
Abstract
Policing is the foundation of a strong state that realizes peace, order, and stability for its citizens. This study attempted to explore public order policing; police response to public disorder in some selected crisis-affected areas in Ethiopia. The study used a qualitative approach with an exploratory research design. Purposive and snowball sampling was employed to select participants for the study. Data were collected through interviews, Focus Group Discussion/FGD, observation, and document review techniques. Regarding participants of the study, 33 key informants from government officials (including prosecutors, experts from peace and security offices in the regions, Human Rights Commission officers, journalists, and police), 20 in-depth interviews with victims and their families, religious and community leaders; and 8 FGDs were conducted with police officers, victims, and community/religious leaders. The data of the study were thematically analyzed. The findings of the study showed that the Police did not play a proactive role because of many factors such as waiting for an order from a higher commandant/government official, and political infiltration of police officers that immersed them in tricky of partiality. Hence, the crisis resulted in socio-political, economic, and psychological problems in the community of crisis-affected areas. The study concluded that police had minimal preparedness and hence were not successful in managing, preventing, minimizing, or stopping damages. Therefore, police organizations must always do security threat assessments to proactively handle damages due to crises; exercise an empowered decentralized chain of command during a crisis, raise the level of awareness to police officers regarding the police profession, and provide an immediate response to public calls.

Keywords: Police Response, Crisis, Public Order Policing, Ethiopia

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Introduction
Crises have become an inseparable part of life's routines. Around the world, humans face various threats and disasters, both natural and human-caused, the frequency and severity of which is greater now than ever in the past (Scheuren, Waroux, Below, Guha-Sapir, & Ponserre, 2008). The crisis can be conceptualized as a chaotic situation that threatens the current order; as the situation persists, the known reality undergoes a drastic change, and the public’s ability to comprehend and attribute meaning to what is happening is seriously challenged (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmar 2003). In such situations, the public experiences stress, fear for the future, and at times helplessness (Van de Walle & Turoff, 2007). This situation leads the people in conflict and crises area to raise the issue of public order.

Public disorder is a condition characterized by widespread criminal and political violence and intimidation against targeted groups or individuals. Public order succeeds when widespread criminality and violence are reduced to the bare minimum, perpetrators pursued, arrested, and detained and the local population can move and live freely without fear of undue violence (Justice Law and Order Sector, 2011). Large-scale crises present complex dangers, which include, in addition to the threat or damage to human lives, the collapse of infrastructures, technological and communication systems, as well as obstruction and blockage of roads that may impede rescue teams’ access (Seeger et al., 2003).

Handling these situations through responding to public disorder, becomes the role of public institutions, including national and local governments (Lowrey, 2004), especially police have a substantial communicative role. Since the public has the right to receive, at all times, reliable and up-to-date information so as to be able to make informed choices on which the safety and welfare of the individual and his/her family will depend (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). Police are at the frontline of the criminal justice system to give immediate responses for public disorder (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). Thus, police institutions are responsible for upholding the laws of their jurisdictions and protecting people and property at
the time of crisis and disorder (Treglia, 2013).

Police-citizen interactions are one of the primary points of contact between citizens and law enforcement during public disorder. In a consensual model of policing, officers can select how to respond to an incident because they have the legal and practical capacity to choose from various options (Winter, 2015). Police meet the expectations of the community, by supporting the victim and make it clear that the suspect/offender (wrongdoer) is dealt with fairly and correctly (RAND Corporation, 2015). Paradoxically, in emergency situations, huge segments of the population especially marginalized and neglected communities that are denied or otherwise lack access to justice, security, and other public goods may see justice and security actors themselves as direct sources of injustice and insecurity (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007).

Boin and Overdijk, (2013), and Devitt and Edward (2008) in their study on crisis management and crisis leadership suggest that during a crisis, bureaucratic and command structures can negatively affect the internal and external flow of information. The study on law enforcement leadership styles and organizational effectiveness also suggests that police leaders avoid traditional bureaucratic structures and must empower decentralized decision making (Schaffer, 2010 & Decker, 2018). However, few studies specifically examine law enforcement leadership in complex, stressful, and urgent circumstances that require public order policing. For example, Willem de Lint (2004) on his assessment of public order policing in Canada found that public order policing is innovating a hybrid police control and service are practiced simultaneously in a morphing of intelligence-led and community policing orientations. The study focused on how police respond to public protest and crowd control during mobs and riots that ignore police response before and after unrest.

