

Government Reactions to Rural Famines in Three Consecutive Ethiopian Regimes, 1880s–1991: A Comparative Study

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Abstract

Famines and starvations of rural peasantries were persistent for centuries in Ethiopian history. This article focuses on government reactions to such famines that occurred from the last decades of the 19th to the last quarter of the 20th centuries in Ethiopia. About three great famines and starvations took place in the country during those decades. The main objective of this study was to assess the nature of government reactions to rural famines during the three consecutive regimes (the last decades of the 19th to the last quarter of the 20th centuries) in comparison to one another. A number of archival sources, the direct products of the time, and other primary sources were consulted and analysed. Results showed that the reactions of the respective governments during those famines had been far from satisfactory; and were even deteriorating from the said had been better in the late 19th century to the worst in the 1970s and 1980s.

Keywords: Rural famine, government reaction, resource allocation, relief and rehabilitation, re-settlement and migration

1. Background

It is known that drought took place in different parts of the world since olden times. However, that does not mean all these countries were affected by starvation and famines. Unlike in earlier times, these days, it is understood that natural forces and climatic conditions like drought were not the only factors for famines to occur. The main factors behind famines can be explained from different perspectives. Currently, several broad factors behind famines are presented in the existing literature. Some of these are the

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decline of food availability, food entitlements (food rights), and the role of politics (Attilio Vadala 2009). These factors are helpful to understand both the nature of famines and the government reactions to them. However, traditionally, the 1973–74 famine in Ethiopia was perceived as an act by God, as a punishment for the evil deeds of the Emperor or the people (Pankhurst 1985).

The food availability decline explanation mostly corresponds with the fact that famine is the result of natural disasters. Such explanation is very common in the literature of modern history of Ethiopia. There are two categories of this approach. The first, which is well explained, takes natural disasters like drought and flood as the major determinants. Such natural disasters could reduce food production for a particular period and create severe food shortages. The second category of the food availability decline approach focuses on population growth which could invite for food scarcity (Malthus 1798: 6–12). This explanation of food scarcity because of population growth is rare in the literature about the history of Ethiopian famines.

The food entitlement approach is one that underpins that famine should be understood as the failure of accessibility to food. Amartya Sen noted that, commonly, there is enough food available in a country during famines although all people could not have access to it. More specifically, he underlined that famines are explained by entitlement failures, which in turn can be understood as failure of endowments, production possibilities, and exchange conditions, among others (Sen 1981: 433–464).

The other explanation is an approach which politicises famines. Accordingly, famines should not be explained as the result of natural disaster or a challenge to charity; rather they became parts of political agenda. Such thought makes famine and starvation success or failure of political performance of rulers. Moreover, in a given democratic system, the election of a government depends, among other things, on its policy about famines and its re-election on the accomplishment of that promise to solve the problem of famine. Famine, therefore, must appear as something of crucial importance on government agenda in a political convention (Sen, 1981).

Literature has identified different types of reactions to rural famines by governments, depending on the aforementioned perspectives. Indeed, four types of government acts are identified. The first one is intentionally creating famine or escalating the already existing famines. These were governments that deliberately use hunger as a means of extermination to destroy what is perceived as “troublesome” populations. Such governments intentionally create, inflict, or prolong conditions that could result in or contribute to the starvation of a significant number of persons. The second nature of government act is in the carelessness nature. Those governments execute policies that cause famines, and then irresponsibly continue to pursue these policies despite learning that they are preparing ground mass starvation. Thirdly, some governments are marked by unresponsiveness. These are the authoritarian governments, resistant to the fate of their populations even though they arguably possess the means to respond to crises. They could eventually turn blind eyes to mass hunger. The fourth nature of government act is the least deliberate but related to desperation. These are in actual fact incompetent or hopelessly corrupt ones, faced with food crises at home due to drought or price shocks. They are understandably unable to effectively respond to their citizens’ urgent needs (Marcus 2003, 97: 245–281).

Generally, this article dealt with government reactions to rural famines in the three consecutive Ethiopian regimes, Emperor Menilik II, Emperor Haile Selassie I, and *Derg*. The political aspects of famines in Ethiopian history have been overworked by researchers from different disciplines. Thus, this study attempted to analyse the activities of each regime within its time, political and socio-economic contexts. However, it is worthy to note that the subjects of comparison, indicators, are not time- and space-specific in the socio-economic or political history of Ethiopia.

A number of primary¹ and secondary sources were consulted for the purpose of this study. Reports about the government reactions to the famines of 1970s and 1980s were accessed from the Manuscript Section of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies Library and consulted. Mainly, archives, minutes of the successive meetings of committees and investigation commissions were used exhaustively to explain about the positions of the governments and

peoples' persistent appeals for food aids. Besides the archives, the memoirs of individuals who had participated in the processes of dealing with the famines and the chronicle of the Emperor (Emperor Menelik II) in the case of the famine of 1888–1892 were intensively gone through. The news on the daily newspapers about the famines of 1970s and 1980s were also reviewed.

Besides all these primary sources, a number of academic publications, books and journals were consulted to have a clear picture about the theoretical aspects of governments' dealing with famines and to identify the gap of knowledge to be filled in by the present study.

