

Original Article

**Language Policy and Social Identity
in the Light of Socio-Political Changes in Ethiopia.
A Comparative Case Study among the Gumuz and
Shinasha**

Sophie Küspert-Rakotondrainy¹

Abstract

Ethiopia has since 1991 pursued a federal system of governance that recognizes the different ethnic groups living within its borders. This comparative case study has investigated the relationship between this socio-political change, language policy in education and social identity among two minority groups in western Ethiopia, the Gumuz and the Shinasha. The sample includes 59 informants; education administration officers at different levels and school stakeholders. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were used in addition to review of official documents on education. The findings indicate a huge political drive behind the language policy as well as an increased and improved sense of ethnic and cultural identity. However, the policy is received differently among the two groups. It is also suggested that the relationship between socio-political change, language policy, and social identity may be circular.

Key words: *diversity, socio-political change, language policy, education, social identity, language of instruction, Ethiopia, Gumuz, Shinasha*

Introduction

In every multicultural and multilingual society there is need for strategies to handle diversity. Also in Ethiopia, an incredibly diverse country situated on the Horn of Africa, this has been an issue throughout the different governments that have ruled the country. Policy on language(s) of instruction in education is one way to execute diversity management. This again has an

¹ The author holds an M.A. in Comparative and International Education and is currently advisor for the Norwegian Mission Society in Ethiopia.

impact on different groups' social identity and how power relations in society are perceived. Before 1991, only Amharic, the language of the ruling class, was designated for official use in the country. Naturally, this led to a strong wish for ethnic self-determination and fairer power distribution in society. Thus, after the change of government, the new education and training policy implied that every ethnic group shall be able to use their own languages.

As shown in this study, there in fact appears to have been a political *need* for this policy, to ensure political stability and power balance between the different ethnic groups of the country, and probably also the only way to ensure loyalty towards the government. Furthermore, mother tongue instruction has strengthened and improved the social identity of the two minority groups that were the focus of this study.

This article is based on the research and fieldwork for my M.A. thesis (Küspert-Rakotondrainy, 2013). The fieldwork was completed in Ethiopia in September to November 2012 and the main research site was Benishangul Gumuz Regional State, a multiethnic region among the most marginalized areas of the country. In this article, theoretical background and methodology will shortly be presented before introducing Ethiopian history and politics. A presentation of the results from the study as well as a discussion follows.

Literature Review

The literature and the analytical framework constructed for this study can be grouped into three components; socio-political change, language planning and policy, and social group identity, which are assumed to affect each other sequentially. However, each of the components can possibly affect the other; thus changes in social group identity can lead to a new social environment due to the positive or negative effects of language planning. New socio-political changes will again represent a need for new ways of planning language.




Figure 1: Analytical framework

Socio-political Change

In a conflict perspective according to Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Grenfell, 2007), society functions through *social reproduction*. In essence, this point of view sees society and education as inherently unfair because upper-class or wealthy groups have the power to define what is valued. Thus, their children benefit from having the “right” language and behaviour in school, so they are more prone to succeed, and the *power structures* of society are maintained. However, through changing the power relations in society, social reproduction of certain cultural or linguistic features can come to an end, which is here referred to as *social* or *socio-political change*.

A changed model of *diversity management* often follows socio-political changes. The assimilationist model implies that everyone is supposed to be incorporated into one culture or language. In the differentialist model the

different groups are segregated, and in the multiculturalist model the different groups are recognized and diversity is encouraged (Inglis, 2008).

It is often difficult to achieve *social cohesion* within a diverse society (Adeno Addis, 2001; Inglis, 2008). The paradox is that “the greater and deeper the diversity in a society, the greater the unity and cohesion it requires to hold itself together and nurture its diversity” (Parekh, 2006, p. 196). However, multiculturalist models are considered to be far better than assimilation, segregation or laissez-faire policies because they recognize the reality of the pluralistic society (Adeno Addis, 2001; Inglis, 2008; Parekh, 2006).

Planning for Language and Identity

A certain model for handling diversity leads to a certain planning for language and thus a specific language policy. The assimilationist model is likely to produce a monolingual policy; the differentionalist model is likely to produce a policy that emphasizes the use of each language separately within the specific language groups; the multiculturalist model is likely to produce a multilingual policy (Inglis, 2008; Vedder & Virta, 2005). The different approaches to language planning are also different ways to plan identity, as visible in the term *identity planning* (Pool 1979). This is based on the assumption that people tend to identify with a specific linguistic group when they adopt a language (Eastman, 1981; Pool, 1979).

Language planning is more than taking neutral decisions concerning which languages to use where, when and how in a given administrative entity. Language planning is often driven by political, economic and social factors such as political control or power balance (Cooper, 1989; Inglis, 2008). Thus, policies concerning the language of instruction will often have dual *political vs. pedagogical* intentions.

Language planning has an impact on different factors within a group’s *ethnolinguistic vitality*, according to Giles and Johnson (1987). Vitality here means that people within a group “thrive and remain distinct” (ibid., p. 71). It can affect a group’s status factors (e.g., political prestige), demo-

graphic factors (the spread of the language and the number of its users, etc.) and institutional support (e.g., use of the language in education). It is assumed that a policy that accepts diversity is likely to foster a strong sense of ethnolinguistic vitality.

Social Group Identity

Evidence that mother tongue is by far the best language of instruction has been emphasized for several decades, especially in the context of Africa (Alidou et al., 2006; Brock-Utne, 2001; Mekonnen Alemu, 2009). This is both because of the apparent pedagogical benefits of using a familiar language in school as well as psychological consequences concerning self-esteem, self-confidence, identity and empowerment (Brock-Utne, 2001; Cummins, 1996; Prah, 2003; Smith 2008).

Identity is not always exclusively individual, but is also something collective. *Social identity* refers to “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group” (Tajfel 1974, p. 69). Social identity is therefore shaped collectively within the group, and the group has to cooperate in order to arrive at an identity that is perceived as positive. By using Tajfel (1974), Tajfel and Turner (2001) and McNamara (1997) one can break down social identity into four processes:

1. Social categorisation (placing people into ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’)
2. Awareness of social identity (applying characteristics to the group)
3. Social comparison (competition between groups to achieve positive characteristics)
4. Psychological distinctiveness (the process of trying to increase the value of the group characteristics when a group fears for prestige, through different strategies)²

Ethnicity is defined by Fishman (1989) as “a self-and-other aggregative definitional dimension [...] that deals with ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ and [...] ‘them’ vs.

² This is a simplified presentation of Tajfel’s (1974) matrix on insecure group comparisons. See *ibid.*, p. 97 for a more thorough explanation.