Available literature in Ethiopia has indicated that the absence of independence in police hampered public order policing. For example, Baker (2015) on his inquiry found that in Ethiopia the police are regime agents to enforce the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009 but has fallen back on violent public order policing. Hallelujah (2009) also noted that the police in Ethiopia are seen as a force that increasingly moved towards unprofessionalism and political partiality. For Denny and Demelash (2013) transformation in Ethiopia requires a broader decoupling of the police from the politics. This has hampered the independence of the police and its vital contribution for a peaceful and democratic system. Even though, police are expected to be professionally independent in order to uphold the rule of law and guaranteeing the safety and security of all the inhabitants of the country, in Ethiopia, policing is embedded into politics as the police are required to enforce the laws that are enacted by the government and influenced by the ruling party (Workneh, 2016).

In Ethiopia, even though police play countless roles in protecting people and their property during crisis, there were conditions where police have been highly challenged to give immediate response to public order. Hence, Ethiopia experienced a significant increase in internal displacement in 2018 as a result of inter-communal conflict in several pockets of the country (Ethiopian humanitarian response plan, 2019). They added that at the peak of the crises around 300,000 Ethiopians were displaced and had to flee their homes. Ethiopia has become the world’s largest host of internal displacement and crisis country than any other country in the world that year.

The studies conducted so far did not sufficiently address the issue of public order policing and police response during crisis in Ethiopia. Therefore, the study explored police response in controlling or preventing crimes in progress and minimizing damage shortly after crises occur in some selected crisis affected areas in Ethiopia. The main aim of the study was to explore police response to public order policing in some selected crisis-affected areas of Ethiopia. Thus, this study sets out to achieve the following specific objectives: to examine the factors that hinder police to provide immediate response to public disorder during crises; and to assess the consequences resulted due to lack of immediate police response in the study areas.

Research Methods
Based on the severity of the crisis, loss of life, property damaged, and different social crisis like displacements (ETHIOLEADERS, 2020), study areas were purposively identified. Accordingly, this study addressed the cities/town of Adama, Chiro, Hirna, Harar, Diredawa, Iteya, Asela, Dodola, Agarfa, Goba, Batu, Shashemene, Hawassa, Burayu, and Addis Ababa. The study depended on crises occurred from 2018 to 2020 in the study areas. The Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Anti-Riot Directorate report (2018) confirmed that the above areas experienced potential public disorder (violence) post political reform era of 2018 in Ethiopia, and the disorders didn’t get immediate police responses.

The study relied on qualitative research approach. Given the fact that police response for public order policing during crisis is the leading source of interest, a number of questions have been generated to portray the issue of public order policing and police response during crisis in Ethiopia. In this regard, the exploratory research design was employed. Because, exploratory research is usually conducted when there are few or no earlier studies to which references can be made for information (Stebbins, 2001).

The target population included government officials (municipality officials, prosecutors, peace and security officials, and police officers) of the selected cities/towns, Zones and Woredas; victims’ family of victims of the crisis; eye witnesses among residents; and community and religious leaders. Purposive sampling was used to select key informant interviewees from government officials like municipality officers, prosecutors, security officers and police officers. Snowball was also employed to select in-depth interview for participants from victims’ family of victims, and eye witnesses among residents of the study area.

Regarding method of data collection, primary data were collected through interview, focus group discussion and observation, and secondary data were obtained through document review. Twenty (20) in-depth interviews were held with victims/family of victims of crisis, elders, eye witness among residents, community leaders, religious and community leaders. Thirty-three (33) key informant interviews were also held with government officials (municipality officers, prosecutors, peace and security officers and police officers) of cities/towns administrations, Zones and Woredas, experts from Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, journalists from mass media agencies (Fana TV, ETV and Nahoo TV) and Commissioners from Ministry of Peace. Similarly, eight FGDs were organized out of which five were conducted with police officials and experts, and three of them were conducted with victims and community leaders of the study areas. The overall situations of victims or family of victims of the crises (physical damages of human and property related, psychological situations, etc.) were captured. Additionally, different documents like news of mass media; Ethiopian Human Right Commission reports; minutes, and reports that police, security bureau, and municipality were reviewed. To this effect, interview and FGD guides, observation and document review checklists were prepared and properly utilized.

