country in 2011. While students protested the death of one of their colleagues, Justin Zongo, in police custody, trade unions, professionals as well as the rank-and-file soldiers took to the streets in protest against high costs of living, low and unpaid wages. While the protests and political upheavals lasted several months during the first half of 2011, they did not constitute a mass movement in the real sense, partly because opposition parties were not able to build the necessary political coalition to offer credible alternatives to the protesters clamouring for political and economic reforms. In one instance, on 14 April 2011, a mutiny by presidential bodyguards over unpaid allowances forced the President to momentarily flee to his hometown of Ziniare (BBC News, 2011).

The authority of Compaoré was no doubt challenged by the mutiny, especially coming from his trusted and better-resourced presidential guards. In response to the 2011 mutiny, the President embarked on a reform of the military, and went as far as directly assuming responsibility for the reform process by designating himself as the Defence Minister on 20 April 2011. He also reshuffled the government and appointed Luc-Adolphe Tiao as Prime Minister.<sup>4</sup> Successful municipal and legislative elections that may have inadvertently allowed opposition parties and elements to gain more and stronger representation were held in December 2012. Thus, even though the ruling party, the Congress for Democracy and Progress, CDP, still won a sweeping majority, the opposition became a rallying point for thousands of people insisting on all-encompassing constitutional amendments throughout the first half of 2014. Apart from signalling that new dynamics were at play across the country, the sprouting of a broad coalition of opposition groups, as evidenced in demonstrations in the capital, clearly showed that Compaore was swimming against a stronger tide. In April 2014, the opposition coalition MPP held its congress and followed this with a large rally held on 31 May at the national stadium, the Stade du 4 Août, in Ouagadougou. Civil society groups also participated in these demonstrations (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).

---

<sup>4</sup> No less than six Prime Ministers served under President Compaore throughout his 27-year tenure in power, starting with Youssouf Ouedraogo when he first assumed power in 1987.

## **The 2014 Coup in Burkina Faso**

By mid-2014, it was already widely known that Burkinabes were deeply suspicious that President Compaoré was likely going to seek another five-year term of office the following year despite the existence of a constitutional two-term limit. Notwithstanding allegations of backing rebels and fuelling civil wars in neighbouring countries within the sub-region, Compaoré had been instrumental in brokering peace in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Togo, Niger, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. It is also on record that he used his vast networks to help Western powers battling Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel (BBC News, 2014). Ironically, while his regional mediation credentials and frontline involvements in the so-called global war on terror across the West African Sahel brought him and his country enormous prestige and diplomatic gains, they did not completely sanitize or shield him from the political crisis brewing at home.

It is important to recall the circumstances of Blaise Compaore's ascension to power on 15<sup>th</sup> October 1987, during a military putsch that witnessed the brutal murder of his former comrade and charismatic military ruler, Captain Thomas Sankara, and 13 other officers. The first four years of his rule were devoted to undoing the popular legacies of the short-lived regime of his predecessor, and understandably to also consolidate and firm up his grip on power. Once those initial moves were completed, Compaore was emboldened to start a transition to constitutional rule that he did not only participate in, but was also sure of winning in 1991. Since then, he organized and won all successive presidential elections in 1998, 2005 and 2010. Throughout the long period, what subsisted was a hybrid regime that combined semi-authoritarian and a semblance of democracy with repression, to secure and ensure political stability.

Despite the semblance of a free and open political system, the regime relied on three key infrastructures of power and authority: the military; the ruling party, Congrès pour la démocratie et le progress (CDP), and traditional chiefdoms. With this political structure, Compaoré maintained tight control over the military as well as on politics and society. In the absence of any formidable opposition, he governed the country through a subtle, but vicious system of alliances, compromises and illusions (ICG, 2013). In a little over one decade, the 1991 Constitution saw five major amendments, including the one in 1997 that initially removed the presidential term limit. The two-term limit was, however, reintroduced in 2000 along with a reduction in term duration from seven to five years. Specifically, Article 37 of the Constitution stipulates that the President will be elected for five years by direct universal suffrage in a secret ballot, and can only be re-elected once (Burkina Faso's Constitution, 1999). It was based on these provisions that Compaoré's announcement of his intention to contest the next presidential election in August 2005 was challenged by opposition parties as unconstitutional. As far as his supporters were concerned, however, the claim by the opposition is disputable because

the amendment could not take a retrospective effect. Interestingly, in October 2005, the Constitutional Council ruled that because Compaoré was a sitting president in 2000, the amendment would not apply until the end of his second term in office (Engels, 2015). This development allowed him to contest the 2005 presidential election and, again, was re-elected in 2010.