‘them’” (ibid., p. 5). A particular ethnic identity is both self-perceived as well as defined by outside groups. Language is one of the most visible and prevalent characteristics that define ethnicity. In the Ethiopian Constitution (FDRE, 1994b) the term “ethnicity” is not mentioned, but instead “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”, which refers to more than 80 different ethnic groups. These are defined as having common “culture, [...] language, [...] identities, [...] psychological make-up, and [...] inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory” (ibid., article 39, 5).

Apart from the attributes commonly used to create group boundaries such as the ones mentioned in the Constitution, Eriksen (1996) argues that one should not overlook the concept of ‘race’ although it is no longer a valid scientific label. This aspect is also considered in this study as it deals with groups who consciously refer to their different skin complexion.

In addition to Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups we also have the pan-Ethiopian identity expressed by the term “Habesha” (Paul 2000). This is a unifying label for all Ethiopians, although it often is used to refer exclusively to the Christian highland population. An interesting question arising in this study is to what extent peripheral ethnic groups identify with being Habesha.

Methods

This qualitative study has two minority groups in Western Ethiopia as its main focus; the Gumuz and the Shinasha. It seeks to determine the impact of policy on language of instruction in a diverse society through two research questions:

1. What has the impact of socio-political changes been on policy formation regarding the language of instruction?
 - a. How did the current policy on the language of instruction emerge out of the context of the Ethiopian political situation?
 - b. What are the rationales and aims of the policy, and how is it being implemented in Benishangul Gumuz Regional State?
2. What is the impact of the policy on language of instruction for the changes in the Gumuz and Shinasha social group identity?

In order to answer these questions, different methods were employed. Ques-

tion 1 made use of a qualitative analysis of seven official documents mainly about education³ as well as semi-structured interviews with 8 key persons involved in policy making at different administrative levels – federal, region and woreda (see description of the federal system below).

For the second question, data from lengthy semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with 18 teachers/principals, 22 parents (equal number of mothers and fathers), 5 community members/elders and 3 members of the staff at the teacher training college in the zonal capital Gilgel Beles⁴, and three people who did not belong to any of these groups were used. There were a total of 59 informants; 24 of these were interviewed in single interviews, 10 in couple interviews⁵ and 25 divided into 7 focus group sessions⁶. Around one half of the informants were Gumuz and the other half Shinasha. All sampling was purposive. School and classroom observation were made to a limited extent during the fieldwork.

The research sites were two schools using Gumuz as the language of instruction and two schools using Shinasha, all located in comparable surroundings in Metekel Zone, Benishangul Gumuz. Interviews with officials were conducted in their education administration offices in Addis Ababa and the regional capital Asosa, or in the local woreda offices. They were selected purposefully on the basis of their knowledge of the education policy. Some interviews were conducted in English; the others were conducted through an interpreter who spoke the mother tongue of the informants.

Ethiopian History and Politics

As an incredibly diverse society, Ethiopia has throughout history employed different models for handling diversity. From the expansion of modern Ethio-

³ *Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia* (FDRE, 1994b); *Education and Training Policy* (FDRE, 1994a); *Education for All. Ethiopia Country Report* (MOE, 2000); *The Education and Training Policy and Its Implementation* (MOE, 2002a); *Education Sector Development Program II* (MOE, 2002b); *Education Sector Development Program III* (MOE, 2005); *Education Sector Development Program IV* (MOE, 2010).

⁴ Training is given for Gumuz, Shinasha and Berta mother tongue teachers.

⁵ There were made 5 couple interviews as some informants, especially elders, expressed the wish to be interviewed together.

⁶ There were supposed to be 4 members in each focus group, but at two schools there were only three mother tongue teachers so these two groups had only three members. In addition it was only possible to get hold of three Gumuz fathers for the focus group session.

pia in the late 19th century under Emperor Menelik II, Ethiopia endorsed an assimilationist political model. This so-called “Amharisation” can be defined as “cultural and political domination” (Yonatan Tesfaye, 2010, p. 161), especially when it comes to use of Amharic as lingua franca and only language of instruction in school, and domination of Orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, one third of the land in most conquered areas was given to Amhara settlers or local nobility, “reminiscent of European feudalism” (Alem Habtu, 2004, p. 99). The result was “economic marginalization, as well as cultural and political alienation” (Yonatan Tesfaye, 2010, p. 162; cp. Cooper, 1989).

Great dissatisfaction with these politics, which continued under Emperor Haile Selassie, resulted in numerous upheavals. In 1974 the Emperor was finally brought down by a pseudo-socialist military junta, called the *Derg* (Cooper, 1989; Yonatan Tesfaye, 2010).

The *Derg*, however, adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards ethnic and linguistic differences (Yonatan Tesfaye, 2010), and assimilation continued⁷. This initiated the growth of different ethnic liberation movements. Several of these movements overthrew the *Derg* in 1991, under the lead of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (together labelled the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front [EPRDF]⁸). Over the next two years the EPRDF introduced a federal system of governance that organized the country into nine regional and two city states, mostly constructed around existing ethnic boundaries, although no region is mono-ethnic. The regional states are further organized into zones, *woredas* and *kebeles* which have their own level of independency.

There was made a new constitution that acknowledged ethnic self-determination and full freedom for each ethnic group to develop and use their language (FDRE, 1994b; cp. Alem Habtu, 2004; Yonatan Tesfaye, 2010).

⁷ This was in spite of a huge literacy campaign that was said to aim at making peasants literate in their own language. In reality it was a political move to ensure the government’s power basis (Cooper, 1989).

⁸ The EPRDF mainly consists of satellite parties that the TPLF had created, such as the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) instead of, e.g., the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) that wanted more self-determination and no Tigray rule, or the All Amhara People’s Organisation (AAPO) that opposed federalism and Eritrean sovereignty (Aalen, 2002).

However, this process was not entirely peaceful as some ethnic liberation movements did not acknowledge the domination of Tigray. Still, until today, the federal government is led by the EPRDF.

Even before the adoption of the Constitution, the new education and training policy acknowledged the right for all children to be educated in their mother tongue (FDRE, 1994a). Today over 20 languages have been introduced as language of instruction – some for 4 years, some for 6 and some for 8 years. Amharic is taught as a subject starting from grade 3 and English from grade 1 to those who are instructed in languages other than Amharic. In general, better achievement has been recorded for students who have mother tongue instruction (Heugh et al., 2007; Mekonnen Alemu, 2009). Socially, the implications are slightly more unclear; some argue that recognising different languages is in line with the diversity of the country and is thus worth pursuing (Heugh et al., 2007; Seidel, Moritz & Tadesse, 2009), others argue that the differences between the development of the languages is so big that the policy increases the present inequalities (Cohen, 2005; Teshome Wagaw, 1999).