Data were quantitatively analyzed and for this purpose thematic analysis was employed. Regarding response, frequencies, and reports that police tried to assure the credibility, dependability, transferability and conformity. It was done through using multiple data sources or data triangulation; involved peer review to review and examine the research process and the data analysis in order to ensure that the findings were credible/are consistent; and examine if data support the finding, conclusion and interpretation. In this study, the ethical principles were carefully considered. The participants were well informed about the purpose of the research, expected durations and procedures as well as the issue of confidentiality and privacy.

Results
Factors that Hinder the Police to Respond for Public Disorder
The study shows that police were challenged to respond for public calls due to several problems which are discussed below.

Establishment of Informal Groups and Its Recognition by Government
The past few years, especially after the government has made over all reform and change throughout the country during 2018, it was also the time when there was formation and acceptance of strong informal groups such as the Kerra (Kero’s Kerra), Amhara’s (Fano’s Samsale), Atsewoch’ Amhara, Somalie’s Hego, Sidama’s Ejato, Gurage’s Zepra, etc. than formal institutions. Inappropriate recognition and giving responsibilities for the above listed informal groups generated many complications throughout the country. Victim in-depth interview participant who was owner of burned hotel at Goba revealed the experience as follow: I can say a group of individuals who were organized by the members of Kero have almost all substituted the governmental Ethiopian Civil Service University

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structure. They can take any measure and act as formal governmental body. Illegitimate recognition by higher officials made this informal group to do what they want without a sense of responsibility and accountability, which its impacts were negatively reconsidered on the state itself. They did what they want to do due to inappropriate recognition from government bodies. As a result, some of them joined a terrorist group like Shene and did a visible instigation of the people out of their group based on their ideology, education and religion.

This idea was also supported by key informants from Shashemene City Administration that there were occasions where Kero attempted to distribute lands by their own power and provide incentives for officials that indicate the substitution role of government structure with informal one. A senior police officer who served 20 years in west Hararge zone as well stated that there was informally organized youth who intimidated and asked wealthy people to pay money for them otherwise, they will damage their property without the recognition of the government. In Hararge zone, informal groups collected from 8-10 thousand.

Ethiopian birr per individuals and left from the surrounding after collecting a huge amount of money.

In the case of Harar regional state, one of the security commissioners who held high position in peace and security sector disclosed as it was also time that norms of the society were highly violated and individuals who call themselves as Demina on the arena to fulfill their own interests. Since this group act as double joker, sometimes act as a legitimate law enforcer and on convenient times as illegal (participating in crime), It highly challenged police to control the strikes. On other side, informants from Harar region peace and security office confirmed that “there was distrust of community towards members of police, because public suspicious that some of police officers supporting the informal structures and violating the rule of law. As a result, there were cases of fear of police to not harm them than safeguard.”

Similarly, in Dire Dawa City Administration the informal groups have done beyond instigating the unrest and participating in the conflict. FGD discussants from Dire Dawa police commission claimed that informal groups such as Kero, Setaaw, G-7, etc. established office whereby they execute investigation, prosecution, and even give judgments by their own which was a clear indicator of captured and rule of law in Dire Dawa. The police agree that most of the police members were kept mute on the day of the crises following the assassination of artist Hachalu Hundessa. The officer become liable for his/her action, maybe not ordered by his/her immediate leader to do so. Also, one of the interview informants in the interview conducted at Bishoftu town has discussed the same idea bellow.

During the conflicts, it is very important to keep the chain of command in the line of duty, so for order to take action there must be a chain of command. For example, after the killing of artist Hachalu, there was peaceful demonstration which turned to violence, thereafter to disperse it some police officers were waiting for command while others were engaged in directly. Contrary to the above notions, the interview made with one of the crime prevention official of Agarfa Woreda police has stated that the big problem of police force is waiting for orders to take action/measure from every chain of command. In our Woreda this was the reason why police and the group so called Ejeto was involved in the killing of artist Hachalu Hundessa that reached high climax and socioeconomic destruction. Their acts resulted in property and loses of life. For me, in every aspect of crises, waiting for order is like a game of coming back to office for receiving orders even while we encountered red-handed issues like theft (male, 30, KII).

