African Union Forces Mandates and their Implications for the Fight Against Al-Shabaab in Somalia

Jacqueline NAKAIZA Ph.D.,[1] Charlotte Karungi MAFUMBO Ph.D.[2] & Zaid SEKITO Ph.D.[3]

To Cite this Article

NAKAIZA, J., MAFUMBO, C. K. & SEKITO, Z. (2025). African Union Forces Mandates and their Implications for the Fight Against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. *African Solutions (AfSOL) Journal* 6(1), pp.25. https://doi.org/10.63990/afsol.v6i1.13033

Editor-In-Chief: Dr. Andrew E. Yaw Tchie

Managing Editor: Cynthia Happi

[1] Jacqueline NAKAIZA, Makerere University, Uganda. jackiekibirige@gmail.com **ORCID ID:** https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7004-5923

[2] Charlotte Karungi MAFUMBO, Makerere University, Uganda. **ORCID ID:** https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3034-9219

[3] Zaid SEKITO, Makerere University, Uganda. **ORCID ID:** https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6744-5800

Abstract

This paper examines the implications of the African Union (AU) Mandate in Somalia. It focuses on peace support operations, support to political settlements, and the reduction of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. The sustenance of the insurgency has partly been blamed on the continued deployment of foreign troops and their role in enabling the survival of the nascent foreign-backed Federal Government (Namatovu, 2023). As a result, there is a need to interrogate the mandate of the forces and why they have failed to eliminate Al Shabaab from Somalia. Drawing on Rational Institutionalist theory, we argue that the mandate of a regional mission determines the extent to which it counters insurgency and contributes to peaceful political settlements. To achieve their mandated objectives, AU-led forces adopted several measures regarding the conduct of operations, stabilisation, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, capacity-building, and training. This was despite challenges such as logistical issues, mistrust between partners, the absence of a shared strategy, insufficient intelligence, a sensitive relationship with the host government, and the complexity of clan politics in Somalia. The paper argues that the country continues to require foreign security assistance and is not prepared to assume full security responsibilities. Going forward, creating a strong, militarily effective Somali security apparatus should be a prerequisite for AU forces to withdraw. This can guarantee the long-term sustainability of efforts to resolve the intractable conflict. This should be followed by a national political strategy that allows Somalia's future to be shaped by Somalis.

Keywords: Al Shabaab, AU-led forces, Somalia, Peacekeeping, Peace Support Operations, Political Settlements.

Introduction

From the late 1980s, Somalia experienced intractable armed conflict that has eroded state institutions that previously managed conflict between its different clans (De Waal, 2020; Menkhaus, 2007; Pham, 2013). As the conflict progressed, it increased in complexity. Initially driven by competition between various warlords in the 1990s, the conflict came to be defined increasingly by terrorism (Adam, 1992; Marchal, 2007). Since 2006, the conflict has been driven by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, known as "Al Shabaab" (Bryden, 2014; Regens et al., 2016), which rose to prominence following Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia from 2006 to 2009 (Anderson, 2014). The group claims to seek the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the country (Warner & Weiss, 2017) and the removal of all forms of foreign interference in Somalia. The group conducts military operations against the nascent Somali government and its foreign supporters, notably the United States (US), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and some Gulf states (Rwengabo, 2018). Al Shabaab has been the subject of extensive journalistic and scholarly reporting; stringent legislation in municipal and international law; and a phenomenal military onslaught by various international coalitions. Yet the organisation is remarkably resilient. The group manages a sophisticated revenue-collection system through illicit activities, extortion, and taxation (Wendy, 2023), and provides public goods as a government-in-waiting including: education; justice; and security (Skjelderup, 2020). The group is able to keep its members motivated and attract sympathisers, support, and volunteers – locally and internationally – so that it maintains the capacity to carry out ever more ghastly attacks (Kellar, 2024; Schneider, 2021).

In an effort to curb the insurgency, multiple initiatives by various actors – from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to successive African Union's peace keeping missions – have sought to stabilize Somalia. In the process, the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and individual states like Ethiopia have become frontline actors pursuing a range of measures to end the insurgency. These African-led efforts are also supported by the EU, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), United Nations (UN), and the US, amongst others. Despite the gains against the group made between 2011-2018 (Fisher, 2019; Paul D. Williams, 2016; Williams et al., 2018), violence, insurgency, and political fragmentation persist (Reno, 2012). More recently, the group has increased the regularity of its attacks in Somalia. There are fears that the government is not capable of securing Mogadishu and there is a growing risk of Al Shabaab fully overrunning the government (Sweet & Toth, 2025).

Research Problem

By the mid-1990s, the ongoing conflict in Somalia necessitated the international community to intervene, although many Western countries were hesitant to deploy their troops (Bruton, 2010; Møller, 2009b). Indeed, when Bill Clinton visited Africa in 1998, one of the objectives of his trip was to lobby African governments to deploy troops in Somalia (Hendrickson, 2002). This would only come to fruition nine years later in 2007. The decision to deploy an AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia was rationalised on the basis that African leaders better understand the needs and local contexts of other African states. Consequently, they can use this knowledge to help rebuild locally legitimate and functional polities (Beswick, 2010; Williams, 2008). This follows an increasing emphasis on the notion of Africans solving their problems commonly summarised in the refrain: "African Solution for African Problems" (ASAP) (Mafumbo et al., 2024; Ottoh, 2017).

For this reason, the AU deployed peacekeeping troops in Somalia in 2007. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1744 (United Nations, 2007) with an initial mandate of six months. Its objective was to stabilize the country as a bridging mission to a United Nations operation that would support long-term post-conflict reconstruction (United Nations, 2007).The primary mandate of AMISOM then was to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as well as keeping Kismayo port and the Mogadishu airport safe and operational (Williams, 2018b). In subsequent years, rather than deploy a peacekeeping force, the UN kept on renewing the AMISOM mandate every six months because conditions on the ground in Somalia were deemed too insecure for such a deployment (Williams, 2018a; Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017).

