

Public Order Policing During Crisis: A Critical Analysis of Police Response in Crises Affected Areas in Ethiopia, Abdo Beshir ^{1*}, Abebaw Tilahun ², Mihret Asemire ³, and Kumlachew Dereso ⁴

Abstract

Policing is the foundation of a strong state that realizes peace, order, and stability for its citizens. This study attempted to explore public order policing; police response to public disorder in some selected crisis-affected areas in Ethiopia. The study used a qualitative approach with an exploratory research design. Purposive and snowball sampling was employed to select participants for the study. Data were collected through interviews, Focus Group Discussion/FGD, observation, and document review techniques. Regarding participants of the study, 33 key informants from government officials (including prosecutors, experts from peace and security offices in the regions, Human Rights Commission officers, journalists, and police), 20 in-depth interviews with victims and their families, religious and community leaders; and 8 FGDs were conducted with police officers, victims, and community/religious leaders. The data of the study were thematically analyzed. The findings of the study showed that the Police did not play a proactive role because of many factors such as waiting for an order from a higher commandant/ government official, and political infiltration of police officers that immersed them in tricky of partiality. Hence, the crisis resulted in socio-political, economic, and psychological problems in the community of crisis-affected areas. The study concluded that police had minimal preparedness and hence were not successful in managing, preventing, minimizing, or stopping damages. Therefore, police organizations must always do security threat assessments to proactively handle damages due to crises; exercise an empowered decentralized chain of command during a crisis, raise the level of awareness to police officers regarding the police profession, and provide an immediate response to public calls.

Keywords: Police Response, Crisis, Public Order Policing, Ethiopia

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Introduction

Crises have become an inseparable part of life's routines. Around the world, humans face various threats and disasters, both natural and human-caused, the frequency and severity of which is greater now than ever in the past (Scheuren, Waroux, Below, Guha-Sapir, & Ponserre, 2008). The crisis can be conceptualized as a chaotic situation that threatens the current order; as the situation persists, the known reality undergoes a drastic change, and the public's ability to comprehend and attribute meaning to what is happening is seriously challenged (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmar 2003). In such situations, the public experiences stress, fear for the future, and at times helplessness (Van de Walle & Turoff, 2007). This situation leads the people in conflict and crises area to raise the issue of public order.

Public disorder is a condition characterized by widespread criminal and political violence and intimidation against targeted groups or individuals. Public order succeeds when widespread criminality and violence are reduced to the bare minimum, perpetrators pursued, arrested, and detained and the local population can move and live freely without fear of undue violence (Justice Law and Order

Sector, 2011). Large-scale crises present complex dangers, which include, in addition to the threat or damage to human lives, the collapse of infrastructures, technological and communication systems, as well as obstruction and blockage of roads that may impede rescue teams' access (Seeger et al., 2003).

Handling these situations through responding to public disorder, becomes the role of public institutions, including national and local governments (Lowrey, 2004), especially police have a substantial communicative role Since the public has the right to receive, at all times, reliable and up-to-date information so as to be able to make informed choices on which the safety and welfare of the individual and his/her family will depend (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). Police are at the front-line of the criminal justice system to give immediate responses for public disorder (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). Thus, police institutions are responsible for upholding the laws of their jurisdictions and protecting people and property at

the time of crisis and disorder (Treglia, 2013).

Police-citizen interactions are one of the primary points of contact between citizens and law when there is public disorder. In a consensual model of policing, officers can select how to respond to an incident because they have the legal and practical capacity to choose from various options (Winter, 2015). Police meet the expectations of the community, by supporting the victim and make it clear that the suspect/offender (wrongdoer) is dealt with fairly and correctly (RAND Corporation, 2015). Paradoxically, in conflict and crisis contexts, large segments of the population especially marginalized and neglected communities that are denied or otherwise lack access to justice, security, and other public goods may see justice and security actors themselves as direct sources of injustice and insecurity (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007).

Boin and Overdijk, (2013), and Devitt and Edward (2008) in their study on crisis management and crisis leadership suggest that during a crisis, bureaucratic and command structures can negatively affect the internal and external flow of information. The study on law enforcement leadership styles and organizational effectiveness also suggests that police leaders avoid traditional bureaucratic cultures and must empower decentralized decision making (Schafer, 2010 & Decker, 2018). However, few studies specifically examine law enforcement leadership in complex, stressful, and urgent circumstances that require public order policing. For example, Willem de Lint (2004) on his assessment of public order policing in Canada found that public order policing is innovating a hybrid police form in which control and service are practiced simultaneously in a morphing of intelligence-led and community policing orientations. But this study focused only on how police respond to public protest and crowd control during mobs and riots that ignore police response before and after unrest.

Available literature in Ethiopia has indicated that the absence of independence in police hampered public order policing. For example, Baker (2015) on his inquiry found that in Ethiopia the police are regime agents to enforce the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009 but the regime has fallen back on violent public order policing. Hallelujah (2009) also noted that the police in Ethiopia

are seen as a force that increasingly moved towards unprofessionalism and political partiality. For Denny and Demelash (2013) transformation in policing in Ethiopia requires a broader decoupling of the police from the politics. This has hampered the independence of the police and its vital contribution for a peaceful and democratic system. Even though, police are expected to be professionally independent in order to uphold the rule of law and guaranteeing the safety and security of all the inhabitants of the country, in Ethiopia, policing is embedded into politics as the police are required to enforce the laws that are enacted by the government and influenced by the ruling party (Workneh, 2016).