Concerning the chain of command, there was no difficult problems at Woreda level with police officers rather the problem was found at zones and regional level that they didn’t respond for a crisis report. For instance, the prosecutor interviewed at Hirmo town of west Hararge provided the following details:

At the time of disturbance, police at Woreda level was ready to prevent the mob. Thus, while the protest began, they immediately reported to Zone officials and waited only for the permissions to take actions. However, for the report made at 8:00 am in the morning no response was made until 3:00 pm. Even finally when they gave us response, it did not allow police to take actions. Therefore, the strict chain of command with the absence of higher officials’ responsiveness challenges operational police officers not to respond to public disorders in our Woreda (male, KII).

Based on the expressions of top-level police officer who was interviewed at Asela City of Arsi Zone, “on the day the crises happened due to the murder of artist Hachalu, most of their police members were silent and held back from taking any action (measure) that ceased the crises by waiting for an order from immediate bosses or upper leaders of each chain of command. However, on that day most of the higher police officials of the police commission had directed them not to take any actions. For me, in every aspect of crises, waiting for orders even when it was given by the authority, they told us as they were risk takers,” (male, 52, KII).

Fear Aftermath of Their Action

Actually, there was a threat of outcomes of their action by police or fear of consequences of their measures against mob. They fear that if they take any action and it will result in any unexpected negative outcomes like injuries, death or other damages that will be followed by liability. For instance, if their action resulted in any kinds of injuries or losses of life, it felt that that consequence was going beyond liability that was issued by the government. It can also result in revenge like attack, threat, even killing of individuial by his/her family (i.e., child, wife, father or mother) by victims’ family or any other group associated with the deceased (male, 45, KII).

Likewise, the data collected from FGD participants of police officers held at Dodola Town indicated the existence of fear of counterattack from community. Because, while police take action and if their action resulted in unexpected outcomes, the communities immediately identify who took that measure/action and then they will act to take revenge on him/her. For instance, the one participant discussed the idea as follows:

On the crises due to the claim of activist Jewar Mohammed, government withdrew his security, our police forces had taken measures to secure the environment. Following that event two of our members were intimidated by different groups and even via social Medias like Facebook for long period of time and they suffered a lot. During such difficulties the police...
One of the informants who was a prosecutor in Dodola Town gave the idea corresponding to the role of police in Dodola Town said that: "security personnel were not equipped to respond. Because, it can increase the fear of backlash in police due to expansion of lawlessness among different groups of community (male, 38, KII)."

Partiality of Police in Providing Service
According to the informant who was among the leaders of Bale Zone, it is difficult for the police to serve the community in the right ways and in impartial minds when the police or the security forces are infiltrated in ethnic, religious and political affiliation. The conflict that occurred during the death of artist Hachalu has been aggravated by the fact that the police were the source of problems, including government officials who played the role in coordinating and inciting the youth (male, 38, KII). To some extent there were also some police officers who covertly followed the ideology of political parties, so they may cheerfully encourage the destruction of the country (male, 45, KII).

Similarly, the security and administration official who were interviewed at Dodola Town said that "security personnel, particularly police forces, militia, etc., were tagged into the religion, ethnic groups and political parties. Even, a person who works impartially for the public and for the truth will be fired or replaced or sent to other remote areas by some officials. Due to this case, innocent people were wrongly attacked, and police and other law enforcers remain silent" (male, 30, KII).

Regarding this issue, an informant who was a journalist at Ethiopian broadcast corporation (EBC) has explained his observation of area such as Nagele Arsi, Goba and the outskirts of Addis as follows:

"In these areas even if they arrive on time, police were not willing to help the victims because they collaborated with the attackers. To strengthen the experience, for example, in Buryuru town during the attacks, the police didn’t arrive on time. They reasoned out that there was no enough number of police officers, and also their commitment and willingness were very low and they claimed that they were not given a proper command." An informant who was a peace and security advisor of West Harerge Zone made a detail about this concept by saying that “there were undisciplined police officers who viewed their office as a business that can be expressed in terms of taking side for their religion, ethnic groups, prioritizing one’s own benefit etc.” Likewise, as to interview made with one of Fana Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) journalists, some of the police officers who were supposed to protect and serve the population didn’t have enough understanding about the profession and how to serve their people impartially. As a result of this, they usually stay behind/ delay from any calls of help or intervention by leaving behind their oath and commitment. The journalist continued with the second reason, as most of the police officers are dominated by the politics rather than the rule of law; they are affiliated towards certain political ideology or group, plus they predict the results (as to what will happen due to the conflicts) beforehand and they aren’t silent from the law enforcement activity.

