The Achilles’ Heel of Democracy and the Strength of Autocracy  Fikru Feleke Shewarega*

Abstract

The Western world has passed a difficult time to reach today’s level of socio-economic and political development. However, their experience does not tell that at the early stages of their development they started from democracy. For developing countries, it may be from devotion to “generously help” developing countries or deliberately impede development, they advocate democracy although everything must be context sensitive. One political system cannot be fit for all countries at all times. What is important is to set a universal goal than universal means. All countries at some point in time converge on values of democracy and human rights. But given differences in resources, institutions, history, and external influence, the way they develop, and exercise democracy cannot be the same. The conditions in which developing countries are determine what political regime to be applied. Both Democracy and Autocracy have their merits and demerits. We should take what is best for developing countries from these regimes. They are not oil and water that we can mix to produce the best political system. The major objective of this article is to indicate the proper balance between democracy and autocracy suitable for developing countries that are struggling to achieve development in the middle of fierce domestic and global challenges. To this end, qualitative method is employed to collect and analyze secondary data. Accordingly, the study has come up with a finding that at the early stage of development it is inevitable for developing countries to adopt a "democratic authoritarian regime."

Keywords: Autocracy: democracy, development, state and nation-building, army

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Introduction

What dictates the choice of a given regime type is the conditions a country is in which is discussed in this section. This is an era when more is expected from the state than ever before. But state strength is a complex, multifaceted concept that involves political motivation as well as institutional capacity and willingness (Torres and Anderson, 2004).

State strength is a relative concept. It can be measured by the state's ability and willingness to provide fundamental political goods associated with statehood, notably: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Around the world, many states have critical capacity gaps in one or more of these four areas of governance, broadly conceived. In effect, they possess legal but not empirical sovereignty. In the security realm, they struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, provide security from external and internal threats, control borders and territory, ensure public order and provide safety from crime. In the political realm, they lack legitimate governing institutions that provide checks on political power, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, deliver impartial justice and efficient administration, and permit broad citizen participation. In the economic realm, they strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies and lack a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic growth. Finally, they are unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs of their populations by making even minimal investments in health, education, and other social services (Patrick, 2006).
States that fail to meet these minimal standards have been characterized as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, or ‘poorly performing’. More extreme cases have been labelled ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ (Torres and Anderson, 2004). Weak states are defined as countries lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; to secure their populations from violent conflict, and to control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their population (Rice and Patrick, 2008). Also, the state is unable to play its full role in international systems and has a negative spill over effects on near neighbors (Torres and Anderson, 2004).

Why are some countries fragile? An extensive theoretical and empirical literature has highlighted several factors that contribute to (or are, more generally, associated with) fragility (Gelbard, et al., 2015).

Fragility can be the outcome of a multitude of interrelated internal and external causes, which analysts classify into four broad classes: structural and economic factors, political and institutional factors, social factors, and international factors. Structural and economic factors such as poverty, low income (sustainability of regimes is highly correlated with per capita income), and economic decline can be drivers of fragility since poor economic performance can undermine the popularity of governments. Other structural factors which can incite and perpetuate fragility include violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, lack of natural resource wealth, demographic stress, and adjacency to fragile countries. Similarly, political, and institutional factors such as bad economic and political governance, political repression, weak institutional capacity, institutional multiplicity, and succession politics can precipitate fragility due to the uncertainty these situations create. The prevalence of tension within society caused by social factors such as horizontal inequalities, societal fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality, and weak civil society structures to provide checks and balances can also instigate disturbances and lead to the fragility in any state (Economic Commission for Africa, 2012).

Fragility can also emanate from and be sustained by international factors such as a legacy of colonialism, developments in the international political economy, climate change, and global economic shocks. Rising food and energy prices can result in instability and cause fragility as large sections of the population are unable to access the basic needs (Economic Commission for Africa, 2012).

As state structures collapse and borders become more porous, countries often export violence -- as well as refugees, political instability, and economic dislocation to states in their vicinity. This risk is compounded because weak, vulnerable, or collapsed states are often adjacent to countries with similar characteristics that possess few defences against spillovers (Patrick, 2006).