In June 2014, the ruling party called on the President to organize a referendum that would allow him to change the Constitution again to seek re-election in 2015 (ENCA, 2014). The proposed constitutional amendment, however, triggered a major rift within the ruling party, culminating in the resignation of about 70 prominent members of the National Political Bureau in early 2014. Among the reasons given for the mass resignation included widespread marginalization of party members and the excessive militarization of party structures. Having pulled out of the party and government, opposition individuals moved on to create a new party, the Mouvement du peuple pour le progrès (MPP). This development significantly changed the balance of political power within the country in ways that expectedly had significant and far-reaching impacts on the 2015 presidential election (ISS, 2014). For instance, having been virtually under a single party in a supposed democracy, the emergence of MPP invariably meant the monopolization of political power long vested in the CDP. Also, the new development meant that the President could not remain the fulcrum around which the whole political and governance structure of the country revolved. Yet, the fledgling opposition was still mostly weak and divided, with at least 74 political parties faced with weak organizational and financial capacities. The absence of a formidable and resilient opposition made it less difficult for Compaoré to win four presidential elections, each time with more than 80% of votes.

As widely anticipated across the country, a proposal for term extension was introduced to the National Assembly, starting with a debate on 30th October 2014, to amend the Constitution for the umpteenth time to allow Compaoré to seek re-election. Following this development, protesters stormed the National Assembly in Ouagadougou, setting it ablaze and looting offices, with at least one death reported (BBC News, 2014). Compaoré immediately declared a state of emergency and offered to resolve the political stalemate by heading a transitional government until elections. On the same day that Lt. Col. Isaac Yacouba Zida declared himself the new leader of Burkina Faso, he also announced the President's resignation and made a proposal to install a transitional government "in consultation with all parties." Finally, the coup plotters dissolved the National Assembly (BBC News, 2014), effectively instituting martial laws.

But the general public was neither keen to accept the incursion of the military in power nor to embrace the proposals made by the junta. Indeed, majority of public opinion at that time was that the military had hijacked the people's revolution and that the only exit

would be for a civilian-led transitional administration. Clashes between protesters and the security forces became frequent as the former gave the military deadline to install another civilian transitional government within one year. In the face of widespread recalcitrance by the public, soldiers barricaded strategic facilities within the capital, including the Main Square and television station. They cordoned off the main square where thousands of people had gathered to demonstrate against military takeover.

### **Outcomes of the Coup on Politics in the Post-Compaore Era**

The coup was ominous in several respects but perhaps the more obvious one was how it flagged people's resolve to resist authoritarian rule regardless of the costs. However Burkina Faso has a reputation for been relatively peaceful and stable in an insecure region. It really impacted other Sahelian and West African states, especially in light of the conflict in Mali and increase in terrorist violence in northern Nigeria. It was costly for Burkinabes and the region. The range of economic and social challenges facing Burkina Faso are complex and multidimensional, but remain in a state of flux within the context of the current political situation in the country. Furthermore the coup demonstrated that the armed forces remain a key actor in the country's political life. The military's ability to interfere in political affairs has remained a constant feature of Burkina Faso's history since 1966. Although the events in Burkina Faso received a fraction of the media attention dedicated to the Arab spring uprisings that occurred just a few years earlier, the storyline remains much the same.

Eventually, persistent calls within and outside the country for a quick return to civilian rule paid off with the signing of the transitional charter on 17<sup>th</sup> November 2014 outlining the legal framework for a civilian-led transition. After weeks of negotiations between the army and key civilian stakeholders, a quasi-civilian transnational [government] was established with Michel Kafando, a former diplomat, as interim President and foreign minister while Zida became Prime Minister and Defence Minister. A 90-member transitional council was put together to also serve as the country's parliament. In November 2015, the transitional government gave way, following the successful election of a new president Marc Kabore. Since his ascension to power, Burkina Faso has made a full transition to democratic constitutional rule.

