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## Editorial Note

With this first issue of Volume 3 No.1 of JADS, we are pleased to welcome Dr. Hailemichael Aberra; Professor M.P Van Dijk; Mr. Aloysius N. Bongwa;Dr Jana Zehel; and Professor Dr Wolfgang Jutee as the new advisory Board members. In this issue there are three articles capturing topical issues of interest to scholars, practicing managers and policy makers in Africa.

The first contribution, by Christophe Van der Beken, offers a comparative analysis of the nine regional constitutions of Ethiopia. By doing so, he explores an area of Ethiopian constitutional law which has largely remained undiscovered. Although the federal constitution offers the framework and sets the limits for regional constitutional autonomy, the regions have been left with considerable autonomy in determining form and content of their constitutions. Regions have for instance a significant degree of discretion in designing their institutional and administrative structures. When comparing all aspects of the state constitutions, the author observes similarities, but also identifies some notable differences. The major differences are to be found in the area of local government where specific institutions are often created to deal with intra-regional ethnic diversity. As such, the state constitutions play an important role in achieving unity in diversity at regional state level. Hence, although the regions might not have fully exhausted their constitutional autonomy, the regional constitutions do reflect specific features of the respective regions for which they have been designed.

The second contribution is by Seyoumore focusing on Sub-Sahara Africa Economic Growth and Past Foreign Experience deals with the effects of the colonial experience on contemporary economic growth in Africa. Mr. Seyoumore examines the poor growth performance of African countries due to corruption, internal conflict, and external tension. Colonial experience

can be measured in different ways--language. borders. regions. etc--that still influence the way Africa relates to the rest of the world. Here. colonial experience is measured by colonial occupation--for the English. the French. the Germans and the Portuguese. All the countries with the exception of French appear to have had a positive effect on economic growth. But in terms of efficiency in transforming resources into output, the results were mixed. When efficiency is measured in terms of the capital-labor ratio. the colonial experience seems to have been positive.

The third contribution is entitled Determinants of Household Poverty taking Gondar city as a case and is authored by Getachew and Samson. The authors in their article identified the determinants of urban poverty in Gonder city in Amhara region of Ethiopia. The data for the study was obtained mainly from cross-sectional survey conducted in Gondar city in 2009. A total of 240 sampled heads of the household were selected by systematic random sampling from all twelve urban Kebeles. Food Energy Intake (FEI) method was used to calculate food poverty line. whereas Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) approach was employed to estimate total poverty line. The analysis for poverty indices result shows a head count poverty of 32.9 %. a poverty gap of 0.0704 and poverty severity indices of 0.0225. Moreover. different households are classified as either poor or non poor on the basis of the poverty line. According ly. the results show that household size and number of sick household members significantly explain the variations in the likelihood of being poor. Moreover. households receiving remittances and getting higher monthly income are more likely to exit from the poverty trap. Employment sector also significantly explains the possibility of going out of the poor household group.

Before concluding. we would like to express our infinite gratitude to the anonymous reviewers. who give a fundamental contribution to the papers' publication: especially. we would like to thank the authors who decided to disseminate their work and thoughts through our Journal.

The Editor-in-Chief

# Sub-Saharan Africa Economic Growth and Past Foreign Experience

## Seymour Patterson*

*Abstract: The paper examines the relationship between colonial experience, corruption, political instability and economic growth. The methodology is based on a standard neo-classical production function that was expanded to include dummy variables for English, French, German and Portuguese effects on economic growth. The paper also considers the effects of the colonial experience on efficiency measured by the capital-labor ratio and by the error variable from the regressing per capita GDP on the capital-labor ratio. The results were mixed for the capital-labor ratio and positive for the error coefficients. Sub-Saharan African SSA is rife with political instability, corruption, and slow economic growth that might be a reflection the legacy of the colonial powers. The study demonstrates that the colonial presence had some effects on political instability and corruption. Economic growth is explained by capital-labor ratio, and colonial presence with mixed results. We infer from the empirical results that capital deepening is important to economic growth in SSA and that former colonial powers exert a lingering mixed influence on economic performance. Given that, the paper recommends SSA seek ways to increase their capital-labor mix and to purpose policies that reduce political instability and corruption as a strategy for long-term economic growth.*

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## Introduction

The historical experience of a country with foreign occupation might have effects on the political and economic decisions it pursues today. Some countries benefited from the transmission of technical and administrative knowledge of colonial powers to a larger extent than others did. Bertocchi and Canova (1998) consider empirically the relationship between economic growth and colonial heritage and find colonial heritage explain differences in economic growth when it is measure by "the identity of the metropolitan ruler and by the degree of market penetration."

The modern effects of a colonial experience was addressed by Gennaili and Rainer (2007) that showed precolonial centralization made local chiefs more accountable, which improved the provision of public goods. Bertocchi and Canova (1998) discuss economic growth, while Gennaili and Rainer talk about the distribution of income, i.e., the provision of public goods. According to Barro (1991), 1996) political instability (such as ethnic tensions and internal conflict) can reduce economic growth through its effects on investment. Some writers maintain that corruption by reduce economic growth (Tullock 1996).

Colonial powers in Africa of their culture—language is perhaps the most palpable legacy. However, their colonial presence also left other intangible and tangible practices—work habit, commercialism, and political orientation. Nevertheless, the most egregious legacy must be the creation of artificial national boundaries that forced together different ethnic groups. This also set the stage for recent conflicts along ethnic fragmentation lines. In turn, these tensions find manifestations in political instability and corruption.

This paper examines the effects of colonial influence of the British, French, German, and Portuguese on economic performance in their former colonies indirectly through corruption and conflict. It examines empirically the links between the colonial experience on political instability and corruption and economic growth. That is, whether implicitly the flag of the occupying nation matters for subsequent economic and political performance.

The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: Section II talks briefly about the former colonial presence in sub-Saharan Africa of the English, the French, the Germans and the Portuguese; Section III deals with the political framework African countries took on perhaps because of foreign culture which was overlaid on the native cultural values;

Section IV deals with the methodology for analyzing cultural influence on economic growth; Section V describes and discusses the data; Section VI contains the empirical results; Section VII offers the summary and conclusion of the paper; and finally, Section XIII provides some policy recommendations.

## Colonial Legacy

Do different approaches to colonial administration influence the behavior of native Africans after the departure of the colonial powers? The four powers this paper will consider are the English, the French, the Germans and the Portuguese. These powers were not monolithic. Hence, each colonial power implemented practices and policies differently.

This might have affected political instability, corrupt practices and economic growth differentially. While no effort is made to examine the actual cultural, political, and administrative practices of foreign occupiers, we believe the occupiers left lasting impressions behind.

If these systems made possible the appearance of multiparty democratic structures one could make the case that they created benefits to post-colonial African societies.

These societies obtained benefits because Western views of individual freedom, responsibility, and accountability, which

are conducive to development. Quinn (2003, p. 247) has also shown that multiparty regimes on average outperformed authoritarian regimes in every category such GDP growth, saving, inflation, and illiteracy.

We are interested in knowing if the presence of Europeans in Africa planted the seeds for the poor performance of post-colonial Africa and whether the transition from colonial rule to native rule created a vacuum of values and skills that explains the present state of African performance. Quinn (2003, p. 235) notes the decolonization can equally likely be replaced with any structure – authoritarian or democratic.

This seems to be true no matter the level of income, the existence and strength of the civil society, or the presence of a business class (bourgeoisie). While this paper will not pursue this line of inquiry, there is popular strain of political thinking that argues democracies performance better than non-democracies; and that democracies don't fight each. The implication for external stability is clear.

## Instability and corruption

There is a degree of simultaneity between democracy variables and growth variables. Democracy is a Western attribute with institutions that promote a non-separable bundle of goods such as free and fair elections, the rule of law regarding freedom, choice, and property; and defines and protects individual and property rights in an environment of security and certainty that rewards the economy with faster economic growth. The better performance of multiparty systems, and open (vs. closed), individual (vs. state) and market (vs. planned) economies has been alluded to before [see Quinn (2003); Scully 1988)].

A pro-growth government head of state is less likely to be forcefully removed from office or be assassinated. Further, Barro (1991) and Barro and Lee (1994), and Easterly and Levine (1997) have shown that political instability can have a negative effect on investment. That is, political instability reduces investment and because it can lead to speculative behavior that undermines investment: speculation about the exchange rate and foreign direct investment restraints, or causes hoarding in anticipation of price inflation. For economic growth to take place, there must be an environment that is conducive to human and physical capital, and technological accumulation. Scully (1988) showed that the type of institutional framework adopted by a country influences economic growth in different ways. In countries where the government defines and protects individual freedoms and property rights, growth tends, on average, to be greater than in countries where those freedoms

and rights are proscribed. That is, the political system that provides security and certainty of property and guarantees the private ownership of property is one in which investment will be encouraged.

Gyimah-Brempong (1991) discusses the issue of simultaneity by noting that political instability not only reduces growth by having a negative impact of productivity, but also by "reducing the accumulation of productive resources and retarding technical progress" thereby reducing economic growth. However, the direction of causality includes not only the effects of political instability on growth but also the effects of growth on political instability. In Africa, people have been powerless to change a government that was responsible for poor economic performance. Opportunities to bring about change in government through the ballot box were small. Therefore, people had to resort to violence to remove an incumbent government with which they were not pleased. This is an explanation for instabilities. Internal conflict in Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, the Congo (recently, Marshall Law), etc., has had adverse effects on economic performance in these countries. Policymakers cannot hope to attract foreign investment to an environment of such high risk. Where internal conflict exists, governments are constantly forced to allocate resources to address these conflicts, diverting such

resources away from otherwise productive uses.

Moreover, political instability might be a manifestation according to Easterly and Levine (1997) of "a more fundamental country characteristic: ethnic divisions." Is the colonial experience of African countries an explanation of the political instability and today's causes of poor performance in Africa? In addition, Devereaux and Wen's (1996) argue that the prospects of higher taxes can cause capital flight, lower investment and slower economic growth. Growth takes place in an environment of peace.

Democracies don't fight each other. President Bill Clinton 1994 State of the Union address said, "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.

Democracies don't attack each other, they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy." However, White (2005) provides a long list of instances over many years of democracies at war. Anyway, Edwards and Tabellini (1991) talk about political instability and weakened government, and the stability of democratic governments. Freedom, prosperity and peace and lead to economic growth. Liberal democracies stand on three virtues: freedom, prosperity and peace. There appears to be

a strong demand for free and fair elections and the protections of individual liberties around the world. Some countries feel that force is justified to achieve the benefits of democracy— peace and prosperity. Corruption, in particular bribery, can increase delays in a queue so that a public official can extort more bribes; but corruption can also speed up the queue (Lui 1996). If corrupt practices allocate resources to people who value them the most, efficiency might increase by moving such people from the end to the head of the queue. Corruption might raise efficiency when (1) payment of speed money avoids bureaucratic delays and (2) government workers who receive bribes with a wink and a nod from the government, may be induced to work harder (Mauro, 1995). Efforts to reduce corruption might not increase efficiency; the incidence of corruption might decline; yet its overall cost might not. Fewer instances of corrupt practices with large side payments would replace more frequent instances of corruption behavior with smaller side payments each.

Although some writers say emphatically that corruption reduces growth (Braguinsky 1996 and Tullock 1996), others (Lui 1996 and Mauro 1995) are less sanguine. Reforming a culture of corruption has both political costs and benefits. If the political cost of income redistribution exceeds the net benefits,

reform of corruption (measures to eliminate it) will be suspended (Rodrik 1992). Therefore, corruption is persistent. Colonization might have had something to do with this.

## Methodology

The second hypothesis of this paper is that the differential effects of foreign occupation can influence the degree of efficiency with which a country can transform inputs into output. We assume a simple neoclassical production function that is homogenous of degree one, twice differentiable—whose marginal products are positive but diminishing. Real output per unit of labor can be expressed as

$$y = f(k) = k^a \qquad (1)$$

where y is output per unit of labor, and k is the capital-labor ratio.

Differentiating equation (1) and dividing through by real output Y yields

$$g_y = e_k g_k \qquad (2)$$

where $g_y$ denotes the growth rate of output, and $e_k$ is the output elasticity of the capital-labor ratio, and $g_k$ is the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio. Equation (2) states that growth and higher growth rates of labor will lead to higher growth rates of real output. Some countries will be more efficient in transforming inputs into output. The efficiency with which they accomplish this depends in part on the legacy of their colonial experience. This experience will have an effect on political stability and

the level corruption both of which suppress capital formation and output growth. The likelihood of output suppression was increased by the artificial creation of African borders that forced different ethnic groups of live together, and by favoring one ethnic group with better education and civil service and administrative jobs, thus undermining the efficiency of human capital and reducing its formation. Scully (1988) offers a fuller discussion of the idea of an efficiency frontier. However, for our purpose here suppose there is an efficiency benchmark such as $f(k)^*$ equals $y^*$. Actual output per capita of labor for some countries will exceed $f(k)^*$--i.e. will be efficient at transforming inputs into output; others will be below $f(k)^*$ and will not be efficient at making this transformation. For efficiency, we assume each country has the same capital-labor ratio. A country's efficiency ratio, $f(k)/f(k)^*$, runs the gamut from $(0 < f(k)/f(k)^* \leq 1)$. Thus, a very inefficient country's production is close to zero, but an efficient country's output will be close to or equal to $f(k)^*$. The efficiency ratio can be written as

$$ER = f(k)/f(k) \qquad (3)$$

Efficiency is measured as the residual from equation (2), on the assumption that $y \leq f(k)$ where the probability is $p(y \leq f(k)$. In the Solow growth model,

technical efficiency leads to long-term growth. At steady-state equilibrium, investment—$sf(k)$ equals the $(n+d)k$—the product of the sum of the population growth and the depreciation rate times the capital-labor ratio.