The majority of contemporary theories on democratization and democratic transitions have built on the empirical experience of democratization in Europe or the Americas. These theories, as well as policy writings influenced by these writings, often assume the prior existence of a Weberian state. Max Weber’s definition of the state has remained a benchmark for most contemporary social science analysis. According to the Weberian definition, the defining properties of the state include the following: “unchallenged control of the territory within the defined boundaries under its control, monopolization of the legitimate use of force within the borders of the state, and the reliance upon impersonal rules in the governance of its citizens and subjects". The great majority of post-colonial states that gained independence in the post-1945 era do not fulfill these criteria (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003).

Given these multiple problems developing countries are facing, which regime type is suitable is the major concern of this paper. Accordingly, the paper raises four major questions: (1) what are the main weaknesses and strengths of democracy? (2) What challenges and opportunities can develop countries experience from autocracy? (3) What lessons can developing countries take from the early nation and state-building experiences of Europe? (4) What role can Army play at the early stage of state and nation-building?

Research Method

Methodologically this research is a qualitative one that depended on secondary sources. The data are collected and chosen through thorough examination comparison and evaluations of their relevance for the article.

Result and Discussion

Dictatorship and Economic Growth

Which political regime is better to achieve economic development democracy or dictatorship? One cannot deny the fact that development encompasses a broad spectrum of economic, ecological, political, technological, and social issues (Slaus and Jacobs, 2011). But among the two alternative regime types which one creates a more conducive condition for development is a debatable issue without a conclusive answer. According to the neoclassical view about the theory of growth, key factors for economic growth are labor, physical and human capital. Empirical studies, however, suggest that these factors are inadequate to understand growth and provide many instances where countries with similar per capita levels of physical and human capital realize very different rates of economic growth. Thus, other factors need to be accounted for (B. Djezou, 2014).

Perhaps the most common generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large, impoverished mass and a small favored elite results either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or tyranny (popularch-based dictatorship) (Lipset, 1960).

The proposition that wealthy societies are usually more democratic has a long lineage. Political philosophers have suggested this proposition; for example, John Stuart Mill, reflecting upon the British colonies, theorized that democracy was not suitable for all nation-states (Norris, 2008). If some authors felt that democracy was unlikely to survive without a prior process of economic development, others believed that democracy itself impeded that development (Kelsall, 2014). The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth pressures for immediate consumption, which reduce investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993).

Although underdevelopment per se should not constitute a fundamental obstacle to
democratization, the establishment of stable and sustainable democracy requires substantial changes in the forms of accumulation, the promotion of an acceptable level of welfare that will allow the majority of the people to have confidence in the capacity of democratic institutions to manage economic, social, and political conflicts, and the resolution of the contradictions between authoritarian relations that are dominant at the political sphere and nascent liberal pressures that are to be found in civil society (Bangura, 1991). Political order and governmental authority are needed during the early, difficult stages of economic development. Only at a later stage do participation and distribution become relevant (Sorensen, 2008:101). Historical cases of states that have been democratic since the moment they were founded are exceptional. The US and India may offer the most prominent examples but, even then, fully functioning administrative apparatuses were in place before the end of colonial rule and the establishment of independent democratic states. In general, functioning state is in place before democracy is established. State-building calls for a considerable concentration of power, authority, autonomy, and competence in state political and bureaucratic institutions. Democratization, on the other hand, has an inherent tendency to disperse power and slow down decision-making processes through the creation of multiple veto players and checks and balances. In short, while state-building focuses on creating (more) effective and capable states, democratic structures are intended to keep the state under check (Verena and Alina, 2007).

The "conflict perspective" argues that at least some ability to resist populist pressure is necessary for growth. Lower-income individuals, it is supposed, have a higher demand for immediate consumption and will use their political power to raise wages, tax capital, and engage in other redistributive policies that inhibit profits and therefore investment. Democracy enables societal groups to make greater demands on the state for particularistic benefits that are detrimental to growth. Autocrats are both better able to resist such demands and, indeed, to suppress labor unions, wages, and consumer demands (Baum & Lake 2003). Moreover, if liberal democracy leads to a minimal role for the state, that too may be harmful to development. In the past, in many developing countries the state may have been over-involved in the economy. Thus, some disengagement may be justified. However, the state must play a key role to create an adequate regulatory environment and fill the gaps created by market failure. Some note that an authoritarian government will be better prepared to take hard decisions in economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs (Samarasinghe, 1994).