The Emergence of the Language Policy

The assumed close political involvement in the policy making process addressed in research question 1a was fully confirmed in this study. The Ministry of Education (2002a) ensures that the process of formulating the policy was entirely “transparent, participatory and democratic” (p. 4). However, Daniel S. Alemu and Ababayehu A. Tekleselassie (2006) show that the top-level of the EPRDF in reality took the most important decisions before delegating the issue, and the implementation started before the policy was settled. Furthermore, the grassroots level was excluded from the formulation of the policy (ibid.).

In fact, there was a huge political pressure to implement the policy quickly. The different ethnic nationalist movements were all demanding self-determination which needed a peaceful solution. “There was urgency, a political urgency” in the words of a national policy maker (interviewed on 6 September 2012). An example of the political pressure was the decision that all

the newly recognized languages should be written in the Latin alphabet. This choice was neither linguistic nor pedagogic, but a political decision to exclude the Amharic (Geez) alphabet which was too much associated with the previous Amhara rule (Daniel S. Alemu & Abebayehu A. Tekleselassie, 2006; also confirmed by several informants). These assumptions also account for the delay of the introduction of the Amharic language as a subject until grade 3 in the curricula.

Two Groups in Focus

The research site of this study, the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State, is a small but diverse region. It is one of the regions that lag behind the general development of the country (concerning education, poverty, infrastructure, etc.) and it also has a history characterized by a quite high level of conflict (Tsega Endalew, 2006; Young, 1999). It can be described as a neglected area since this region and Gambella Region largely have “been ignored by governments, development agencies and political analysts” (Young, 1999, p. 322).

Officially, five indigenous ethnic groups live in this region: the Gumuz and Berta are the biggest, although only 0.5 % of the total Ethiopian population; the Shinasha are even considerably smaller, and the Mao and Komo are two very small ethnic groups. Five years ago, three of the indigenous languages for this region, Gumuz, Shinasha and Berta were introduced as languages of instruction. Two of these groups; the Gumuz and the Shinasha are the main focus of this study.

The Gumuz are around 122,000 in number (Abbink, 2012a). From the 18th to the 20th century they were among the main victims of slave raids and pressure from highland settlers who pushed the indigenous population into less fertile and hostile lowland areas (Abdussamad Haji Ahmad, 1999; James, 1986). The derogatory terms “*Shanqilla*” and “*Baria*” were used for the Gumuz and some other ethnic groups to designate them as dark-skinned slaves until the end of the *Derg* period. The Gumuz can be distinguished by their darker complexion, their language, as well as their distinctive culture which

among others includes sister exchange marriage⁹. Until this day the Gumuz remain rural and marginalized, with little access to schools (Tsega Endalew, 2006) and few educated women (according to oral information).

The Shinasha are, contrary to the Gumuz, often light skinned (Lange, 1982) and speak a language they call Borna (Abbink, 2012b). They were once part of a big kingdom called Gongga which prior to the 16th century stretched from today's southern Ethiopia up to Metekel Zone in Benishangul Gumuz – the area where the Shinasha live today (Abbink, 2012b; Lange, 1982). The kingdom slowly broke apart, and a large segment of the population was assimilated by the Oromo (Tsega Endalew, 2006). Now the Shinasha number around 60,000 of whom only one third still speaks the language (Abbink, 2012b; Wedekind, 2012). The Shinasha generally have a considerably high educational level and are well represented in higher positions in society throughout the country. Now that their language has been introduced as the language of instruction, the low number of speakers may represent a challenge.

This region and these two ethnic groups have been chosen for this study firstly because there is very little existing literature on this part of Ethiopia. Secondly, the situation in Benishangul Gumuz is interesting from a historical point of view as it on the one hand has been an area of expansion for the Emperors and the highland population, but on the other hand has been on the sideline of major political incidents. Thirdly, a comparison between the Gumuz and Shinasha is interesting as these groups live in the same geographical area but under contrasting social conditions.

Results

The Policy of Language of Instruction

The education and training policy (FDRE, 1994a) states two rationales for the language policy: the pedagogical advantage of learning in mother tongue, and the right of all ethnic groups to use their language. All in all, most docu-

⁹ This practice means that a man has to give his sister to his wife's family in exchange for his wife (James, 1986).

ments from the Ministry of Education emphasize the pedagogical rationale although identity also is being mentioned (MOE, 2002a). Here, identity is linked to an economic rationale as the citizens will be more productive if they are confident in their identity (*ibid.*). The political rationale is less apparent in the documents but was emphasized by several informants in the study. For example, a national policy maker (interviewed on 24 September 2012) mentioned the wish for unity and search for ethnic identity (see the discussion on the emergence of the policy above). Another national policy maker (interviewed on 6 September 2012) actually argued that there was no genuine pedagogical rationale behind the policy, but that it was being put in the foreground in order to conceal the true rationale which was a resolution of the ethnic liberation movements.

Also the aims are divided between being pedagogical or political (or economic). The pedagogical aim of better achievement with mother tongue instruction is frequently, and often solitary mentioned in official documents (e.g., FDRE, 1994a; MOE, 2002a; *cp.* also MOE, 2000). In the Education Sector Development Programmes (ESDP) which have been developed together with international donor agencies (MOE, 2002b; 2005; 2010), economic aims of education in general, such as productivity and economic growth through more pedagogical efficiency are apparent. This is in contrast to documents prepared by the ministry alone which focus more on intrinsic values (problem-solving, democracy, justice, etc.).

Strong political aims were brought forward by the informants. On the grassroots, the aim seems to be able to express cultural identity through using one's own language (regional education officer, interviewed on 15 September 2012). On the national level, the aim was to make use of this wish at the grassroots and hence be able to promote peace and prevent "conflict if the groups are not acknowledged" (regional education officer, interviewed on 14 September 2012).

Also the implementation is driven by both pedagogical as well as political factors, in the country as a whole, and in Benishangul Gumuz in particular. As it appeared from several informants, the political drive behind the policy is

not always beneficial:

So if you want in simple terms, the policy is pedagogically sound; the implementation is not pedagogically sound; it is politically sound. So that's why I said there is a political expediency, a political priority, more than pedagogical concern. And this has led to some difficulties in the actual implementation. [...] Qualified instructors are available in one language, but not in another language. [...] Some of the languages don't have primers, they don't have manuals, they don't have dictionaries [...]. And these guys are going to sit for the national examination... (national policy maker, interviewed on 6 September 2012).

In 2007, 21 of the primary schools in Benishangul Gumuz were selected as pilot schools¹⁰. In each of these schools, one of the languages Gumuz, Berta or Shinasha were implemented as language of instruction from 1st to 4th grade. Additionally 80 or more other public schools have started implementing the policy although there are not enough teachers and materials even for the pilot schools. The teachers in the pilot schools often receive trainings for a few days only or receive no training at all to teach in the medium of their language.