Thus, an increase in the saving rate would lead to an increase per capita output in the short-run, but in the long-run per capita output growth would revert to the population growth rate n. On the other hand, an increase in the population growth rate will cause per capita output to decline; capital widening would result with an accompanying decline in labor productivity. However, the inclusion of technology in the model, with no change in the capital-labor ratio, would cause per capita output to rise. With k unchanging and $sf(\theta_1) > sf(\theta_0)$ (where $\theta$ is technology in period 0 and 1), the difference in per capita output is due to differences in technology.

The economic growth in per capita output shown in equation (2) will be affected by the presence of different colonial legacies of qualities or characteristics that are peculiar to the British, French, German and Portuguese, and others.

To the degree that the powers implemented their colonial administration policies differentially on the colonies' cultural, political, and socioeconomic propensities, they created a framework

In which technical efficiency will be manifested differentially, too. If so, we can expect to observe differences in economic growth because of the different influences of colonial powers on the countries they colonized.

Connecting Political Instability and Corruption to GDP growth

Since corruption and political instability (measured as ethnic tension and internal conflict) have a negative effect on GDP. What needs to be shown is how colonial experience (measure by geographic location—where they ruled; and language spoken) relates to today corruption and instability. To make this link, we make political instability and corruption functions of colonial experience, and thus we can write $PI$=f(colonial experience) and therefore $COR$ = f(colonial experience), where PI = political instability—ethnic tension ($ETHT$) and internal conflict ($INTC$), $COR$ = corruption. Next, we show the connection between $PI$ and $COR$ to GDP per capita $PCGDP$. This gives us the following:

$$PCGDP = g(PI, COR)$$
$$= g(ETHT, INTC, COR) \quad (4)$$

where $ETHT$=f(colonial experience), $INTC$=f(colonial experience), and $COR$=f(colonial experience). It follows that by substituting the expression on the RHS of equation (4) into equation (5), we have a connection between GDP and political instability. Thus,

$$PCGDP = g(ETHT, INTC, COR) \quad (5)$$

The growth equation to be estimated is equation (2) augmented to include dummy variables for the colonial experiences.

$$LPCGDP = a_0 + a_1 LCAPLBR + a_i DUM_i + u_k \quad (6)$$

where $LPCGDP$ is the logarithm of real GDP per capita, $LCAPLBR$ is the logarithm of capital-labor ratio, and $DUM_i$ is the dummy variable for colonial, respectively, ($i=ED$, $FD$, and $PD$) for English , French, German and Portuguese, used to country dummies to capture colonial powers effects on the countries the occupied. Finally, $u_{it}$ is a stochastic error term. In neoclassical growth theory, increases in the capital and labor are expected to increase the growth rate of output. Thus, the coefficient of the capital-labor ($LCAPLBR$) ratio variable is expected to be positive. The effects on economic growth and efficiency of the remaining variables $ED$, $FD$, and $GD$ cannot be ascertained a priori. Some general inquiry about administrative styles and treatment of the indigenous population might inform some thesis about their secular effects on public policy choices and on the countries' propensities to grow.

## *Data*

Equation (4) shows the relationships between economic growth, the capital-labor ratio, and the colonial experience. The economic data come from a sample of 20 African countries used in the estimation of the model for the period covering 1982 to 2002, which were determined by the availability of economic data (from WDI 2008/2009) and the identification of African countries that were under colonial rule, from IPOAA. These countries are listed in Appendix 1. The data on ethnic tensions, internal conflict, and corruption come from Howell (1998, The Handbook (p. 235-242). For each country, the data represent assigned points to each variable. For example, government stability is assigned a maximum of 12 points, the ethnic tensions variable is given 6 points, and the internal conflict variable has a maximum value of 12. If points award to a variable is less than 50 percent of the total, that variable is considered as very high risk, but if points are 50 to 60 percent they are considered as high risk, 70 to 80 percent as moderate risk, and 80 to 100 as low risk. This means that low values of external government stability, ethnic tensions, and internal conflict mean high risk and high values low risk.

An alternative and popular source of corruption indexes is Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index/Bribe Payers Index where countries are ranked by the "'degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians,'" and corruption is defined as "the abuse of public office for private gains."

Here, the corruption variable has a value between 0 and 6. Low numbers for corruption for a country mean high levels of corruption in that country and high numerical values of the corruption variable denote low country corruption. The coefficient of the corruption variable in the regression of economic growth rate is expected to be negative, although some researchers argue it might be positive. Howell (1998) data for corruption were used in this study for consistency with ethnic tension and internal conflict that were also available in The Handbook.

The data for gross domestic product (GDP), capital (from gross capital formation), and labor (proxied by population) come from the World Development Indictors 2004. The logarithm of GDP and the capital-labor ratio were found to get growth rates outcomes in the regressions. In general where variable was a ratio the logarithm was not taken except for the capital-labor ratio. The data for GDP in is constant 1995 dollars for the period 1982-2002. Capital can be calculated using the

perpetual inventory method—$K_t = (1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t$, where depreciation $\delta$ is 4 percent a year from O'Connell and Ndulu (2000). Alternatively in terms of per capita income where k is the capital-labor ratio, sy=gross investment, theta is depreciation rate and n the population growth rate, we have $dk_t = sy-(n+\delta)k_{t-1}$.

Since the change is dk=0, capital was found for the initial year 1982 by assuming that gross investment is equal ·to net investment plus the rate of "depreciation" of capital. Since in this case gross investment will equal replacement investment, then dividing gross investment by the sum of population and depreciation growth rates $(n+\delta)$ yields the initial capital stock. Depreciation is assumed to be four percent. Population growth rates are from World Development Indicators 2004.

The source of the colonial experience dummy variables information is IPOAA Magazine, Who negative and significant at all levels of significance. It seems the French and Portuguese presence in Africa cannot explain the level of corruption in SSA countries. Comparing the standardized coefficients for each variable, we find that German dummy had greater positive impact on corruption than the English dummy; and the Portuguese dummy had a smaller negative impact than the French dummy on corruption. With respect to ethnic tensions, a negative effect on efficiency.

*As for the LCAPLBR variable, Table 3 shows that the coefficients of ED is significant at the one percent level of significance, but, FD and GD are significant at all levels of significance and their sign is positive. All the* coefficients of the colonial experience for the capita-labor ratio were positive, but for Portuguese presence whose dummy variable coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. Regression in column 2 of Table 2 explains 10 percent of the variation in the dependent variable *ETHT*. However, the *ED* coefficient is 0.379 and is not significant—*ED* has no effect on ethnic tensions. The *FD* (French) coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance, and the *PD* (Portuguese) coefficient is also negative and significant at all levels of significance. Therefore, the English had no effect on ethnic tensions but the Germans did. The French *FD* had a negative impact, as did the Portuguese. Using standardized coefficients for comparing the relative impact of each variable, we find that the German coefficient 1.338 had the greater positive effect—higher level of ethnic tension; the English had no effect. The French had a higher negative effect than the Portuguese did.

Ruled What? and the CIA World Fact book. IPOAA contains information on colonial relationships before and after WWI. Some European countries gained colonies after WWI, such as England and France, and some loss colonies. Germany had no colonies after WWI. The data from the Handbook were used for external tension, internal conflict and corruption, while IPOAA was the source of the data for colonial powers: Brussels, England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. However, the major players in Africa were England, France and Portugal (Germany was included) in our sample of African countries.

### Empirical Results

An important issue arises when dealing with time series data is whether the variables grow over time. This is a question of whether the series is stationary or non-stationary. Augmented - Dickey Fuller ADF) tests were used to check for a unit root to determine if the variables reported in Table 1 are stationary.

| Table 1 – Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests (unit roots) | |
|---|---|
| Variables | ADF test |
| *GDP95* | -4.1720 |
| *GCF95* | -5.2158 |
| *LF* | -4.0407 |
| *PCGDP* | -4.0393 |
| *LPCGDP* | -3.8629 |
| *CAPLBR* | -4.1523 |
| *ED* | -3.8502 |
| *FD* | -3.6946 |
| *GD* | -3.4388 |
| *PD* | -3.4388 |

Note: The variables are: GDP95 is GDP in constant 1995 US\$, *GCF* is gross capital formation, and *LF* is the labor force, PCGDP is per capita GDP, *LPCGDP* is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, *CAPLBR* is the capital-labor ratio, *ED* is the English dummy, *FD* is the French dummy, *PD* is the Portuguese dummy.

The asymmetric critical value at 10 percent level of significance is -2.57. Since of the ADF test results are greater than the critical value, we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit for any of the variables. Thus, the results reported in Table 1 show that all the variables are stationary. One aim of the paper is to examine the effects of colonial rule on

corruption, external tensions and internal. Column two of Table 2 reports results of the regression of corruption of the measures of colonial rule. The $R^2$ is .11 implying that 11 percent of the variation in corruption is explained by the model. However, the coefficients of *ED* and *GD* are positive and significant at all levels of significance.

This implies that both the English and the German experience had a positive effect on corruption. The French dummy *FD* is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance, the Portuguese dummy *PD* is negative and significant at all levels of significance.

It seems the French and Portuguese presence in Africa cannot explain the level of corruption in SSA countries. Comparing the standardized coefficients for each variable, we find that German dummy had greater positive impact on corruption than the English dummy; and the Portuguese dummy had a smaller negative impact than the French dummy on corruption. With respect to ethnic tensions, the regression in column 2 of Table 2

explains 10 percent of the variation in the dependent variable *ETHT*. However, the *ED* coefficient is 0.379 and is not significant—*ED* has no effect on ethnic tensions.

The *FD* (French) coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance, and the *PD* (Portuguese) coefficient is also negative and significant at all levels of significance. Therefore, the English had no effect on ethnic tensions but the Germans did. The French *FD* had a negative impact, as did the Portuguese. Using standardized coefficients for comparing the relative impact of each variable, we find that the German coefficient 1.338 had the greater positive effect—higher level of ethnic tension; the English had no effect. The French had a higher negative effect than the Portuguese did.

Turning internal conflicts reported in column 3 of Table 2, correlation coefficient $R^2$ is 0.21 and all the colonial dummy variables are significant at all levels of significance. Here, *ED*, *FD* and *PD* have negative signs, implying they had a negative effect on ethnic tensions in SSA. But the German dummy coefficient is positive suggesting their presence set

the stage for higher levels of internal conflicts in SSA. Form the reported standardized coefficients (not shown in Table 2) the French dummy coefficient had the lowest negative impact on internal conflicts. The upshot of this is the colonial presence in Africa had mixed effects on corruption, ethnic tension, and internal conflict—depending on the country. The intensity of the impact positive or negative varied also among the colonial rulers. On the assumption that corruption, ethnic tension, and internal conflict had a negative effect on per capita GDP

Column one in Table 2 shows the regression results of the effect of capital and labor (the capital-labor ratio) and colonial influences on per capita GDP growth. *LPCGDP*, in our selected SSA countries. The regression explains 63 percent of the variation in per capita GDP growth. With exception of the French dummy coefficient, which is not significant, all the other coefficients are significant at all levels of significance. The logarithm of the capital-labor ratio $LCAPLBR$ is positive with a value of 0.340, which means a one percent rise in the capital-labor ratio would raise per capita GDP growth by 34 percent. The French dummy coefficient has no effect on economic growth--it has a negative sign but is insignificant statistically. The English dummy variable coefficient is 0.202 indicating a rise in growth of per

capita GDP from a structural effect in the model (intercept shift) for a growth rate of $e^{0.202} - 1 = 1.223 - 1 = 0.223$, which averages 2 percent a year for eleven years. The German dummy variable coefficient is also positive implying the German presence had a positive effect on economic growth. The coefficient of the German dummy is 1.048 and significant at all levels of significance. This is the amount that the intercept rose during the period.

But the growth rate is $e^{1.048} - 1 = 1.85 - 1 = .85$ (85 percent) for 11 years. The average per year contribution to growth shown by the German dummy coefficient is 16.8 percent. On the other hand, the Portuguese dummy variable coefficient is negative and significant. This suggests that the Portuguese presence had a negative effect of economic performance. The structural induced decline in economic growth here is $e^{0.298} - 1 = 0.742 - 1 = -0.257$, which annualizes to -2.3 percent over the period. This can be interpreted as a loss of -2.3 percent in per capita GDP growth over an eleven-year period due to the Portuguese occupation.

Table 2 Regression of colonial experience on economic growth from 1982-2002.