Unfortunately, no clear evidence was found on the nature of government reactions to rural famines in Ethiopia until the late 19th century. In fact, most of the famines hitherto recorded were framed as if they were a natural disaster or were due to the punishment of God. Thus, the reactions of the governments to several famines were under the perception that human being can do nothing to solve the punishment of God. The only action that was perceived as 'can be realised' was giving alms to the victims and finally praying to God. According to the information obtained from different local and foreign sources there is evidence at least about the series of famines since the 9th century all through the 19th century (Pankhurst 1985: 9). Almost all of the Ethiopian governments functioned throughout these centuries seemed to have perceived as if the famines were due to the punishment of God against the wrong doers— be they kings or peoples. The reactions of the Ethiopian rulers against such calamities were, however, rarely explained. It is only in few cases that they wrote as, "the king could feed and dress his peoples in a manner a father could do to his children". The people also did not believe that providing aid or support to the victims during such evil days is the responsibility of rulers or governments. Instead, aid was perceived as the deeds of the generous king because of his personal kindness. That is why the minor support of kings to the people in few cases throughout the centuries for which we have information have been over exaggerated (Pankhurst 1985: 9–20).

2. The Reactions of the Three Consecutive Ethiopian Regimes

During the three regimes of Emperor Menilek II (1889–1913), Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930–1974) and the military rule under Colonel Mengistu (1974–1991)— the rural people faced calamitous famines were nicknamed differently. The 1888–1892 famine during Emperors Menilek’s reign was commonly known as *kifu ken* (evil days), the 1959 and 1972–1975 famines during Emperor Haile Selassie’s reign were named as *dubbalech* (Startled out of the blue) and *Aschenikachew* (Perturbing them) or *Shenkutie* (flogger), respectively and the 1982–1985 one during the rule of Mengistu was named as *agurit* (goggling to them). In fact, all of them were identified commonly as *kifu ken* (Fekade 1989:48, 50; Asaminew 1992:1–3).

The respective rulers reacted differently in their own ways. Admitting the occurrence of the sever famines, resource allocation, and the like had deteriorated from the period of Emperor Menilek through that of Colonel Mengistu. Menelik’s effort and attention to the problem within the standard of that period was by far better, although selective, than that of Emperor Haile Selassie’s. The process became the worst during Mengistu’s time, commonly known as the *Derg* period. The *Derg* criticised the Emperor for his negligence to solve the problem. Surprisingly, *Derg*’s negligence or intentional creation of the famine was much worse than Emperor Haile Selassie’s. Unlike their predecessors, who ascribed the problem to God both Haile Selassie and *Derg* ascribed the famines to peasants’ laziness or to their sin and natural disaster (drought), respectively in their explanation through the media (Gebere Silassie 1967; Haile Mariam 2013; Debebe 2014). It also seemed that they had political priority to the rural famine. For instance, the ministers and many other government officials had the understanding that the rural famine should not be presented to the Emperor justifying that he was busy with other major national issues (Haile Mariam 2013:41–42). Similarly, Mengistu also asserted that his officials and the political cadres should not be immersed into such minor problems; rather they should give much priority to the revolution (Debebe 2014:159)².

Consulting and drawing from a number of archival sources, the direct products of the times, and other primary² sources, this article attempted to carefully examine the reactions of the three regimes to rural famines. The

issues taken into consideration as points of comparison were: admitting what officially happened, creating or escalating the problem for other purposes, allocation of resources for relief and rehabilitation, migration of the victims to the capital, and re-settlement policies of the respective governments.

2.1. The Government Role in Admitting and Disclosing the Famines

The first point of discussion pertaining to the governments' reaction was whether they officially admitted and eventually declared the occurrence of the famine, its scale and the rate of victims, including death records. Like his predecessors, Emperor Menilek II had framed the famine calamities as the punishment of God. He had, therefore, declared the threatening incident before the cruel famine in pin pointing “men of Shewa join your hand all in one; all of you be in your churches and cry to the Lord for mercy (*egzio*), for you clearly know that if the oxen disappear there will be no grain and that if there is no grain there will be no men” (Gebere Silassie 1967:153). Accordingly, all the members of the society could pray in their respective churches by giving recognition to the order of the King and hoping the better will come (Gebere Silassie 1967).

During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, his ministers attempted to hide the occurrence of the famine of 1972–1975 in Wollo. However, the famine was just one of the worst of the incidents that recurred several times. For instance, the famines of 1958 and 1966 in Tigray and in Wollo were treated with categorical unresponsiveness, even in developing hostility towards the peasants assuming that they were not grateful for the divinely-sanctioned imperial rule. The ministers thought that the peasants could let themselves die due to famine for defaming the reputation of the honourable Emperor (An Africa Watch Report 1991:57–60).

During this time, most of the issues regarding the famine were in the hands of the ministers, mainly in the Office of the Prime Minister (Fantaye 2007: 321). The first reaction to the problem was the establishment of a certain committee known by the name “የእህል እጥረት አጥኝ ኮሚቴ”, (‘Food-crops Scarcity Study Committee), in November 10, 1971 to address such national problems. The Committee itself was established by the direct order from the