In Ethiopia, even though police play countless roles in protecting people and their property during crisis, there were conditions where police have been highly challenged to give immediate response to public order. Hence, Ethiopia experienced a significant increase in internal displacement in 2018 as a result of inter-communal conflict in several pockets of the country (Ethiopian humanitarian response plan, 2019). They added that at the peak of the crisis, almost three million Ethiopians were displaced and had to flee their homes. Ethiopia has become the world's largest conflict-related internal displacement and crisis country than any other country in the world that year.

The studies conducted so far did not sufficiently address the issue of public order policing and police response during crisis in Ethiopia. Therefore, the study explored police response in controlling or preventing crimes in progress and minimizing damage shortly after crises occur in some selected crisis affected areas in Ethiopia. The main aim of the study was to explore police response to public order policing in some selected crisis-affected areas of Ethiopia. Thus, this study sets out to achieve the following specific objectives: to identify factors that hinder police to provide immediate response to public disorder during crisis; and to assess the consequences resulted due to lack of immediate police response in the study areas.

Research Methods

Based on the severity of the crisis, loss of life, property damaged, and different social crisis like displacements (EHRC, 2020), study areas were purposively identified. Accordingly, this study addressed the cities/towns of Adama, Chiro, Hirna, Harar,

Diredawa, Itaya, Asela, Dodola, Agarfa, Goba, Batu, Shashemene, Hawassa, Burayu, and Addis Ababa. The study depended on crises occurred from 2018 to 2020 in the study areas. The Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Anti-Riot Directorate report (2020) confirmed that the above areas experienced potential public disorder (violence) post political reform era of 2018 in Ethiopia and the disorders did not get immediate police responses.

The study relied on qualitative research approach. Given the fact that police response for public order policing during crisis is the least studied area in Ethiopia and novelty of the issue, an exploratory research design was employed. Because, exploratory research is usually conducted when there are few or no earlier studies to which references can be made for information (Stebbins, 2001).

The target population included government officials (municipality officials, prosecutors, peace and security official and police officers) of the selected cities/towns, Zones and Woredas; victims/ family of victims of the crisis; eye witnesses among residents; and community and religious leaders. Purposive sampling was used to select key informant interviewees from government officials like municipality officers, prosecutors, security officers and police officers. Snowball sampling was also employed to select in- depth interview for participants from victims/ family of victims, and eye witnesses among residents of the study area.

Regarding method of data collection, primary data were collected through interview, focus group discussion and observation, and secondary data were obtained through document review. Twenty (20) in-depth interviews were held with victims/family of victims of crisis, elders eye witness among resident's, religious and community leaders. Thirty-three (33) key informant interviews were also held with government officials (municipality officers, prosecutors, peace and security officers and police officers) of cities/towns administrations, Zones and Woredas, experts from Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, journalists from mass media agencies (Fana TV, ETV and Nahoo TV) and officials from Ministry of Peace. Similarly, eight FGDs were organized out of which five were conducted with police officials and experts, and three of them were conducted with victims and community leaders of the study areas. The overall

situations of victims or family of victims of the crises (physical damages of human and property related, psychological situations, etc.) were observed. Additionally, different documents like news of mass media; Ethiopian Human Right Commission reports; minutes; and reports of police, security bureau, and municipality were reviewed. To this effect, interview and FGD guides, observation and document review checklists were prepared and properly utilized.

Data were qualitatively analyzed and for this purpose thematic analysis was employed. Regarding trustworthiness the researchers tried to assure the credibility, dependability, transferability and conformability. It was done through using multiple data sources or data triangulation; involved peer review to review and examine the research process and the data analysis in order to ensure that the findings were credible/are consistent; and examine if data support the finding, conclusion and interpretation. In this study the ethical principles were carefully considered. The participants were well informed about the purpose of the research, expected durations and procedures as well as to the issue of confidentiality and privacy.

Results

Factors that Hinder the Police to Respond for Public Disorder

The study shows that police were challenged to respond for public calls due to several problems which are discussed below.

Establishment of Informal Groups and Its Recognition by Government

The past few years, especially after the government has made over all reform and change throughout the country during 2018, it was also the time when there was formation and acceptance of strong informal groups such as Oromo's Kero/Kare, Amhara's Fano/Satenaw/ Atsewochu represent Amhara, Somalie's Hego, Sidama's Ejato, Gurhage's Zerma, etc. than formal institutions. Inappropriate recognition and giving responsibilities for the above listed informal groups generated many complications throughout the country. Victim in-depth interview participant who was owner of burned hotel at Goba revealed the experience as follow:

I can say a group of individuals who were organized by the name of Kero have almost all substituted the governmental

structure. They can take any measures and acted as formal governmental body. Illegitimate recognition by higher officials made this informal group to do what they want without a sense of responsibility and accountability, which its impacts were negatively reconsidered on the state itself. They did what they want to do due to inappropriate recognition from government bodies. As a result, some of them joined a terrorist group like Shane and did a visible instigation of the people out of their group based on their ideology, ethnic group and religion.

This idea was also supported by key informants from Shashemene City Administration that there were occasions where Kero attempted to distribute lands by their own power and provide incentives for officials that indicate the substitution role of government structure with informal one. A senior police officer who served 20 years in west Hararge zone as well stated that there was informally organized youth who intimidated and asked wealthy people to pay money for them otherwise, they will damage their property without the recognition of the security sector. These informal groups collected from 8-10 thousand.

Ethiopian birr per individuals and left from the surrounding after collecting a huge amount of money.