One quite common argument among political scientists is that democracy is suitable for development in already rich countries with high state capacity, but that more authoritarian government may be needed in poorer countries with weak state institutions. In such countries, authoritarianism is argued to stabilize politics, strengthen state institutions, enhance the accumulation of capital investment, and thereby ultimately generate economic development (Knutsen, 2009). If a democracy-first thesis is true, how can it explain some cases exceptional to its argument? Like the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, both two countries experienced dramatic economic development without democratic institutions during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the case of China from the 1990s also demonstrates that non-democracy still can achieve economic development. Thus, democracy is not the necessary precondition for developing countries to reach development (Chen 2007).

This does not mean developing countries remain undemocratic forever. As Stephen Haggard (1990) notes, in the long run, there is a definite positive association between economic prosperity and democracy. In general, the rich industrialized countries enjoy democratic institutions and freedoms. Conversely, it is rare to see democracy thrive under conditions of economic deprivation (Cited in A. Samarasinghe, 1994). A clear indication of this is that after a long period of economic development under authoritarian rule, which engendered a large and increasingly restive middle class, the ruling regimes in Korea and Taiwan undertook a process of political liberalization which transformed both countries into democracies (Choue, Lee, and Sané, 2006).

In the context of East Asian economic development, it is commonly suggested that citizens (and political elites) view democracy as an impediment to growth and stability – even if they endorse democracy in principle. This supposed tension between democracy and economic development was also prominent in Lee Kuan Yew’s criticism of democracy. Singapore is widely cited as the archetypical case of where citizens accept a restriction of their political rights and liberties in exchange for the economic progress of the non-democratic regime (Dalton & Ong, 2005).

So, what explains why some autocracies succeed so spectacularly when others fail? Further, why is there a greater range of performance among the autocracies? One of the more popular explanations hinges on the character of individual leaders. The explanation goes like this. Because autocracy puts fewer restraints on the leader, it simplifies the transmission mechanism between his or her own characteristics and economic performance, so that benevolent leaders produce exceptionally good outcomes, and bad leaders exceptionally poor ones (Kelsall, 2014).

As argued above, the primary reason why democracy is considered to hinder economic development is the pressure for immediate consumption under its institution, and this leads to investment reduction. As compared with democracies, only dictatorships can resist the pressure for immediate consumption with its institution and promote economic development (Chen, 2007). Furthermore, those who believe that democracy does not help development point out the following: Firstly, democracy encourages ethnic and other cleavages and creates instability that jeopardizes development. Secondly, political elites respond to pressure groups that cause distortions in resource allocation. Third, democracy puts pressure on the rulers to redistribute ahead of growth. What is required for development is more savings and less consumption. That is easier to achieve under an authoritarian regime that can take unpopular decisions (Samarasinghe, 1994:19).

What the experience of democratic countries tells us, according to Amartya Sen, is that the practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and particularly in the last century or so (Sen, 1999). This brings us to a widespread acknowledgment that among well-off countries, democracies do far better than other governance systems at generating prosperity and stability over extended periods. Establishing a world of prosperous democracies is the agreed-upon goal. The debate is over how poor countries can best reach this threshold (Siegle, 2006).

Poor countries can grow their economies more rapidly with authoritarian governments. That is, in societies with sparse financial, human, and institutional capacity, authoritarian governments can better...
marshal these limited resources towards clear, definable objectives. Spared the distractions of periodic elections, autocratic governments can steadily pursue a coherent, long-term development vision. Priorities can be set, investments made, and infrastructure built. No need for endless rounds of participatory dialogue and buy-in. Wages can be kept down, savings generated, and an attractive investment climate created (Ibid).

The policy implication flowing from these assumptions is that deferring democracy until countries reach some middle-income status is justified. Attempts to promote democracy in the developing world prematurely are fraught with risk (Ibid).

One general proposition which is true of all these systems is that dictators have a greater capacity for action, good or bad. If a dictator wishes to raise taxes, declare war, or take tough measures vs. crime, he may have to deal with some opposition to these policies among his advisers, but by and large, he can do so. Democracies, on the other hand, are often mired in inaction. The basic reason is that democratic leaders can only act when they can build support for their policies and there may be no consensus as to what to do. Even on problems where there is an agreement that something should be done, there may be no agreement on what should be done. In extreme cases, the political system of a democratic country may become paralyzed by conflicts or opposing viewpoints. In these circumstances, politicians often prefer to do nothing, to shroud their positions in ambiguity, or to pretend to be on all sides of an issue. The result is that the population can become cynical and lose trust in the promises of any politician.