office of the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia Aklilu Habtewold (Haile Mariam 2013: 41–44). Unfortunately, the support extended to this committee from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet was very limited or unsatisfactory to the state of affairs. There was no agreement among the committee members on how to announce or expose the problem to the wider public. Interestingly enough, the ministers in the cabinet of Prime Minister Aklilu were members of the Committee. It was presided over by *Ato* Mulatu Debebe, who was by then the Minister of the Ministry of Social Development, a ministry which was established in January 1957. It was created, to avert the recurrent famines in different provinces of the country (The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C., IES ms, no 5706:1). Some of the members of the Committee demanded to obtain the necessary support from the wider public, mainly from the urban dwellers or civil servants; and suggested that it was better to announce the problem on the Ethiopian mass media. On the other hand, others directly opposed this suggestion under the pretext that it could result in political crisis, even more than the feared social and economic chaos. It seems that those who opted that the drought should not be officially addressed to the public and the famine should be addressed using local resources had the upper hand and their idea was in line with the Ministers' to secure recognition. Then, the drought continued unexposed (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C., IES ms, no 5706:112). This idea was also strongly supported by the Prime Minister; to the extent of accusing the British media that significantly exposed the famine to international community on October 18, 1972. The Prime minister underlined that the British government had the plan to overthrow the imperial government of Ethiopia (Fantaye 2007: 320). Even, those officials who knew the catastrophe, being members of the said Committee, were not confident enough to explain the magnitude of the ensuing famine, which was particularly serious in the provinces of Wollo and Tigray where they were asked to do so by some Journalists. For instance, one of the officials also a member of the Committee vaguely described, even by denying the presence of this national problem on Ethiopian Television in February 15, 1973 (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C:113).

Evidence shows that during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, famine had been framed as the fate of the unindustrious peasantry, as can be noted from this quote: “The rich and the poor always exist and will exist. Why? Because there are those that work ... and those that prefer to do nothing.... Each individual is responsible for his misfortunes, his fate” (Wiseberg 1976:108). His officials had also thought that the peasants and “nomads” of Wollo were defaming the reputation of the Emperor by starving themselves. Reports of famine from different regional or provincial offices seem to have consistently ignored or denied the presence of the cruel famine (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C: 37).

This newly emerged tradition of hiding news of rural famine was repeated during the reign of the *Derg* in the manner that was even worse. The government political agents were told that the President did not want to hear about such news of famine or social disorder but news of development (Debebe 2014: 154). In a meeting to treat the government performance report of 1976 E.C. (1983/84) and approve the budget of 1977 E.C. (1984/85), nothing was mentioned by President Mengistu about the rural starvation, about drought and famine. He reported as if every village of rural Ethiopia was producing enough or surplus grain, although one-fourth of the total population of the country were on the verge of death (Debebe 2014: 157). He understood the famine and expressed his view to the then Vice Commissioner of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) as;

Cool down! You must remember that you are a member of the Central Committee [of our party]. ...you should not be immersed in such petty social problems that can be faced during a period of transition. There were frequent famines before we come to political power; it is how the nature keep its balance. Today we began interfering in this law of nature and that is why our population become more than 40 million (Ibid: 159).

On the next day, President Mengistu was said to be disappointed with the report of the RRC Commissioner Major Dawit Wolde-Gyiorgis concerning the famine and the latter’s attempt to disclose the problem to international community and organisations, whom the President labelled as mere imperialists. He had advised the Commissioner insisting that “there is no need of exaggeration, provide whatever the latter could do by deploying

possible national resources and divert the attention of the international community” (Debebe 2014: 181). This was exactly the same with what Aklilu Habtewold did in 1965 E.C. (1972/73), the fact already stated above. It was ordered that the movement of foreigners in the country should be limited to Addis Ababa alone. As a result, the Intelligence Office was warned not to give licence to foreigners to go to provinces. Just like Haile Selassie’s State Minister a certain Legesse Bezu, the key *Derg* member Legesse Asfaw had explained his attitude about the ensuing rural famine of the year 1984–85 indicating this as “there are different gossips regarding the drought. There was also similar gossip among members of the management. Such was part of the plan to reverse the revolution. ... The agents of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the imperialists are poisoning the conscience [mind] of innocent people. Their objective is to create chaos and abort the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution.” (Debebe 2014: 189). Surprisingly, the Legesses were aware of the catastrophe and had seen it with their necked eyes. But both of them gave their explanation to the media as such simply to appease or please their masters, Aklilu Habte Wold and Mengistu Haile Mariam, respectively.

2.2. Resource Allocation for Relief and Rehabilitation

The rulers in those three regimes were in big political commitments which needed magnificent resource allocations during the time of the famines that occurred in their respective regimes. The major ones were the coronation ceremony of Emperor Menilek II in 1889, the 80th birthday anniversary of Emperor Haile Selassie, and the 10th year anniversary of the Revolution. There were also other equally important political commitments.

Concerning the coronation ceremony of Emperor Menilek, it had been reported that the ceremony was a very modest and almost non-ceremonial in the aspect of serving extravagant feast. Gebre Silassie wrote about the ceremony in a very short phrase as “after this, in the year of Mathew, all the cows and oxen were perished. The king was sad because of this. He did not plan to make coronation ceremony.” (Gebre Silassie 1967: 156). The King announced food-saving declaration by prohibiting meat consumption, including in his palace, saying that, “if I have prohibited it to others, I myself will not eat”. It had been reported that the Emperor ate no beef for

about three years, saying: “why should I enjoy plenty while my people are in want?” The customary banquets were not served in the palace during those years; rather, it was prepared in less quality and served to the victims (Debebe 2014).