In the case of Harar regional state, one of the senior commissioners with high position in peace and security sector disclosed as it was also time that norms of the society were highly violated by individuals who call themselves as Demina on the arena to fulfil their own interests. Since this group act as double joker, sometimes act as a legitimate law enforcer and on convenient times as illegal (participating in crime), It highly challenged police to control the strikes. On other side, informant from Harar region peace and security office confirmed that *“there was distrust of community towards members of police, because public suspicious that some of police officers supporting the informal structures and violating the rule of law. As a result, there were senses of fearing of police to not harm them than safeguard.”*

Similarly, in Diredawa City Administration the informal groups have done beyond instigating the unrest and participating in the

conflict. FGD discussants from Diredawa police commission claimed that informal groups such as Kero, Satenaw, G-7, etc. established office whereby they exercise investigation, prosecution, and even give judgments by their own which was a clear indicator of eagerness to substitute formal government structures. Some members of the society use to stand and participate in this ideology and groups. Some others fear accountability of not to be punished in the future and not to be targeted by extremist groups and even police fear to go against their deed. In general, Chiro town police FGD discussants stated that since unnecessary recognition for informally organized groups by government undermined the police, most of them focused only to protect themselves and their office.

During the statehood question of Sidama people, the group so called Ejeto was declared 11-11-11 as a motto that the final date when their question needs to be answered. It was when the division of the security sectors, particularly police has begun like into Sidama, and South Nation and Nationalities People’s (SNNPR) police force that leads the regional government to decide the freezing of Sidama police force temporarily. There were mobs, destruction of properties of others group, injuries and death which caused due to inappropriate police responses. Also, public allegation as police was taking side and not remain neutral was observed at Hawassa city.

Chain of Command

There were two contrary ideas regarding immediate response of police during the crises. On one side some participants argue that police should be guided by the principle of chain of command that asserts doing what they are ordered by their immediate boss or not to do what they are not ordered. On other hand, since the police is professionally trained and authorized to serve the community in the manner to keep peace and order of their community, they have the responsibility to respond immediately any crises that affect the community without precondition such like waiting for directives/order from immediate leader. In relation to the divergent notions, the participants have shared the following:

Concerning the hierarchy and the chain of command, the police officers who were participants of the FGD held at Dodala town of west Arsi zone discussed that as a

principal police force should be guided/directed by command/order which provided by immediate bosses found at each chain of command. This was the reason why most of the police members were kept mute on the day of the crises following the assassination of artist Hachalu Hundesa. The officer become liable for his/her action, maybe not ordered by his/her immediate leader to do so. Also, one of the interview informants in the interview conducted at Bishoftu town has discussed the same idea below.

During the conflicts, it is very important to keep the chain of command in the line of duty, so in order to take action there must be a command from upper bosses. For example, after the killing of artist Hachalu, there was peaceful demonstration which turned to violence, thereafter to disperse it some police officers were waiting for command while others were engaged in directly. Contrary to the above notions, the interview made with one of the crime prevention official of Agarfa Woreda police has stated that the big problem of police force is waiting for orders to take action/measure from every chain of command. In our Woreda this was the reason why non- responded crises have occurred in different times, particularly following killing of artist Hachalu Hundesa that reached high climax and resulted in massive destruction of property and loses of life. For me, in every aspect of crises, waiting for order is like a game of coming back to office for receiving orders even while we encountered red-handed issues like theft (male, 30, KII).

Concerning the chain of command, there was no difficult problems at Woreda level with in police chiefs and officers rather the problem was found at zones and regional level that they didn’t respond for a crisis report. For instance, the prosecutor interviewed at Hirna town of Western Hararge provided the following details:

At the time of disturbance, police at Woreda level was ready to prevent the mob. Thus, while the protest began, they immediately reported to Zone officials and waited only for the permissions to take actions. However, for the report made at 8:00 am in the morning no response was made until 3:00 pm. Even finally when they gave us response, it did not allow police to take actions. Therefore, the strict chain of command with the absence of higher officials’ responsiveness

challenges operational police officers not to respond to public disorders in our Woreda (male, KII)

Based on the expressions of top-level police leader who was interviewed at Asela City of Arsi Zone, “on the day the crises happened due to the murder of artist Hachalu, most of their police members were silent and held back from taking any action (measure) that ceased the crises by waiting for an order from immediate bosses or upper leaders of each chain of command. However, on that day most of the higher police officials of the police commission had directed them not to take any action except deterrence effect until order was given by them. If not, they told as they were risk takers,” (male, 52, KII).

Fear Aftermath of Their Action

Actually, there was a threat of outcomes of their action by police or fear of consequences of their measures against mob. They fear that if they take any action and it will result in any unexpected negative outcomes like injuries, death or other damages that will be followed by liability. For instance, if their action resulted in any kinds of injuries or loses of life, they feel that the consequence was going beyond liability that was issued by the government. It can also result in revenge like attack, threat, even killing of individual or his/her family (i.e., child, wife, father or mother) by victims’ family or any other group associated with the deceased (male, 45, KII).