Dependent variable: LGDPLF,    COR, INTC, ETHT

| Independent Variables | (1) LGDPLF | (2) COR | (3) INTC | (4) ETHT | (5) LGDP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 5.117 (18.94) | 2.163 (53.90) | 9.184 (65.78) | 3.662 (22.95) | 5.177 (17.38) |
| LCAPLBR | 0.340 (9.175) | | | | 0.413 (11.14) |
| ED | 0.202 (4.186) | 0.312 (6.231) | -0.896 (-4.947) | 0.037 (0.223) | 0.084 (1.789) |
| FD | -0.0244 (-0.492) | -0.148 (-2.139) | -0.918 (-5.533) | -0.375 (-2.229) | -0.171 (-3.771) |
| GD | 1.048 (10.80) | 0.826 (20.83) | 2.815 (20.16) | 1.338 (8.387)) | 1.034 (9.830) |
| PD | -0.298 (-6.468 | -0.163 (-4.078) | -3.184 (-22.81) | -0.662 (-4.150) | -0.536 (-8.508) |
| COR | | | | | 0.099 (5.700) |
| ETHT | | | | | -0.0538 (-3.188) |
| INTC | | | | | -0.065 (-4.267) |
| Observations $R^2$ | 455 0.63 | 455 0.11 | 455 0.21 | 455 0.10 | 455 0.67 |

Since there was very little multicolinearity in the data, it seemed appropriate to include corruption, ethnic tension, and internal conflict in the determination of per capita GDP directly. This is shown in column 5 of Table 2. The $R^2$ of this expanded model is 0.67. All the coefficients are significant at all levels of significance but the English dummy, which is negative and significant at the 10 percent level of significance and the ethnic tension coefficient, which is significant at the one percent level of significance. The effect of the capital-labor ratio *LCAPLBR* is 0.413—that implies that a one percent rise in the capital-labor ratio would increase real per capita GDP growth by .41 percent. The table also shows that the English and German dummy coefficients have a positive effect on economic growth, while the French and Portuguese dummy coefficients have a negative effect on economic growth. The corruption coefficient is 0.099 and significant. It implies that corruption has a positive effect on economic growth. Some authors (Lui, 1985 and Mauro, 1995) discussed the possibility that corruption could have a positive effect on efficiency.

*Note: LCAPLBR is the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio. ED, FD, GD, and PD are the dummies variables for English, French, German, and Portuguese colonial powers; t-values are closed below the coefficients.*

Table 3 contains information about the effects of the colonial experience on efficiency. There are two forms of efficiency measures shown—the effect of the colonial experience on the capital-labor ratio *LCAPLBR* and efficiency designated as residuals computed from the regression of logarithm of real per capita on *GCF95* divided by the labor force *LF* These efficiency results appear in column 1 under *EFF* and are the regression errors. The smaller the difference between the actually *LGDP95* values and the estimated *LGDP95* values the greater the efficiency in the utilization of capital and labor in the country. The coefficient of the English dummy variable is significant at the one percent level of significance. It indicates that the English presence in SSA had a positive effect on efficiency. The coefficient of the French dummy variable *FD* is negative and insignificant. French presence in SSA had no effect on efficiency as defined here.

German dummy variable coefficient is significant at all levels of significance and positive. It implies that the German presence had a positive effect on efficiency. The Portuguese $PD$ coefficient is negative and significant at the one percent level of significance, implying that the Portuguese presence in African had a negative effect on efficiency. As for the $LCAPLBR$ variable, Table 3 shows that the

coefficients of $ED$ is significant at the one percent level of significance, but, $FD$ and $GD$ are significant at all levels of significance and their sign is positive. All the coefficients of the colonial experience for the capita-labor ratio were positive, but for Portuguese presence whose dummy variable coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant.

| | Table 3 – The effects of country dummies on growth and efficiency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **EFF** | | **LCAPLBR** | |
| Ind. Variables | Coefficients | T-ratios | Coefficients | T-ratios |
| ED | 0.0188 | 3.041 | 0.422 | 3.376 |
| FD | -0.0612 | -0.971 | 1.126 | 8.992 |
| GD | 0.965 | 8.390 | 2.535 | 20.98 |
| PD | -0.303 | -2.641 | 0.164 | 1.187 |
| Intercept | -0.102 | -1.736 | 7.110 | 64.03 |
| $R^2$ | 0.21 | | 0.16 | |

Note: $LCAPLBR$ is the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio and $EFF$ the measure (residuals) of efficiency.

$LCAPLBR$

The effect of the colonial experience on efficiency is mixed, the signs of the coefficient of the dummy variables are positive and negative in equal numbers—two are positive *ED* and *GD* and two are negative, *FD* and *PD*, although *FD* is insignificant. The effects of *ED*, *FD*, and *GD* on the capital-labor ratio *LCAPLBR* are positive but *PD* is not statistically significant. So by and large, the colonial influence on the capital-labor ratio was positive.

## Summary and Conclusion

The paper attempts to establish a link between the colonial experience in SSA corruption, ethnic tension, and economic growth. It was demonstrated that the measure of colonial presence *ED*, *FD*, *GD*, and *PD* had mixed effects of political instability and corruption. These variables discussed in the literature elsewhere are shown to have negative effects on economic growth as was shown in Table 2 column 5. The coefficients of ethnic tension and internal conflict variables have negative signs, but the corruption coefficient is significant and positive.

The *FD* dummy coefficient has a negative effect on economic growth because the coefficient is not significantly different from zero (column 1, Table 2) or because the *FD* coefficient is negative and significant

(column 5, Table 2). The Portuguese variable *PD* is negative and significant (Table 2 columns 1 and 5). The English and the German dummy variables are significant and positive influence on economic performance in SSA.

Differences in administrative practices of the colonial powers may have had long-term effects that are even now being felt in SSA. But the contribution to the three powers to the level of economic performance is mixed. This despite the fact that foreign power practices paved the way for ethnic tensions, political instability and corruption. Perhaps, too, they planted the seeds that caused some countries make consistently good political and economic choices and others not. These are not new questions.

In addition, countries that make poor political choices will transform inputs (capital and labor) into output less efficiently. It appears that African countries' colonial experience may have exerted some long-term mixed influence on economic growth in SSA. However, in this post-colonial period the path to faster growth in Africa appears to be capital deepening that is because from Table 2 columns one and five the capital-labor ratio is positive and significant at all levels of significance.

## Policy Recommendations

Further, the English dummy variable has a positive sign, and the Portuguese dummy is negative (the dummy coefficient from Bertochi's regression was also negative). Colonial power policies had mixed effects of economic performance. The positive effects cannot be replicated and the negative effects (corruption, ethnic tension, and internal conflict) must be repudiated and reduced as policy goals in post-independence era. It is clear from Table 2 that in the sample period SSA countries with higher capital-labor ratio unambiguously made the greater contribution to economic growth in our model. It suggests more capital inflows should be encouraged and promoted. It is clear from Table 2 that in the sample period SSA countries with higher capital-labor ratio unambiguously made the greater contribution to economic growth in our model. It suggests more capital inflows should be encouraged and promoted. A pro-investment strategy is a growth strategy. Government action that confers more political rights on individuals might just be needed to set in motion more investment and greater efficiency that would lead to faster economic growth.

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Ethiopia
Gabon Gambia
Ghana
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Source: WDI 2004

# Constitutional Diversity in Ethiopia: a Comparative Analysis of Ethiopia's Regional Constitutions

*Christophe Van der Beken**

**Abstract:** *as is customary in federations, the federal constitution of Ethiopia has allocated state powers between the federal government and the federated entities or regional states. One of the powers thus attributed to Ethiopia's regional states is constitutional autonomy or the power to enact their own constitutions. The nine regions established by the federal constitution have all exercised this power so that today's constitutional construct in Ethiopia consists of one federal and nine regional constitutions. Although the federal constitution constitutes the legal foundation of the regional constitutions and simultaneously offers the framework within which the regions can exercise constitutional autonomy, the latter are left with considerable discretionary powers to determine form and substance of their constitutions. For instance, the regions can draft their own bill of human rights (as long as these do not violate the human rights protected under the federal constitution), they can design their own political institutions and they can organize their own administrative set-up. Hence, in order to understand the human rights protection at the regional level, the structure and powers of the regional and sub-regional governmental institutions and the relationship between the different administrative hierarchies, an analysis of the regional constitutions is mandatory. Since such analysis has not been given due attention in legal scholarship, this paper offers a brief comparative study of all nine regional constitutions. After having discussed and compared all chapters of the regional constitutions, the paper concludes that although the regional constitutions are similar in many respects, there are areas where significant differences can be observed. This indicates that the regional constitutions are indeed reflective of the specific societies for which they have been drafted. For instance, regional constitutional provisions with regards to the regional institutional organization and the administrative set-up clearly take into account intra-regional ethnic constellations.*

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## Introduction

The most striking provisions of the federal constitution of Ethiopia – which came into effect in 1995 – are the ones reflecting the country's population diversity. Indeed, Ethiopian society is not ethnically homogeneous, but is rather characterised by a considerable diversity in the areas of language, religion, governance traditions, culture and socio-economic activities. In fact, the latest population and housing census of 2007 classifies the Ethiopian population into more than eighty ethnic groups. In order to accommodate this diversity as well as to protect state integrity, the 1995 constitution has established a federal state whose territory mainly consists of nine regional states, delimited primarily on the basis of ethnic criteria. Since the regions have thus been designed as forums for the protection of ethnic interests, the

federal constitution grants them considerable powers – including the power to enact their own constitutions. All regions have effectively used the latter power, so that today the Ethiopian constitutional framework consists of one federal and nine regional constitutions. However, although the federal constitution has attracted a fair share of attention in legal scholarship, the regional constitutions have barely been touched upon.

Yet, this limited attention to the regional constitutions does not reflect their importance. Although the regional constitutions have to respect the supremacy of the federal constitution – and can thus not contain provisions that violate federal constitutional provisions -- the states are nevertheless left with considerable discretionary power to design their own constitutional framework. For instance. the federal constitution contains only limited provisions concerning the regional territorial-administrative and institutional organisation, which provides the regions with considerable autonomy to give form to their own territorial-administrative set-up.

Hence, in order to understand the territorial-administrative organisation of the regions, the distribution of powers between the intra-regional administrative levels (for instance, between regional and local governments) and the institutional structure of the latter, an analysis of the regional constitutions is necessary. Such an analysis also shows how intra-regional ethnic diversity – which characterises all regions – is constitutionally approached and allows for an assessment of whether the Ethiopian constitutional framework is appropriate to achieve the twin constitutional objectives of protecting diversity and guaranteeing unity. This article is a modest attempt to explore the largely undiscovered field of Ethiopia's regional constitutional law by providing a brief comparative analysis of all regional constitutions in Ethiopia. Before proceeding with the constitutional analysis, some basic information on the historical, political and constitutional background to the enactment of the regional constitutions is provided.

## Background to the Enactment of Regional Constitutions in Ethiopia

Until 1991, Ethiopian nation- and state-building policies attempted to accomplish the establishment of an Ethiopian nation state without equally respecting Ethiopia's ethnic commu- nities and by centralizing state power. These policies were already contested in the 1960s during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, and when they were continued by the *Derg* military regime a full-

blown civil war erupted.

Indeed, during its 17-year rule, the *Derg* had to face continuous armed resistance by several ethnic-based liberation movements. Each of these movements defended the interests of a specific ethnic group such as the Oromo, Afar or Tigrayans. The major liberation movement was the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front), which was established to defend the interests of the Tigrayans. In 1989, the TPLF managed to oust the military administration from Tigray and to place the largest part of the region under its control. In the same year it initiated the establishment of the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front). With the establishment of the EPRDF, the TPLF aimed at the formation of a broad coalition of parties organised on an ethnic basis. The cooperation between the EPRDF and other liberation movements – including the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) – led to the final demise of the *Derg* in May 1991. The new Ethiopian government, which was composed of members representing several ethnic movements, organised a national conference in July 1991. This conference – a majority of whose participants were representatives of ethnically organised political movements – adopted a Transitional Period Charter, which served as interim constitution

during the transitional period (hence, until the coming into effect of the new constitution). Several provisions of the Transitional Charter expressed the commitment of the document's drafters to protect the rights of Ethiopia's ethnic communities.

The Charter also served as the legal foundation of an ethnic-based decentralised state structure. The new constitution, which was adopted by a constituent assembly on 8 December 1994 and which came into effect in August 1995, confirmed this trend and established an ethnic-based federal state. Based on the right to self-determination granted by Article 39 to all Ethiopian ethnic communities, Article 46 of the federal constitution stipulates that the Federal Democratic Republic (of Ethiopia) shall comprise states (or regions).

The states are then listed in Article 47(1): the states of Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul/ Gumuz, the Southern Nations, National- ities and Peoples (hereafter the Southern region), Gambella and Harar. Article 52(2b) of the federal constitution grants them the power to enact their own constitution. Yet, regional constitutional autonomy is limited by the obligation to respect the federal constitution. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the

federal constitution contains only limited provisions concerning the regional administrative and institutional organisation. The federal constitution contents itself with creating a framework within which the regional states can give form to their administrative and institutional organisation.

Firstly, Article 50(2) of the federal constitution provides that the states have legislative, executive and judicial powers. Article 50(3) stipulates that the "State Council" is the highest regional organ and that it is accountable to the people. Article 50(6) stipulates that the "State Administration" is the highest organ of the executive and Article 50(7) provides for the establishment of regional courts. With regards to the regional courts, the federal constitution contains more detailed provisions that considerably limit regional powers in this area.