The Emperor also distributed grains from the government granaries. He ordered his nobles and dignitaries to distribute the grains they had in their granaries as he did. Accordingly, charity was provided to the needy by some of them. Particularly, those who govern fertile regions mentioned below contributed to a great extent. The generosity of *Dejazmach* Gername, who governed the fertile district of Ada’a, was exemplary. The same was true in the case of *Ras* Darge Sahele-Silassie, who owned fertile lands in Selalie. The Emperor encouraged the people to use hoe to cultivate their land instead of sitting idle during these hard times. It is said that he engaged himself in manual labour activities like digging and clearing bush and urged his officials *Ras* Mikael and *Ras* Walie to do the same until they get mercy from God, whom they begged to bless them with draught animals (Gebre Silassie 1967: 176; Afewerq 1961:64–65). The Emperor had also made an effort to distribute plough oxen, which were obtained from the Ogaden region, for peasants who lost their oxen because of the render pest (Gebre Silassie 1967: 195; Pankhurst 1985: 99–199; Debebe 2014: 242).

As far as the available local sources are concerned, no evidence indicates that Emperor Menilek gave deaf ear or tried to hide the rural famine that happened during his reign. In fact, Gebre Iyesus (1961) mentioned the hardships of the victims by saying that the Emperor could support only those who could arrive at his palace; but significant number of them died on their way to the capital or in their villages. Of course, the Emperor visited those people who could not arrive at his place, in their villages and advised them that they should use hoe to cultivate their lands in the absence of plough oxen. For instance, he visited North Shewa (Ifat) in late 1890 or early 1891. After observing their efforts to cultivate lands using hoes, donkeys and horses which were not common before that time, he distributed crops like *gomman zar* (rapeseed) and *adanguarre* or *dangollo* (runner bean or sword bean) that could be harvested within a very short time so that they

can survive. The peasants did cultivate and saved their lives (Ahmed 2002:231–243).

Unfortunately, some “nationalist historians”³ from the southern provinces of the country, mainly the Oromo, depicted the efforts of Emperor Menilek in a different way. They explained that the actions of the state were the major cause in deepening the famine in many rural societies of Ethiopia. They argue that others were surviving and benefiting while Menilek and his subordinates had been escalating the famine on the process of territorial expansion to the south. Thus, Menilek was able to obtain grain to feed his people in the newly founded town of Addis Ababa and the capital town was perceived as a “Noah’s Ark” in the middle of these severe calamities. Much of this grain was obtained by confiscating from the rural communities of newly incorporated regions (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 2829). Mainly, his officials and subordinates reacted to the famine by plundering the rich Oromo provinces and raiding cattle from the Ogaden region. The Emperor sent the northern garrisons to other towns, such as Bure, Nekemte, Keffa and Harar to be fed by the local population. He also ordered provincial governors to supply famine relief to the troops, clergy and other court subordinates (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 2829).

Emperor Haile Selassie’s experiences about the famines during his reign, concerning resource allocation were totally different. Although, many authors said that all was the deed of his ministers, primarily the Prime Minister, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie was contrary to the aforementioned efforts and attitudes of Emperor Menilek. He celebrated his 80th birth-day anniversary extravagantly, while the peoples were suffering from the famine (Debebe 2014: 235).

The general nature of government reaction to the famine during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie can be understood from the experience of the people of Merhabete during *Dubalech* in 1959. The district governor, *Fitawrari* Geleta Qoricho appealed to the government for aid to rescue the people from death; but he could not get any response. Then, he went to Addis Ababa and appealed to the nobilities and royalties from Merhabete that by then lived in the capital. Their reaction had been reported painful as they replied; “What is special in it? The peasants [are] accustomed to hunger and

they knew how to survive for generations. You are assigned to govern not to beg for alms. Why you insult our country and people labelling them as beggars?” (Asaminew 1992: 3–4).

We do not have concrete evidences for efforts of the government to support the victims of the famines in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The exception was the effort of the government to send grains for some districts in Wollo province in 1965/66. Unfortunately, it did not arrive on time to the victims. Moreover, the grain was sent on the modality to be sold at lower prices to the victims. Still, the victims could not afford to buy it. Then, the government sold it to private merchants (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C: 58). The other attempts to provide victims with the necessary supplies in the consecutive years were extremely lengthy and steady. For instance, a letter of request for food supplies for victims in Elikrie, Bale province in 1972 was received four months later in Addis Ababa (Haile Mariam 2013: 54).

The intention of the government during those years was to address the problem from local sources rather than publicising it. Moreover, the established committee also underestimated the magnitude of the problem. They claimed that there was no need of exposing a problem of “single parish” to international community which was “an insult” for the country. Series of *Dejazmach* Legese Bezu’s interviews on Ethiopian television (ETV) and Aberra Jembere’s position in some of the meetings of the Committee reflected this view (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C: 37, 56).

Certain officials who were members of the Committee went to Wollo province to observe the magnitude of the problem in 1973. Then, they came back with disturbing reports disclosing that about 110–120 persons died in each rural parish of the province because of the famine and diseases caused by malnutrition. On the other hand, the imperial government refused not only to provide food aid but also rejected the appeal of the people of the province for exemption from backlog annual land taxes of several years, about 3,000,000 Eth. *Birr* (Debebe 2014:47–49). But, after a frequent request, the Emperor cancelled only the annual tax from 1942 to –1959 E.C.; but they were demanded to pay the ones from 1960 to 1964 E.C. as it

was ordered by the Emperor during his official visit to Wollo in November of 1972. Of course, he did not visit the victims of the famine; rather the “development projects” in the province (*Addis Zemen*, Newspaper, *Hidar*, 12, 1965 E.C.: 1, 7). During the same period, for instance, in 1973 a good coverage of news concerning Wollo was published on the state newspaper *Adiss Zemen*. But, there was no coverage of the famine. The news was more about the official visit of the Emperor to the region, the visit of the Crown Prince Asfawossen, and their generous donation for the construction of a new church.