Likewise, the data collected from FGD participants of police officers held at Dodola Town indicated the existence of fear of counterattack from community. Because, while police take action and if their action resulted in unexpected outcomes, the communities immediately identify who took that measure/action and then they will act to take revenge on him/her. For instance, the one participant discussed the idea as follows:

On the crises due to the claim of activist Jewar Mohammed as government withdrew his security, our police forces had taken action to secure the environment. Following that event two of our members were intimidated by different groups and even via social Medias like Facebook for long period of time and they suffered a lot. During such difficulties the police

institution didn't give them a guarantee and thus it is difficult to carry out any kinds of operation without instruction/order given by concerned body. Also, on the same day one of our members had taken a measure and resulted in a death of an individual who was among the strike. However, he suffered a lot of difficulties from police organization as well as from community. At that moment he was forced to pay 'guma' which means paying blood price or compensation for family of the deceased (victims) that follows homicide and used as ritual of purification after murder as per Gada system of Oromo. Therefore, such events force us to think that if we take any action on similar occasions without order/command of leaders we will be responsible for and no one would side/protect us (FGD participants).

One of the informants who was prosecutor in Dodola Town gave the idea corresponding with above views: "The police forces are already discouraged to not play the role of taking measure while something wrong occurred. If they take some action, they will be punished and even sent to prison without justification. So, the police are in a position to be afraid of taking actions in response to public calls," (male, 32, KII).

Also, there was fear of exclusion from social life, lack of home to rent and any other societal services by the surrounding community (male, 45, KII). For instance, while the police take such immediate response which result in negative consequences, the government didn't support police or not stand beside them rather the issue is considered as offence and police are accused for further liability (male, 52, KII). Furthermore, one informant who was a leader of police at Arsi zone shared a notion that endorses preceding concepts:

It is obvious that there was retaliation attack of police members by violent groups/community, particularly to those who strictly enforce the law as per the rule and regulation during the occasion of serious crises. For instance, for the same case, my own house was burnt by a group of rebellion on the day on which artist Hachalu was killed (male,

52, KII).

Also, one informant who was serving as security guard of Wegagen Bank at Shashemane Town stated that there was increment of anarchism in our community which more exacerbated as a result of reform that government propagated in 2018. This is also not an easy issue to affect the quality of police response. Because, it can increase the fear of backlash in police due to expansion of lawlessness among different groups of community (male, 38, IDII).

Partiality of Police in Providing Service

According to the informant who was among the leaders of Bale Zone, it is difficult to serve the community in the right ways and in impartial minds when the police or the security forces are infiltrated in ethnic, religious and political affiliation. The conflict that occurred during the death of artist Hachalu has been aggravated by the fact that the police were the source of problems, including government officials who played the role in coordinating and inciting the youth (male, 38, KII). To some extent there were also some police officers who covertly followed the ideology of political parties, so they may cheerfully enjoy the destruction of the country (male, 45, KII).

Similarly, the security and administration official who were interviewed at Dodola Town said that: "security personnel particularly police forces, militia, etc., were tagged into the religion, ethnic groups and political parties. Even, a person who works impartially for the public and for the truth will be fired or replaced or sent to other remote areas by some officials. Due to this case, innocent groups were severely attacked, and police and other law enforcers remain silent" (male, 30, KII).

Regarding this issue, an informant who was journalist at Ethiopian broadcast corporation (EBC) has explained his observation of area such as Nagele Arsi, Goba and the outskirts of Addis as follows:

In these areas even if they arrive on time, police were not willing to help the victims because they collaborated with the attackers. To strengthen the experience with example, in Burayu town during the attacks, the police didn't arrive on time. They reasoned out that there was no enough number of police officers, and also their commitment and willingness were

very low and they claimed that they were not given a proper command.

An informant who was a peace and security advisor of West Harerge Zone made a detail about this concept by saying that "there were undisciplined police officers who violated police ethics that can be expressed in terms of taking side for their religion, ethnic groups, prioritizing one's own benefit, etc.". Likewise, as to interview made with one of Fana Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) journalists, some of the police officers who were supposed to protect and serve the population didn't have enough understanding about the profession and how to serve their people impartially. As a result of this, they usually stay behind/delay from any calls of help or intervention by leaving behind their oath and commitment. The journalist continued with the second reason, as most of the police officers are dominated by the politics rather than the rule of law; they are affiliated towards certain political ideology or group, plus they predict the results (as to what will happen due to the conflicts) beforehand and they stay silent from the law enforcement activity.

Leadership and Coordination Issues

On the day of crisis, particularly the crises that happened due to murder of artist Hachalu, most police leaders were on a training that was organized by regional police commission at different training center and for Bale zone it was organized at west Guji zone (Bule Hora town). To some extent this was also considered as a factor that made for the lack of immediate responses collectively. of training, some leaders were off duty. However, those who were on duty and also represented couldn't have minimized those losses caused due to non- responded crises. Thereof, there was a problem of police leaders which gives opportunities as to crisis were more intensified and they resulted in unimagined losses of life and property damage (male, 45, KII)

Also, there was no enough preparedness. According to one of the informants from west Harerge zone peace and security office, the police lack the preparation to respond proactively. His idea is discussed below:

Even in the normal circumstances, police should gather information and verify evidences when there are

indications of problems by considering the questions of the people. Then, depending on the verified evidence, police should plan and make necessary preparedness in hotspot areas to give immediate response for public call proactively. However, with this regard, local police officers' activity was minimal which they couldn't accomplish order from courts and gangster proactive operations. There were informal groups with hidden agenda who had detailed information and readiness more than police to disturb the peaceful demonstration and instigate for strike supported by police less preparedness makes the unrest beyond police control (male, KII).

However, since the event of artist Hachalu was happened at midnight without any preparation, the police forces were easily attacked. Particularly, in some area like in Agerfa of Bale zone, there were mass of rebellions which were too much and go beyond the available police force on time to control (male, 45, KII).