The federal constitution further limits the autonomy of the regional states by formulating a number of principles that the latter have to respect when developing their administrative organisation. Article 52(2a) stipulates that the regional states have to establish a state administration "that best advances self-government" and "a democratic order based on the rule of law." Hence, a centralised or undemocratic approach by the regional states would be unconstitutional. That a centralised approach at the regional level is

not allowed is again confirmed by Article 50(4):

> *State government shall be established at State and other administrative levels that they find necessary. Adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the People to participate directly in the administration of such units.*

Although the regions had already enacted constitutions shortly after the adoption of the federal constitution, a constitutional revision process – which resulted in the revision of all regional constitutions – started in 2001. Consequently, the constitutions that are analysed in this article are the revised ones. These are the constitutions of Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and the Southern region of 2001, the constitutions of Afar, Benishangul/Gumuz and Somali regions of 2002, the Gambella regional constitution of 2003 and the 2004 Harar constitution.

## Ethiopia's Regional Constitutions: A Comparative Analysis

Since all regional constitutions share a similar structure – which is based upon the federal constitution – it is expedient to adhere to this structure in the construction of our analysis.

## I. Preamble

Like the federal constitution, all regional constitutions start with a preamble within which the background to the enactment of the constitution and the constitutional objectives are set out. The regional constitutions remind us that the previous regimes in Ethiopia were characterised by a violation of individual and ethnic group rights and by misguided socio-economic policies. By remedying this, the regional constitutions aim to achieve three objectives: the advancement of socio-economic development, lasting peace and security as well as the development of a democratic system. The constitutions of Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and the Southern region also explicitly mention the protection of the languages, cultures and customs of the regional ethnic communities as one of the regional constitutional objectives. Yet they simultaneously stress the common interests and outlooks of their ethnic groups, as such emphasizing the importance of regional unity. The preamble of the Harar constitution goes into some detail as far as the specific position of the Harari people is concerned, mentioning their special history and small population number. Finally, the purpose of the revision of the original constitutions is indicated as *inter alia* providing for separation of state power, mechanisms of checks and balance and transparency.

## II. General Provisions

After having depicted the background to and pointed out the objectives of the constitution in the preamble, the regional constitutions formulate some general provisions in Chapter 1. The first Article determines how the respective regional state has to be named. The second Article deals with the regional state boundaries. Particularly interesting is Article 2 of the Oromia constitution, which explicitly stipulates that the Oromia region does share a border with the Sudan, something which was not clear under the 1995 Oromia constitution and remained thus in doubt. The constitutions also indicate that the regions have their own flags and anthems. What is furthermore important, from the point of view of ethnic accommodation, is the provision on the regional working languages. Article 5 of the federal constitution stipulates that although Amharic is the working

language of the federal government, the members of the federation – hence the regions – may by law determine their respective working language.

The regions have made use of this power and have determined their working languages in the respective regional constitutions. Due to their multi-ethnicity, the Gambella, Benish- angul-Gumuz and Southern regions have chosen Amharic as their regional working language. Obviously, Amharic also continues to operate as the working language of the Amhara region. The Tigray, Afar, Somali and Oromia constitutions have chosen the language of the nominal (the ethnic group to which the regional name refers) – and dominant – ethnic group as their regional working language: hence Tigrigna, Afarigna, Somali and Afaan Oromo respectively. The Harar constitution, finally, has chosen two working languages: the language of the politically dominant Harari and the language of the numerically dominant Oromo.

In the chapter on general provisions, the Benishangul-Gumuz constitution also lists the nations, nationalities and peoples (the three terms generally used by the Ethiopian constitutions to indicate Ethiopia's ethnic groups) that are indigenous to the region: the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo. The only other regional constitution that explicitly lists the indigenous ethnic

groups is the Gambella constitution. Indeed, Article 46 of the Gambella constitution designates the following five ethnic groups as "founders" of the regional state: the Anuak, Nuer, Mejenger, Upo and Komo.

However, as will be argued below both in the section on the human rights provisions and in the section on the regional administrative and institutional structure, all regional constitutions differentiate between indigenous and non-indigenous groups.

The regional constitutions furthermore determine the regional capital, which is (H)Awassa in the Southern region; Harar in Harar; Assosa in Benishangul-Gumuz; Gambella in Gambella; Semera in Afar; Jijiga in Somali; Bahir Dar in Amhara; Mekelle in Tigray; and Adama in Oromia (note that since the coming into effect of the 2001 Oromia constitution, the regional capital has been relocated to Addis Ababa, which had already been designated as capital of Oromia by the 1995 Oromia constitution). The commitment to gender equality, which is expressed in several provisions of the constitution, is also reflected in this constitutional stipulation: "Where the provisions of this constitution are set out in the masculine gender they shall apply mutatis mutandis to the feminine gender."

## III. Fundamental Principles of the Constitutions

Chapter 2 of the regional constitutions lists a number of fundamental principles. The concerned regional provisions more or less restate the fundamental principles of the federal constitution and are thus practically copies of Chapter 2 of the federal constitution. The fundamental principles mentioned are the sovereignty of the people, the supremacy of the constitution, human and democratic rights, the separation of state and religion and prescriptions on the conduct and accountability of the government. With regards to the sovereignty of the people, the provisions of the Afar, Oromia, Harar and Somali constitutions need special mention.

Article 8 of the federal constitution stipulates that all sovereign power – in Ethiopia – resides in the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. Consequently, one would expect the regional constitutions to stipulate that all sovereign power in the region resides in the nations, nationalities and peoples of the region. However, the four aforementioned constitutions provide that sovereign power in the region resides in the Afar, Oromo, Harari and Somali people/ethnic group respectively.

This is a result of the ethnic-territorial approach characterising the Ethiopian federation, which will be explained in the next section. The constitutional attention to human and democratic rights is unmistakable, as is illustrated by the extensive list of human rights included in all regional constitutions. The separation of state and religion is proclaimed in all regional constitutions, even in those regions where nearly all inhabitants adhere to the same religion (i.e. Islam in Afar and Somali).

## IV. Human Rights Provisions

Due to the supremacy of the federal constitution, the human rights protected by the federal constitution have to be respected by the regions. Hence, the regional constitutions contain extensive lists with human rights that are almost identical to the lists included in the federal constitution.

The only federal human rights provision that cannot be found in the regional constitutions is the provision on nationality rights (Art. 33 of the federal constitution), simply because it is the exclusive power of the federal government to determine matters relating to nationality. In all regional constitutions, the human rights provisions are included in Chapter 3 "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms". Following the traditional classification, the regional constitutions protect the classic civil

and political rights, social and economic rights, women's rights, children's rights, minority rights as well as other so-called third generation rights such as the right to development and environmental rights. The classic rights listed in the Ethiopian constitutions include the right to life; the right of security of person; the right to liberty; prohibition against inhuman treatment; procedural guarantees in criminal trials such as the rights of arrested persons and convicted prisoners; the non-retroactivity of criminal law; the prohibition of double jeopardy; right of access to justice; the right to honour and reputation; and the right of equality.

Concerning the latter right, the regional constitutions stipulate that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to equal protection of the law. Accordingly, the law shall guarantee to all persons the right to equal and effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, social origin, wealth, birth or other status. Although discrimination on grounds of sex is thus prohibited, the constitutional drafters judged it necessary – in order to achieve effective gender equality – to explicitly provide for the possibility of affirmative action. This possibility is included in the constitutional provisions on women's rights. The importance of the

right to equality must also be seen against the historical background of ethnic and religious discrimination in Ethiopia – as discussed in section II.

As of the coming into effect of the constitution, any discrimination on the basis of ethnic identity (components of which are race, colour and language) or religion violates the constitution. A similar concern for achieving true equality lies behind the constitutional authorisation for special assistance to the most backward ethnic groups – as is included in the chapters on "principles and objectives of regional policy" (discussed in section VI below). Also protected are the right to privacy; marital, personal and family rights; the freedom of religion, conscience and belief; the right of thought, opinion and expression; the right of assembly, demonstration and petition; the right of association; freedom of movement and the right to choose residence. The latter right is an important protection against possible aberrations of an ethnic federal system. Indeed, it protects people who do not originate in a specific ethnic-based regional state – hence who are not members of the empowered ethnic group(s) - against residence restrictions imposed upon them by the concerned regional state. Another protection offered to non-indigenous people is the constitutional provision that any Ethiopian has the right to be

elected or employed to any public office in the region. The only condition is that the individual speaks the regional working language. The Tigray constitution even adds that knowledge of the regional working language is not necessary when the nature of the work does not require it. Non-indigenous people are also protected by the right to vote and to be elected.

Several regional constitutions grant Ethiopian citizens the right to vote and to be elected without any discrimination based on – *inter alia* – ethnic identity. Hence, non-indigenous people cannot be excluded from the election process. It is notable that this right is not included in the regional constitutions of Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar. The question can be asked whether this omission reflects a certain amount of reluctance on the part of the indigenous peoples of the concerned regions towards the political inclusion of non-indigenous peoples. The right to property constitutes the link between civil rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other. Next to two Articles on socio-economic rights, the regional constitutions also contain rights to protect the interests of specific vulnerable groups such as women and children.

As already mentioned – in order to achieve real equality between men and women – the possibility of affirmative action is explicitly guaranteed. The provision of these group-specific rights as well as other so-called third-generation rights, such as the right to development and the right to a clean and healthy environment, reflect the progressive stature of the Ethiopian constitutions. Nonetheless, the most remarkable constitutional human rights provisions are the ones concerning the protection of ethnic communities. For those who are familiar with the federal constitution, this does not come as a surprise. Indeed, Article 39 of the federal constitution grants – under the denominator of the right to self-determination – extensive rights to all ethnic groups of Ethiopia.

These rights comprise language rights and cultural rights, political participation rights, the right to territorial autonomy and even the right of secession. Since – as was mentioned above – the human rights provisions of the regional constitutions are almost identical to the federal provisions, all regional constitutions guarantee a similar right to self-determination to *their* ethnic communities. Although the content of the regional right to self-determination is similar to the content of the federal right – with the notable exception of its conditional character, as will be discussed below – the beneficiaries of the right are certainly not. Article 39 of the federal constitution grants a right to self-

determination to all nations, nationalities and peoples (or ethnic groups) of Ethiopia – of which there are more than 80. The regional constitutions on the other hand limit the grant of self-determination rights to a selected number of ethnic groups.

The Oromia, Afar, Harar and Somali constitutions reserve the right to self-determination for the Oromo, Afar, Harari and Somali people respectively, hence to the nominal ethnic groups.

The Amhara constitution obviously grants a right to self-determination to the Amhara, but it extends this right to include the Agew Himra, Awi and Oromo ethnic groups. In a similar way, the Tigray constitution does not exclusively reserve the right to self-determination to the Tigrayans, but includes the Irob and Kunama communities as well.

The Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella constitutions grant the right to self-determination exclusively to the ethnic communities indigenous to the region: the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo in Benishangul-Gumuz and the Nuer, Anuak, Mejenger, Upo and Komo in Gambella. Finally, the constitution of the Southern region stipulates that only the nations, nationalities and peoples *of* the region have a right to self-determination. The fact that the regional constitutions limit the right to self-determination to

selected ethnic groups is a consequence of the ethnic-territorial mindset that characterises the Ethiopian federation.

What this means is that the Ethiopian federal structure is based on the idea that all ethnic groups are linked to a particular region; hence, that there is a neat correspondence between ethnic and regional boundaries, which legitimates the qualification of Ethiopian federalism as ethnic federalism. Each region has thus been created to protect the interests of specific ethnic groups, which are indigenous to the region. Consequently, the regional constitutions limit the right to self-determination to the indigenous ethnic groups.

Another significant difference between the right to self-determination as conceived by the federal constitution and the regional conception of this right relates to the (un)conditional character of the right to secession. The federal constitution provides for an unconditional right to secession, meaning that all Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples can exercise this right – following the procedure of Article 39(4) – without having to demonstrate the impairment of their interests. The regional constitutions – with the exception of the Southern constitution and the Somali constitution – on the other hand stipulate that the indigenous ethnic

groups will exercise the right to secede only if their rights have been violated and as a last resort. Hence, although the federal constitution grants them an unconditional right to secede, the ethnic groups of the regions have constitutionally expressed their commitment not to exercise it unless certain conditions are fulfilled.

## V. Administrative and Institutional Structure of the Regions

Whereas the regional constitutions contain almost identical human rights provisions – though the above overview has shown that differences do occur – they vary considerably as far as their provisions on the regional territorial-administrative and institutional structure is concerned. Five regional constitutions the Southern, Gambella, Benishangul/ Gumuz, Amhara and Oromia constitutions – provide for a four-tier regional administrative structure: the regional level, the level of the Zone/Special *Weredu/* Adminis- tration of Nationalities, the *Wereda* and the *Kebele* level. The constitutions of Tigray, Afar and Somali provide for a three-tier administrative structure: the region, *Wereda* and *Kebele*. Finally, in the Harar constitution, only the regional and *Kebele* level are provided for. Besides these constitutionally provided administrative

structures, all regional constitutions allow for the establishment of additional administrative levels. The institutions and powers of the latter are to be determined by (ordinary) law. We can observe, for instance, that the regional parliaments have enacted City Proclamations, detailing the organisation and the powers of City Administrations.

## 1. The Regional Level

As is customary in federations, the distribution of powers between the federal and regional levels is provided for by the federal constitution. The basic mechanism is included in Article 52(1) of the federal constitution: "All powers not given expressly to the federal government alone, or concurrently to the federal government and the states are reserved to the states." Hence, the regional states have been allocated the residual powers. Although somewhat redundant, taken into account the allocation of residual powers, Article 52(2) of the federal constitution contains a list with regional state powers. Furthermore, Article 97 and 98 of the federal constitution list the regional powers and concurrent powers of taxation respectively. The basic allocation of powers mechanism as well as the lists with regional powers included in the federal constitution have been integrally included in all regional constitutions. Furthermore, all regional constitutions

provide for the possibility of the region to decree a regional state of emergency, a possibility that is also provided by Article 93 of the federal constitution. An interesting observation is that the Afar constitution additionally stipulates that the regional state "shall give special attention to animal husbandry and grazing land resource development," as such responding to the specific needs of this region whose population is predominantly pastoralist.