The afore-mentioned Committee collected only a total of not more than 1.2 million Ethiopian *Birr* in cash and 193,000 quintal of grains and 34,000 kilograms of milk powder from local sources beginning from April to September 1973. There were also other organisations like the Ministry of Agriculture that collected a certain amount of aid. Of the above 1.2 million, 235,000 *Birr* was donated by the Emperor and the largest amount about 420,133 *Birr* was donated by civil servants of the country (Haile Mariam 2013: 55). Surprisingly, in the same year, about 223,606 Ethiopian *Birr* was donated to the Government of Sudan by the Emperor to address the problem of South Sudan (*Addis Zemen*, newspaper, *Hidar*, 14, 1965 EC: 1). Still worse, there was a critical scarcity of infrastructure and transport services for providing the victims with these collected aids. Contrary to this, in the same year, the national election for parliament, House of Deputies, was held and different materials were transported to about 900 polling stations throughout the country (The Government of Ethiopia *Tikimit* 23, 1965 E.C.:18). Besides these, the Committee was complaining that there were numerous unreliable reports from different provinces requesting aid for large numbers of people that were suffering from famine. One example in this case was the report from Raya Qobo declaring that a large number of people were suffering from famine. But finally, it was found out that the number they sent was several folds of the actual number of people in the *Awuraja* (Haile Mariam 2013: 55).

Besides the shortage of transport services, the absence of efficient and capable government activities was another major problem to reach the victims with the possible provisions. The relation between the central

government and the *Inderasie* (viceroy) of Wollo was not simplistic and direct forward vertically. The relation of the officials from the central government was both with the *inderasie* and the crown prince without clear jurisdiction. This resulted in different pretexts for both offices to externalise their responsibilities to each other as well as to the ministries (Fantaye 2007: 319). There was also ill coordination, corruption, particularly by the *chiqa shums* (village officials) during the dissemination of the grains (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C: 18). This was observed not only by the members of the Ccommittee but also by individuals who were visiting Wollo to see the magnitude of the famine. Generally, the serious concern of the committee and the governors of the provinces was not the massive death of the victims; rather the possible turmoil or anarchy, looting markets, etc (GoE *Yemermari Komishion* 1968 E.C 15).

The famine issue was not disclosed to the public at least at the national level until the victims began to migrate from Wollo and Southern Tigray to the nearby provinces mainly Shewa. It was after this incident that the Crown Prince Asfawassen visited the displaced people, at Addis Alem and gave order, for the officials under him to allocate resources for the victims (Fantaye 2007: 318). The other truing point in the act of relief came when the famine was exposed to international community by the British Broadcasting Corporation journalist Jonathan Dimpleby in October, 1972. After this time, at least at the national level, the Emperor himself began to take part in feeding the victims even if it was not told officially to the public. Many provisions including clothes were distributed to the victims in refugee camps at Alamata, Korem, Weldia, Dessie and Batti under the direct observation of the Emperor (Yohannis 1996: 416).

In fact, Haile Selassie's regime was busy doing three important activities in the year 1973 when the famine reached its climax. These were the parliamentary election, the 42nd anniversary of his coronation and celebration of His 80th birthday. The starved migrants were prevented from entering towns, particularly Addis Ababa, for security reasons. Both the 1958 and 1965/6 famines killed tens of thousands of people. In the year 1972–3; 40,000 to 80,000 people died in the famine that struck Wollo. The famine also led directly to the creation on *Nehasie* 23, 1966 (August

1974) of a Commission by the name “ የድርቅ ቀበሌዎች እርዳታ ማስተባበሪያና ማቋቋሚያ ኮሚሽን” (“Drought-Prone Parishes Relief and Rehabilitation Commission”) by the order of (93/19660) by the newly appointed Prime Minister Endalkachew Mekonnen. It was the department mandated to prevent and ameliorate future famines (Haile Mariam: 61–62). The Commission was reformed and renamed as “እርዳታ ማስተባበሪያና ማቋቋሚያ ኮሚሽን” “Relief and Rehabilitation Commission” in 1972 E.C. (1979/1980). Mr. Shimles Adugna was appointed as Commissioner of the Commission from the very beginning (Haile Mariam 2013: 61, 62, and 70). Concerning the relief activities, Shemelis himself commented that at least they were able to stop the massive death of the people because of famine after the efforts for few months from his appointment. The famine of 1972–73 was thus put under control at least in Wollo by 1974. Sadly, it became serious in other parts of the country (Shimles 2005, 1: 4).

Of all, it was the *Derg* that popularised the negligence and cruelty of the Emperor and his officials in their reaction to the rural famine of 1972–75, although that of the *Derg* itself was the worst in responding to a similar catastrophe exactly after a decade (1983–85). The *Derg* presented on ETV on September 11, 1974 (in the evening of Ethiopian New Year) the rural famine to the urban peoples of the country by making a contrast between the incident which was recorded by journalist Jonathan Dimbleby, “the Hidden Hunger” and the lavish and extravagant life style of the royal families and government officials and the sorrow of the Emperor because of the death of his dog, Lulu, as well as the statue made of marble erected on the grave of his dog (Fikre Silassie 2006 E.C.: 102). Although the catastrophe was said to have been unknown by the Emperor, the majority of the citizens expressed their grievances against him. Consequently, the regime was condemned, and finally destroyed. The Emperor and his ministers were accused of letting huge number of peoples die by denying them any aid (Fikre Silassie 2006 E.C.).