Generally, this shows that the implementation has a strong political drive. But there is also a pedagogical drive, as both teachers as well as parents demand expansion due to the visible benefits of learning outcomes when using the mother tongue. However, there are also reverse tendencies as some parents see the future chances of their children linked to the use of Amharic and English instead of a local language. The regional administration therefore fights two different problems; one is the lack of training and materials, and the other one is the lack of acceptance of the policy in some areas.

The change to English as a medium of instruction in grade 5 represents a challenge for those who have had mother tongue instruction. As the English knowledge and skills of many teachers are very limited, all explanations take place in Amharic which is a disadvantage for students who have only had Amharic as a subject starting from grade 3.

¹⁰ This was done by the regional education administration in cooperation with Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a faith-based organization working on language development.

Almost surprisingly, the observations made at the different pilot schools were mostly encouraging in spite of the fact that teachers were trained for a very short time and used textbooks with mistakes. The teaching was participatory, the students and teachers seemed confident in the use of their language and the parents were content with their children's progress in school. Still, in my own words, "if the language groups were well-prepared, the implementation would probably work better and the advantages of [mother tongue instruction] would be more visible" (Küspert-Rakotondrainy, 2013, p. 50).

The Impact of the Policy on Social Group Identity

The second research question investigates the impact of the policy on changes in the Gumuz and Shinasha social group identity. The initial assumption that the policy would have an impact on identity was entirely confirmed, but uttered itself differently for the two ethnic groups.

Shinasha:

a) Pride and confidence, but not all see the need for mother tongue instruction

Throughout the data from all the Shinasha informants (parents, teachers, officials) it was visible that they value their language very much, both intrinsically because using the language carries positive emotions, and because of the pedagogical advantages of better learning. The language is also valued as something precious for the future, for employment or when moving to another area – then they have a firm basis in their identity and "can explain about Shinasha" (mother, focus group, on 9 October 2012). Several informants told about incidents where they confidently made people from other ethnic groups aware of their language. Some informants also explained that relatives who do not speak the language anymore often want to learn it from those living in areas where it is preserved. This confidence was also observed in the schools where the language was used with enthusiasm and pride.

However, the Shinasha community has not always been so confident about their language because it, as all other Ethiopian languages except for Amharic, had been suppressed for centuries. Furthermore, there seems to be people within the Shinasha community who oppose the language policy. A

Shinasha father explained that he thinks his son is better off with Amharic as language of instruction because this is the language that everyone understands. Officials and teachers therefore have a strong emphasis on awareness-raising, especially since the language has already been forgotten in many communities. Many parents were relaxed about learning Amharic as most Shinasha communities are fully bilingual, and children often learn Amharic from general exposure.

b) Wish to be unique and not “Habesha”

The Shinasha cannot be differentiated from Oromo or Amhara by appearance, and assimilation into these groups is still going on. Therefore the Shinasha language communities emphasize their differences compared to other groups, and the uniqueness of the Shinasha was mentioned in several interviews. For example, one teacher (interviewed on 26 October 2012) tried hard to explain how strongly the traditional Shinasha clothing, kitchen tools, etc. differ from other ethnic groups. However, today very few of these items are frequently in use, but still people show them as symbols for their difference. Difference and division are actually welcomed, as apparent in this discussion between two mothers (focus group, on 15 October 2012):

Mother 2: “[The language policy] makes more visible which ethnicity someone belongs to.”

Mother 1: “I agree. When this language is developed, other ethnic groups will say about us: ‘This is Shinasha language, culture and history’ [...]”

Researcher: “So is it a good thing that the differences become more visible?”

[The whole group agrees that it’s a good thing.]

Informants often said that Habesha designates all Ethiopian people, but when asked if Shinasha are Habesha, most of them refused. A teacher even said that if someone chooses to educate his child in Amharic, he “must change his tribe not to be Shinasha” (focus group, on 9 October 2012). This firm division between Shinasha and Habesha is expressed even when other ethnic groups cannot differentiate the Shinasha from highland groups. Thus, this again shows a strong wish to be different although others do not necessarily see it that way.

c) *Keep originality*

Many informants emphasized the importance of mother tongue instruction because it is their last hope to prevent old traditions as well as the language itself from being lost. Many parents told the researcher that their children came home from school and taught them old words that were not in use anymore because people use the Amharic equivalent (e.g., the weekdays), and they elaborated on all the old traditions that were reintroduced with the language policy. For example, one father said “*all* the original culture should reappear through the language of instruction” (focus group, on 16 October 2012). Furthermore, possible negative issues within their culture were overlooked by all informants, and when asked, some reluctantly gave information about, for example, traditional circumcision of girls. Hence, the traditions are lifted up as something positive that distinguishes the ethnic groups from others through the use of mother tongue in school.

d) *Culture and history define Shinasha – but what about language?*

As characteristics for the ethnic group, common culture (life event celebrations, food culture, ceremonies, etc.) and common history were regularly mentioned by informants and evaluated very positively. The issue of language is more complex as many Shinasha do not speak the language anymore. Thus, knowledge of the language does not matter for being a Shinasha.

However, language still seems to be a very important characteristic, and “they feel very strongly about their language, much more than others, and they don’t want to lose it” (regional officer, interviewed on 6 October 2012). It seems that the Shinasha want to reintroduce language as a more important group characteristic, maybe because they fear that otherwise they will also lose other characteristics through assimilation. Therefore, in order to fight assimilation, they do not want to permit anyone to leave the ethnic group, so even if a person moves away from home and forgets his language he should still “represent his community” (father, focus group, on 16 October 2012).

e) *Equality and unity*

Through the language policy and the fact that all ethnic groups can use their

language in education, the Shinasha report an increased sense of equality, mutual respect and even a sense of national unity. Thus, demonstrating their distinctiveness, particularly through using their language in public, does not encourage disconnection or conflict with other groups, according to the informants. On the contrary, this leads to a stronger feeling of unity than at the time when everyone was required to fit into the same language (Amharic).

f) Active struggle for growth and visibility

It was visible that the Shinasha feel it as an obligation to work actively in order to expand the policy, and they now see it as their own duty to “take care of [the language] in the community and in other appropriate spheres” (community elder, interviewed on 11 October 2012). This eagerness was also confirmed by regional officers. Furthermore, the Shinasha are not satisfied with only four years of mother tongue instruction, and some parents even talked about wanting to expand mother tongue into university. Through this strategy they also expressed the wish to assimilate the “lost” Shinasha back into their original ethnic group and thus increase the number of the Shinasha and the speakers of the language.