From April 1st 2022, AMISOM was transformed into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with authorisation from UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022) (UNSC, 2022). ATMIS's core mandate was: to degrade Al Shabaab; provide security to population centres and main supply routes; and develop the Somali Security Forces (SSF) to enable them to take over security of the country by the end of 2024 (Robinson, 2024). ATMIS has since been rebranded again as the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which officially began operations in January 2025. Despite eighteen years of successive AU missions and the tremendous gains made against Al-Shabaab on many fronts, Somalia still needs support. The question then is, what implications do the AU Forces Mandates have on the process of peacekeeping missions

with particular reference to adherence to the three core principles: consent, strict impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense?

This paper therefore, examines the implications of successive AU mandates for the process of peacekeeping. It draws on content analysis and key informant interviews focused on intra-AU bargaining dynamics, as well as wider global considerations informing mandate design in Regional Organisations (ROs). It argues that the mandate of the AU-led peacekeeping mission determined the effectiveness of efforts to counter an insurgency and contribute to a more peaceful political settlement. The paper contributes to the literature on peacekeeping, regional interventions, and political settlements in Africa. The recommendations are intended to inform the future of the AU's presence in Somalia and other peace support operations on the continent.

Research Questions

This paper explores the following research questions. First, how have revisions to the AU mandate in Somalia impacted the mission's role in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and political settlements, if at all? Second, what revisions can be made to the AU mandate, or another successor mission, to address the Somali insurgency and achieve sustainable peace?

Theory

The effectiveness of regional counterterrorism operations is measured by the degree to which such efforts curtail terrorism (Rosand et al., 2022). To develop and test this argument, we combine a rational-institutionalist perspective with principal-agent and bargaining theory to argue that the mandate of a regional counterterrorism mission determines the extent to which such an effort counters terrorism activity. The rational-institutionalist perspective views ROs as deliberate, state-created, structures that enable states to achieve specific objectives (Abbott & Snidal, 1998). Different from general-purpose organisations, regional counterterrorism missions are issue-specific, and their mandate is limited to addressing terrorism-related challenges in cooperating states.

This issue-specificity, though sometimes antithetical to adaptability in the face of geopolitical change (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020), allows state principals to assign agents, ROs, and specific regional missions. In this vein, principal-agent theory views ROs as agents created by principals to act on their behalf and in their interest (Rwengabo, 2018). Bargaining theory highlights the give-and-take

exchanges between states not just during the creation of ROs but also during the design of the institutional rules by which RO's specific missions are pursued (Rwengabo, 2018). Combining these three theories conceptualises ROs as states' agents and spaces of cooperative response to issues of common concern.

Through an RO, a regional counterterrorism mission is created, supervised, guided, altered, and dissolved. The RO acts as a key means of promoting regional peace, and, once it is in place, the RO can be mandated to pursue a specific mission. In response to terrorist threats, states define the mandate of a regional counterterrorism mission. The mandate, in turn, specifies the aspects of terrorism the mission counters and what it does not.

The degree of independence retained by the RO (Abbott & Snidal, 1998) shapes the extent to which RO officials can alter the mission's mandate without approval from states. Since any such approval is a decision-making process, it entails interstate bargaining dynamics around mandate alterations and extensions that are often not straightforward. Mandates are institutional rules, which need to be set at RO decision-making levels, such as a summit or ministerial council.

The mandate of a given institution is therefore the result of bargains reached through give and-take exchanges in which states act on incomplete information about each other's interests and the conflict (Little & Zeitzoff, 2017; Westerwinter, 2014). The empirical implications of this theoretical approach are clear. The AU-led peacekeeping mission is an AU pursuit sanctioned by the UN and thus rules specifying its mandate reflect UN and AU considerations in setting up such a mission. This defines the mission's peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and political activities, as well as its limits.

Methodological Approach and Design

The study discusses the implications of the AU's mandate on peacekeeping, political settlements, and counterterrorism. This paper will focus on AMISOM and ATMIS which have already concluded, rather than the recently established AUSSOM. To address this issue, the paper focuses on intra-AU bargaining dynamics as well as global factors informing mandate design. In particular, the study develops a time-sensitive analysis that explores the changing performance of policy, by looking at all AU mandates since 2007. Each revision to the mandate is analysed to examine whether these changes have had implications on peacekeeping, political settlements, and counterterrorism. This is done by studying the ways in which mission mandate and its implementation may have had a direct and

indirect impact on these policy areas. The findings will enable us to identify possible entry-points for enhancing the AUSSOM mandate in regards to political settlements and counterterrorism.

This study is based on qualitative desk research, supplemented by key informant interviews (KIIs) with participants in negotiations over AU mandates. The latter include regional security experts, Somali experts, journalists, former and current AU forces commanders, diplomats, civilian witnesses to the insurgency, and members of civil society organisations (Dawson, 2019). The interviews were conversational and explored the experiences and insights of the respondents on the AU-led peacekeeping mission and the Al Shabaab insurgency. This qualitative approach, which emphasises the use of words in data collection and analysis (Bryman, 2016), was applied since it enables an in-depth understanding of the intricacies of the negotiations determining AU mandates. Interview data was also supplemented by analysis of UN and AU reports, UNSC and AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) resolutions, and other AU-related academic and non-academic publications.

AU Forces Mandate in Somalia and Revisions Since 2007

AMISOM's core mandate was to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, consolidate and expand the control of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and help to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia. According to UNSC resolution 1744, AMISOM was to: i) support Somalia's fragile peace process through dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with the security of all those involved in the process; ii) protect institutions and provide security for key infrastructure and help it consolidate its authority in Mogadishu; iii) assist in the re-establishment of national Somali security forces; and iv) provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. The AU, the UN, and other bilateral partners had hoped that within six months, AU forces would stabilize the situation and prepare for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (Williams & Boutellis, 2014).