Likewise, the notion presented by one of the interviewees who was eye witness of the Shashemene crises was presented like this:

...from the situation I observed that there were overcrowds or massive number of rebellions who were collected on the moment of crises occurred due to death of artist Hachalu that even more exceeded the proportional ration of police to control. Before they rash into destruction, at the beginning rebellions seem collected to express their grief. In the demonstration the participants firstly went out to the streets and manifested their sadness by Hachalu's death by mourning and expressing their feelings. As to me this is one factor that may hinder the response of police for crises occurred because there was mismatch of ratio of population to the police members. However, in the police leadership there was a deficiency of forecasting such events as well as difficulties (male, 38, IDII).

Therefore, the reason why that much destruction of property and loss of life occurred was due to lack of quality leadership and coordination among police officers and leaders (chief commanders); particularly in Agarfa of Bale zone (male, 30, KII).

Lack of Cooperation among Security Sectors

In the different situations of crisis, the major problem for security sectors like regional police, federal police, defense force, administration and security office, etc. lacks cooperation as they are serving for the same goal.

For instance, one of the kebele's officials of Shashemane town revealed that there was absence of cooperation among security segments. Habitually, there is no culture of working together to achieve better results. That was why every security sector moving around the city were damaged. Even some of the defense forces were laughing while the city was on the destruction. Therefore, our country is at risk if there is no cooperation between security sectors like defense forces, federal police, regional regular police and Special Forces, and the militias (male, 31, KII).

In addition to this, one of east Harerge zone police officials said: "on the day that artist Hachalu died; the security sector committee problem rose from chief of Defense force who was running the hidden agenda of TPLF and tried to sabotage the effective implementation of the security committee's plan. That affected the members of defense force and as a result they showed negligence for the crisis."

On another phase, as to inmates who were serving prison when the crises happened in Shashemane surroundings, instead of keeping the harmony among the police and community, most police officers chose to treat people inhumanly in every aspect. They even applied different kinds of revenge and resentment instead of providing awareness for something that wrongly happened. Due to these reasons, most of the time, the people are not willing to stand or cooperate with the police force when problems occurred such as crises, (male, 33, IDII).

Even though there were exhibited problems of cooperation in many places, to some extent, there were areas which worked better to synchronize among security sectors. As to the data collected from peace and security

advisory of west Harerge zone indicated that after having permission from their respective higher officials, security sectors have carried out their tasks by dividing hotspot and targeted areas with greater responsibility.

For instance, in the case of Chiro Town and, placement and division of tasks undertaken in a manner like Federal Police for Oda Bultum University and surroundings; Defense Force for Mieso and Asebot *woreda*, regular police with their respective town and Oromia Special Police Force patrolling the major road and every area that need additional force. With this assignment good cooperation was observed to minimize consequences of strike. But the cooperation of other stakeholders (*woreda/zone* administrators, and others) with police was not good rather they prompted the strike by creating good governance problems, and refrain from facilitating logistic support to the police (male, KII).

Shortage of Manpower and Facility

Even if it was not an immediate cause of the crises, there was a shortage of supportive materials like vehicles, police equipment and deficiencies of manpower which were not easy concerns. For instance, according to zonal peace and security office of West Harerge zone, before and on the day of artist Hachalu's death, only two police officers were sent to kebeles where crisis has started. Even they moved on their foot and arrived after the crisis has caused higher consequences (male, KII).

Among others, the top-level official of East Harerge police has discussed that still the police response is not fully effective, because of logistic scarcities and absence of sufficient police force (male, KII). In addition to the preceding concepts, the FGD participants have detailed as the following:

During the crisis there were no police materials like police stick, helmet and other riot controlling equipment that leads police to hesitate from taking action in the gatherings of protestors. problems Regarding shortage of man power, one participant argued his experience that there is high police turnover, while I was chief of *woreda* police station: - It was expected to cover 37 kebeles that require 154 kilo meters travel to reach only with a total of 29 man power.

Also, informants interviewed at different police organizations highly confirmed the challenge of logistic and manpower in majority of police intuitions. For instance, in the case of Hirna *woreda* there is shortage of gun for police and more than 20 officers assigned to operation only with police baton during the disturbance which makes them vulnerable for risk. In terms of man power there were small numbers of police officers with inappropriate equipment (male, KII). Likewise, in the case of Dire Dawa city there was serious logistic problem for police and absence of sufficient police force. Therefore, during the crisis the issue targeted is only police problems rather the external factors like those discussed in so far to respond crises immediately (male, KII).

Furthermore, one of the study informants who were prosecutor at Hirna town stated that there is also a quality problem even for those available police officers. The informant expressed it like this: "some police officers didn't have good police stand; even we are afraid on behalf of them while they escort prisoners other than fighting with gangsters. That is why during the crisis in a *woreda* of having more than 40 police members only 20 of them were actively confronting the crisis situation". In addition to the above problems, since the budget for police department is *woreda* administration office, police department is to be under influence and also forced to accept any order from administrators or politicians.

Consequences due to Lack of Immediate or Late Police Response

As a result of lack of immediate and late police response, the data that has been collected from the study areas showed the occurrence of enormous repercussions which affects individuals, family as well as nation as a whole. The identified consequences are categorized under economic, social/ psychological and political classifications. They are discussed as follow:

Economic Consequences

Lack of immediate or late police response resulted in economic consequence such as burning and destruction of properties, robbing, illegitimate possession, impediment on investment, roads blocking, economic disempowerment, economic segregation, immobility of tourists, individuals exposed to beg on the street, etc.