Gumuz:

a) Value of mother tongue, but low confidence

Also the Gumuz value their language. This is mainly because of the pedagogical benefits of using mother tongue, considering that many do not speak Amharic. In fact, 50% of the Gumuz informants in this study were monolingual in their mother tongue. Therefore, mother tongue instruction increases the achievement considerably. In addition, enrolment also seems to increase as a result of the policy because parents are more eager to send their children, especially girls, to a school that uses their language. Apart from that, the language is also viewed as important because it gives value to the Gumuz culture as well as increasing the self-confidence of its users.

On the other hand, the view towards one’s own ethnicity and language also seems to be quite negative, and they still feel unequal compared

to other groups. For example, some students spoke Amharic with each other in break times even if they all were Gumuz. Some informants expressed fear that the Gumuz students will be even more inferior to the other ethnic groups as a result of mother tongue instruction as they see good knowledge of Amharic as a future opportunity for their children. One mother expressed that “if we have Gumuz teachers who live in the bush like us, we will not learn anything” (interviewed on 20 October 2012).

To illustrate this, one community elder told a story about the origin of the Gumuz as an ethnic group where those with light complexion managed to run away from the area where both groups lived. “Who remained? The Gumuz, the black. Who escaped? Those with light skin colour. Those who are educated today” (interviewed on 16 October 2012). But still this elder and most other informants support the language policy because they value the benefits of mother tongue instruction.

b) Historical burden

Slavery and other unequal treatment such as occupation of the Gumuz territories and payment of taxes to the land lords are part of the common Gumuz history. Many informants mentioned this, either to explain why they still are marginalized, or in order to compare it with the present situation where they finally are recognized and are allowed to use their language. For example one father related: “They were supposed to live like animals. They seemed like animals” (focus group, on 17 October 2012). This negative judgment about their own group is inherited from history, and it is therefore maybe not surprising that many still struggle with it.

c) Wish for less separation, but cannot be “Habesha”

It was clear that the Gumuz cannot and do not want to be confused with any other ethnic group: “Gumuz are not Amhara!” (Gumuz staff at teacher training college, interviewed on 12 October 2012). So, when asked if Gumuz can be seen as Habesha, the answer was always plain negative, but some expressed that Shinasha can be seen as Habesha because of their light complexion. However, the increased difference between the ethnic groups

through the implementation of the language policy was not, as for the Shinasha, seen as something positive. They would rather want their children to be included in the community of the other groups.

At the same time as they feel more separated from other groups, they feel a stronger unity within their own ethnic group which may be attributed to the policy. Gumuz has different sub-groups, the most important being the Gumuz of Metekel and the Gumuz of Kamashi Zone. The reason for an increased feeling of unity is, firstly, that the written language uses words from both dialects, although the process of making textbooks is challenging because everyone has to agree upon one common language. Secondly, there is a political reason: They would lose their position as the second biggest group in the region if they split. Thus, many prefer to pay the price of a more difficult process of making a written language in order to stay united.

d) Development and modernisation

Learning their own language seems to serve a specific purpose for the Gumuz as they see mother tongue instruction as a key to 'development', i.e. to abandon traditions that are evaluated as harmful or old-fashioned in favour of practices more similar to other ethnic groups. This aspect was brought up in almost all interviews made with Gumuz informants, especially on school level. Sister exchange marriage was often mentioned in this regard. Mother tongue instruction can contribute to changing this as more girls become educated and take a stand against it. There was also a wish that other, not necessarily harmful traditions, such as the traditional way of farming and building houses, would be changed by the language policy as more educated Gumuz represent a possibility to reach out to teach people in rural areas. However, some informants also mentioned traditions they would like to preserve which were not considered old-fashioned or harmful; for example problem-solving through the advice of elders, making of traditional Gumuz beer and a certain way of working together in groups in the villages.

The paradox here is that the use of the traditional language is seen as a key to get away from certain parts of the traditional culture. Furthermore, becoming more similar to other groups that are perceived superior is seen as

a step to become equal. Hence, they do not see themselves as equal yet, even if their language is equally in use, but they want to become equal by adopting some of the group characteristics of the other groups:

A long time ago, we had no education. That's why our language was not starting [in school] equally with the others. Now, to start mother tongue instruction is good. We have hope that we will be equal with the others in future. That would be good (Gumuz father, interviewed on 17 October 2012).

e) Language, culture and complexion define Gumuz

Characteristics that were mentioned as necessary in order to be a Gumuz were knowledge of language and culture. In addition, it was explained that no light skinned person can ever become a Gumuz as this person would not stay to “fight for Gumuz” as soon as it becomes negative to be a Gumuz (teacher, interviewed on 20 October 2012). Complexion, thus, appears to be one of the most important common characteristics of the Gumuz, and they therefore feel more attached to other dark skinned groups in the South and West than with those living in the same area.

Nevertheless, inequality also seems to be linked to complexion, as “the Shinasha felt superior because of their light skin colour, and for them blacks seem to be like slaves” (elder, interviewed on 18 October 2012). Language as a characteristic is important in the sense that it is a key to keep their identity and all the other group characteristics, as a Gumuz can cease to be a Gumuz if he or she forgets his or her language (e.g., through assimilation).

f) Passive acceptance of the policy

Contrary to the Shinasha, the Gumuz showed a more passive attitude towards the language policy. They do appreciate it, and many teachers do a great job in preparing school materials in the language, but the community does not contribute actively. Mostly, informants explained that the policy was something that was imposed upon them by the federal and regional administration. They also failed to see their own role within the implementation as they expressed that the policy “is not our principle. We accept what we are

told to do” (teacher, interviewed on 15 October 2012). Parents at the visited schools were reluctant to show up, and they did not seem used to participating in the education of their children.

Discussion

Socio-political Change

Coming from an assimilationist model of diversity management, Ethiopia now pursues a more multicultural way of handling diversity through recognising different ethnic groups and their rights to develop their own languages. The present system of governance has however been characterized as “over-emphasis on ethnicity” (Yonatan Tesfaye, 2010, p. 236), especially when considering that administrative units are based on ethnic group boundaries. It was also found in the study that the separation between the groups increases through the language policy and that the Gumuz fear this tendency. These traits may therefore to a certain extent resemble a differentialist model.

However, when looking at education in particular, the fifth grade students in Benishangul Gumuz are all put into one classroom where they use Amharic (and English) without making an allowance for the student’s mother tongues. Therefore, the policy also resembles a more assimilationist model. According to Inglis (2008), it is actually possible to find all three models within one system, so this seems to be the case for education in Ethiopia.