Rather than pursue their mandated functions, the troops realised that there was no peace to keep and were drawn into a bloody struggle with various anti-TFG forces—most notably Al Shabaab—fighting for control of the city of Mogadishu (Freear & De Coning, 2013; Williams, 2009). Indeed, Anderson argues that AMISOM was not a peacekeeping mission but a counterinsurgency operation whose efforts where to defeat and contain the insurgency while at the same time addressing its root causes (Anderson, 2014). As a result, AU member states were reluctant to contribute troops. From 2007 to 2011 only Uganda and Burundi deployed (Beswick, 2014; Jackson, 2014). From 2007

onwards AMISOM's mandate has been extended and revised (Williams, 2016) numerous times by both the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council to counter the evolving nature of the insurgency and to suit the evolving demands of the mission.

There were several reasons for the consistent modifications to AMISOM's mandate. First, the situation in Somalia continued to evolve, as Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups continued to pose threats to international peace and stability. Second, there was a realisation that the troops would stay much longer than previously anticipated. Third, the AU and the international community recognized the need to increase the number of troops, the importance of AMISOM's contribution to lasting peace and security, and the need for support in areas such as governance, the protection of infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. This transformed the mission from a defensive to an offensive posture to respond to Al-Shabaab pursuing guerrilla warfare.

Consequently, in 2008, the African Union Commission (AUC) issued AMISOM with strategic directives to guide the mission in achieving its objectives (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017). The directives outlined nine criteria for the mission's success including: engaging the TFG in inter-Somali dialogues; the integration of militias into national security forces; the relocation of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) to Mogadishu; the establishment of the TFIs in all regions; handover of the mission to a UN advance contingent; the stabilisation of the hostile environment in the country; the commencement and completion of the disarmament of armed groups; the completion of planning for support to an election process; and the return of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017).

Several institutional reviews and benchmarking exercises were subsequently done. These include the AMISOM Mission Implementation Plan in 2012 (Williams, 2013b), the development of the AMISOM Concept of Operations in 2012 (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2012), the AUC's Strategic Review of AMISOM (African Union, 2013a), and the AU–UN joint review conducted in mid-2013 (African Union, 2013b). The joint AU–UN benchmarking process in 2013 underscored the need for a number of strategic tasks that would be required to enable AMISOM's exit from Somalia, such as security sector development, political agreements on the shape of the federal structure, and improvement of security through degrading Al Shabaab. De Waal (2020) notes that the federal structure in Somalia was meant to address the deep distrust in the central government. If implemented well, it was hoped that the tasks would enable conditions that would pave the way for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

The operationalisation of AMISOM's mandate evolved in several distinct phases that are explored below. These were:

> i) establishment and early years, 2007-2011;
>
> ii) expansion and intensified operations, 2011-2014;
>
> iii) stabilisation and political progress, 2015-2017;
>
> iv) transition and drawdown, 2018-2021;
>
> v) and transition to ATMIS (2022**).**

During the early years, 2007-2011, the mandate prioritised establishing security measures in strategically significant regions of Somalia, primarily Mogadishu, and establishing a secure environment for the effective operation of the TFG. Repeated attacks by Al-Shabaab, hampered the fulfilment of this mandate, especially as AU member states did not contribute troops as earlier promised, except for Uganda and Burundi (Møller, 2009a) Burundi's deployment was also delayed and there were no Somali National Security Forces (Hesse, 2015) that could effectively work with AMISOM. The expansion phase, 2011-2014, saw AMISOM intensify its operations after the enlargement of its mandate and increase of its military strength, including through troop contributions from Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Williams, 2018b). With this larger military force the mission was able to push Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other significant metropolitan areas. For instance, AMISOM took control of Bakara market in 2011¸ and then in 2012 pushed the group out of Kismayo. The area under Al-Shabaab control in southern and central Somalia was therefore gradually reducing. From 2015 to 2017 the mandate's focus shifted to supporting stabilisation and wider political progress. During this period, the regions that had been liberated from Al-Shabaab were stabilised and there was a general improvement in the security situation around Mogadishu. More widely there was a successful election of a new president, and the installation of a new government coupled with a more inclusive government structure.

The period from 2018 to 2021 was characterised by transition and reduction in the number of troops, with a view to enabling the SNA to gradually take over security responsibilities. With AMISOM's assistance, the Somali government began taking on more authority in security, governance, and service provision. AMISOM continued with delivering training, advice and support to Somali security services, as well as supporting civilian-led stabilisation and state-building endeavours. The end of AMISOM and transition to ATMIS in 2022 was based on a planned transfer of security responsibilities from AU forces to the Somali Security Forces (SSF), with the FGS as the anchor of their country's security. These plans are premised on the UN's norms of Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) which posit that it is the responsibility of each state to protect its populations (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002).

To pursue this objective, AMISOM worked with the US and the EU to train the SSF as well as prepare them for this transition (Williams et al., 2018). Nonetheless, the proposal that AMISOM would withdraw from Somalia by 2021 and transfer security responsibilities to the SSF was received with mixed reactions. There were increasing fears that the drawdown would enable Al-Shabaab to regain control over areas it had previously lost to the FGS and AMISOM (Anzalone, 2016; Muibu, 2024; Nakaiza, n.d.). Thus, rather than withdraw the troops, in April 2022 AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS (ATMIS, 2022).

Earlier plans for AMISOM to be withdrawn by the end of 2021 was revised after acknowledging that it was an unrealistic aspiration given continued infighting between political elites, continued terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab, and the inability of the SSF to takeover full responsibility of security. Therefore, rather than withdraw AMISOM troops as initially planned, the UNSC, the AU, and the FGS agreed to establish ATMIS instead.

ATMIS came into force on 1st April 2022 and was mandated under UNSC resolution 2628 (2022) (UNSC, 2022) as a multidimensional mission with military, police, and civilian components and a clear mandate to fully implement the Somali Transition Plan.[4] Unlike AMISOM, ATMIS had a life span of two years, 2022 – 2024, with a mandate structured across several phases: i) reconfiguration; ii) joint shaping and clearing operations, including the handover of some forward operating bases (FOBs) to the SSF; iii) decisive operations and handover of the remaining FOBs; and iv) withdrawal and liquidation of ATMIS (ATMIS, 2022).