The inauguration of a new democratic government is a sign that the country is on the path to democratic stability with prospects for economic growth. However, some observers are of the view that the country will need to do a lot to deepen its newly-won democracy, if it is to ensure that it is to deter the possibility of any future interferences by the military in the politics of one of Africa's poorest countries (Ernest, 2015). In January 2016 in the aftermath of presidential elections, Burkina Faso's newly elected president Roch Marc Christian Kabore appointed a new prime minister, The appointment of the new Prime

minster, Paul Kaba Thieba, an economist who worked for the West African Central bank, but with limited political experience was noteworthy. It was obvious the administration wanted a technocrat in the position of head of government given the priority of reviving the slowing economy.

On January 15, 2016 Islamist terrorists carried out an attack on a hotel in Ouagadougou in the capital, as confirmed by the Foreign Minister in an interview he granted to the press (BBC, 2016). The attack was on for several hours with reports of hostages being held at the hotel and at some people believed to have either been injured, or killed. Among the dead were six Canadians, three Ukrainians, two French nationals, and eight Burkinabes. It was first time Islamist Jihadist terrorists had carried out an attack in Burkina Faso (BBC, 2016). However the general consensus was that the attack may have been coordinated with Islamist Jihadists in Mali. As the polity was edging towards a more secure footing, this scenario marked an unprecedented assault on Burkina Faso's national security.

There have been demonstrations against the administration of Kabore during and after the municipal elections conducted on the 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2016, as well protests against the election of provincial mayors (African news, 2016). In addition, security forces reportedly foiled another coup attempt on the 8<sup>th</sup> October 2016 (Aljazeera News, 2016). Former Presidential guards were suspected of have planned the failed coup. Sociopolitical issues also continue to remain a source of concern.

## **Conclusion**

The political crisis that engulfed Burkina Faso and the role of regional and international actors in supporting its home-grown political transition program that rid the country of a long-standing ruler, and military interlopers is of great significance to Africa's quest for democratic consolidation, peace and security. The country was able to avert a descent into military dictatorship and political crises, and successfully defended its democratic space from subversion by anti-democratic forces, by ensuring a complete return to constitutional rule. Moving forward, a number of critical issues may threaten the stability and future of Burkina Faso's newly-won democracy. Those would range from economic (addressing rising incidences of inflation, unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment) to political (e.g. developing strong and credible democratic institutions, deepening democratic norms, values and principles, and fostering popular participation in governance) and security-related challenges (especially those related to the mismanagement of the disbandment of the former presidential guard and countering extremist violence and terrorist threats).

## References

- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson. (2006). *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- African news (2016) Burkina Faso Ruling party wins big in municipal elections. 23rd May Accessed on 26th September 2017.
- Anyangwe, C. (2011). Understanding the phenomena of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. In, Gutto, Shadrack (Ed.). (2011). *Shared values, constitutionalism and democracy in Africa*. Fortune-Africa Publishing.
- Aljazeera News (2016) Burkina Faso: Coup attempted thwarted says government. 21 October. Available at <http://www.aljazeeranews.com> Accessed on 26 September 2017.
- Belkin, A et Al. (2003). Towards a structural understanding of coup risk. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 47(5), pp.594-620.
- BBC News. (2014a). How Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore' sparked his own downfall. 31 October. Available at: <http://www.bbcnews.com> Accessed on 7 November 2014.
- BBC News. (2014b). Burkina Faso army announces emergency measures. 30 October. Available at: <http://www.bbcnews.com> Accessed on 8 November 2014.
- BBC News. (2016) Burkina Faso attack Troops to end deadly hotel siege. 16th January. Accessed on 26 September 2017.
- Birikorang, E. (2013). *Coups d'état in Africa: A thing of the past?* KAIPTC Policy Brief, 3.
- Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, N. (3 July 2013). Redoing the Egyptian revolution: How to get the transition right this time. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2013-07-03/redoing-egyptian-revolution>
- Bruckner, J. (2013). Die Mär vom "demokratischen putsch" in Ägypten. Wissenschafts Zentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, November. Available at: <http://democracy>.