The regional level has a three-tier institutional structure consisting of a legislative body, the State Council (which is called "Caffee" in Oromia), an Executive (or Administrative) Council and the regional courts. In all regions except Harar, the members of the State Council are directly elected according to the plurality system. The effects of this system are somewhat mitigated in the Southern region, Gambella, Benishangul /Gumuz and Amhara regions, since the constitutions of these regions guarantee the representation of minority nationalities and peoples in the State Council. The Harar constitution, taking into account the specific position and interests of the Harari people, provides that the State Council be composed of two houses: the House of Peoples' Representatives and the Harari National Council. The 22 members of the House of Peoples' Representatives and the 14

members of the Harari National Council together constitute the 36 members of the Harar State Council.

The Harari National Council is composed exclusively of Harari. The members of the House of Peoples' Representatives are elected according to a special mode of election. The constitution provides for a *de facto* guaranteed representation of the Harari in this latter institution by stating that four members must be elected from the Jugol constituency – a constituency predominantly inhabited by Harari. The remaining 18 members are elected outside the Jugol in a district predominantly inhabited by Amhara and Oromo. All regional State Councils have similar powers. First, they have legislative powers in all matters assigned to the regional level. The State Councils also have important control powers.

The State Council approves the regional budget and Article 49(3.17) of the Amhara constitution stipulates that the State Council "[c]alls for questioning the head of the regional government and other officials of the regional state and thereby examines the workings of the executive organ thereof." A similar provision is included in Article 49(3q) of the Oromia constitution: the *Caffee* has the power to "[c]all and question the president and other regional officials. Investigate discharge of responsibility of the regional administrative council."

Analogous provisions are included in all other regional constitutions. Finally, the State Councils or regional parliaments have a number of special powers that are neither legislative nor direct controlling powers. For instance, the regional parliaments have the power to proclaim a state of emergency, to ratify interregional agreements, they have a number of appointment powers and they can organise their internal functioning.

They elect their Speaker and Deputy Speaker and they establish standing and ad hoc committees. In Harar, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the State Council are nominated by the regional House of Peoples' Representatives and the Harari National Council respectively. These two houses also have a number of powers of their own. The Harari National Council is competent for matters that are particularly pertinent for the Harari people, such as the development of a cultural and language policy to protect the Harari language and culture. The House of Peoples' Representatives is competent for non-ethnic matters, for matters that concern all ethnic groups in the region. First, the House of Peoples' Representatives has the power to submit draft laws to the State Council in a number of important fields (laws concerning social and economic policies and concerning taxes and other duties). Furthermore, the House of Peoples'

Representatives is competent to evaluate the budget of the region and to submit it for approval to the State Council. The Southern region is also specific, not because of a special organisation of the State Council but because of the fact that the State Council is complemented by a second council: the Council of Nationalities.

The Council of Nationalities, as far as its composition and competences are concerned, is strongly inspired by the model of the federal House of the Federation. Article 58(1) of the Southern constitution states that the Council of Nationalities is composed of representatives of the nations, nationalities and peoples. This implies that each nation, nationality or people of the Southern region has a right to be represented in the second chamber of the parliament. Article 58(2) adds that each ethnic group has a right to one additional representative for each one million of its members. The members of the Council of Nationalities are elected by and from among the members of the Zonal and Special *Wereda* Councils: the Councils of the sub-regional administrative entities in the Southern region as will be discussed below. The Council of Nationalities has *inter alia* the power to interpret the regional constitution; it makes decisions concerning the right to self-determination of the nations, nationalities and peoples

and it promotes the unity and equality of the peoples of the region.

In all regions, the Executive/ Administrative Council comprises the Chief Executive or President, Vice President, bureau heads and other members as determined by (regional) law. The Chief Executive is elected by and from among the members of the State Council. In Harar, the regional president is nominated by the Harari National Council. The appointment of the Deputy Chief Executive (Vice President) and of the other members of the Executive Council is, upon recommendation of the Chief Executive, approved by the State Council.

The constitutions of the Southern region, Benishangul/Gumuz, Gambella and Oromia stipulate that the Deputy Chief Executive has to be elected from among members of the State Council. That the State Council has a controlling power over the executive is expressed in the provision that the Executive Council is accountable towards the State Council.

The Executive Council has a number of competences among which are the following: it ensures the implementation of regional laws; it drafts the regional budget and submits it for approval to the State Council; it submits draft laws to the State Council. Since the Afar region, as mentioned above, is constitutionally mandated to give special attention to

animal husbandry and grazing land resource development, the Afar constitution states that it is one of the objectives of the Executive Council to "[c]reate a conducive environment to improve the living standards of the pastoralists and free them of backward methods of work."

The Chief Executive/regional president is the chair of the Executive Council and has *inter alia* the following powers: the president leads the regional government; he (or she) supervises the implementation of decisions of the regional government; he signs laws and regulations of the regional legislative and executive institutions; he directs and controls the regional state's security and police forces; and he selects nominees for the post of member of the Executive Council and for the post of President and Vice President of the regional Supreme Court. The Afar constitution – again reflecting the Afar region's specific features – furthermore allows for the establishment of Councils of Elders at the various administrative levels.

The establishment of an elders' and clan leaders' Council is also provided for by the Somali constitution. As mentioned in the section on the preamble above, one of the main reasons for the revision of the regional constitutions was the need for separation of powers and the

establishment of checks and balances. In the original (unrevised) regional constitutions, presiding over meetings of the regional parliament was included as one of the powers of the regional president. According to Juneidi Saddo, the former president of the Oromia region, the *Caffee* (State Council) was "run by the executive branch and as the legislative organ, it was not run as a separate and independent entity." In the revised constitutions, this power of the regional president has not been preserved. Now all State Councils are presided over by a separate Speaker. This new situation led Juneidi Saddo to the conclusion that "the separation of powers is now recognized by law in this state and our constitution is revised to reinforce it."

Due to the precedence of the federal constitution, all regional constitutions have adopted the provisions of the federal constitution concerning the organisation of the regional judiciary. Article 78(2) of the federal constitution states that supreme federal judicial authority is vested in the Federal Supreme Court. Similarly, Article 80(1) of the federal constitution stipulates that the Federal Supreme Court shall have the highest and final judicial power over federal matters. With regards to the federal judicial organisation, the federal constitution furthermore stipulates that the federal House of Peoples' Representatives may,

by two-thirds majority vote, establish nationwide or in some parts of the country only, federal High Courts and First Instance Courts. What this means is that only the establishment of the Federal Supreme Court is guaranteed by the constitution.

The establishment of federal High Courts and First Instance Courts is completely dependent on a decision of the House of Peoples' Representatives. Awaiting such a decision of the House of Peoples' Representatives, the jurisdiction of the federal High Courts and First Instance Courts is delegated to the regional state courts. To this, the federal constitution adds that the regions have a three-tier judicial structure, which is composed of a Supreme Court, High Courts and First Instance Courts. Additionally, adjudication by religious and customary courts is also recognised. Article 78(2) of the federal constitution was conceived as a transitional provision. As long as the House of Peoples' Representatives does not establish federal High and First Instance Courts, their powers are exercised by the regional courts. The delegation will be withdrawn as soon as the federal courts are established.

However, this provisional delegation seems to be made permanent by other constitutional provisions. In this regard, we can refer to Articles 80(2) and (4)

of the federal constitution. Article 80(2) provides: "State Supreme Courts shall have the highest and final judicial power over State matters. They shall also exercise the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court." Article 80(4) stipulates: "State High Courts shall, in addition to State Jurisdiction, exercise the jurisdiction of the Federal First-Instance Court." The provisional character of the delegation is no longer mentioned. Analogous provisions are included in the regional constitutions.

This leads to the question whether the regional Supreme and High Courts will continue to have concurrent jurisdiction for federal matters after the establishment of the federal High and First Instance Courts. This issue became particularly pertinent after the federal House of Peoples' Representatives adopted Proclamation No. 322/2003, which provides for the establishment of Federal High Courts in five of the nine regions (Afar, Somali, Benishangul/ Gumuz, Gambella and the Southern region). With regard to the appointment of judges, the regional constitutions also had to respect the concerning provisions of the federal constitution. This means that the president and vice-president of the regional Supreme Court are appointed by the State Council, upon the recommendation of the regional president. The other regional judges are

also appointed by the State Council, upon the recommendation of the regional commission for judicial administration.

In the case of appointment of judges in the regional Supreme Court and in the regional High Courts, the regional commission for judicial administration is obliged to ask for the advisory opinion of the federal commission for judicial administration. Additionally, in the Amhara, Benisha- ngul/Gumuz, Gambella and Southern regions, the administrative level of the Nationality Administration/ Zone/ Spec- ial *Wereda* (which – as will be discussed below – is hierarchically situated just below the regional level) will submit its own opinion on the appointment of High Court and First Instance Court judges in its territory.

As we conclude our discussion of the judicial structure, we will focus on the regional mechanism of constitutional interpretation. The unrevised regional constitutions included an extraordinary mechanism of interpretation of the regional constitution.

This mechanism included that the power to interpret the regional constitution was given to the regional parliament; a more radical infringement of the *nemo iudex in sua causa* principle is hardly thinkable. The constitutional revision withdrew this power from the State Council and in all

regions, except for the Southern region, a new institution competent for constitutional interp- retation was established: the Constitu- tional Interpretation Commission. The Constitutional Interpretation Commi- ssion is assisted in its task by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, a body of predominantly legal experts. However, the regional constitutions demonstrate considerable differences as far as the composition of the Constitutional Interpretation Commi- ssion is concerned. The Oromia, Afar and Somali constitutions stipulate that the Commission is composed of representatives from each *Wereda* or district Council. In the Amhara region, the Constitutional Interpretation Comm - ission is composed of representatives from each *Wereda* Council and from each (of the three) Nationality Council(s) – the Council of the Nationality Administration. In the Gambella and Benishangul/Gumuz regions, the members of the Commission are elected by and from the Nationality Councils.

The Gambella region, as will be discussed in the next section, is territorially divided into three Nationality Administrations, one each for the Nuer, Anuak and Mejenger. Hence, the members of the Commission are elected by and from among the members of the Councils of these administrative entities.

In order to guarantee the representation of all indigenous ethnic groups, the Gambella constitution also guarantees the representation of the Upo and Komo.

In Benishangul/Gumuz, the members of the Commission are elected by each of the five Nationality Administrations (one for each of the five indigenous groups). Each indigenous ethnic community is entitled to four representatives, bringing the total membership of the Constitutional Interpretation Commission to 20. The Tigray constitution provides that the regional Constitutional Interpretation Commission comprises a representative from each *Wereda* Council as well as the representatives of the region in the federal House of the Federation. Still another arrangement is included in the Harar constitution. The Harar Constitutional Interpretation Commiss- ion comprises representatives of the region in the federal parliament, members of the two houses of the State Council as well as former regional presidents. In the Southern region, constitutional interpretation power is, as mentioned, granted to the Council of Nationalities.

## 2. The Level of the Zone/ Special Wereda /Natio- nality Administration

The Gambella and Benishangul/Gumuz constitutions provide for the Administration of Nationalities as the administrative level hierarchically just below the regional level. The Gambella constitution provides for the establish- ment of three Administrations of Nationalities: one for the Anuak, the Nuer and the Mejenger respectively.

The Benishangul/Gumuz constitution does not specify the ethnic communities for which an Administration of Nationalities can be established However, the expectation that such administrative entities were only to be established for the indigenous minorities was confirmed by a regional law of 2008, which provided for a Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo Administration of Nationalities. The administrative level just below the regional level in the Southern region is the Zone/Special Wereda. Currently, the Southern region is administratively divided into thirteen Zones (Gurage, Hadiya, Kembata Timbaro, Sidama, Gedeo, Debub Omo, Kaffa, Sheka, Bench Majji, Silte, Wolayita, Gamo Gofa and Dawro) and eight Special Wereda (Yem, Derashe, Amaro, Burji, Konso, Alaba, Konta and Basketo). The names of all Special Wereda and of nine Zones (Gurage,

Hadiya, Sidama, Gedeo, Kaffa, Sheka, Silte, Wolayita and Dawro) indicate that 17 ethnic groups in the Southern region have received their own territorial administration, namely those groups to which the names of the Zones/Special Wereda refer.

The names of the four remaining Zones refer to several ethnic groups or have no ethnic connotation (such as the Debub/South Omo Zone). In the Amhara region, the administrative level next to the region is, similarly as in Gambella and Benishangul/Gumuz, the Nationality Administration. However, a Nationality Administration has only been established for the Himra, Awi and Oromo ethnic communities. In the other parts of the Amhara region, the administrative level directly subordinate to the region (according to the constitution) is the Wereda.