This can set in motion a downward spiral since the more this happens, and trust is lost, the harder it becomes for politicians to do something by forging a compromise. This is more likely to happen when the pressures for political action on an issue are particularly conflicting, when positions are far apart, when issues are particularly divisive, when the population is divided along racial or ethnic lines, and when there is relatively little trust in politicians by the citizens. To put it another way, while there may be freedom to speak in democracies, sometimes no one is listening. And in general, there is a trade-off: the more points of view are represented by the political system, the smaller the system's capacity for action. This is one source of the allure of dictatorship. Dictators possess the capacity to repress opposition to their policies, and this means they can act in circumstances where democratic rulers cannot (Wintrobe, 2001).

Democracy and Economic Growth

It is often claimed that nondemocratic systems are better at bringing about economic development. This belief sometimes goes by the name of "the Lee hypothesis," due to its advocacy by Lee Kuan Yew, former president of Singapore. He is certainly right that some authoritarian states (such as South Korea, his own Singapore, and post-reform China) have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarian ones. The "Lee hypothesis," however, is based on sporadic empiricism, drawing on very selective and limited information, rather than on any general statistical testing over the wide-ranging data that are available. General relations of this kind cannot be established based on very selective evidence. For example, we cannot take the high economic growth of Singapore or China as "definitive proof" that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth, any more than we can draw the opposite conclusion from the fact that Botswana, the country with the best record of economic growth in Africa, indeed with one of the finest records of economic growth in the whole world, has been an oasis of democracy on that continent over the decades. We need more systematic empirical studies to sort out the claims and counterclaims (Sen, 1999).

In maritime Southeast Asia, we find Southeast Asia's only genuine democracies: Indonesia, the Philippines, and East Timor. The relative success of democracy in 'island Asia' is surprising in many ways, especially in terms of democratic preconditions: not only are the socio-economic characteristics of these three countries less than propitious for democracy, but they are also amongst the region's most ethnically and religiously diverse states, and more threatened by communal violence, ethnic identity and militant Islam than anywhere outside Southern Thailand (Choue, Lee, and Sané, 2006).

Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country of over 240 million people, with hundreds of different linguistic and ethnic groups. Like its two democratic neighbors, the Philippines and East Timor, it combines electoral democracy with acute problems of governance and state effectiveness. All three countries are amongst the poorer states in Southeast Asia, with a per capita GDP of around $4000, well below the $6000 that Przeworski et al consider a minimum threshold for democratization (Ibid).

We must not only look at statistical connections but also examine and scrutinize the causal processes that are involved in economic growth and development. The economic policies and circumstances that led to the economic success of countries in East Asia are by now reasonably well understood. While different empirical studies have varied in emphasis, there is by now broad consensus on a list of "helpful policies" that includes openness to competition, the use of international markets, public provision of incentives for investment and export, a high level of literacy, and schooling, successful land reforms, and other social opportunities that widen participation in the process of economic expansion. There is no reason at all to assume that any of these policies is inconsistent with greater democracy and had to be forcibly sustained by the elements of authoritarianism that happened to be present in South Korea or Singapore or China. Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence to show that what is needed for generating faster economic growth is a friendlier economic climate rather than a harsher political system (Sen, 1999).

According to Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin (2004) cited in Chen (2007) Democracies indeed outperform non-democracies in economic development due to regular elections, democratic regimes need to respond to the demands of their citizens and societal groups; the institutional arrangement of election is the key for democracies better perform in the economy. Besides, due to several characteristic features of democracy, such as accountability, checks and balances, low corruption, openness, competition, the flow of information, transparency, and adaptability, democracies usually outperformed non-democracies on most indicators of economic and social well-being. Thus, the policy and strategy to assist developing countries to develop are by promoting democracy, not by economic growth.

