Intra-Unit Minorities in the Context of Ethno-National Federalism in Ethiopia

Abstract

After years of centralized rule emphasizing unity and territorial
integrity, Ethiopia since 1991 has adopted a federal system
aimed at accommodating its diversity. The system is designed
to empower hitherto marginalized ethno-national groups by ensuring
self-government in nine constituent units and redrawing
boundaries to match them with ethno-national boundaries. By
designing constituent units, and, in some cases, local governments,
that ensure self-rule to major ethno-national groups, the
constitution transforms these groups into majorities within the
territories they control at constituent and local level. This article
argues that while conferring territorial autonomy and self-rule
to mobilized, territorially grouped ethno-national groups may be
a step in the right direction in addressing the age-old “nationality
question,” the design establishes a titular ethno-national
group that claims exclusive control over territory, dominates
public institutions, perpetuates majority rule and replicates the
problems of the “nation-state” at constituent-unit level. The
combination of majority rule by titular ethno-national group and
exclusive control over territory at constituent-unit level in a context
of heterogeneous constituent units and increased inter-regional
state mobility has thus brought grave consequences for
intra-unit minorities. What the design provides is autonomy for
a particular titular ethno-national group, not autonomy for all
inhabitants in the constituent unit. Hence, the question arises:
What institutional and policy options do we have to address the
rights of intra-unit minorities in the states? It is argued that the
process of empowering ethno-nationalist group at regional-state
level was conducted without putting relevant institutional and
policy mechanisms in place to minimize the marginalization of
intra-unit minorities. The article thus examines the institutional,
political, legal and policy safeguards that exist for intra-unit
minorities. It proposes four mechanisms that aim to address
the concerns of intra-unit minorities: power-sharing as well as
non-territorial autonomy; external checks by the federal government
to monitor constituent units’ compliance with intra-unit minorities; and strict enforcement of human rights throughout the
country. Enforcement of these packages of supplementary measures
would mitigate the situation of intra-unit minorities and
recast the conception of political power and territory in such
a way that they are understood not as the exclusive property of
particular ethno-national group but a shared common good for
all the inhabitants of the constituent units.