Leadership and Coordination Issues
On the day of crisis, particularly the crises that happened due to murder of artist Hachalu, most police leaders were on a temporary basis. However, in several cases, the leadership there was a mismatch of ratio of population to police members. However, in many cases, the police were the source of problems, they were not given a proper command even during the crisis. As a result of this, they usually stay behind/ delay from any calls of help or intervention by leaving behind their oath and commitment. The journalist continued with the second reason, as most of the police officers are dominated by the politics rather than the rule of law; they are affiliated towards certain political ideology or group, plus they predict the results (as to what will happen due to the conflicts) beforehand and they aren’t silent from the law enforcement activity.

Indeed, the police response was inadequate and there was no immediate response by considering the questions of the people. Then, depending on the verified evidence, police should plan and make necessary preparations in hotspot areas to give immediate response for public call proactively. However, with this regard, local police officers were informed about the areas which they couldn’t accomplish order from courts and gangster proactive operations. There were informal groups with hidden agenda who had detailed information and readiness more than police to disturb the peaceful demonstration and instigate for strike supported by police less preparedness makes the unrest beyond police control (male, KII).

However, since the event of artist Hachalu was happened at midnight without any preparation, the police forces were easily attacked. Particularly, in some area like in Agerfa of Bale zone, there were mass of rebellions which were very much too and go beyond the available police force on time to control (male, 45, KII).

Likewise, the notion presented by one of the interviewees who was eye witness of the Shashemene crises stated like this:

…from the situation I observed that there were overcrowds or massive number of rebellions who were collected on the moment of crises occurred due to death of artist Hachalu that even more exceeded the proportional ration of people to police. However, the police forces were easily attacked. Particularly, in some area like in Agerfa of Bale zone, there were mass of rebellions which were very much too and go beyond the available police force on time to control (male, 45, KII).

Also, there was no enough preparedness. According to one of the informants from west Harerge Zone, an official said that during the demonstration the participants firstly went out to the streets and manifested their sadness by Hachalu’s death by mourning and expressing their feelings. As to me this is one factor that may hinder the response of police for crises occurred because there was mismatch of ratio of population to the police members. However, in the police leadership there was a deficiency of forecasting such events as well as difficulties (male, 38, IDII).
Lack of Cooperation among Security Sectors

In the different situations of crisis, the major problem for security sectors like regional police, federal police, defense force, administration and security office, etc. lacks cooperation as they are serving for the same goal.

For instance, one of the kebele’s officials of Shashemene town revealed that there was absence of cooperation among security segments. Habitually, there is no culture of working together to achieve better results. That was why every security sector moving around the city were damaged. Even some of the defense forces were laughing while the city was on the destruction. Therefore, our country is at risk if there is no cooperation between security sectors like defense forces, federal police, regional regular police and Special Forces, and the militias (male, KII). In addition to the above problems, since the crisis in a woreda of having more than forty-seven (47) governmental offices have been totally demolished including police department during crises occurred in the city.

According to the participants of the FGD from Ambantu village of Bale zone; crops, residential houses, animals, and crop miller of the village were burned on the basis of their owners’ identity and ideology of being in and out the group. A victim who was from Goba town said: “my hotel was number one tourist destination at Goba town and also a hotel which hosts different training and ceremonies including governmental events. But amazing it was burnt at presence of police and changed to ash”.