Despite the progress made by Somalia in assuming greater responsibility for its national security from ATMIS forces in the years after 2022, little progress has been achieved in degrading Al Shabaab. At the end of the planned two years of transition, the UNSC endorsed the AU PSC's decision to replace ATMIS with AUSSOM (UNSC Resolution 2767 (2024)), marking a further step in transitioning national security responsibilities to the country's own forces.

---

[4] The Somali Transition Plan outlined a strategy to build operational and institutional capacity for the SSF, as well as build capacity in the areas of justice, accountable local governance, and service delivery.

Implementation of the AU Mandate

This section explores how the AU implemented the key objectives of their mandate. It focuses on the conduct of operations, stabilisation, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance and capacity-building and training.

Regarding the conduct of operations, AMISOM deployed to regions characterised by violence and instability to establish a conducive environment for the maintenance of peace. The use of force was regarded as a key mechanism for achieving this, as the political landscape was fiercely contested by multiple parties, and characterised by high levels of violence. AMISOM therefore functioned as a peace enforcement mission.

This necessitated revisions of the AMISOM mandate, adding new responsibilities without the concurrent removal of existing obligations. Functional collaboration existed between AMISOM's military and police components and the SNA to carry out coordinated operations geared towards eliminating Al-Shabaab's presence. These operations focused on securing and controlling main supply routes (MSRs) as well as strategically important towns. To counter mortar attacks by Al-Shabaab, AMISOM devised an Indirect Fire Policy in 2010, to safeguard civilian populations during counterattacks while adhering to international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) (Boutin et al., 2016; Onditi et al., 2021).

More widely, AMISOM's operations were informed by several documents developed at headquarters, some of which also supported adherence to IHL and IHRL. They include: the Status of Mission Agreement, Strategic Directives, Concept of Operations, Force Commanders' Directives, Police Commissioners' Directives, Rules of Engagement, Directives on the Use of Force, AMISOM Protection of Civilian Strategy, Indirect Fire Policy, AMISOM Standard Operating Procedures, African Union Policy on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for Peace Support Operations, African Union Policy on Conduct and Discipline for Peace Support Operations, and the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell (CCTARC).

Since 2007, the international community has not worked cohesively to meet the needs of successive Somali governments (Garad, 2025; Muibu, 2024). Consequently, stabilisation has been characterised by individualised and disconnected endeavours. Even where AMISOM attempted to initiate a reconciliation process, this was often hampered by a lack of financial, and lack of comprehensive

political strategy for the mission. One exception to this trend was in Lower Shabelle region, where Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) contingents were able to foster reconciliation between the Biyomaal and Habr Gedir clans.

There was also the lack of cooperation and trust among UN member states responsible for organising and implementing essential coordination efforts which resulted in the responsibility falling upon AMISOM, the UK, the US, and the EU to act collectively. These entities specifically collaborated around Operation Badbaado in Lower Shabelle (Hashi & Barasa, 2023; Robinson, 2021), to share best practices, exchange information on clans, prevent redundant reconciliation efforts, and provide support to local authorities after recapturing territory from Al Shabaab.

These activities were intended to enable the delivery of services, establish social cohesion, and support the growth of new and legitimate governance structures. Stabilization has been hampered since the transition to ATMIS, as the Somali military now conducts most of its operations outside the AU forces' Area of Responsibility (AOR). This has posed challenges for implementing partners who rely on the AU for security.

Initially, one of AMISOM's key mandates was to protect those engaged in political reconciliation processes while degrading the influence and capabilities of AS and other armed groups (Williams, 2017). As the mission progressed, the AU and its partners realised there was a need to have a more proactive approach to ensure the protection of civilians.

The failure of the mission to sufficiently protect civilians affected its legitimacy amongst the Somali population, undermining its ability to achieve its mandate. For example, during the fighting in Mogadishu, AMISOM experienced a significant number of civilian casualties. In 2007 alone Amnesty International documented a total of 6,000 civilian deaths (RIGHTS, n.d.). In 2009, a total of 1,739 civilians lost their lives, this figure then rose to 2,200 in 2010, before subsequently declining to around 1,400 in 2011 (Williams, 2013c). This number continued to decline and by 2022, when AMISOM was terminated, there were only 952 casualties recorded (Sebe et al., 2022). The mission developed a comprehensive plan for the protection of civilians to mitigate the adverse impact on non-combatant communities (Bellamy & Williams, 2009; Williams, 2013b). The plan had three key pillars: prevention of physical violence; ensuring protection in line with human rights frameworks; and fostering a conducive environment for protection. In support of these objectives, AMISOM established Radio Bar-Kulan, disseminated publications, organised media training workshops,

produced video documentaries, and maintained AMISOM's official website to disseminate information about the protection of civilians.

In 2009, AMISOM was requested to support the drought response, but was unable to due to its military focus. Over time the mission would provide some humanitarian assistance though this was minimal and had no visible impact.[5] In general AMISOM was able to defeat Al Shabaab militarily in some areas but could not provide services to local communities through Quick Impact Projects (QIPS), due to a lack of funding.'[6] This was referred to in AMISOM as the "stabilisation dilemma" (Williams, 2013a).

With regard to capacity-building, AMISOM was supported by the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) to provide training in domains that were not encompassed by the evaluated funds. Areas of capacity support included: financial management and accountability; executive direction and management; information analysis; security; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). AMISOM delivered several initiatives aimed at enhancing organisational capabilities including: the acquisition of a secure facility for the Independent Media House in Mogadishu; the restoration of three districts in Mogadishu, demining; the provision of fuel for Radio Mogadishu; and the operation of generators in three civilian hospitals in Mogadishu.