The Oromia constitution stipulates that the Zone constitutes the administrative level just below the region. The Tigray, Afar and Somali constitutions on the other hand do not mention the Zone and designate the Wereda as the immediate sub-regional level. The Harar constitution, finally, provides for a two- tier administrative structure comprising the region and the Kebele The Administration of Nationalities/ Zone/Special Wereda – the sub-regional

administrative level in Benishangul/ Gumuz, Gambella, Amhara and the Southern region – has legislative (although genuine legislative powers are granted only in the Southern region), executive and judicial institutions. The (legislative) assembly of this sub-regional territorial administration is the Council. The Nationality Council shall comprise members of the regional council representing the nationality and members of the *Wereda* Councils – located in the territory of the concerned Nationality Administration – elected under special consideration.

In the Southern region, the Zone/Special *Wereda* Council has a similar composition with directly elected members as well as members elected from the Zone/Special *Wereda* to the State Council. The members of the Nationality Council are elected for a term of five years. An important power of the Council, which allows the concerned ethnic group to protect its ethnic identity, is the power to determine the working language of the territorial administration.

As mentioned, in the Southern region, the Zone/Special *Wereda* Council also has legislative powers. Another important element of autonomous decision-making is the power of the Council to approve the budget of the sub-regional administration, based upon the budget allocated to it by the regional parliament.

Furthermore, the Council has power of control over the local executive. Finally, the Council elects its Speaker and Deputy Speaker and can organise itself in committees.

The executive body of the Nationality Administration/Zone/Special *Wereda* is the Council of Administration of Nationalities/Administrative Council. This institution comprises the Chief Administrator, Deputy Chief Administrator and heads of executive departments. The Chief Administrator, who is elected by and from among the members of the Nationality Administration/ Zone's assembly, is the chair of the executive body. The other members of the executive body are selected by the Chief Administrator and their appointment is approved by the assembly. Due to the power of the assembly to control the executive, the four regional constitutions stipulate that the executive body is accountable to the assembly. The executive body has the power to draw up the annual budget and to submit it for approval to the assembly. Furthermore, it formulates the economic and social development policies of the administration. It also ensures the observance of law and order in its territory.

Finally, each Nationality Administration/ Zone has at least one High

Court as well as First Instance Courts for each *Wereda* (district). Although the sub-regional territorial administrations have a considerable degree of autonomy, they are accountable to the regional level. The four constitutions indicate that the sub-regional executive body is not only accountable to the sub-regional assembly but also to the regional Executive Council and Chief Executive.

In contrast to the above-mentioned sub-regional administrations, the Zone in Oromia is not an ethnic-based entity. The Zones in the Oromia region do not have an assembly, but solely an executive organ: the Zonal Administ- ration. The Zonal Administration is headed by the Principal and Deputy Administrators. The members of the Zonal Administration are not elected by the population of the Zone, but are appointed by the regional Adminis- trative Council upon the recommen- dation of the regional president. The members of the Zonal Administration are therefore to be considered – to use the words of another author – *extended arms of the regional council*. Consequently, the Zonal Administration is not accountable to the population of the Zone, but solely to the regional government – more specifically to the president and the regional Administrative Council.

The powers of the Zone include *inter alia*: coordinating the activities of the districts in the Zone; coordinating the social and economic institutions that are commonly used by the several districts; guiding and controlling the security and police services of the Zone; insuring the implementation of policies, laws, regulations and guidelines of the *Caffee* (State Council) and the regional Administrative Council.

## 3. The ·Wereda (District) *and* Kebele Level

All regional constitutions – except the Harar constitution, which only mentions the *Kebele* – provide for the administrative level of the *Wereda* (district) and the *Kebele*. In the Tigray, Afar and Somali constitutions, the *Wereda* is the administrative level directly subordinate to the regional level. Although the *Wereda* and *Kebele* – in contrast with the Nationality Administrations discussed in the previous section – are not primarily designed to accommodate the interests of specific ethnic groups, some districts and *Kebele* nevertheless offer territorial self-rule to – small – ethnic groups.

The districts and *Kebele* have a parallel institutional structure. The districts have a district council (assembly) and an executive body, the Administrative Council. The members of the district council are directly elected by the population from the different *Kebele* in

the district. They are elected for terms of five years. The district council has important competences such as the approval of the budget of the district, the approval of plans in the area of social services and economic development, supervising the development of projects in the area of agricultural development, collecting certain taxes and the issuance of guidelines to guarantee peace and security in the district. Finally, the district council has a controlling power over the executive in the district.

Executive power is exercised by the Administrative Council, headed by the Chief Administrator. The Chief Administrator is elected by and from among the members of the district council and he is accountable to this council and to the regional president (or - in case the district is situated in a Nationality Administration or Zone – to the Chief Administrator of the latter). The district Chief Administrator selects the other members of the Administrative Council, whose appointment must be approved by the district council. The *Kebele* has a similar institutional structure. First, there is a *Kebele* Council whose members are directly elected, for a term of five years, by the population of the *Kebele*. The *Kebele* Council has a controlling power over the executive power that is held by the *Kebele* Administrative Council. The *Kebele*

Administrative Council is headed by the *Kebele* Chief Administrator.

The *Kebele* Chief Administrator is elected by and from among members of the *Kebele* Council. He is accountable to this council and to the district government. When discussing the *Kebele*, we also need to point at the judiciary. In the discussion of the judiciary at the regional level, it was mentioned that the regions have a three-tier judicial structure: the Supreme Court, High Courts and First Instance Courts. Hence, the First Instance Court, established in each district, is supposed to be the lowest level of the judicial organisation. However, all regional constitutions provide that a court will also be established at the level of the *Kebele*: the so-called Social Court.

A further implementation of the constitutional provisions on the Social Courts can be found in ordinary legislation.

## VI. Principles and Objectives of Regional Policy

After having dealt with the regional administrative and institutional structure, all regional constitutions – except for the Harar constitution – formulate in a separate chapter a number of principles and objectives that are guidelines for the regional governments in their policy

endeavours. The federal constitution contains an analogous chapter 10 "National policy principles and objectives".

As with the human rights provisions, the regional principles and objectives are almost identical to the national/federal ones. This is not surprising since the federal constitution stipulates that the national principles and objectives have to be respected by both the federal and regional governments. The federal constitution lists principles for external relations, principles for national defence, political objectives, economic objectives, social objectives, cultural objectives and environmental objectives.

The principles for external relations and for national defence are not included in the regional constitutions since they deal with issues that are outside the powers of the regions. However, the national political, economic, social, cultural and environmental objectives have been adopted by the regional constitutions. They can be seen as corollaries of the human rights as protected by the regional constitutions. For instance, the regional constitutions mention as political objectives that the government shall respect the identity of nations, nationalities and peoples and that it (the regional government) shall give special attention to the most backward communities. Both objectives result

respectively from the right to self-determination of ethnic groups and from the concern to achieve genuine ethnic equality. The economic objective that the government shall promote the participation of peoples in the formulation of regional development policies finds its corollary in the right of the people to participate in development activities, which is part of the right to development. The right of the people to a clean and healthy environment necessitates that the government shall endeavour to ensure that all residents of the region live in a clear and healthy environment, which is mentioned as one of the environmental objectives. Some minor differences between the regional constitutions can furthermore be observed.

Again reflecting the specific features of the regional population, the Afar constitution mentions the promotion of the living standards of the pastoralists as one of the economic objectives of the regional government. What is also notable is the emphasis given by the Benishangul-Gumuz constitution to the political objective of good governance. Article 110(3) stipulates that there shall be good governance down to the *Kebele* level which is free from corruption, transparent, accountable to the people, efficient and effective.

## VII. Miscellaneous Provisions

Under this heading, the regional constitutions detail the procedure that has to be followed in case of a regional state of emergency and they discuss the position and powers of the Auditor General. It is also here that we can find the constitutional amendment or revision procedure. Although there are some notable differences between the various regional constitutions with regards to the state of emergency procedure, the major variations can be observed with regards to the constitutional amendment procedure. All regional constitutions have designed different procedures – although some procedures, such as the Tigray and Oromia or the Amhara and Gambella ones are very similar.

## Conclusion

The above analysis has shown that the regional constitutions of Ethiopia are not mere copies of the federal constitution. It is true that the federal constitution constitutes the framework within which the regional constitutions have to be designed. Yet this framework has certainly not exhausted the discretionary powers of the regions to construct constitutions that reflect the specific features of their respective societies.

For instance, although the human rights catalogues included in the regional

constitutions are very similar to the human rights protected by the federal constitution, notable differences have been observed. Yet, it is primarily in the area of the regional territorial-administrative and institutional organisation that the regional constitutions display distinct features. These region-specific provisions are often related to the ethnic composition of the regional population.

In other words, the regions have constructed constitutional arrangements that respond to the challenges posed by their specific ethnic constellation. Hence, in order to assess whether the Ethiopian constitutional framework allows for the achievement of its main objective – unity in diversity – a profound knowledge of the regional constitutions is of paramount importance. Through its almost exclusive focus on the federal constitution, legal scholarship on Ethiopian constitutional law has so far neglected an important limb of Ethiopia's constitutional body – although it is only fair to mention that sub-national constitutions in other federations suffer from a similar lack of scientific attention. It is the author's hope that this brief analysis will to some extent help to fill the knowledge gap in the area of Ethiopian regional constitutional law, and that it can thus serve as a starting point for more elaborate research on this topic.

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# Determinants of Household Poverty: a case of Gondar City

## Getachew Jenber *& Samson Kassahun**

*Abstract: The research identified the determinants of urban poverty in Gondar city in Amhara region of Ethiopia. The data for the study was obtained mainly from cross-sectional survey conducted in Gondar city in 2009. A total of 240 sampled heads of the household were selected by systematic random sampling from all twelve urban Kebeles. Food Energy Intake (FEI) method was used to calculate food poverty line, whereas Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) approach was employed to estimate total poverty line. The analysis for poverty indices result shows a head count poverty of 32.9 %, a poverty gap of 0.0704 and poverty severity indices of 0.0225. Moreover, different households are classified as either poor or non poor on the basis of the poverty line. Accordingly, the results show that household size and number of sick household members significantly explain the variations in the likelihood of being poor. Moreover, households receiving remittances and getting higher monthly income are more likely to exit from the poverty trap. Employment sector also significantly explains the possibility of going out of the poor household group.*

Key words: Household Poverty, Expenditure Poverty, Food Poverty,

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## INTRODUCTION

Many developing countries in the South are characterized to be poor (World Bank, 1990). Needles to say, poverty is both relative and absolute. Attempts to analyze it may constitute a major problem since the concept of poverty has so many attributes varying in both time and space. Most attempts to measure poverty are forced into simplification and the use of poverty indicators or surrogates, which dare rarely brought together in a way that elucidates the real complexity of poverty.

A World Bank report (World Bank, 1990: 139) on the status of poverty claimed that there were over one billion poor people in the less developed countries, of whom 180 million are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank further stated that the proportion of the Sub-Saharan African population in poverty in 1985 was estimated at nearly 47 per cent and was second in the world to that of south Asia.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP,1991:15 -18. 88-91. and 194-195) has provided estimates of numbers and percentages of people "below the poverty line" for a number of countries. totalling 1.2 billion for the

less developed countries in 1990, and using "real GDP" in the calculation, i.e. gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). The "Poverty line" was defined as "those income levels below which a minimum nutritionally adequate diet plus essential non – food requirements are not affordable" (UNDP, 1991:195).

The problem for urban poor people is not just a loss of or a fall in income resulting in an inability to buy essential goods, but a change in the minimum survival endowment, such as loss of labour power owing to ill health. In a clinical examination of urban poverty in Ethiopia, Samson (2004) observed that urban poverty is the most important challenge in both income and non-income measures. The growth of urban population and increasing urbanization will enlarge the number of urban poor. Urbanization is not harmful by itself but it entails a positive or negative consequence for which cities must be aware and also be well prepared in time to face the consequences. On the one hand, more poor people are now living in urban areas than ever before. However, urban centres do not have enough resources and institutional capacity to support the bulging population (UN-HABITAT, 2001).

According to the world urbanization prospect (United Nations, 2003) the process of urbanization is already advanced in the more developed countries, where 74 per cent of the population lived in urban centres. The proportion of the population living in urban areas is expected to increase to 82 per cent by 2030. By 2030, Africa will have more urban dwellers than many other developing countries expecting to encounter rapid rates of urbanization during 2000-2030, so that by 2030, 54 per cent of the inhabitants will live in urban areas (United Nation, 2003). Furthermore, Africa's urbanization process took place within only a few decades compared to the rather gradual pace of the western world where smooth and progressive adjustments to the changes were possible. Related to these observations, one of the characteristics in the rapid urbanization processes in Africa is known as 'hyper-urbanization', where it is characterized by a mere shift of the population toward urban areas unaccompanied by the actual transformation of urban industrial structure (Samson 2004).

When the world is becoming increasingly urban, there is also an increase in the number of urban poor. Ravallion (2001) argued that the urban share of the poor in a developing region would be an increasing convex function of the urban share of the population. That means, the higher the initial level

of urbanization, the larger the effect would be on the proportion of the poor living in urban areas, for any given increment to the urban population share. In this respect, urban centres in Ethiopia, like all developing countries, are not ready to combat urban poverty that resulted from hyper-urbanization due to lack of resources and low level of institutional capacity. In addition, it becomes a challenge to accommodate and provide basic necessities for urban life such as sufficient housing, piped water, sewerage, public transportation, education, health and other necessary amenities.