The reports of Ethiopian human right commission (EHRHC, 2020) revealed that a food oil company and its vehicles were burnt down to ashes at Burayu. Moreover, demonstrators have broken down other people vehicles; bank of Abyssinia and Commercial Bank of Ethiopia’s Sanusi branch were damaged. It added that there were sever property destruction and damage at the city of Shashemene during the killing of artist Hackal. As per the report, in this city, 20 buildings, 35 residential houses, 78 vehicles, 79 hotels, 36 Bajaj, 17 motor bicycles, 28 byps and 2 schools, and several governmental organizations were burned. Also, the researchers’ observation during field work and FGD conducted with police leaders at Shashemene and the severity of the destruction and burn of the properties.

Robbing of Properties: during the crisis both the properties of individuals and government were robed by people. In some areas properties were first robbed before burning of immovable assets. Gold shops, electric breakers, animals, motor bicycles, shop items, hotels, fertilizer from wire houses and valuable properties of individuals from residential homes, etc. were aggressively robbed. The regional and federal police force did not intervene despite the fact there are considerable police forces (Ethiopian

Consequences due to Lack of Immediate or Late Police Response

As a result of lack of immediate and late police response, the data that has been collected from the study areas showed the occurrence of enormous repercussions which affects individuals, family as well as nation as a whole. The identified consequences are categorized under economic, social/psychological and political classifications. They are discussed as follow:

Economic Consequences

Lack of immediate or late police response resulted in economic consequence such as burning, destruction of properties, robbing, illegitimate possession, impediment on investment, roads blocking, economic demisorruption, economic segregation, immobility of tourists, individuals exposed to beg on the street, etc.
mobility of people from place to place was restricted; closed for several times for several days; the crises in the study areas. The reasons and the observations made have showed that Impediment on Investment centers (FGD with community and religious car, cars, and other properties from market individuals who took others' properties observed. For instance, there were a group of illegitimate possession of properties/ improper enrichments; the interview made with senior municipality official of Shashemene city identified that one of the very intentions of some protestors of crisis was to possess properties of others and become wealth at the expenses of other efforts during the crisis were clearly observed. For instance, there were a group of those who took others' properties forcefully during the crises like Bajai, Isuzu car, cars, and other properties from market centers (FGD with community and religious leaders in Goba town).

Impediment on Investment: the data collected and the observations made showed that investment has been seriously affected due to the crises in the study areas. The reasons account for this result where the roads were closed for several days for several days; transports were locked; mobility of people from place to place was restricted; both domestic and international tourists were banned; and business activity centers were locked. It is obvious most of the potential investors' demanded peace and security to invest their capital, even investments which were already commenced were forced to close and stop their function/bank protections/guarantee from police forces. This occasion pushes the potential investors not to invest their capital and resulted in obstructs on incomes/earns of crises affected cities and the nation as well (FGD participants).

Social and Psychological Consequences Beyond the loss/damage of property, the crisis resulted in citizen's greater sacrifice of life, hopelessness, psychological impact and frustrations. The detail has been discussed as follows. Cruel, brutal and inhuman killing of innocent citizens: The most dreadful and desperate thing that touches the moral of observers which also violates/degrades human nature has been observed. The moral and ethics of the people are degraded. Killing of humans makes no ethical and moral in most countries, particularly in our Ethiopia before, but now it has been exercised. Based on the data obtained from interview, a man was miserably slaughtered by protesters and his body parts were separately cut off by knife at Dodola. According to the data obtained from the city municipality of Burayu town, 29 citizens have lost their lives and all of them were males. In the same area, a young girl was cruelly killed, after she experienced the death of her father and uncle in front of her, while hiding her younger brother. As per the report of Ethic Human Rights Commission report (2020), in the Bishoftu town following the murder of Oromo artist Hachalu, 4 people were killed brutally and numbers of people were injured.

Psychological fear: there are threats and fears due to the trauma of what happened in the past and the threat of the crises. This situation also created depression in the minds of affected groups because they thought lack of guarantee about what might happen in the future. For instance, a son whose father and mother were killed in front of him by gun at Shashamene now became mentally ill. Also, there was threat to be encircled again so that they remain restless for 24 hours without sleeping. Since the attacks were based on marginalized groups based on ethnic, religious and ideology; there were suspicions and fears of living dehumanized, difficult to pay for rental houses and daily livings. Then, the life of some them have become misfortune. For instance, it exposed daily laborers for economic crises and even difficult to pay for rental houses and daily livings. The detail has been discussed as follows. Economic disempowerment: those who accumulated affluence by their efforts were forced to loss their assets. Seizing or enriching the properties of others within a day/overnight which improperly empowered others would be disempowered those owners the property. The properties of innocents were burnt and demolished which made their lives full of tragedy. While some others enjoyed the robbed wealth, the livelihood of many innocent citizens become misfortune. For instance, it exposed daily laborers for economic crises and even difficult to pay for rental houses and daily livings. The detail has been discussed as follows.