The major problem in resource allocation to the victims during the *Derg* period was that President Mengistu and all his ministers and political agents were preoccupied with the preparation for the 10th year anniversary of the revolution and the establishment of Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) as

well as fighting the opponents of the regime, Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The peoples in those territories were ignored and the bulk of the country's income was allocated for the war as president Mengistu himself declared that about 46% of the Ethiopian Gross National Product was allocated for military expenditure (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 155).

While thousands of the rural people were dying of famine, the aforementioned groups of people were busy in urging the urban dwellers to decorate highways and buildings by their own expense. The towns and cities were decorated with slogans, such as "Down with Imperialism!"; and "Temporal natural problem should not deter us from our ultimate objective!". Besides this, hundreds of North Koreans were brought to decorate the capital. In the same year, huge amount of money was spent to construct new buildings, roads and to erect the huge statue of Lenin (Debebe 2014: 167). Surprisingly, Mengistu did know clearly the occurrence of the famine, even including its magnitude, the number of victims from the detailed series of reports of the RRC (Debebe 2014: 188).

The President and his subordinates claimed that the problem was temporal; the nation was on the move to build socialism, a system that was supposed to solve the problem for good. After knowing enough about the famine, the *Derg* purchased about 100,000 coloured electric light bulbs, 400,000 bottles of whisky from Britain. On top of that, they could not receive the whisky for the celebration on time and were forced to order other whisky in exaggerated price that was brought by airplane. They also decorated the capital and finally celebrated the anniversary (Debebe 2014: 253).

The *Derg* could have learnt a lot from the mistakes of its predecessor, Emperor Haile Silassie. Unfortunately, it had also fallen into the same trap, as it tried to hide the news or give deaf ear and blind eye to the problem. The *Derg* only made some efforts during the early years of its rule, to curtail the continuum of the famine of the last years of the imperial regime.

One of the basic limitations of the Drought Commission was that it was established in hurry during the last dates of the imperial regime and could not address the major problems right away. Particularly, it had a chronic

shortage of human power. In fact, this was attempted to be addressed, by redeploying human power from the defence and police forces of the time (Haile Mariam 2013: 65). The other related problem of this newly organised commission was that it was under the strict supervision of the *Derg*. Deputy Commissioner and officers were appointed from the armed forces (Haile Mariam 2013: 66–67). The Commission at this early stage requested for aids both from local and international donors by the will of the *Derg*. It was because of this that the Commission could collect and distribute 12,342,638 quintal of grain and 3,634,450 clothes for 38,452,186 persons beginning from the date of its foundation through 1988 (Haile Mariam 2013: 74).

Unfortunately, the story about *Derg*'s reaction to the famine of 1984–85 is totally different. Here, the available sources, both from the national and foreign scholars, on the incidents discussed about the famine from political point of view (An Africa Watch Report 1991). At this early stage, the relief and rehabilitation of the victims was totally left to the RRC, which was not capable enough to address the problem because of the scarcity of financial and other related resources. The officials of the Commission were attempting to expose the case to international communities to get aids from different organisations. Unfortunately, the government's political appointees and the President were not ready to do that. So, the RRC officials were sandwiched between the victims and the politicians (Debebe 2014: 76); like the "Grain Scarcity Study Committee" during the reign of the Emperor was sandwiched between the Office of the Prime Minister and the victims.

2.3. Reactions of the Government to Migration to the Capital

The other point of departure among the three regimes in their reaction to rural famines was their treatment of displaced starved people who were on their way to the capital city. Still in this aspect, Emperor Menilek took a different track in hosting the migrants to his capital. As to both local and foreign available sources, he welcomed them and tried to treat them in accordance with the tradition and standard of the day (Pankhurst 1985: 99–100). Chronicler Gebres Silassie, *Aleqa* Lemma and Afeworq Gebreyesus described the incident in similar ways (Gebre Silassie 1967: 176; Mengistu 2003 EC: 144; Afeworq 1961: 82). *Aleqa* Lemma, who was at Addis Ababa Trinity Church during this time, had narrated his experience as, "he gave

much [grain] to the migrants. He sent the Gojjames down there. Gojjam was plundered by Emperor Yohannis. It was Gojjam [es] [that] first started to migrate; who did not come? [Everybody came]. Also the Tgrians [came]" (Mengistu 2003 E.C.: 144). Afeworq Gebreyesus also mentioned the presence of numerous migrants in the capital. As to his explanation, Menilek could support only those who were able to arrive at the capital. In fact, the people surrounding Addis Ababa and South of it did not migrate to the capital probably because of political and cultural reasons. So, the majority of these people perished in their villages. During the reign of Emperor Menilek, there was no police force that deterred the migrants from entering the capital, unlike the successor regimes as will be discussed below (Afeworq 1961: 82).