Viewed in this light, the merits of democracy and its claim as a universal value can be related to certain distinct virtues that go with its unfettered practice. Indeed, we can distinguish three different ways in which democracy enriches the lives of the citizens. First, political freedom is a part of human freedom in general and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of the good lives of individuals as social beings. Political and social participation has intrinsic value for human life and well-being. To be prevented from participation in the political life of the community is a major deprivation. Second, democracy has an important instrumental value in enhancing the hearing
that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including claims of economic needs). Third—and this is a point to be explored further—the practice of democracy allows citizens to learn from one another and helps society to form its values and priorities. Even the idea of "needs," including the understanding of "economic needs," requires public discussion and exchange of information, views, and analyses. In this sense, democracy has constructive importance, in addition to its intrinsic value for the lives of the citizens and its instrumental importance in political decisions. The claims of democracy as a universal value must take note of this diversity of considerations (Sen, 1999).

As Samarasinge, observes Democracy can reinforce market-oriented development in several ways. An accountable and transparent system checks corruption. The rule of law guarantees property rights that help capitalist production. Democracy may also lead to reforms that transfer resources from privileged sections of the community, say, rural areas, to underprivileged sections, say, rural areas that may foster more sustainable and equitable growth (Samarasinge, 1994).

In some countries, social welfare has improved because of democracy because the competition for the votes of the masses promotes welfare policies. Such policies affect not only current consumption levels but also the distribution of wealth, defined to include both physical capital as well as human capital (Ibid).

Until quite recently, conventional wisdom has held that economic development, wherever it occurs, will lead inevitably—and quickly—to democracy. The argument, in its simplest form, runs like this: economic growth produces an educated and entrepreneurial middle class that, sooner or later, begins to demand control over its own fate. Eventually, even repressive governments are forced to give in. The fact that almost all the richest countries in the world are democratic was long taken as evidence of this progression. Recent history, however, has complicated matters. As events now suggest, the link between economic development and what is generally called liberal democracy is quite weak and may even get weaker. Although it remains true that among already established democracies, a high per capita income contributes to stability, a growing number of affluent authoritarian states suggest wealth alone does not automatically lead to greater political freedom. Authoritarian regimes around the world are showing that they can reap the benefits of economic development while evading any pressure to relax their political control. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in China and Russia (De Mesquita and George, 2005).

**Unveiling Nation and State Building Experiences**

In the burgeoning literature generated by recent international interventions, there has been a tendency to use the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ interchangeably. This has confused different, though closely related, processes of political development and has also obscured the highly contingent relationship between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in historical processes of state-formation and consolidation. State-building is the task of building functioning and durable states capable of fulfilling the essential attributes of modern statehood which include providing security from external threats and maintaining internal order, raising, and collecting taxes, delivering essential services such as health and education, the provision of transport and communications infrastructure, and the prudent management of the economy (Dinnen, 2007). State-building is either state-rebuilding (in post-conflict situations) or state strengthening (i.e. increasing capacity in fragile and weak states) (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).

Nation-building, on the other hand, refers to the broader process of developing a shared sense of political community that is capable of binding together the population of a given state. While the state has a central role in this task, nation-building also requires the mobilization of a range of non-state stakeholders (Dinnen, 2007). State-building deserves priority over nation-building: the competence, probity, effectiveness, fairness, representativeness, and distributive justice of the state in its conduct of public affairs will usually be more decisive in creating fellow-feeling than any heavy-handed insistence on national loyalty (Stark, 1986).

After the French Revolution, especially in the late nineteenth century, many policies were deployed to create a unitary nation-state in France in which all French citizens had only one cultural and political identity. These policies included a package of incentives and disincentives to ensure that French would become the only acceptable language in the state. Political mechanisms to allow the recognition and expression of regional cultural differences were so unacceptable to French nation-state builders that advocacy of federalism was at one time a capital offense (Stepan, Linz and Yadav, 2011).

Other successful democracies, such as contemporary Sweden, Japan, and Portugal, are close to the ideal type of a unitary nation-state. Some federal states, such as Germany and Australia, have also become nation-states. In a polity where socio-cultural differences have not acquired great political salience, and most of its politicized citizens have a strong sense of shared history, the aspiration to create a nation-state should not create problems for the achievement of an inclusive democracy. The creation of such a national identity and relative homogeneity in the nineteenth century was identified with democratization and was possible in consolidated states. If a polity has significant politically-salient cultural or linguistic diversity—and a large number of polities do—we will argue that political leaders in such a polity need to think about, craft, and normatively legitimate a type of polity with characteristics of a "state-nation." The polities we would like to call state nations are multicultural, and sometimes even have significant multinational components, which nonetheless still manage to engender strong identification and loyalty from their citizens. Thus, state-nation is a term introduced to distinguish democratic states that do not, and cannot, fit well into the classic French-style nation-state model based on a "we-feeling" resulting from an existing or forged homogeneity. In the twentieth century, however, attempts to create a nation-state by state policies encountered growing difficulties, even in an old state like Spain (Ibid).