The socio-political changes have also had an effect on the power structures in society. With the logic of Bourdieu (see above), the dominating class or group loses some of its power in favour of less powerful groups when minority languages are being valued¹¹. This should result in lessening social reproduction of previous cultural and linguistic features because it equalizes the chances of children. However, in Ethiopia, children with good Amharic knowledge will still have an immense advantage over the others in school,

¹¹ Bourdieu uses social classes in his works whereas this study is concerned with ethnic groups. The difference here is that ethnic groups do not necessarily have a system of social ranking of wealth, status, etc. (cp. Eriksen, 1996). Ethnic groups also seem to have a deeper historical and biological dimension than social classes.

especially after mother tongue instruction stops. The fact that mother tongue is now being more valued than before, as it appears from the study, does therefore not necessarily mean that the power *structures* have changed. The emphasis on this aspect is less among the Shinasha who from the start may have suffered less from social reproduction because of integration into the Amharic speaking society, but it was apparent among the Gumuz.

Some may even argue that this maybe not entirely multicultural model and the fact that the power structures have only partly changed, is the very intention of the government, and there are voices expressing that the government not truly delegates authority (cp. Abbink, 2009; Aalen, 2002; Berhanu Gutema, 2007). Decentralisation and self-determination was only done to such an extent that the ethnic nationalist movements were satisfied and loyalty to the TPLF-EPRDF was secured, but not so much that it would actually change social power structures (cp. Berhanu Gutema, 2007; Teshome Wagaw, 1999).

A central question here is whether this system promotes or inhibits social cohesion. Referring to the sources above as well as to Yonatan Tesfaye (2010, p. 236), there is “identity fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines” in Ethiopia today, in line with the arguments for a differentionalist model of diversity management. This may support a view on decreased social cohesion. However, according to Parekh (2006) it is a necessity to encourage diversity in order to create unity. It seems like the Ethiopian government is aware of this fact, as allowing ethnic groups to emphasize their distinctiveness indeed creates a sense of unity and social cohesion, as found among the Shinasha. In the end it might therefore be the case that the multicultural model is the best for the diversity management in Ethiopia.

Language and Identity Planning

This study recorded identity planning (cp. Pool, 1979) as there is a strong political pressure for recognition of different ethnic identities (cp. Daniel S. Alemu & Ababayehu A. Tekleselassie, 2006; Smith, 2008). The policy pays much attention to fostering a strong identity within the mother tongue, but also Amharic and English are being applied in order to construct a common

platform. As a consequence, it seems that people really do identify more with their own group after the introduction of the policy, but at the same time they refuse to identify with the Amharic-speaking core (“Habesha”). This might, as Eastman (1981) argues, be because minority groups that learn the majority language do not necessarily start to identify with that language group because they learn the language out of necessity.

On the basis of this study we can therefore suggest that if it ever was the intention of the government to connect all Ethiopians to one lingua franca that should play some role for the identification as Ethiopian; this does not seem to have worked. Teshome Wagaw (1999) actually suggests that the intention of the government is to promote increased polarisation in order to prevent a unified opposition. On the other hand, according to the discussion above on diversity and unity, it does not seem necessary, and maybe not even desirable, to unite everyone into one single identity in order to achieve unity.

Thus, whether intended or not, the government has in fact planned identity through the planning of language. This becomes clearer when looking at the three factors that form ethnolinguistic vitality (cp. Giles & Johnson, 1987). Firstly, according to this study, the status factors were altered through increased recognition of the languages. Secondly, the concentration of each ethnic group is as high as possible through the conscious construction of the different administrative entities (demographic factor). Lastly, introduction of mother tongue as language of instruction in school is a proof of institutional support. Thus, the language policy of the government can in fact contribute to increased ethnolinguistic vitality¹².

As it appears, there is a huge pressure to expand mother tongue instruction in the general political climate of Ethiopia. The regional administration expresses the need for quick implementation of the policy as broadly as possible and only two of the eight interviewed education officials questioned the implementation strategy. There is a certain demand for this also at school level, although probably less than assumed on higher levels. The conse-

¹² It must be acknowledged that the term originally refers more to how vitality is perceived by the language users and not how it is objectively.

quence of this quick implementation is that the teachers lack training and materials. As a result, the students may become victims of decisions based on political interests instead of pedagogical needs.

Furthermore, it is surprising that Amharic is only introduced in grade 3 as a subject when English is a subject from grade 1. Amharic is also never language of instruction for students who do not have Amharic instruction from the start, as English becomes language of instruction as soon as mother tongue instruction stops. However, English is a language much less widely known and used, and even teachers often do not know it sufficiently. Again, this decision is of political origin as one tries to avoid associations with “Amharisation”. However, the students may suffer for the sake of political strategies, as they undoubtedly need a thorough knowledge of Amharic for any kind of formal employment.

Social Group Identity

The findings from the study can be related to the four processes of social identity introduced in the analytical framework:

- The process of social categorisation increased for both groups. For the Shinasha this was described as desirable, whereas the Gumuz rather wished less categorisation.
- Awareness of social identity also changed: The Shinasha wish to make language a more important characteristic and use it in order to keep the other characteristics (culture and history) from getting lost. Also the Gumuz wish a stronger focus on language, but in addition they also have the characteristic of complexion.
- Social comparison was found to improve as a result of the policy, although the Gumuz still reported negative comparisons. Psychological distinctiveness is achieved by both groups through employing the language of instruction for more positive characteristics, but with different strategies: The Shinasha rely on lifting up their own traditional characteristics, whereas the Gumuz instead want to adopt characteristics from other groups.

Generally, the language policy in education was evaluated positively by both ethnic groups. However, the data shows that the Gumuz and the Shinasha often use different and sometimes contradictory explanations for why the policy is important for them and what they want to achieve through introduction of mother tongue instruction. Especially the first and the last of the

processes of social identity presented above are interesting. Reasons for the differences between the groups can be attributed to the groups' historical and social conditions.

The Gumuz express a wish for less social categorisation as isolation and marginalization is something they still do experience. Gumuz people often live in rural and marginalised areas and in communities apart from other ethnic groups. Their appearance often differs significantly from others – in clothing, use of tools (e.g., how to carry water) and complexion, and many speak only Gumuz language. Therefore, the increased separation between children of different ethnic groups due to different languages of instruction is not seen as a desirable effect of the language policy.

This study shows that the Gumuz want to adopt more “modern” group characteristics (education, building of houses, avoidance of traditional practices, etc.) in order to be able to evaluate their identity more positively. The language policy is here seen as a means to change their low social status and get away from the collective history of domination by other ethnic groups. Thus, to become equal for them means that they must become more similar to other groups who have characteristics that are valued in today's society. This is supposed to happen without losing their language and ethnic identity, which may seem as a paradox.