On the other hand, during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, mainly in early 1970's, there were massive attempts to migrate to regional towns or rehabilitation camps in Tigray and Wollo. But, those who could not move to these rehabilitation centres were waiting for gradual death in their villages. Migration to the capital city was strictly supervised or restricted. This was because they assumed that it would create bad image to the country and strong reaction from the urban dwellers. That was why an earth-shaking complaint took place from every government official when the first migrants were seen in Addis Ababa in February, 1973 and the surrounding area, mainly in Addis Alam and Sendafa. Series of letter correspondences were made between the centre and governor of Wollo and among different ministries in the centre (Haile Mariam 2013: 58).

Coming to the *Derg* period, almost the same reaction was taking place, prohibiting victims from entering the capital. In case it happened, the politicians ordered the RRC officials as follows: "displaced peoples from Wollo arrived in Addis Ababa; [so] do whatever you have to do!" (Haile Mariam 2013: 121). The major reason behind the restriction was that the junta was celebrating its 10th year anniversary of the revolution, a number of gusts and journalists were to arrive. For that purpose, an official, for example ordered: "[T]here are peoples [that] started moving from Dessie to Addis Ababa to stumble the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution. Go in hurry and stop them [from entering the capital]!" (Haile Mariam

2013). After the anniversary was celebrated, the capital was over-flooded by starved people. Thus, the capital was open to the migrants and the news of the famine disseminated across the nation and among the international community. Of course, the President officially announced it and began to request the international community for aid (Debebe 2014: 198–199). As a result, about 14,000 migrants were assembled in the rehabilitation camps only in Addis Ababa and its outskirts (Debebe 2014: 258–268).

2.4. The Re-Settlement Policies of the Regimes

The re-settlement during the time of Menilek was made under the cover of territorial expansion. But the process was at its climax during the time of the great famine (*kifu ken*) (1888-1892). Therefore, it was a way out from the problem for most of the soldiers, the peasant and the clergy who followed the footsteps of the army for re-settlement in the resourceful regions of the country. Menilek did not face any challenge in recruiting the bulk of human power since a number of able males of the people under his jurisdiction were volunteer army for their own sake. That was why we have settlers in the southern half of the country extensively from Wollega to Jigjiga (Dechasa 2015: 245–250).

Most of the time, it is the political thought that was given emphasis by considering all northerners in these regions as *neftegnas* or *melkegnas*; but the majority of them were from the lower social status, came to those regions to escape the famine, hunger and other related hardships. The numerous Gojammie and Gondere settlers in Wollega and bulk of Shewans in Illubabor, Arsi-Balie, Sidamo and Harar, e.t.c. during the time of Menilek were the direct result of this process (*ibid.*). There were numerous Wolloyes in different southern regions of the country even before the time of Emperor Haile Selassie. All these re-settlements were successful not only because of the efforts of the settlers, but also because of the strong support and promotion of the government of Emperor Menilek (Geda Melba 1994).

The re-settlement policy during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie was gradual and the extension of the previous regime. Moreover, the famines that occurred before the 1950s and 1960s also forced a number of people to settle in Wollega and became the role model for those who attempted to

settle in the early 1970s. Now, the government was also promoting the re-settlement of people from this region to the south and south western regions of the country even if it was not officially announced by the media. The real example for such arrangement was mentioned in the speech of Leggesse Bezu on ETV and the welcoming speech for the Emperor in 1973 while he was visiting Wollo, saying: “We are also settling those who are in problem because of scarcity of arable land”. Of course, it seems that the governor of the province took it as a usual activity of Wolloyes and let them move as long as they pay for release (*yekotie*) (*Addis Zmen*, newspaper, *Hidar* 10, 1965 EC: 5). That was why the most politicised phrase “ወሎ መስደድ ልማዱ ነጩ።” was reported frequently to accuse some officials of the imperial regime.

Generally, before the revolution of 1974, there was a steady spontaneous outmigration of people from the northern highlands to the southern and western Ethiopia. For instance, 17 locations were identified where resettlement was implemented between 1950 and 1974, partly encouraged by the government, and partly assisted by measures, such as the eradication of malaria from many lowland areas. It is estimated that up to one million people moved to those sites. International agencies, such as the World Bank agreed that the northern highlands were “overpopulated” and encouraged the government to start programs for controlled re-settlements (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 210).

The most common characteristics of the re-settlement during the times of Emperor Menilek and Emperor Haile Selassie were that the movements and re-settlements were based on the will of the settlers themselves and even self-sponsored in most cases. They also settled in the area of their choice and less hostile geographical setting, mostly on highlands nearby garrison towns and none- or less-malaria infected regions.

The *Derg* made the initial plan and attempt for re-settlement of the people from the northern over-cultivated regions to the fertile but uncultivated regions of the country in 1979/80. In fact, there was such intention in the 10 year national plan to settle 150,000 people every year. But, the accidental one was the attempt to settle the seasonal labour migrant from Wollo to cotton plantation site of Dubti (Afar). Previously, the migration and re-

settlement was made by the interest and will of the migrants themselves. But beginning from 1980, people were captured from different sites, including churches, mosques and markets and taken to the plantation sites. That was followed by forced re-settlement in Assosa, Bale, Kaffa and other provinces without any material and psychological preparation of the settlers (Haile Mariam 2013: 129–130).

According to an African Watch Report (1991), three weeks after the media attention to the famine in October 1984, the Ethiopian Government officially launched re-settlement program. The plan was to move a large section of the population from the north to the south. The target was to settle 1.5 million people. In fact, about 600,000 people were moved in three phases: November 1984–May 1985, October 1985 – January 1986, and November 1987 – March 1988. The justification presented to the international communities and the people of Ethiopia was that the settlement was a famine-relief measure. But foreign sources, mainly those of the pro-TPLF ones, identified this claim as fallacious. As to them, it was a counter insurgency, a policy of trying to remove by force a large section of the population— “draining the sea to catch the fish”—, that were the rebellious group (An Africa watch Report 1991: 194).