In Ethiopia, in the face of scanty and anecdotal data sets, it may be difficult to make conclusive judgment of the incidence of urban poverty. However, urban poverty incidence has increased by an estimated four percentage points over 1995-99, against a slight decline of two percentage points in rural poverty over the same period. The substantial increase in urban poverty is mainly attributed to an upsurge of poverty in Addis Ababa, from 50 to 57 percent over 1995-99 (World Bank 2005).

Poverty is no doubt one of the main social problems facing urban centres in Ethiopia today. Income is not only low but distributed extremely unequal. Sustainable livelihoods development that allows people accumulate and use

asset to improve their wellbeing and to lift themselves out of poverty is uncertain. The effectiveness and productivity of assets in supporting peoples' livelihoods depends not only on direct asset productivity and value, but also on the options, constraints and costs involved in poor exercising of their rights. Hence, understanding the determinants of poverty at household level which is different from rural poverty due to demographic, economic and social aspect will provide a snapshot about who is poor, their access to services, their living standards and so forth, thereby contributing to the effective targeting of poverty by policy measures. Keeping this in view, the general objective of the study is to identify the determinants of poverty and poverty conditions of the study area in order to pave the road for policy intervention and practical action. The specific objectives are to determine poverty line, poverty indices and identify determinants of poverty.

The remaining part of the paper is organized in such a way that the theoretical concepts are presented in section two and methodology part is explained in section three. Section four is about result and discussion and section five focuses on conclusion.

# CONCEPTUALIZING URBAN POVERTY

Conventional economic definitions use income or consumption complemented by a range of social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, nutrition, proportion of household budget spent on different items such as food, school, health and drinking water, to define level of poverty. Alternative interpretations developed largely by rural anthropologists and social planners working with rural communities in the third world allow for local variation in the meaning of poverty and expand the definition to encompass perceptions of non-material deprivation and social differentiation (Wratten, 1995; Satterthwaite, 1995). Generally, there has been an expansion of the discussion on poverty to include more subjective definitions such as vulnerability, entitlement and social exclusion (Jones, 1999). These concepts have been useful for analysing what increases the risk of poverty and the underlying reasons why people remain in poverty. Vulnerability is not synonymous with poverty, but refers to defencelessness, insecurity, exposure to risk, shocks and stress (Jones 1999; Wratten 1995; Chambers 1995, p.189). Assets such as, human investment in health and education, productive assets including houses and domestic equipment, access to

community infrastructure reduce vulnerability (Chambers 1995). Entitle - ment refers to the complex ways in which individuals or households command resources, which vary between people over time in response to shocks and long-term trends. Social exclusion can be understood as people being prevented from participation in the normal activities of the society in which they live or being incapable of functioning. In other words, social exclusion means incomplete citizenship and unequal access to the status, benefits, and experiences of typical citizens in society (Samson, 2004, 2007, Marsh, 2001).

Despite the fact that there is much debate on defining poverty, the only point of agreement is that poverty is defined in terms of 'lack' or 'deficiency' in some form of necessities in human survival and welfare (Wratten 1995:12). In trying to measure "lack" or "deficiency", the growing body of literature on poverty agree that it is more than just measuring 'income.' For instance, many poor families do not earn a regular income and their needs are met with more than only cash inputs (Jones 1999). However, most operational measure defines poverty as some function of a shortfall of income or consumption expenditure from a poverty line, and hence measures only poverty

at a single point in time. Accordingly, most countries still operate on the basis of setting a poverty line, which is basically a simple tool useful for bureaucratic decision-making about welfare support (Rakodi 1994; Satterthwaite 1997).

# METHODOLOGY

## A) Data source and the study area

Gondar city was established in 1632 G.C. by Emperor Fasiledus. It was the capital city of Ethiopia for 200 years since its establishment. Thus it was the center of Ethiopian politics for long period of time. Many emperors of Gondar left behind their legacy which makes Gondar rich in ancient palaces and castles. . At present, Gondar, located 748 kms from Addis Ababa, is the centre of North Gondar administrative zone and has its own city administration.

Household level determinants of poverty generally rely on the household level data. In this study a cross sectional household data has been collected through a household questionnaire to collect information on various social and economic factors in Gonder. Gondar city has 23 Kebeles which are categorized as urban and rural. However, the research focused on only 12 urban Kebeles by taking randomly selected 240 sample households.

# B. Analytical Framework

To measure poverty and identify the 'Poor' from 'Non-poor' empirical models have been utilized. A binary Logit or Probit regression model is an appropriate technique to see the probability for a household to remain poor. The present study therefore uses a binary logistic regression model given that the dependent variable $(Y)$ is dichotomous: 0 when a household is above poverty line and 1 when it is below the poverty 'line. Predictor variables are a set of socioeconomic and demographic status indicators and human capital

$$p_j = \frac{e^{\alpha + \beta X_i}}{1 + e^{\alpha + \beta X_i}}$$

(1)

and dwelling asset of the household. Let $P_i$ denote the probability that the j-th household is below the poverty line.

That is, $P_i = P(Y_i = 1/X_i)$

$$\ln \frac{P_i}{1 - P_i} = \alpha + \sum_i \beta_i X_{ii}$$

(2)

where $X_i$ is a vector of predictors of the $i^{th}$ household. Then the response probability $P_i$ is given by:

where $\boxed{\beta}$ is a row vector and $\boxed{\alpha}$ is a scalar. The logit function to be estimated is then written

$$\ln Y_j = a + bc_j \quad (3)$$

as The log it variable $\boxed{\ln\{P_i /(1-P_i)\}}$ is the natural log of the odds in favour of the household falling below the poverty line. Equation (2) is estimated by maximum likelihood method and the procedure does not require assumptions of normality or homoskedasticity of errors in predictor variables.

To determine food poverty line, the regression model that is used to estimate the parameters is given:

$$z^f = e^{(a+bR)} \quad (4)$$

where $Y_j$ = total value of food consumed per adult equivalent units by household j. $C_j$= total calorie consumption per adult equivalent by household j. u and b are parameters to be estimated.

The food poverty line $Z^f$ is the estimated cost of acquiring the calorie recomme-nded daily allowance:

$$H = (A + \gamma k)^\theta \quad (5)$$

where, $Z^f$ = food poverty line. R = recommended daily allowance of calories per adult equivalent, which is 2200 for Ethiopia.

To consider inter-personal variation in consumption, researchers usually utilize the standard approach, called the "adult equivalent household size" (Banks and Johnson, 1994, Decton, 1999. FAO, 2005):

Where, A = number of adult. k = number of children. $\gamma$= the cost of children relative to adult. $\theta$ = Household economies of scale. $\gamma$ and $\theta$ are parameters which lie between 0 and 1. The value of $\gamma$ is 0.5 and $\theta$ is 0.95 in comparable studies.

$$S_i = \alpha + \beta \log(\frac{y_i}{z_i}) \quad (6)$$

Thus, this study also utilizes these values to compute the adult equivalent household size. The food poverty line indicated in (4) is estimated and some allowance for non-food items is made. Thus, total poverty line including the cost of non-food goods is computed using the following regression equation suggested by Ravallion and Bidani (1994).

where, $S_i$ = the share of total expenditure devoted to food by household i, $y_i$ = the total spending or expenditure (food plus non-food). $Z^f$ food poverty line and $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are parameters to be estimated.

$$Z = z'(2-\alpha) \quad (7)$$

Revalion and Bidani (1994) also suggested that the square value of log $(y_i/z^f)$ will probably allow a better fit to the data because it permits the income elasticity of demand for food to exceed unity at low value of y.

$$P_a = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{q}\left[\frac{Z-X_i}{z}\right]^a \quad \alpha = 0,1,2 \quad (8)$$

The total poverty line is given by:

After the poverty line is determined, poverty indices such as $P_0$, $P_1$, and $P_2$ will be estimated using Foster Greer Thorbeck (1986) formula:

where, z = food poverty line, $\boxed{X_i}$ = consumption expenditure or income of household q= number of households below poverty line, n = total number of sample households for $\alpha$ = 0, 1, and 2 which represent head count ($P_0$), poverty gap($P_1$), and severity of poverty ($P_2$)

## Results and Discussions
### Table 1: Regression Statistics for Food Poverty line of Gondar City

| | Coeff icient | Standard Error | t-stat | P-valu e | Lo wer 95 % | Upper 95% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Int erc cpt | 1.104 02 | 0.03598 2184 | 30.6 823 | 1.11 E-84 | 1.03 313 2 | 1.17490 0567 |
| Ci | 0.000 34 | 1.26075 E-05 | 27.0 089 | 1.97 E-74 | 0.00 031 6 | 0.00036 5353 |

R-Square 0.754
Adjusted R Square 0.752967
Standard Error 0.20215
Observations 240

## Poverty Line Estimation and Poverty Status

In this study food energy intake (FEI) and cost of basic needs approach (CBN) that permits some allowance for non food items are employed to determine poverty line. International poverty line of $1 a day is used to show the local price difference on poverty measurements. This method employs regression of natural logarithm of expenditure as dependent and daily calorie intake as independent variable to compute the food poverty line at which a person's food energy intake is just sufficient to satisfy a given required quantity of his or her daily calories.

As mentioned in the methodology part of this paper, food poverty line is computed

as $Z^f = e^{(a + bR)}$ where $Z^f$ = food poverty line, a = intercept of the regression, b = coefficient of calorie intake and, R = the standard daily calorie intake of a person per day.

Hence, from the above regression result indicated in table 1, the poverty line can be calculated as:

$Z^f = e^{(1.10402 + 0.00034*2200)}$   = 6.38 Birr per day.

In Gondar city, people who have expenditure of below Birr 6.38 per day could be considered as below food poverty line and those spending more than birr 6.38 per day could be categorized in the above food poverty line group. The estimation of the poverty line is based on adult equivalent consumption and it shows the poverty related to Food Energy Intake (FEI). When head count poverty is estimated based on this poverty line of 6.38 Birr per day, 24.6% of the sampled population are living below poverty line and the remaining 75.4 % are living above poverty line.

People in urban areas are characterized by 'monetized economy', where products and services are trade in exchange for money. They are not only spending their money on food items but they also spend on other items like clothing, education, health, and different socioeconomic activities. Accordingly, the present study revealed that huge proportions (58.4%) of the household income are used for food items and only 41.6% are for non food items.

Therefore, computing poverty line that includes food and non food spending is important. To determine total

poverty line, the food poverty line Birr 6.38 and some allowance for non-food items should be included. According to Revallion and Bidani (1994), households usually spend on non-food goods even though they do not reach the minimum nutritional requirement since some non-food goods are similarly basic.

Thus, total poverty line Z is then determined as:

where Z = total poverty line, $Z^f$ = food poverty line and α = intercept parameter that is estimated from equation (6). Therefore:   $Z = 6.38(2-0.624958)$  = 8.77 Birr per day per adult equivalent.

The estimation of the poverty line is based on adult equivalent consumption of basic needs. Therefore, people who spend below Birr 8.77 per adult equivalent per day are considered as 'Poor' while those spending above the poverty line which is Birr 8.77 are considered as 'Non poor'.

Table 2 shows the distribution of poor and non-poor household by kebele.

Accordingly, the total poverty status from the selected households in Gondar city shows that people living below total poverty line are found to be 32.9 %, whereas 67.1 % are found above poverty line. When we look at the distribution by kebele, the highest poverty incidence is found in Abeye Egzie, followed by Kirkos Akababi and Azezo Demaza respectively.

## Poverty Indices

Poverty measures such as head count

### Table 2: Total poverty Status of sampled household by kebele

| Kebele | Poor | | Not poor | | Tot al | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | % | N | % | | |
| Abajale | 7 | 33.3 | 14 | 66.7 | 21 | |
| Abeye Egzi | 9 | 52.9 | 8 | 47.1 | 17 | |
| Adebabay Eyesus | 3 | 21.4 | 11 | 78.6 | 14 | |
| Arbegnoch Adebabay | 5 | 31.3 | 11 | 68.7 | 16 | |
| Azezo Ayermarfey a | 7 | 31.8 | 15 | 68.2 | 22 | |
| Azezo Demaza | 10 | 45.5 | 12 | 54.5 | 22 | |
| Gebrieal Akababi | 4 | 25.0 | 12 | 75.0 | 16 | |
| Kirkos Akababi | 12 | 48.0 | 13 | 52.0 | 25 | |
| Ledeta | 5 | 27.7 | 17 | 72.3 | 22 | |
| Maraki | 7 | 25.0 | 21 | 75.0 | 28 | |
| Medihaniea im Akababi | 4 | 22.2 | 14 | 77.8 | 18 | |
| Mehal Arada | 6 | 31.6 | 13 | 68.4 | 19 | |
| Grand Total | 79 | 32.9 | 161 | 67.06 | 240 | |

Source: Field survey, 2009

### Table 3: Poverty Indices

| Type of poverty line | $P_c=$ head count | $P_1=$ poverty gap | $P_2=$poverty severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Food poverty line | 0.246 | 0.0598 | 0.0233 |
| Total poverty line | 0.329 | 0.0704 | 0.0225 |
| $1 a day poverty line | 0.375 | 0.0650 | 0.0233 |

*Source: Field survey, 2009*

index, poverty gap index and Foster Greer Thorbake index which is also called poverty severity index are the most frequently used measures of poverty. In this study after the determination of food and total poverty lines, these poverty indices are computed using the field survey household data. The result of the survey is shown below.