Many post-colonial states, particularly in Africa, had no pre-colonial state that could be revived, and the great majority of these states are poly ethnic. Nevertheless, two points must be made here: first, perhaps the only African state to have collapsed institutionally in the post-colonial era, namely Somalia, is also one of the few mono-ethnic ones. In other words, shared ethnic identity is not sufficient to build nationhood. Second, in most poly ethnic states, some degree of compromise between constituent groups is needed, and some degree of supra-ethnic symbolism is required— if only to avoid riots and unrest. To depict the nation as identical with a ‘mosaic of ethnic groups’ could, at the same time, threaten to undermine the project of nation-building since it focuses on differences instead of similarities (Eriksen, 2010).

Whereas the processes of state formation in Europe and the western world took centuries,
The political leadership of the weak state faces a fundamental dilemma. The state must be strong to build more unity within the society, to construct national identities, and to create legitimacy by providing security and other services. Yet, the political leadership does not have the resources to accomplish these tasks. To obtain them it resorts to predatory and kleptocratic practices or plays upon and exacerbates social tensions between groups in the society, which only adds to these tensions and further erodes loyalties. The weak state is thus caught in a vicious circle. “Everything it does to become a strong state perpetuates its weakness” (Ibid).

It should be noted that the formation of the nation-state in Europe has not been a peaceful process. From military violence to cultural oppression to forced adoption of a common language and forced conscription of soldiers, the nation-building process was rife with violence committed by the powerful majority group or the ruling elite to bring minorities and the less powerful into the nation-building process. There was little romance in this process – and little democracy, too, for that matter. However, in the post-World War II world, violence is no longer an accepted way of solving conflicts, at least not in the moral rhetoric of the international community. The non-acceptance of violence is not limited to military or physical violence. Also, cultural violence, for instance forcefully imposing a national language, will spark international condemnation based on the general acceptance of people’s right to self-determination. And so it seems that the European road to nation-building, paved as it was by violence, is not a very feasible road for fragile states today (Grootenhuis, 2016) because the international political and economic system has changed radically in the last half-century and, therefore, the war-making/state-making connection does not work in the contemporary world (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

The undeniable fact is that historically, state-building preceded democratization and was generally accomplished by coercive means through conquests or in the process of resisting conquests (Kidane, 1997). From this, the lesson that stats men and policymakers take is that state formation and state-building have emerged as long-term, non-linear, tumultuous, inherently violent, and conflict-ridden processes that are also deeply political (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).

Cited in Van de Walle, and Scott (2009), we note Ottoway’s observation that ‘The world should not be fooled into thinking that it is possible to build states without coercion’. Harsh compromises are often necessary, and these include military coercion and the recognition that democracy is not always a realistic goal.

Centrality of Army at Early Stage of State and Nation Building

Until the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom in the world was that ethnicity and nationalism were outdated concepts and largely resolved problems. On both sides of the Cold War, the trend seemed to indicate that the world was moving toward internationalism rather than nationalism. As a result of the threat of nuclear warfare, great emphasis on democracy and human rights, economic interdependence, and gradual acceptance of universal ideologies, it became fashionable to speak of the demise of ethnic and nationalist movement (Yilmaz, 2007).

Despite expectations to the contrary, however, a fresh cycle of ethno-political movements has re-emerged in Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), Central Asia, Africa, and many other parts of the world. In fact, with the end of the Cold War, which increased international cooperation while decreasing the possibilities of interstate wars, the main threat to peace does not come from major inter-state confrontations anymore, but from another source: intra-state conflicts, conflicts that occur within the borders of states? These conflicts have replaced the Cold War's ideological clashes as the principal sources of current conflicts (Ibid).

Sometimes ethnic conflicts result from the collapse of state authority. Just as serious ethnic conflicts may lead to the collapse of the state, the collapse, by itself, may give rise to inter-ethnic conflicts. The reason for this is that the state, especially the modern state, has many positive functions in terms of sustaining social peace, and, with its collapse, serious problems inevitably arise (Ibid).