Reflections on Why the AU has not Achieved their Mandate

This section explores the reasons why AU-led forces have not achieved their mandate of totally degrading Al Shabaab after close to 20 years of intervention. The reasons include: a limitation in the number of forces; logistical challenges; mistrust between the different partners of the mission; insufficient intelligence; a difficult relationship with the host government; and the complexities of clan-based politics in Somalia.

In the first instance, the AU encountered challenges and limitations as its forces were spread across a vast operational territory, making them vulnerable to attack. In the past, AMISOM placed excessive emphasis on territorial acquisition and protection of civilians rather than diminishing Al-Shabaab's fundamental military capabilities. As a former senior AU official put it "the forces of AMISOM

---

[5] Interview with Midih a former AMISOM Commander at Mbuya, November 2023.
[6] Interview with Sumba, a Somali Politician at Kololo September 2024.

experienced a state of over-demand, leading to difficulties in effectively mobilising local Somali troops, police, and administrators."[7]

AMISOM's attempts to implement an effective stabilisation strategy across south-central Somalia suffered from several political and operational challenges. The absence of a shared stabilization strategy between AMISOM and the Somali government was a major obstacle. The speed of AMISOM's military operations also far outpaced the capacity of potential stabilization responses. AMISOM's fragmented system of command and control also hampered stabilisation activities. Moreover, Al Shabaab was able to withdraw in the face of AMISOM's military superiority, blend with the population, and regroup. Crucial force enablers, such as military helicopters, never arrived. Finally, the SNA failed to play either a supporting or leading role in the fight against Al Shabaab. Delays in the recruitment of AU civilian personnel responsible for humanitarian assistance and the lack of a budget for these activities also undermined its role in this area (Daramola, 2015).

In terms of logistics, the AU-led forces have no direct control over logistical operations, as they are sourced from the United Nations and other streams of assistance. The AU must therefore maintain a strong working relationship with UNSOS as it has a constantly changing set of needs, such as the repair of partner-donated cars that lack their own maintenance capacity.

The AU and AMISOM encountered several obstacles in the execution of a comprehensive protection of civilians (POC) policy across their operations. These challenges stemmed from inconsistent intelligence and insufficient backing for a mandate that prioritised supporting the FGS. AMISOM initially recognised the significance of POC but did not prioritise it sufficiently. However, it persisted in carrying out military campaigns against Al Shabaab while striving to uphold its obligations under IHL.

The relationship between the AU and the host government was also occasionally characterised by tension. AU-Somalia relations took place at a number of levels. The first level was through the Somali government's engagements with key organs of the AU, including the AU Assembly. The Somali government also participated in AU Executive Council meetings, PSC meetings (when invited), and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC). The Somali government also engaged directly with the AUC and AMISOM. The AUC and the TFG established a committee at the level of the AUC Chairperson and the TFG President that was meant to review the mission's strategy, but this was

---

[7]Interview with Faye a Somali Researcher in Nairobi, February 2024

never operationalised. The first AMISOM representative to interact with the TFG in 2007 was the Force Commander, as the Special Representative of the Chairperson (SRCC) could not deploy to the country. When the SRCC deployed to Mogadishu, more extensive engagement with the TFG began. A legal agreement governed the deployment of AMISOM to Somalia, the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), which was signed between the TFG and the AU in March 2007 (Bowden, 2010).

The signing of a SOMA between the mandating organisation and the host nation is a decades-old tradition that the AU borrowed from the UN, which has extensive experience in managing, PSOs. The SOMA contained, amongst other things, references to the obligations of the parties and expectations on AMISOM personnel whilst on deployment. The AU and the FGS expressed a need to revise the SOMA that both parties had signed in 2007 to ensure that it accounted for the changing political situation in Somalia. To this end, a draft SOMA was developed but not adopted. Nonetheless, the FGS approved the draft SOMA when AMISOM transitioned into ATMIS in 2022.

Secondly, AMISOM's TCC composition meant it was perceived differently by the FGS and FMS. The FGS saw the presence of neighbouring states in AMISOM, responsible for their own specific sectors, as undermining FGS authority (Dribssa Beyene, 2018). The FGS was concerned that TCCs had previously provided support to regionally-based militia groups, which had become the basis for the newly established security apparatuses in the FMS. The FGS perceived that the TCCs influenced FMS political behaviour. The FMSs on the other hand, indicated that their existence, especially their security apparatus, was the result of the action of the TCCs not the FGS. As a result, AU forces were not viewed as a neutral arbiter in the FGS-FMS divide.

Thirdly, the FGS perceived that the Force Commander was unable to direct operations unless agreed to by the respective TCCs. An official from the African Union observed that, "Some of the TCCs posed a challenge. It was unclear where their authority and influence commenced and ended. The TCC – AMISOM relationship was not in sync. This was further complicated because some TCCs were deeply involved in local politics."[8]

A fourth challenges was that, the FGS insisted that all support to peace processes, including support from AMISOM, should always be managed through the FGS. By contrast, several FMSs were of the view that since they are the ones who had led on removing AS from their territory, the support should be provided directly to them.

---

[8] Interview with Bah an Official at the AU, Addis Ababa, October 2023.

Fifthly, amid contests between the FGS and FMSs, the presence of multiple competing entities vying for the attention of the FGS and FMS created tensions and hindered unity of purpose among the various partners providing support. AMISOM was also caught up in these tensions. Somalia is plagued by severe divides amongst its political actors, which complicates the process of developing a single clear aim and strategy. The different international powers supporting Somalia – such as the US, Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar – also have their disagreements. Combined with the pervasive use of money from international actors, such as the Gulf countries, this creates unpredictability where no political position, no interest or no alliance is set in stone.

When the AMISOM police component started providing assistance to their counterparts, it had to contend with different and sometimes contradictory instructions from the FGS and from the FMS. This resulted the support being redirected or cancelled altogether. In this regard, AMISOM conducted its activities caught between contradictions instructions between the FGS and the FMSs.