### Incidence of poverty or head count index $P_0$

In Gondar city the head count index for **food poverty** (shown in Table 3) is **0.246** and, the **total poverty** head count index is **0.329**. The international $1 a day head count index is **0.375**. These results imply the proportions of people that live below poverty line were 24.6 % and 32.9% for food and total poverty (food + non food items) respectively. When the poverty status of Gondar

city is measured based on $1 a day poverty line, the proportion of people below poverty line becomes 37.5%, which is almost near to the Ethiopian urban areas poverty head count of 35 % (MoFED, 2002).

The food energy intake or food poverty index shows that     24.6 % of the surveyed population cannot afford to buy or consume basic basket of goods. However, when the expenditure of non food items such as house rent, clothing, education and health expenditure, electric and water bill payment etc are added the index becomes 32.9%. However, the interpretation of such results warrants caution to avoid possible distortion that households are spending the highest proportion of their income for non-food items as a result of food sufficiency at the household level.

## Depth of poverty or poverty gap $P_1$

The poverty gap, which is often considered as representing the depth of poverty, is the mean distance separating the population from poverty line, with the non-poor being given zero. It is a measure of poverty deficit of the population.    The depth or poverty gap $P_1$ of Gondar city for food and food plus non food consumptions are 0.0598 and 0.0704, respectively, as shown in table 3

above. The amount of resource required to bring people out of poverty in Gondar is 5.98% of food spending of the reference population and 7.04% of the food plus non food spending for food poverty and total poverty, respectively.

## Poverty Severity (squared severity gap) $P_2$

This is often described as a measure of the severity of poverty. While the poverty gap takes into account the distance separating the poor from poverty line, the squared poverty gap takes the square of the distance into account. In addition, high values of $P_2$ for a specific kebele indicate that the severity of poverty for people living in that kebele is higher. The $P_2$ results of the surveyed households in Gondar are 0.0233 and 0.0225 for food, and food plus non-food consumption, respectively.

## Income Inequality and Poverty

Inequality refers to the dispersion of a distribution, whether that is income, consumption, or some other welfare indicator or attribute of population. Inequality is a broader concept than poverty in that it is defined over the whole distribution, not only the part of distribution of individuals or households below a certain poverty line. In the study area, households' income was found

ranging from 257 to 11831.50 Birr per month. The average household income was found to be 1735 Birr per month. However, the adult equivalent monthly average income was 263 Birr, in other words the average income of an individual per adult per month was



Gini coefficient = 0.44088, Percentile 95%
CI = 0.415233 to 0.455147
Source: Field survey, 2009
found to be 263 Birr.

The Lorenz Curve is a tool used to represent income distributions as proposed by Lorenz (1905); it tells us which proportion of total income is in the hands of a given percentage of population. While Lorenz curves takes into account how income is distributed in a graphical representation, the Gini Coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It thus varies from 0 (perfectly equal distribution) to 100 (perfectly unequal distribution). Accordingly, as indicated in figure 1, the

Gini coefficient of the study area was 0.44. It means 44% of the income was distributed unequally.

## Determinants of urban household poverty

To identify the determinants of household poverty in Gondar City, binary logistic regression is applied. The results are shown in table 4. Form the 'result we can see that household size (HH_DIZE), number of sick member of the household (N_SICK_MBR), marital Status of head of the household (MAR_STATUS), ownership of house (HOUSE), employment type (EMP_TYPE), education of household head (HHH_EDU), average income of adult equivalent per month (HH_MONINC), and remittance of the household (REMIT) are significantly correlated with household poverty.

The negative value of household employment type indicates that for household heads who are working in a formal employment, the probability of being poor decreases by a factor of 0.116, while the probability of household heads who work in casual or informal work to being poor is higher.

Table 4: Result of Logit Model of Gondar City

| Explanatory Variables | B | S.E | Wald | df | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| G_HEAD | .440 | .990 | .197 | 1 | .657 | 1.552 |
| HH_SIZE | 2.226 | .824 | 7.293 | 1 | .007* | 9.263 |
| PROPW | .347 | .734 | .223 | 1 | .637 | 1.414 |
| DEPEND | 1.341 | .816 | 2.704 | 1 | .100*** | 3.823 |
| MAR_STATUS | -2.089 | .967 | 4.664 | 1 | .031** | .124 |
| HOUSE | -1.779 | .744 | 5.712 | 1 | .017** | .169 |
| EMP_TYPE | -2.156 | .806 | 7.154 | 1 | .007* | .116 |
| AGE_HEAD | -1.298 | .798 | 2.643 | 1 | .104 | .273 |
| HHH_EDU | -2.614 | .966 | 7.321 | 1 | .007* | .073 |
| HHH_PEDU | -.729 | .953 | .586 | 1 | .444 | .482 |
| N-SICK_MBR | 2.320 | .890 | 6.792 | 1 | .009* | 10.177 |
| ACC_BASRV | 1.254 | .746 | 2.825 | 1 | .093*** | 3.503 |
| HH_MONINC | -2.541 | .772 | 10.839 | 1 | .001* | .079 |
| REMIT | -1.591 | .742 | 4.598 | 1 | .032** | .204 |
| Constant | 3.492 | 1.472 | 5.624 | 1 | .018 | 32.839 |

*, **, *** Significant at 99%, 95%, and 90% Confidence interval respectively
Source: Field survey, 2009

Households are assumed to earn more income in a formal and permanent work type than the casual or informal work types. Marital status of the household head also shows negative and statistically significant result, implying that the probability of the household with head who is married not to be poor is higher by a factor of 0.124 as compared to the unmarried one. This could be because of the fact that marital status of a head of the household is connected with the struggle for family survival. The household economy is linked to the monetized economy where by the labour supply and consumption at the household is jointly determined. In this regards, literatures on household arrangements (Bergstrom, 1997; Hart, 1990; Vogel, 2003), argue that the family is basically a communitarian organization, where resources are pooled into a common pot from where all family members can benefit.

The debate on the role of family size in poverty is largely unresolved (Orbeta, 2005). However, larger family sizes means larger expenditures for food, clothing, shelter, education, health and other needs, and as a result, the family is more prone to poverty. The

result for family size shows a positive sign for the household size as expected, with an odds ratio of 9.263, implying that the larger the size of household, the higher the probability of being poor.

Similarly, if the adult equivalent monthly household income becomes greater than the average monthly income, remaining other variables unchanged, the probability of the households to exit out of poverty is higher with a factor of odds ratio of 0.079. Improving income generating opportunities of household through different options would be an important step towards poverty reduction policies and strategies. Ownership of house also has negative relation with the probability of falling into poverty. As shown in the table 4, households who own a house have a higher probability of being non-poor.

Education can reduce poverty in a number of ways. Since more educated people are more likely to get jobs, and are more productive. The result obtained from the model revealed that households whose head's level of education is less than grade 8 are 13.5 times more likely to be poor as compared to household heads with more education

$$e^{\beta} = 1/e^{\beta} = 1/0.073 = 13.5$$

This implies that lack of education is a factor that pushes households to fall in to poverty. Therefore, promotion of education becomes central in addressing problems of poverty.

Similar to income, remittance of households shows a negative relation with the probability of being poor. As the household gets remittance falling in to poverty declines by factors of odd ratio of 0.204. This implies remittance has positive impact for households to get out of poverty. To the contrary diseases have positive correlation with the probability of households to be poor. When member of the household becomes sick, there will be cost of medication, job loss and loss of productivity which leads to the household to fall into poverty. Thus poverty and frequent sickness of member of the household do reinforce each other and have strong correlation. The estimation of the model shows positive and significant correlation indicating that as a household member gets sick, the odds ratio of that household to go into poverty increases by factors of odd ratio of 10.17 respectively.

In the present study the average distance of basic services is considered to see the effect of

access to basic services in determining poverty. The basic services considered in the study were distance from main road, market, primary education, health station, tap water source, police station and banks. Accordingly, the model shows that the variable access to basic services (ACC_BASRV) is negatively and significantly correlated with the probability of a household to become poor.

## CONCLUSION

The article attempts to model the possible determinants of poverty in Gondar City. These possible determinants are classified majorly as demographic and socio-economic variables. The poverty lines of Gondar city were found to be 6.38 Birr for food and 8.77 Birr for food plus non-food items. Of the total 240 respondents the study found that 24.6% of them live below food poverty line and 32.9% below total poverty line.

The regression analysis results show that marital status of the head of the household, income and remittance are negatively associated with the probability of being poor. The study has found also that educational attainment and poverty

are negatively related, implying that education is a determinant factor to alleviate household poverty in Gondar city. House ownership was found to be significantly and negatively correlated with poverty implying that house ownership helps households to get out of poverty, as the house is an asset.

The analysis presented in the paper enables policy makers and decision makers to clearly see the effect of various household and head of the household characteristics on poverty in Gonder City. Since poverty is a social phenomenon and is multi-dimensional in nature, future research can be made focusing on severity of poverty by determining its salient features specifically looking into details of the poverty transition and its prevalence over time.

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## Annex I: - List of the Variables and their description

**Dependent Variables**

HHP (Urban)     (0 = Non Poor, 1 = Poor)

**Explanatory Variables**

| | |
|---|---|
| HHH_HEAST | Head of the Household Health Status (1 = Frequently Sick, 0 = Otherwise ) |
| HOUSE | House Ownership (1 = Own private House , 0 = Otherwise) |
| ACC_BASRV | Access to Basic Service  (1 = < 1 Km, 0 = otherwise) |
| PROPW | Proportion of Female in the  Household  (1 = >5, 0 = otherwise) |
| AGE_HEAD | Age of the Head of the Household (Completed Years) |
| G_HEAD | Gender of the Head of the Household (Female = 1, 0 = Male) |
| EDU | Schooling of Head of the Household (1= < grade 8, 0= otherwise) |
| HHH_PEDU | Level of Education for Parents of Head of the Household (1=<8 grade, 0= otherwise) |
| HH_MOINC | Household Equivalent  Monthly Income (1 =  >263, 0 = otherwise) |
| HH_SIZE | Household Size (1= >5, 0= otherwise) |
| HHH_EPMTYP | Household Head Employment Status  (I = formal, 0 = otherwise) |

Dependency Ratio

DEPEND

$$DEP = \frac{People\ of\ (Age\ 15\ and\ Below\ +\ Age\ 64\ and\ Above)}{People\ Above\ Age\ of\ 15\ and\ below\ age\ of\ 64}$$

| | |
|---|---|
| MAR_STATUS | Marital Status (Married = 1,  Otherwise = 0 ) |
| REMIT | Household Receiving Remittances (Yes = 1, 0 = No ) |

Number of Household Members Who Were Sick for the Last 12 months

N_SICK_MBR

$$DEP = \frac{People\ of\ (Age\ 15\ and\ Below\ +\ Age\ 64\ and\ Above)}{People\ Above\ Age\ of\ 15\ and\ below\ age\ of\ 64}$$

# Journal of African Development Studies
# Submission Guidelines

## *REFEREED ARTICLES*

A typical issue of *JADS* contains refereed articles on a broad range of topics relevant to the field of developments in Africa. Manuscripts are reviewed by a minimum of two qualified academics/professionals by invitation of the Editor-in-Chief. To ensure fairness, the review process is anonymous. Based on the comments of the referees, the Editor–in-Chief makes the final decision as to whether a paper will be published, returned to the author for revision and resubmission, or declined. *Prospective contributors should note that the review process for a peer-reviewed article may be lengthy.* Initial responses from referees are normally not available for a minimum of eight weeks after submission.

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Manuscripts should be typed, double spaced, on 8½" x 11" white bond, with a 1" margin on all sides. Articles in either French or English are acceptable. Double Spacing: Double space between all lines of the manuscript including headings, notes, references, quotations, and figure captions. Single spacing is acceptable only on tables.

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***Title Page:*** The title page includes 6 elements: (1) title and subtitle, if any; (2) author(s); (3) abbreviated title to be used as a running head consisting of a maximum of 70 characters, which includes all letters, punctuation, and spaces; (4) complete mailing address, phone, fax numbers, and e-mail of the author; (5) list of acknowledgments and grants; and (6) the total word count of your manuscript.

***Abstract Page:*** Provide two abstracts: one in English and one in French, about 150 words in length. Include 4 or 5 keywords in both French and English that identify article content.

***Text:*** Begin the text on a new page headed by the title only. Headings and subheadings in the text indicate the organization of the content. Keep the text of your manuscript anonymous for peer reviewers.

***Appendices:*** Begin each Appendix on a separate page, with the word "Appendix" and identifying capital letters centered at the top of the page. If there is only one Appendix, it is not necessary to use an identifying letter.
Acknowledgments:

Place acknowledgments at the end of the text, immediately preceding the notes and/or references. Acknowledgements should not exceed 100 words in length.

***References:*** References cited in the text must appear in the reference list; conversely, each entry in the reference list must be cited in text. It is the author's responsibility to be sure that the text citation and reference list are identical. References should be as per *The Chicago Manual of Style.*

***Tables:*** There is a limit of four to five tables per article. Table size must be no longer than one 4" x 6" page. Tables are numbered consecutively in the order in which they are first mentioned in text. Begin each table on a separate page. Do not write "table above/below" or "the table on p.32" because the position and page number of a table cannot be determined until the page is typeset.

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articles will be sent a proof of their articles for proofreading. These must be reviewed and returned *as soon as possible*. Proofs not returned within a reasonable time period (to be determined by the Editor-in-Chief on a case-by-case basis) may not be published in the issue anticipated.

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