Burning and Destruction of Properties: individuals' property, religious institutions, business centers and government institutions were the target of the destructions. Also, residential houses, hotels, market centers, peasants' crop and other properties were burned. Based on observation and interview analysis at Agarfa Town, the degree and extent of burning and destruction were varied from place to place. In this place around forty-seven (47) governmental offices have been totally demolished including police department during crises occurred following murder of artist Hachalu.

According to the participants of the FGD from Ambentu village of Bale zone; crops, residential houses, animals, and crop miller of the village were burned on the basis of their owners' identity and ideology of being in and out the group. A victim who was from Goba town said: "my hotel was number one tourist destination at Goba town and also a hotel which hosts different training and ceremonies including governmental events. But amazing it was burnt at presence of police and changed to ash".

The reports of Ethiopian human right commission (EHRC, 2020) revealed that a food oil company and its vehicles were burnt down to ashes at Burayu. Moreover, demonstrators have broken down other people vehicles, bank of Abyssinia and Commercial Bank of Ethiopia's Sansusi branch were damaged. It added that there were sever property destruction and damage at the city of Shashemene during the killing of artist Hachalu. As per the report, in this city, 20 buildings, 35 residential houses, 78 vehicles, 79 hotels, 36 Bajaj, 17 motor bicycles, 28 shops and 2 schools, and several governmental organizations were burned. Also, the researchers' observation during field work and FGD conducted with police leaders at Shashemene City confirmed the severity of the destruction and burn of the properties.

Robbing of Properties: during the crisis both the properties of individuals and government were robbed by protestors. In some areas properties were first robbed before burning of immovable assets. Gold shops, electric breakers, animals, motor bicycles, shop items, hotels, fertilizer from wire houses and valuable properties of individuals from residential homes, etc. has been aggressively robbed. The regional and federal police force did not intervene despite the fact there are considerable police forces (Ethiopian

Human Right Commission Report, 2019). FGD conducted at Ambetu reported that before burning of my houses the whole properties (crops, chairs, bed, jewelers, television, clothes, animals and many other affluences were ported to another places. Interview made with victims at Dodola town portrayed that during activist Jewar's call of surrounded stated his experience like the following: "...my shop was totally robbed. The shop was my only source of income and to my family as well. Due to robbing of commodities and the cash from the shop, I remained empty handed to support myself and my family, and thus were forced to become dependent on others to survive."

Illegitimate possession of properties/improper enrichments: the interview made with senior municipality official of Shashemene city identified that one of the very intentions of some protestors of crisis was to possess properties of others and become wealth at the expenses of other efforts during the crisis were clearly observed. For instance, there were a group of individuals who took others' properties forcefully during the crises like Bajaj, Isuzu car, caws, and other properties from market centers (FGD with community and religious leaders in Goba town).

Impediment on Investment: the data collected and the observations made have showed that investment has been seriously affected due to the crises in the study areas. The reasons account for this result where the roads were closed for several times for several days; transportations were locked; mobility of people from place to place was restricted; both domestic and international tourists were banned; and business activity centers were locked. It is obvious most of the potential investors' demanded peace and security to invest their capital, even investments which were already commenced were forced to close and stop their functioning due to weak protections/guarantee from police forces. This occasion pushes the potential investors not to invest their capital and resulted in obstructs on incomes/earns of crises affected cities and the nation as well (FGD participants).

Roads blocking and Immobility of tourists: Mobility of people from place to place for purpose of economic, social, political and other issues were locked; the transportation was restricted; police could not use patrol cars to intervene in the crises. It created favorable conditions for inflation of commodities' price and for the development

of criminality behaviors, etc. Also, in the study areas there are many tourists' destinations. But the unrest and chaos in the areas was unable to attract tourists to visit different tourist attraction sites. Simultaneously, the police force was not in a position to stop/minimize such problems, so tourists could not feel being secured. For instance, the data obtained from tourist guides at Bale zone indicated that both domestic and international tourists were not coming since the crises to visit Sof-omar tourist site. Thus, the flow of tourist has been drastically decreased.

Economic disempowerment: those who accumulated affluence by their efforts were forced to loss their assets. Seizing or devastating of the properties of others within a day /overnight which improperly empowered others would be disempowered those owners the property. The properties of innocents were burned and demolished which made their lives full of tragedy. While some others enjoyed the robbed wealth, the livelihood of many innocent citizens become misfortune. For instance, it exposed daily laborers for economic crises and even difficult to pay for rental houses and daily livings. Then, the life of some of them depended on begging at the street (interview with a victim in Shasemene). Additionally, a victim interviewed at Ambentu village of Agarfa town was a model farmer who was awarded by the Oromia regional government in 2010. Now, every of her properties were burnt and her family is looking for help. Also, an old woman whose property was burned in Shashemane is forced to live with other volunteers (FGD participants).

Social and Psychological Consequences

Beyond the loss/damage of property, the crisis resulted in citizen's greater sacrifice of life, hopelessness, psychological impact and frustration. The detail has been discussed as follows.

Cruel, brutal and inhuman killing of innocent citizens: The most dreadful and desperate thing that touches the moral of observers which also violates/degrades human nature has been observed. The moral and ethics of the people are degraded. Killing of humans like animals was not ethical and moral in most countries, particularly in our Ethiopia before, but now it has been exercised. Based on the data obtained from interview, a man was miserably slaughtered by protestors and his body parts were separately cut off by knife at

Dodola. According to the data obtained from the city municipality of Burayu town, 29 citizens have lost their lives and all of them were males. In the same area, a young girl was cruelly killed, after she experienced the death of her father and uncle in front of her, while hiding her younger brother. As per the report of EHRC report (2020), in the Bishoftu town following the murder of artist Hachalu, 4 people were killed brutally and numbers of people were injured.