Another interesting finding concerning the Gumuz is that as they do not see themselves as Habesha but instead have a strong affiliation with other ethnic groups who are considered to have a darker complexion. This is related to the term “race” (Eriksen, 1996). Although being “black” was associated with lower status, the Gumuz still stick to this characteristic and feel tied to it, maybe because it “can be difficult for them to escape from their ethnic identity if they wish to” (Eriksen, 1996).

The Shinasha welcome increased social categorisation and want to become more visible and distinct from other groups. They are to a large extent integrated in society and merge much more with other groups than the Gumuz do. They also report a feeling of being on equal footing, even with highlanders. They are often well educated, many do not speak Shinasha language

anymore, and they are difficult to distinguish from Oromo and Amhara by appearance. As they have much less historical reasons for ambivalent emotions towards the own identity and characteristics, they want to increase their pride through being more able to show their uniqueness.

Also, as the Shinasha history is characterised by assimilation there is need to combat too much similarity with other groups if they want to prevent further assimilation, especially into the Oromo identity. The strategy they want to employ is to bring back some of their almost lost traditions and cultural traits and reintroduce imperative knowledge of Shinasha for all group members. Mother tongue instruction therefore becomes an essential tool for maintaining the Shinasha identity.

Conclusion

The uprooting political changes in 1991 gave rise to a different way of organizing the Ethiopian society. The increased ethnic self-determination and recognition of different identities suggests a multiculturalist model of diversity management and a fairer power distribution in society as well as in education. The policy on language of instruction may increase the feeling of unity among Ethiopia's ethnic groups although it actually does the opposite; it strengthens the distinctive identity of the different ethnic and linguistic groups.

On the basis of the data from the two groups in the study, it appears the government, assumingly consciously, engages in identity planning through manipulating different group's status and demographic factors as well as institutional support. However, although both groups value the policy positively, it is being used in order to meet different ends for the Gumuz and the Shinasha. The former group wishes to become less marginalized by using their language as a tool to "modernize", whereas the latter wants to revive traditional group characteristics that are on the brink of being forgotten.

These findings are an important contribution to the existing body of literature as they demonstrate what often is implicitly assumed; the connection between change in language policy and changed group identity. Furthermore, the two groups that have been the focus of this study have not been

studied from this angle before – indeed few ethnic groups in Ethiopia have. The study reveals that although the two groups share many similarities, they approach the policy on language of instruction in contrasting ways. It is thus assumable that there might be as many interpretations of what the policy implies for different Ethiopian groups as there are ethnic identities in the country. Further investigations in this field are therefore required.

The analytical framework used in this study does not predict the outcome of changes in the social context, but only how changes on different levels in society are connected. Therefore it is possible to employ the framework on different societies with different contexts or on the Ethiopian society at a future point in time. The framework can then act as a tool to organize information into patterns and it puts forwards factors that are considered as important in the analysis of a changing society. It can make it easier to explain how certain changes are happening and in the end give suggestions for causal relationships between the different components.

As the framework suggests, it is possible that the socio-political changes will not stagnate on the last component, which is processes of changed group identities. The framework rather proposes that newly empowered ethnic groups that have become more conscious of their identity might want to gain more political and economic influence. If there is to be, in future policies, a stronger focus on fairer allocation of economic means and development, the focus may again shift towards more emphasis on Amharic and English. Actually, a national policy maker (interviewed on 6 September 2012) asserted that as soon as the different ethnic groups are satisfied with developing their language, they will understand that it is quite inefficient with almost 30 different languages of instruction within one country.

On the other hand, it is also possible that as the number of languages developed for institutional use increases further and that they may demand that their language shall be recognized as a national working language. Any of these phenomena will in turn have their own effects on social identity. Thus, we might end up at the beginning of the framework, where socio-political changes foster a certain language policy which again has consequences for identity.

References

- Aalen, L. (2002). *Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000*, Chr. Michelsen Institute, viewed 6 March 2012, <http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/186/1/Report%202002-2.pdf>
- Abbink, J. (2009). "The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile 'Social Contract'", *Africa Spectrum*, 44 (2), pp. 3-28, viewed 9 November 2012, <http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/122/122>
- Abbink, Jon (2012a). Gumuz Ethnography. In S. Uhlig (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia Aethiopica*, vol. 4, (pp. 916-917). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Abbink, J. (2012b). Šinašša Ethnography. In S. Uhlig (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia Aethiopica*, vol 4, (pp. 664-665), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Abdussamad Haji Ahmad (1999). Trading in Slaves in Bela-Shangul and Gumuz, Ethiopia: Border Enclaves in History, 1897-1938. *The Journal of African History*, 40(3), 433-446, viewed 12 March, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/183622>
- Adeno Addis (2001). Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in Multilingual States, *Arizona State Law Journal*, 33, 719-789, viewed 5 August 2012, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/arzjl33&div=27&g_sent=1&collection=journals
- Alem Habtu (2004). Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation, *Dialectical Anthropology*, 28(2), pp. 91-123, viewed 12 March 2012, doi: 10.1007/s10624-004-9328-9
- Alidou, H, Boly, A, Brock-Utne, B, Diallo, YS, Heugh, K & Wolff, HE (2006). Executive Summary, In H. Alidou, A. Boly, B. Brock-Utne, Y.S. Diallo, K. Heugh, & H.E. Wolff (Eds.), *Optimizing Learning and Education in Africa – the Language Factor. A Stock-taking Research on Mother Tongue and Bilingual Education in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Working document. ADEA 2006 Biennial Meeting, Libreville, Gabon. (pp. 6-25), viewed 24 February 2012, http://www.adeanet.org/adeaPortal/adea/downloadcenter/Ouga/B3_1_MTBLE_en.pdf
- Berhanu Gutema (2007). *Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism*