blog.wzb.eu/2013/11/12/die-maer-vom-demokratischen-putsch-in-aegypten/

- Coleman, J. et al. (1962). *The role of the military in Sub Saharan Africa*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler A. (2007). *Military spending and the risks of coup d'etat*. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford: Oxford University [Press].
- Decalo, S. (1989). *Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa*. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(4), pp.547-578.
- Diamond, L., et al. (Eds.). (1990). *Democracy in developing countries*. Vol. 4: Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Dorrie, P. (2012). *Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaore and the politics of personal enrichment*. Available at: [www.africanarguments.org](http://www.africanarguments.org) Accessed on 3 November 2014.
- ENCA. (2014). *Burkina Faso ruling party calls for referendum on term limits*. Africa, 22 June. Available at: <http://www.enca.com/burkina-faso-ruling-party-calls-referendum-term-limits> Accessed on 8 November 2014.
- Engels, B. (2015). *Political transition in Burkina Faso: The fall of Blaise Compaore*. *Governance in Africa*, 2(1):3, pp.1-6.
- Ernest, H. (2015). *Burkina Faso Electoral Reforms test fragile transition*. 27 April. Available at: <http://worldpoliticsreview.com> Accessed on 12 July 2016
- Evans, G et Al. (1998). *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books.
- Ferguson, G. (1987). *Coup d'état: A practical manual*. New York: Arms and Armour Press.
- Huntington, S. (1981). *Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military relations*. Boston: Belkenep Press.
- Genna, G. et al. (2013). *Do democracy clauses matter? A Paper Presented at the 54th International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, 03-06 April 2013*.

- Hiroi, T. et al. (2013). Causes and triggers of coups d'état: An event history analysis. *Politics and Policy*, 41(1), pp. 39-64.
- Ikome, F. (2007). Good coups and bad coups, the limitations of the African Union injunctions on unconstitutional changes of power in Africa. *Occasional Paper*, No 55.
- Institute for Security Studies (ISS). (2014). Risks ahead of the constitutional referendum in Burkina Faso. *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report*, 9 (August).
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2013). Burkina Faso: With or without Compaore, Times of uncertainty. *Africa Report*, 2015 (July).
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2015). Burkina Faso: Nine months to complete the transition. *Africa Report*, 222 (28 January).
- Issaka, K. (2006). *Civil wars and coups d'état in West Africa*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Jackman, R. (1978). The predictability of coups d'état: A model with African data. *American Political Science Review*, Vol.72, (December) pp.1262-1275.
- Johnson, T., Slater and McGowan. (1984). Explaining African coups d'état 1960-1982. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78 (3), Pp.622-640.
- Luckham, R. et al. (2001). *Conflict and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: An assessment of the issues and evidence*. IDS Working paper, No.128. Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Issues.
- Luttwak, E. (1968). *Coup d'état A practical handbook*. London: The Penguin Press..
- Mcbride, M. (2004.) *Crises, coups and entry-deferring reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Paper presented at the Public Choice Seminar at the University of California.
- McGowan, P. (2003). African military coups d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, trends and distribution. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(3), p.351.
- Nordinger, E (1977). *Soldiers in politics military coups and government*. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Organization of African Union (OAU) Assembly of heads of State and Government, Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional Changes of government (AHG/SDec.5 (XXXVI))

Perlov, O. (2014). Abdel Fattah el-Sisi: A chronicle of foretold failure, or perhaps not? Egyptians' discourse on the social networks. Institute for National Security Studies, INSS, Insight, No. 587, August 11, 2014.

Stone, R. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98(4), pp.577-591.

Schraeder, P. J. (2000). *African politics and society*. New York: Bedford St Martins.

Svolik, M. (2012). *The Politics of authoritarian rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tardoff, W. (1993). *Government and politics in Africa*. 2nd edition. London: Macmillan.

Thompson, W. (1980). Corporate coup-maker grievances and types of regime targets. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12(4), pp.485-496.

The Guardian. (2014). Protesters storm Burkina Faso's parliament. 30 October. Available at :<<http://www.theguardian.com> Accessed on 4 Nov 2014.

United Nations. (2014). Human Development Index. Available at: <https://data.undp/dataset/Table-1-Human-Development-index-and-its-components/myer-egms> Accessed on 10 August 2015.

Wells, A. (1974). Coup in theory and practice: Independent black Africa in the 1960s. *American Journal of Sociology*, no.79.