Psychological fear: there are threats and fears due to the trauma of what happened in the past, at the time of the crises. This situation also created depression in the minds of affected groups because they thought lack of guarantee about what might happen in the future. For instance, a son whose father and mother were killed in front of him by gun at Shashamene now became mentally ill. Also, there was threat to be encircled again so that they remain restless for 24 hours without sleeping. Since the attacks were based on marginalized groups based on ethnic, religious and ideology; there were suspicions and fears of living harmoniously with others who are believed to be out of the groups. Some family members of victims do not go to see the burned properties again due to psychological trauma. They added that "we have fear now something can be done against our lives again" (FGD participant). Many victims expected no bright but dark future and thus many individuals become hopeless. Some victims were reluctant to explain the details of the crisis. They fear similar problems may reoccur if they disclose the facts. Interview made with victim at Shashamane add that they believe nothing will be restored despite the fact that many concerned government bodies are cognizant of the problems. Interview with prosecutors at Chiro town showed that some frustrated citizens sold their remaining property and migrated to other places where they perceived they will get guaranty for their lives and property.

Degrading of Social cohesion and Stigmatization: significant numbers of respondents at all most study areas explained that the incidents escalated hostility between religions and ethnic groups. Sense of living in harmony and solidarity among ethnic groups is pivotal for a nation but not the case in point due to the results of crisis. Since the base for attacks was the identity, people caught in dilemma and suspicious to live

harmoniously with other religious or ethnic groups and thus togetherness was degraded. Stigmatization of minor groups from informal social associations such as *Edir* (association used to support each other during various social events) and *ekub* (group used to support each other economically), etc. were experienced. Some ethnically/religiously minor dwellers in different study areas were deprived or isolated from social services, political affairs and economic developments (FGD participant). Unlike the above senior political officials and police in the study areas believes deprivation and stigmatization have been restored even though victims did not accept them. But facts on the ground showed the problems were not yet rectified.

Displacement of people: even though the degree varies from place to place nearly in all areas of the study many people were displaced from their living areas. According to the data obtained from a religious leader at Dodola town, it was affirmed around 264 officially known people were displaced from their homes. The document showed that among displaced people there were vulnerable groups such as kids, elders and women involved. Following the murder of artist Hachalu more than 100 households were displaced from the area so called Ambentu. Even those who remained there stayed there with fears and unsecured because they did not have the opportunity/choice to go anywhere (FGD participant). In general, the study data showed that there was massive displacement of people from several study areas like Agarfa, Itaya, Goba, Burayu, etc.

Political Consequences

After those attacks most people, particularly the victims lost their interest on the government and the security bodies. Thus, they don't want to participate in any political activities. It detailed as following.

Denial of Justice: according to community and religious leaders of FGD participants at Goba town, some of perpetrators of attach were not brought to justice system; however, some innocent members of minor ethnic/religious groups were detained by false evidence while those who really killed/damaged property were freed. Also, police members who were involved in attacks during the crisis were not made accountable and punished accordingly. What has been done was only shifting their work place. Similarly, those who didn't carry out their responsibility of enforcing the law (omission of their responsibility) and were simply observed without any reaction to control the

perpetrators while the destruction and loss of life were taking place. Similarly, interview with an old business man whose property was damaged at Iteya town during crises stated as follows: "...I was taken to Hatosa wereda office by the name of personal protection while my property actively in destruction. Then paradoxically I was detained and accused for the destructions of others' property because why I was from minor ethnic group of the area."

In general, regarding justice the data gained from victims and officials are not alike. The victims believe justice is not given and restored whereas some interviewed police and government officials explained as justice has been given.

Lack of trust on Government: almost all victims interviewed in the study areas believed and have feeling of being unsecured and lack of trust on the government, particularly on police. FGD discussants added that they do not think government will protect them from similar attacks if any similar attack occurs in the future. Also, they have lost confidence on government remedial measures. As per the interview with Police at Harar city, it also resulted in mistrust among the members of police and community, frustrations of community, etc. According to the data obtained from one of the journalists after the attacks, individuals who faced atrocities don't want to live in that area again, because they believe that they will get attacked again because they don't believe the responsible government body and the police will give them enough protection. Another journalist from Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation added the same testimony to the situation the people who survived the atrocities don't want to live in the same area where they have experienced attacks due to lack of trust in the security systems.

Discussion

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010), Police are at the frontline of the criminal justice system to give immediate responses for public disorder. They are often called upon to intervene when an act of violence is in progress or shortly after it has occurred. According to the present study, police were not totally responded for public call in some areas whereas they arrived late and tried to respond in some other areas after property damages, injuries and loss of life had occurred. Treglia (2013) has stated that

police are responsible for upholding the laws of their jurisdictions, and should protect the lives and property of the people at time of crisis and disorder.