- in Ethiopia*. (Doctoral dissertation), SPIRIT – Doctoral Programme, Aalborg University.
- Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.C. (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, London: Sage Publications.
- Brock-Utne, B. (2001). Education For All – In Whose Language? *Oxford Review of Education*, 27(1), 115-134, viewed 27 February 2012, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03054980125577>
- Cohen, GPE (2005). Mother Tongue and Other Tongue in Primary Education: Can Equity be Achieved with the Use of Different Languages? In H. Coleman (Ed.), *Language and Development: Africa and Beyond. Proceedings of the 7th International Language and Development Conference*, (pp. 62-75), viewed 19 February 2012, [http://www.langdevconferences.org/publications/2005%20Addis%20Ababa%20Coleman%20\(ed\).pdf](http://www.langdevconferences.org/publications/2005%20Addis%20Ababa%20Coleman%20(ed).pdf)
- Cooper, R.L. (1989). *Language Planning and Social Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cummins, J. (1996). *Negotiating Identities: Education for Empowerment in a Diverse Society*. Ontario: California Association for Bilingual Education.
- Daniel S. Alemu & Ababayehu A. Tekleselassie (2006). Instructional Language Policy in Ethiopia: Motivated by Politics or the Educational Needs of Children? *Planning and Changing* 37(3&4), pp. 151–168, viewed 2 January 2013, <http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=EJ756221>.
- Eastman, C.M. (1981). Language Planning, Identity Planning and World View. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 32, 45-53, viewed 24 February 2013, <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ijsl.1981.issue-32/ijsl.1981.32.45/ijsl.1981.32.45.xml>.
- Eriksen, T.H. (1996). 'Ethnicity, Race, Class and Nation', In J. Hutchinson & A.D. Smith (Eds.), *Ethnicity*, Oxford Readers. (pp. 28-31), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Federal Democratic Republic Government of Ethiopia [FDRE] (1994a). *Education and Training Policy*, viewed 19 February 2012, <http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia%20Education%20and%20Training%20Policy.pdf>

- Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [FDRE] (1994b). *Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Addis Ababa: Government of Ethiopia, viewed 6 March 2012, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=193667
- Fishman, J.A. (1989). *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters LTD.
- Giles, H. & Johnson, P. (1987). Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory: A Social Psychological Approach to Language Maintenance, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 68, pp. 69-99, viewed 11 May 2012, <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ijsl.1987.issue-68/ijsl.1987.68.69/ijsl.1987.68.69.xml>
- Grenfell, M.J. (2007). *Pierre Bourdieu. Education and Training*, London: Continuum Library of Educational Thought.
- Heugh, K., Benson, C., Berhanu Bogale & Mekonnen Alemu (2007). *Study on Medium of Instruction in Primary Schools in Ethiopia*, Final Report, Commissioned by the Ministry of Education, viewed 8 March 2012, http://www.hsrc.ac.za/research/output/outputDocuments/4379_Heugh_Studyonmediumofinstruction.pdf
- Inglis, C. (2008). *Planning for Cultural Diversity*, (Fundamentals for Educational Planning No. 87), Paris: UNESCO/IIEP, viewed 13 February 2012, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001597/159778e.pdf>
- James, W.(1986). 'Lifelines: Exchange Marriage among the Gumuz', In D. Donham & W. James, (Eds.), *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia. Essays in History and Social Anthropology*, (pp. 119-147), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Küspert-Rakotondrainy, S. (2013). *Language Policy and Identity in a Diverse Society: the Impact of Language of Instruction on Social Group Identity. A Comparative Case Study from Ethiopia*, (M.A. thesis), Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Oslo.
- Lange, Werner J. (1982). *History of the Southern Gonga (Southwestern Ethiopia)*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- McNamara, T.F. (1997). Theorizing Social Identity. What Do We Mean by Social Identity? Competing Frameworks, Competing Discourses, *TESOL*

- Quarterly*, 31(3), pp. 561-567, viewed 16 November 2012, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3587838/pdf>
- Mekonnen Alemu (2009). Implications of the Use of Mother Tongues versus English as Languages of Instruction for Academic Achievement in Ethiopia, In B. Brock-Utne & I. Skattum (Eds.), *Languages and Education in Africa: a Comparative and Transdisciplinary Analysis* (pp. 189-199), Oxford: Symposium Books.
- Ministry of Education, Ethiopia [MoE] (2000). *Education for All (EFA 2000). Assessment of Progress. Country Report*, viewed 19 February 2012, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_EFA_2000.pdf
- Ministry of Education, Ethiopia [MoE] (2002a). *The Education and Training Policy and its Implementation*, viewed 19 February 2012 http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_education_policy_implementation.pdf
- Ministry of Education, Ethiopia [MoE] (2002b). *Education Sector Development Program II*, viewed 10 September 2012, <http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia%20ESDP%20Education%20sector%20development%20program.pdf>
- Ministry of Education, Ethiopia [MoE] (2005). *Education Sector Development Program III*, viewed 19 February 2012, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_Education_Plan_August_2005.pdf
- Ministry of Education, Ethiopia [MoE] (2010). *Education Sector Development Program IV*, viewed 19 February 2012, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_ESDP_IV.pdf
- Parekh, B. (2006). *Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Second Edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Paul, J.C.N. (2000). Ethnicity and the New Constitutional Orders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, In Y. Ghai (Ed.), *Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States* (pp. 173-196). Cambridge: University Press.
- Pool, J. (1979). Language Planning and Identity Planning, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 20, pp. 5-21, viewed 28 February 2012, <http://panlex.org/pubs/etc/lpip.pdf>

- Prah, K.K. (2003). Going Native: Language of Instruction for Education, Development and African Emancipation, In B. Brock-Utne, Z. Desai and M. Qorro (Eds.), *Language of Instruction in Tanzania and South Africa* (LOITASA), Dar-es-Salaam: E & D Limited.
- Seidel, K., Moritz, J., & Tadesse, J. (2009). Results of the Ethiopian Reform in language and Education Policy, In C. Griefenow-Mewis (Ed.), *On Results of the Reform in Ethiopia's Language and Education Policies* (pp.59-126), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Smith, L. (2008). The Politics of Contemporary Language Policy in Ethiopia, *Journal of Developing Societies*, 24 (2), pp. 207-243, viewed 21 August 2012, doi: 10.1177/0169796X0802400206.
- Tajfel, H. (1974). Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, *Social Science Information*, 13(65), pp. 65-93, viewed 14 May 2012, doi: 10.1177/053901847401300204.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C. (2001). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, In: M.A. Hogg & D. Abrams (Eds.), *Intergroup Relations. Essential Readings* (pp. 94-109). Hove: Psychology Press.
- Teshome Wagaw (1999). Conflict of Ethnic Identity and the Language of Education Policy in Contemporary Ethiopia, *Northeast African Studies*, 6(3), pp. 75-88, viewed 19 March 2012, doi: 10.1353/nas.2003.0009
- Tsega Endalew (2006). *Inter-Ethnic Relations on a Frontier: Mätäkkäl (Ethiopia), 1898-1991*. (Doctoral dissertation), University of Hamburg.
- Vedder, P. & Virta, E. (2005). Language, Ethnic Identity, and the Adaptation of Turkish Immigrant Youth in the Netherlands and Sweden, *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 29, pp. 317-337, viewed 11 February 2012, doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.05.006.
- Wedekind, K. (2012), Šinašša Language, In S. Uhlig (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia Aethiopica*, vol .4, (pp. 663-664), Wiesbaden.
- Yonatan Tesfaye (2010). *Ethnic Diversity and Federalism. Constitution Making in South Africa and Ethiopia*. Farnham: Ashgate.