To be more specific, state collapse causes local anarchy in which individuals and groups find themselves in a state of serious insecurity. In the absence of a central authority, security is inevitably subjectively pursued, and social conflicts occur out of it. Group solidarity usually increases in the absence of a central authority as individuals try to get a sense of security by clinging more to their group. Increasing in-group solidarity, in turn, exacerbates an ethnocentric behavior, that is extreme in-group favouritism and discrimination against out-groups, a social-psychological component of inter-group tension, if not conflict. Further, the collapse of a state result in a power struggle for governance among different ethnic groups (Ibid).

The above discussion suggests civil war is marked by three widely recurring features. It (1) reveals the existence of rivals to the dominant coalition; (2) increases the salience of violence for contestation and rule maintenance; and (3) redraws social and spatial zones of control, with far-reaching implications for strategies of rule maintenance and access to resources. These three recurrent features are likely to affect the two dimensions of the state: the political
settlement and its institutional expression (Rogers, 2016).

Political settlements are defined by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as “the forging of a common understanding, usually between political elites, that their best interests or beliefs are served through acquiescence to a framework for administering political power” (Di John and Putzel, 2009).

According to Parks and Cole the fundamental insight of the political settlement’s framework is that governance, stability, and the quality and pace of development are viewed as the outcome of struggles and ensuing arrangements among powerful elites. These struggles largely involve informal processes of conflict, negotiation, and compromise. As elite factions seek to secure access and control over sources of wealth and power or advance a particular ideology or national vision, they will often come into conflict with each other. "Political settlement" is a descriptive term that characterizes the nature of the arrangements among these elites to manage this conflict (Cole, 2010).

This approach stresses that any political order is based on an agreement between groups with access to violence; particularly those that could bring down the existing order were they to revolt. Together, these groups, whose alliance is at the heart of state power, are the dominant coalition. Although often stable for long periods, any political settlement is subject to recurrent renegotiation, in which external shocks or gradually accruing changes in bargaining power can lead to (sudden) shifts in the settlement (Rogers, 2016).

Usually, liberal democracies provide many structural mechanisms preventing, at least, legal discrimination and easing identity expression. For example, in most liberal democracies, minority rights are protected by law. Different ethnic groups have a space to exercise their group identities, and social problems can find democratic channels to express themselves. Equally or more importantly, the distribution of political power can be shaped or re-shaped through political elections. Therefore, issues concerning ethnic groups can be peacefully dealt with in liberal democracies before they escalate to large-scale conflicts (Yilmaz, 2007). But Where the state maintains factional politics "Quite frequently, democratic governments are themselves the source of state fragility when they are ineffective because of paralysis, deadlock or corruption among the democratic parties or leaders" (Lund,2009).

On the other hand, in authoritarian, totalitarian, and other non-democratically constituted states, the absence or weakness of systemic mechanisms that can alleviate social tension may easily escalate ethnic issues to the point of violent conflict. In such regimes, dominant group privileges are usually supported by local law and popular culture perpetuating discrimination and repression at the political level, as well as at the societal level (Yilmaz, 2007).

But before a country can have a democratic state, it must first have a state—a set of political institutions that exercise authority over a territory, make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence (Diamond, 2006). As noted by Samuel P. Huntington, "The most important political distinction among countries concerns, not their form of government but their degree of government" (Huntington, 1968).

Democracy cannot be viable (and neither can it really be meaningful) in a context where violence or the threat of violence is pervasive and suffuses the political calculations and fears of groups and individuals. It is possible to implement peace without democracy, but it is not possible to build democracy without peace (and in fact, peace will be better and deeper with democracy). One thing must be stressed above all others: no order, no democracy (Ibid).

Looking at this reality of developing countries, while democracy may be a desirable long-term goal, the process of democratization in poor, fractious societies is inherently destabilizing. The risks of premature democratization, therefore, outweigh the potential benefits. Autocracies can better ensure stability in what are often volatile environments. Developing countries are typically highly fractious. Only the iron fist of an authoritarian government can hold the disparate camps together. Democratic transitions initiated in such contexts are likely to be polarizing – sharpening ethnic, economic, geographic, or religious tensions – and increasing the risk of conflict and radicalization. While democracy may be a desirable long-term goal, it is the process of getting there that is problematic. The concern that political competition can accentuate fissures in a society leading to civil strife is reasonable. One need not think too hard to envision opportunistic politicians playing up ethnic cleavages for short-term political gain, only to have the situation spiral out of control (Siegle, 2006).