The FGS has gone on to indicate that it no longer needs the AU police component in subsequent missions, and believes that they do not add value to the reconstruction of the Somalia Police Force. An official from the Somali government noted that, "AMISOM Police have never done any good work here in Somalia. Policing is a local state function, and AU Police don't need to have boots on the ground. They should confine their duties to providing advice and nothing beyond that."[9]

The FGS has also expressed reservations or downright hostility towards the AMISOM civilian component. According to FGS officials interviewed by the researchers, AMISOM was a strictly military operation and did not need a civilian component. They argue that the civilian component suggested that AMISOM was interfering in the affairs of Somalia: "The civilians in AMISOM went too far and were thinking of replacing the host nation with NGOs."[10] Subsequent FGS administrations have declared quite a number of AMISOM civilians' staff, including the Head of Mission, *persona non grata*.

The view that the AMISOM civilian component was not required was common in the mission area and even within AMISOM. Some contingent commanders quietly expressed their unease about the presence of civilians in the mission area and attributed their presence to the slowdown of military

---

[9] Interview with Hajj a Somali Government Official, at Mogadishu, September 2023.
[10] Interview with Meseh a Commander from the SNA at Mogadishu, September 2023.

operational tempo, especially after 2016. In their view, this slowdown was due to the change of command of the mission from the Force Commander in the early days to the presence of the SRCC in the latter part of AMISOM's life.

The lack of visibility of an overall AU political strategy pertaining to Somalia caused a significant deficiency in solidifying the authority of AMISOM and delineating it's aims in the political space in Somalia. The lack of capacity of the political office at Mission Headquarters compounded this. This was further complicated by the presence of AMISOM TCCs, whose objectives were not necessarily in tandem with that of the AU. This also reinforced the view from the host nation that AMISOM was purely a military operation and should not play a role to play in the political space.

Another challenge identified was the strategic approach adopted in the operation in Somalia. A diplomat from the AU in Somalia noted that, "the whole mission in Somalia is based on the clear-hold-build (CHB) strategy."[11] One of the main elements of this approach was its objective that the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), including the SNA, would take over areas cleared of AS. The clearance of these areas would be done jointly by AMISOM and the SNSF, thus ensuring that when the area is cleared, the SNSF will hold the area. However, the absence of an adequate follow-on presence from host nation complicated the implementation of the CHB strategy, resulting in some areas falling back to armed opposition groups.

The complexity of clan politics of Somalia also led to a lack of cohesion and unity of purposes in the SNA, which impacted their ability to hold the ground after clearance operations. "The lack of political agreements amongst the political elite has affected SNSF cohesion. There was an incident where the 14th October SNA Brigade had, in a cleared area, deployed a different clan from another area and the SNA was attacked and their members killed. This was not an attack by AS but by other clans."[12]

The low levels of trust between AMISOM and the FGS further complicated the relationship between AMISOM and the host nation: "The first form of interaction between AMISOM and the SNSF in joint planning and operations in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Notwithstanding the provisions in the CONOPs and the assertion of some Somali respondents that the SNA constitutes the first line of offence in AMISOM's military campaigns, most military operations are not always conducted jointly. Several factors are cited for this, including the limited number of SNA soldiers that have been

---

[11] Interview with Drabs a diplomat from the AU, Mogadishu, September 2023.
[12] Interview with Augus, ATMIS Commander, in Nairobi, 31 October 2023

sufficiently trained to fight, the problem of limited communications and military equipment for joint offensive operations, and a lack of trust between some of AMISOM's TCCs and the SNA/SNSF" (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017).

Conclusion

After nearly twenty years of intervention under different tittles, the African Union-led forces have not succeeded in totally degrading and eliminating the threat posed by Al Shabaab and establishing a stable security environment in Somalia. Al Shabaab itself remains strong and, if not contained, can easily overrun the security provided by the SNSF. The country continues to require foreign security assistance, as the state is not yet prepared to assume full security responsibilities. Even when there were attempts to transfer the responsibilities to the Somali National Forces, they are generally not battle ready and have often fled the frontlines to save their lives from the encroaching militants. Going forward, AU-led forces in Somalia and their collaborators must redirect their efforts towards enhancing the capabilities of the Somali national security forces and establishing robust governance institutions. This would ensure the long-term sustainability of efforts towards resolving the intractable conflict. Despite previous gains in offensive operations, certain gains have proven to be precarious and have been steadily eroded after the transition from AMISOM into ATMIS.

Creating a strong, militarily effective Somali army should be a prerequisite for the withdrawal of AU forces. Unfortunately, efforts for a coherent and unified security sector remain futile. What prevails is better characterized as a "security arena" with several spaces for contestation between security actors with competing interests and shifting alliances. Strong Somali Security Forces, with the capacity to sustain combat operations over the long-term and maintain the monopoly of violence would in turn sustain a unified political settlement encompassing all Somalis. As much as the mission made significant progress, much remains to be addressed. We therefore recommend that stakeholders responding to the insurgency should shift their focus to the political strategy for entering a national political bargain, replace the commitment to armed struggle with a political engagement, and ultimately allow Somalia's future to be shaped by Somalis and not by foreign interests, as seems to be the case today.

Acknowledgements

Declaration of Interest Statement

The authors have reported no potential conflict of interest.

Biographical Note

Jacqueline Nakaiza holds a Ph.D from Makerere University, Uganda. Her research interests primarily focus on resolving terrorist insurgencies but specifically negotiating a peaceful end to the protracted insurgency in Somalia; militaries and security, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), gender specifically motherhood for female peacekeepers, women in the military and UN Security Council Resolution 1325; silencing the guns, conflict transformation and sustainable peace. She is a 2021 Next Generation Women in International Security.