The results also indicated that crises and attacks had occurred; despite the fact that police was there; however, by providing different reasons, they did not stop the attacks. According to De Lint and Potts (2004) where there is divided societal conditions, police will use force more indiscriminately and comprehensively and will look for force multipliers to reinforce their disputed authority. Where there is strong consensus and authority is accepted, force will be minimal and restricted. Schwartz (2015) discussed that policing denotes to any organized activity that seeks to make sure communal order, security, and peace through hindrance, deterrence, investigation, justice, and punishments and Schwartz argued that police should uphold the rule of law so that order prevails. Baker (2015) also claimed that public order policing is often planned in terms of policing designed to trot out political demonstrations, protests and riots in order that folks and property are not vulnerable. However, in Ethiopia, this study showed that whenever there is a chaos or violent demonstration, police were not active at all; they arrived late after major destruction took place. This happened even in the areas where police got early notice to take precautionary measures. But police should be prepared ahead of time and the appropriate national policing capabilities that are required to counter national threats like terrorism, organized crime, public order threats, and so on (Home office, 2015).

Pertaining to factors that hinder police to provide immediate responses for public orders during the crises, the finding indicated that police leaders and officers were in the dilemma to provide directives and to take action independent of others as per the police profession which endorse taking of proportional measure/action during public disorder. Also, some of the police officers were immersed in the tricky of partiality to provide services (i.e., on the base of political ideology, religion, and ethnicity). According to US Dep't of Justice (2003), among good principle of policing, one is serving community without discriminatory on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation 720/2011 article 24(2) also claims that in

exercising police functions, it is prohibited to make discrimination based on race, nationality, color, gender, language, religion, political outlook, social background, wealth, birth or any other stand. The result of this study also indicated that there was non-cooperation among security sectors and shortage of facility and budget in police organization which showed as there was a vital role that government should play in capacitating and creating smooth working environment for police organization, specifically for operational level officers.

The other objective of this study was the consequences due to lack of immediate or late police response following the crisis. Among the consequences, one was economic costs which resulted from the destruction of governmental organizations including police department/stations, individuals' properties, business centers, etc. Beyond the damage of property, the crisis also resulted in sacrificing life, injuries, citizen's greater hopelessness, psychological impact and frustration. Garver (2020) and Brown (2020) argued that crisis is destructive, dangerous, and frightening that results in serious damage to property or the serious disruption to the life of the community. Huet-Vaughn (2015) also argues that the public disorder result in physical injury is highly associated with negative economic consequences. Such public crises can also result in deaths, injuries and disability to men, women and children (Maccini & Young 2009). As noted by Watts (2010), some types of crises result in act of violence, for rioters to take an advantage of dire circumstances to destroy property of others. In addition, those frustrated citizens particularly minority groups sold their remaining property and become displaced or migrate to other places where they perceived that they would get guaranty for their leaves and properties. Also, after attacks most of the victims lost their trust on the government and the security bodies. Furthermore, they did not want to participate in any political activities and lack sense of belongingness in other communities. The above finding was also supported by the concept that indicates as most public disorders or violence cases result in psychological trauma to the people (Case & Paxson, 2006; and Maccini & Young, 2009). Furthermore, the crises can lead citizens to feel more threatened and have a broader impact on social cohesion and entrenches negative attitudes towards

other minority groups (Fielding, 2011).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

In the time frame of this study, Ethiopia has experienced numerous violent demonstrations. However, police did not provide immediate responses; mainly in some areas they reached too late to the calls of victims, in some other areas they appeared but did not provide any reactions and in some other areas they were totally absent from the scene due to different factors. These were waiting for order of higher officials (extreme chain of command); feared the consequences of their measures (fear the aftermath of their actions); partiality of police members in providing service due to infiltration, ethnic and religious difference; lack of good leadership, coordination and coordination among security; and shortage of manpower and facility. Lack of immediate responses, late response, or non-responded public disorder resulted in huge property destruction, injuries and loss of human lives. Finally, other/further than the sacrifice of life and property damage, the crisis resulted in people's psychological trauma like hopelessness, frustration, worry of future guaranty, displacements and lack of trust for police. It also resulted in some psychological and social related consequence like fear of each other's, brutal and inhuman killing, degrading of social cohesion, stigmatization and displacement of inhabitants. Regarding political aspects, there were a sense of feeling of denial of justice and lack of trust on government particularly on police institutions.

Recommendations

Police and security bodies should assess the situation and identify threat levels prior to happening of crises. Thus, a continuous threat assessment must be done, especially in areas where ethnic and religious differences and antagonism are highly observed. As far as the researchers' document review is concerned, there is no guide for police used during operation at crisis situation. Police should have documents like police emergency response plan that guides on how police respond and with whom they should work cooperatively during conflict and crisis situations in the country.

Depending on pre-crisis organizational intelligence, police chain of command during crisis should empower decentralization during crises. During times

of chaos, an inherent characteristic of most crises and leaders must be more autocratic, directive, and assertive.

As the new police doctrine states, police should be free from political interference. What so ever the case is police should never and ever compromise the safety and security issues and should give immediate response for public call other than waiting for orders from higher authorities.

There should be a family protection programs to those police officers who came from the community where they were brought up during and after keeping public order, so that the officers maintain public order without fear that their family will be attacked or targeted. Contrary to this there should be a clear system in which guilty police officers and leaders should be put under scrutiny and get appropriate correctional measures.

A special attention must be given to police stations where most firearms are stored. There must be adequate facilities like firearms and riot control equipment's; secured stockpiles; especially in areas where there is high probability of recurring attacks and conflicts. In such areas a security force must be stationed permanently and it should be strengthened through different security materials/inputs.

A continuous training on the police professionalism, rule of law, constitution and human rights should be given to police officers that can maximize police professionalism and minimize their infiltration. Also, police institution should have to be free from any political intervention and be independent to serve its people professionally.

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