As quoted by Niccolo Machiavelli: The chief foundation of all states, whether new, old or mixed are good laws and good arms. There cannot be good laws where there are no good arms and where there are good arms there must be good laws (Ojo,2015).

Many weak states may conduct political processes that are democratic, but any progress toward consolidation of democracy is impeded by the problem of weak statehood. A successful process of democratization requires that these countries develop more "stateless, "that is, become stronger states. "Stateless" is a precondition for a successful process of democratization, prospects for democratic transition deteriorate when it is lacking (Sorensen, 2008).

Strengthening states prone to failure before they fail is a prudent policy and contributes significantly to world order and to minimizing combat, casualties, refugees, and displaced persons. Doing so is far less expensive than reconstructing states after failure. Strengthening weak states also has the potential to eliminate the authority and power vacuums within which terror thrives (Rotberg, 2002).

Institution building and democratization are separate processes, and their implementation should not be conflated. State building can occur in democratic and nondemocratic states, which exemplifies the distinction between practices. The best way to understand institution-building and democratization is to keep the two areas separated and analyze both as separate entities to better understand and how the two interact. It is important to realize that states can be authoritarian and institutionalized (Rebecca 2014). This being as it may what does the past experiences of developed and democratic countries tell us? In United States a bitter agonizing war was fought between the North and the South wanting to break away from the United States. (Ojo,2015).

Cementing the centrality of powerful government and strong army Hollander (1997) argues that during the seventh century, Europe embraced strong government as a reaction to the political breakdown that had beset them during the last hundred years without thinking of themselves as a part of a continuing long trend toward powerful rulers. In all these, the pervasive role of the military/ force is noticeable. This has given credence to the postulation that force makes nations (Ojo,2015). The need for military force in the process of state-building is undeniable. The
question is how much at which time? Emmanuel Ojo has the answer for this.

From the above table, we can draw a simple lesson that with a varying stage of evolution of state-building, the degree of using force also varies. Despite their complexity in terms of both internal and external dynamics discussed above, in practice, states attempt to "resolve" intra-state conflicts using force to a large extent (Yilmaz, 2007). It must be admitted that sometimes a certain degree of force is an integral part of the overall conflict resolution process in intra-state conflicts (Ibid). However, conflict resolution is also done based on non-coercive measures, which implies that the use of the military should be balanced and integrated with other instruments of power (Oliveira, 2016).

There is no doubt that democracy is a desirable objective of any country but it cannot be achieved without preconditions. This research found out that a certain degree of democracy has no role altogether. Developing countries cannot deny the relevance of fruits of democracy which includes election, accountability and transparency, freedom of speech and assembly, property right, and many other individuals and group rights but democracy alone cannot solve problems in developing countries. The Western world has passed a difficult time to reach today's level of socio-economic and political development. It may be from devotion to generously help developing countries or deliberately impede development that they advocate democracy. But their experience does not tell that at the early stages of their development they started from democracy. Everything must be context sensitive. One political system cannot be always fit for all countries. What is important is to set a universal goal than universal means. All countries at some point in time converge on values of democracy and human rights. But given differences in resources, institutions, history, and external influence the way they take cannot be one and the same. Taking the conditions in which developing countries are in dictates what political system to be applied. Both Democracy and Autocracy have their merits and demerits. Combining good features of both political systems brings best result for developing countries.

Conclusion

Assessing democracy and autonomy one finds strong and weak sides of each of them. Applying only one political system to all countries would be erroneous as countries have diverse experiences, institutions, history, culture, resources, and external influence. As the saying goes one size is not fit to all. Regime type is a function of time and the level of development.

It would not be wrong to conclude that depending on internal socio-economic and political development and level of external influence countries apply what is fit to them. Given the advanced socio-economic and political development attained by developed countries, it is appropriate to be democratic, but it is counterproductive for developing countries without any check. Democracy among others requires strong institutions, educated people, and economic growth. As developing countries have not attained all these democratic exercises cannot be achieved overnight. This does not mean that democracy has no role altogether.

Developing countries cannot deny the relevance of fruits of democracy which includes election, accountability and transparency, freedom of speech and assembly, property right, and many other

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