Charlotte Karungi Mafumbo is a Lecturer at Makerere University and a distinguished scholar, practitioner and an expert in policy development on women, peace and security, counter terrorism, violent extremism, human rights and peacebuilding across various cultural and organizational contexts. She holds a Ph.D. (University of Cape Town), a Master of International Studies (University of Sydney), Postgraduate Certificate in Gender and Armed Conflict Studies, (Hannover University), and Postgraduate Diploma in Social Conditions and Policies of Copenhagen University, and a Bachelor of Arts in Art of Makerere University. She is a 2012 Global South Scholar of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. She has published several journal articles, book chapters, and several consultancy reports and is the current head of Department of History, Archaeology and Heritage Studies of Makerere University.

Zaid Sekito is a Lecturer in the Department of History, Archaeology and Heritage Studies, College of Humanities and Social Sciences (CHUSS), Makerere University. He holds a BA Education (History / Economics), MA in History (Political Economy), and a PhD in History (Terrorism Studies) from Makerere University. His PhD thesis examined how contests over the definition,

conceptualisation and deployment of 'terrorism' in global geopolitics are integrated within the Ugandan state's strategic security position and Uganda's experiences of terrorist violence from the late 1970s until 2015. Zaid is an alumnus of The Gerda Henkel Foundation Doctoral Fellowship (2017-2021), Next-Gen Dissertation Completion Fellow (2020), alumnus African Research Universities Alliance (ARUA) Early Career Researcher (2022), British Academy Writing Fellow (2023), Archiving Memory and Method (AMM) from the Global South Researcher (2022-2024), and APN Post-Doctoral Fellow (2024) and a Carnegie II Post-Doctoral Fellow under the Consolidating Early Career Academic Programme at Makerere University and Partner Universities. Zaid also Coordinates Graduate Studies at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Makerere University.

ORCID ID:

Jacqueline NAKAIZA - https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7004-5923
Charlotte Karungi MAFUMBO - https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3034-9219
Zaid SEKITO - https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6744-5800

References

Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *42*(1), 3–32.

Adam, H. M. (1992). Somalia: Militarism, warlordism or democracy? *Review of African Political Economy*, *19*(54), 11–26.

African Union. (2013a). *REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)* (PSC/PR/2(CCCLVI); p. 30). African Union. https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/8272

African Union. (2013b). *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the joint AU-UN benchmarking exercise and the review of the African Union mission in Somalia* (PSC/PR/2 (CCCXCIX)). African Union Peace and Security Council. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-rpt-399-amisom-09-10-2013.pdf

African Union Peace and Security Council. (2012). *Communique* (PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCVI)). African Union. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/306th-psc-communique-on-amisom-strategic-concept1-eng-05-01-12.pdf

Anderson, N. (2014). Peacekeepers fighting a counterinsurgency campaign: A net assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *37*(11), 936–958.

Anzalone, C. (2016). The resilience of al-Shabaab. *CTC Sentinel*, *9*(4), 13–20.

Anzalone, C. (2018). Black Banners in Somalia: The State of al-Shabaab's Territorial Insurgency and the Specter of the Islamic State. *CTC Sentinel*, *11*(3), 12–18.

ATMIS. (2022, April 1). *The Transition Process*. ATMIS. https://atmis-au.org/the-transition-process/

Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D. (2009). Protecting civilians in uncivil wars. *Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*.

Beswick, D. (2010). Peacekeeping, regime security and 'African solutions to African problems': Exploring motivations for Rwanda's involvement in Darfur. *Third World Quarterly*, *31*(5), 739–754.

Beswick, D. (2014). The risks of African military capacity building: Lessons from Rwanda. *African Affairs*, *113*(451), 212–231.

Boutin, B., Pitcher, K., & Güven, O. (2016). Year in Review 2015. *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 18, 2015*, 225–286.

Bowden, M. (2010). *Black Hawk down: A story of modern war*. Grove/Atlantic, Inc.

Bruton, B. E. (2010). *Somalia: A new approach* (Issue 52). Council on Foreign Relations.

Bryden, M. (2014). The reinvention of al-Shabaab. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, *12*.

Bryman, A. (2016). *Social research methods*. Oxford university press.

Daramola, O. A. (2015). *The African Union's peace mission initiative in Somalia: Focus on the collaboration of the stakeholders*.

Dawson, C. (2019). *Introduction to research methods 5th edition: A practical guide for anyone undertaking a research project*. Hachette UK.

De Waal, A. (2015). *The real politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, war and the business of power*. John Wiley & Sons.

De Waal, A. (2020). Somalia's disassembled state: Clan unit formation and the political marketplace. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *20*(5), 561–585.

Dribssa Beyene, A. (2018). *The security sector reform paradox in Somalia*. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103683/

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2020). Death of international organizations. The organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–2015. *The Review of International Organizations*, *15*(2), 339–370.

Evans, G., & Sahnoun, M. (2002). The responsibility to protect. *Foreign Affairs*, 99–110.

Fisher, J. (2019). AMISOM and the Regional Construction of a Failed State in Somalia. *African Affairs*, *118*(471), 285–306.

Freear, M., & De Coning, C. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, *2*(2), 23–23.

Garad, A. (2025). *The outsourced interventions of the west: Why has the international community not brought about a viable state in Somalia after more than two decades of engagement?*

Hashi, M. B., & Barasa, T. (2023). Enhancing federal inter-governmental relations and state building in Somalia. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, *10*(1), 1–10.

Hendrickson, R. C. (2002). *The Clinton wars: The constitution, congress, and war powers*. Vanderbilt University Press.

Hesse, B. J. (2015). Why deploy to Somalia? Understanding six African countries' reasons for sending soldiers to one of the world's most failed states. *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, *6*(3–4), 329–352.

Jackson, P. (2014). African Union. In *Handbook of Governance and Security* (pp. 519–537). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Kellar, K. R. (2024). *Examining the Factors that Contribute to the Survival and Resilience of the Al-Shabaab Terrorist Organization*.

Little, A. T., & Zeitzoff, T. (2017). A bargaining theory of conflict with evolutionary preferences. *International Organization*, *71*(3), 523–557.

