Constitution-Making in Diverse Societies: The Rise of Multinational Federalism and its Pitfalls

Abstract

Many of the most intractable and violent conflicts of the last decades
have revolved around claims for independence. Multinational
federalism has then often entered the stage as a potential
compromise solution that can realize internal self-determination
by forestalling external self-determination. In this light, this article
recognizes the continued relevance of federalism to diverse
societies, but argues that the debate about it, among scholars
and practitioners alike, needs to be reframed. First, the article
sets out to critically examine the rise since the 1990s of multinational
federalism as a concept and to assess the main arguments
of its opponents. In so doing, the paper identifies and discusses
pitfalls in the seemingly endless academic and political debate
about the viability of multinational federalism. Some of the pitfalls
pertain to the character of the debate itself, and others to
the methodological approach, which has been prevalent so far.
The conclusion points to the limitations of multinational federalism
as a prescription for federal constitutional design in diverse
societies, and advocates the need for appropriate consideration
to be given to seven crucial contextual factors for such a design
to be successful