Displacement of people: even though the degree varies from place to place nearly in all areas of the study many people were displaced from their living areas. According to the data obtained from a religious leader at Dodola town, it was confirmed around 264 officially known people were displaced from their homes. The document showed that among displaced people there were vulnerable such as kids, elders and women involved. Following the murder of artist Hachalu more than 100 households were displaced from the area so called Ambentu. Even those who remained there stayed there with fears and uncertainty/dread and recorded that there was displacement of people from several study areas like Agarfa, Iwaya, Goba, Burayu, etc. 

Political Consequences After those attacks most people, particularly the victims lost their interest on the government and the security bodies. Thus, they don’t want to participate in any political activities. It detailed as following.

Denial of Justice: according to community and religious leaders of FGD participants at Goba town, some of perpetrators of attack were not brought to justice system; however, some innocent members of minor ethnic/ religious groups were detained by false evidence while those who really killed/ damaged property were freed. Also, police members who were involved in attacks during the crises were not made accountable and punished accordingly. What has been done was only show of face. Similarly, those who didn’t carry out their responsibility of enforcing the law (omission of their responsibility) and were simply observed without any reaction to control the
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In the timeframe of this study, Ethiopia has experienced numerous violent demonstrations. However, police did not provide immediate responses in some areas they reached too late to the calls of victims, in some other areas they appeared but did not provide any reactions and in some other areas they were totally absent from the scene due to different factors. These were waiting for order of higher officials (extreme chain of command), fear of reprisal in case of their measures (fear the aftermath of their actions); partiality of police members in providing service due to infiltration, ethnic and religious difference; lack of good leadership, coordination and coordination among security; and shortage of manpower and facility. Lack of immediate responses, late response, or non-responded public disorder resulted in huge property destruction, injuries and loss of human lives. Finally, other/further than the sacrifice of life and property damage, the crisis resulted in people’s psychological trauma like hopelessness, frustration, worry of future guaranty, displacements and lack of trust for police. It also resulted in some psychological and social related issues like fear in each other’s, brutal and inhuman killing, degrading of social cohesion, stigmatization and displacement of inhabitants. Regarding political aspects, there was a sense of feeling of denial of justice and lack of trust on government particularly on police institutions.

Recommendations

Police and security bodies should assess the situation and identify threat levels prior to happening of crises. Thus, a continuous threat assessment must be done, especially in areas where ethnic and religious differences and antagonism are highly observed. As far as the researchers’ document review is concerned, there is no guide for police used during operation at crisis situation. Police should have documents like police emergency response plan that guides on how police respond and with whom they should work cooperatively during conflict and crisis situation.

Depending on pre-crisis organizational intelligence, police chain of command during crisis should empower decentralization during crises. During times
of chaos, an inherent characteristic of most crises and leaders must be more autocratic, directive, and assertive.

As the new police doctrine states, police should be free from political interference. What so ever the case is police should never and ever compromise the safety and security issues and should give immediate response for public call other than waiting for orders from higher authorities.

There should be a family protection programs to those police officers who came from the community. They were brought up during and after keeping public order, so that the officers maintain public order without fear that their family will be attacked or targeted. Contrary to this there should be a clear system in which guilty police officers and leaders should be put under scrutiny and get appropriate correctional measures.

A special attention must be given to police stations where most firearms are stored. There must be adequate facilities like firearms and riot control equipment’s; secured stockpiles; especially in areas where there is high probability of recurring attacks and conflicts. In such areas a security force must be stationed permanently and it should be strengthened through different security materials/inputs.

A continuous training on the police professionalism, rule of law, constitution and human rights should be given to police officers that can maximize police professionalism and minimize their infiltration. Also, police institution should have to be free from any political intervention and be independent to serve its people professionally.

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