Mafumbo, C. K., Nakaiza, J., & Sekito, Z. (2024). African Solutions to African Problems: Political Sloganeering or African Renaissance? In *Mobility, Identity and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Resources Belong to the People* (pp. 15–38). Springer.

Majid, N., Sarkar, A., Elder, C., Abdirahman, K., Detzner, S., Miller, J., & De Waal, A. (2021). *Somalia's politics: The usual business? A synthesis paper of the Conflict Research Programme*.

Marchal, R. (2007). Warlordism and terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia. *International Affairs*, *83*(6), 1091–1106.

Menkhaus, K. (2007). The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts. *African Affairs*, *106*(424), 357–390.

Møller, B. (2009a). *The African Union as a security actor: African solutions to African problems?*

Møller, B. (2009b). *The Somali conflict: The role of external actors* (Issue 2009: 03). DIIS report.

Muibu, D. (2024). Somalia's Stalled Offensive Against al-Shabaab: Taking Stock of Obstacles. *CTC Sentinel*, *17*(2), 18–26.

Nakaiza, J. (n.d.). The Evolving Nature of Foreign Intervention in the Al-Shabab Insurgency in Somalia. *About The Afsol Journal*, 32.

Namatovu, R. E. (2023). *CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITY FORCE TRANSITIONS DURING INSURGENCIES: CASE STUDY: SOMALIA*.

Onditi, F., Ben-Nun, G., Were, E. M., & Nyaburi Nyadera, I. (2021). African Union-Led Peace Support Operations. In *Reimagining Security Communities: Systems Thinking Approach for Africa* (pp. 209–245). Springer.

Ottoh, F. O. (2017). A New Perspective in Continental Conflict and Security Management. *Regenerating Africa: Bringing African Solutions to African Problems*, 305.

Pham, J. P. (2013). *State collapse, insurgency, and counterinsurgency: Lessons from Somalia*.

Regens, J. L., Mould, N., Sartorius, C. M., & O'Dell, J. (2016). Effect of foreign military intervention and controlled territory on the operational tempo of al-Shabaab attacks. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, *9*(1–3), 95–107.

Reno, W. (2012). The regionalization of African security. *Current History*, *111*(745), 175.

RIGHTS, A. (n.d.). *AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2012 THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS*.

Robinson, C. D. (2021). Rebuilding armies in southern Somalia: What currently should donors realistically aim for? *Conflict, Security & Development*, *21*(3), 313–336.

Robinson, C. D. (2024). *As ATMIS looks to withdraw, the risk of large-scale al-Shabaab success in southern Somalia is high*.

Rosand, E., Millar, A., Ipe, J., & Healey, M. (2022). *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional and Subregional Bodies: Strengthening a Critical Partnership*. Global Center on Cooperative Security.

Rwengabo, S. (2018). *Security Cooperation in the East African Community*. Africa World Press.

Schneider, E. R. (2021). *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF AL-SHABAAB SINCE ITS INCEPTION: A REVIEW UTILIZING RATIONAL CHOICE AND STRATEGIC THEORY*.

Sebe, M., Anghelescu, A.-M. A., Grosu, I., & Pădureanu, M.-A. (2022). *African and Romanian perspectives on consolidating the European Union: African Union partnership*. EIR Working Papers Series.

Skjelderup, M. W. (2020). Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures: Al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, *31*(6), 1174–1195.

Sweet, J., & Toth, M. (2025, January 4). Somalia is on the verge of being overrun. Will Trump respond? *The Hill*. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5223813-somalia-is-on-the-verge-of-being-overrun-will-trump-respond/

Turbiville, G., Meservey, J., & Forest, J. (2014). *Countering the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for US special operations forces*. JSOU Press.

United Nations. (2007). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007) Authorising the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). *International Peacekeeping*, *14*(5), 675–678. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701845093

UNSC. (2022, March 31). *Resolution 2628 (2022*. UN Security Council. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2628(2022)

UNSC Resolution 2767. (2024). Security Council Endorses New African Union Support Mission in Somalia. (2024, December 27). *UN Press*. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15955.doc.htm

Veney, C. R. (n.d.). A Sustainable US Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Promoting Human Rights, Development, and the Rule of Law. *Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa*, 173–190.

Warner, J., & Weiss, C. (2017). A legitimate challenger? Assessing the rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. *CTC Sentinel*, *10*(10), 27–32.

Wendy, W. (2023). *Reclaiming Al Shabaab's Revenue*. Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/reclaiming-al-shabaabs-revenue/

Westerwinter, O. (2014). *The politics of transnational institutions: Power, bargaining and institutional choice*.

Williams, P. D. (2008). Keeping the peace in Africa: Why "African" solutions are not enough. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *22*(3), 309–329.

Williams, P. D. (2009). Into the Mogadishu maelstrom: The African Union mission in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(4), 514–530.

Williams, P. D. (2013a). Fighting for peace in Somalia: AMISOM's seven strategic challenges. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, *17*(3–4), 222–247.

Williams, P. D. (2013b). The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, *2*. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bz

Williams, P. D. (2013c). The African Union mission in Somalia and civilian protection challenges. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, *2*(2), 39–39.

Williams, P. D. (2016). AMISOM under Review. *The RUSI Journal, 161*(1), 40–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1152120

Williams, P. D. (2018a). *Fighting for peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*. Oxford University Press.

Williams, P. D. (2018b). Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *12*(1), 172–192.

Williams, P. D., & Boutellis, A. (2014). Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship. *African Affairs*, *113*(451), 254–278.

Williams, P. D., D'Alessandro, M., Darkwa, L., Helal, A., Machakaire, J., & Rupesinghe, N. (2018). Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). *EPON Report*.

Williams, P. D. (2017). The ambiguous place of civilian protection in the African Union Mission in Somalia. *CIVILIANS IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: Key Cases And*, 48.

Wondemagegnehu, D. Y., & Kebede, D. G. (2017). AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions. *African Security Review*, *26*(2), 199–219.