Of all available sources, an African Watch Report is extremely an anti-*Derg* explanation and put everything as an intentional genocide activity against the population of the region. Accordingly, the measure was not only neglect but to wipe-out the region from any population so that the rebellion lost supporters or hosts.

The other landmark in this aspect took place in 1984/85 and the following years to 1988. During these years, the action was taken accidentally after the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution was over and the news of the famine was spread across the nation as well as among the international community. For instance, President Mengistu planned in 1984/85 to settle about 300,000 households and later changed his mind and planned to settle about 500,000 households (more than 1.5 million people) from Wollo and Tigray to the southern and south-western provinces of the country within the period of nine months. Regardless of all these plans and efforts, the *Derg* was able to settle only small number of people, 203,065 households or about

587, 785 people from the north to the different southern and south western provinces of the country in one year. In the next year (1986) about 700,000 people were transported to re-settlement sites although there was strong opposition and scarcity of material provisions. Of this number, about 20,000 died after their arrival to the sites. About 500 were killed by the government because of their attempt to escape back to their villages; and about 1000 were lost on their way back to home villages. Moreover, about 10,000 managed to escape and crossed the international border to Sudan and about 500 managed to return to home villages (Haile Mariam 2013: 273–279). Two years later, i.e, in 1988, the BBC reported that still people were forced to be transported to re-settlement areas from the rehabilitation camps in Wollo. In the same year, eye witnesses mentioned that more than seven convoys of trucks transported people from Korem to Harbu (Haile Mariam 2013: 132, 134).

So, these processes by themselves resulted in big catastrophes; even sometimes more than the famine itself. Large numbers of people died because of the process. Moreover, the departure of much more number of families was another significant disaster. The crisis because of departure was clearly reported as “husbands and wives, parents and children, e.t.c. were departed” (Haile Mariam 2013: 135).

Thus, the re-settlement program of the *Derg* was not successful in comparison to the re-settlements during the preceding regimes because of several reasons. Of all the reasons, the measure was primarily accidental and politically-motivated rather than helping the victims. It was intended to establish model peasants’ associations who were loyal to the revolution in the peripheral regions of the country by mixing up different ethnic groups. It was also intended to donate the settlers with vast collective agricultural lands and encourage the settlers to produce more. In turn, the action could depopulate the rebel-prone northern region of the country so that the opponents of the regime become helpless (Debebe 2014: 154). In addition to this, there were significant contradictions between the information the settlers were fed in their places of origin and the reality in the places of destination. They were told that every supply, including housing, pipe water, and electricity was provided; and that they could produce three times

in a year on such fertile lands. But, when they arrived, they knew that they were deceived (Debebe 2014). The selected sites for the re-settlement were also hostile in different aspects; mainly tropical diseases as well as extreme heat like in Gambella that become about 45 degree Celsius during their arrival. So, it could not be adopted by the people from highland regions of the country. One of such cases took place in Kaffa, Gura Farda, which was highly infected by insect that causes sleeping sickness (Debebe 2014: 262). In the same program, people were totally detached from their home villages and thrown in totally different social and cultural settings. As a result, they could not feel at home because of the fact that most of these settlement sites had no religious shrine like churches and mosques; and thus they were odd for people who were totally religious (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 210–215).

Moreover, the process was forceful, massive in number and intended to make and believe that the people by this time were powerless since they lost all what they had and would be totally dependent on the government. It meant that they were not in a position to resist the measures (*ibid.*). Unlike the policy of the previous regimes that intended to settle people on cleared lands or on the land of the displaced others, the *Derg* settled some of the people among the local ethnic groups. This measure resulted in hatred between the settlers and the hosting people; inducing ethnic conflicts over resources (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 210–22). The program was ill-organised and started spontaneously and led by incapable individuals than by experts, like Legesse Asfaw, who was the leading in giving deaf ear for the famine or saying that the revolution should be given priority and such natural problems could be solved under the socialist ideology. In addition to that, even if the government claimed that the re-settlement was to the benefit of the victims, by transferring them from the exhausted environments to fertile and sparsely populated regions of the country, most of the international community, mainly the west continued to condemn the activity. The American Government, which was supporting and promoting the same activity during the imperial regime, now became the leading opponent of the process (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 210–22).

Finally, the opposition from different resistance groups or political parties, who launched violent military attacks on the new settlement sites, was also another input that contributed for the failure of the program (Debebe 2014: 270–271). However, the pro-west and post-*Derg* government experts described the program that the *Derg* intentionally established as “hesitant of the system”. They were used as listening posts and military bases. Where the settlers and farm workers were not locals, they may help to break up the ethnic homogeneity of an area and provide a force loyal to the government. Moreover, sources of this nature concluded that the settlements were modern day *katamas* [*neftenya* garrisons] to watch over the local populations as Emperor Menilek did in the late 19th century (An Africa Watch Report 1991: 218–219).

3. Conclusions

The nature of the reactions of the regimes to rural famines emanated from their perception of the source of political power and the causes of the famines. In the regimes, the role of the people to own or lose political power for each respective ruler was minimal or non-existent. The rulers in all of the regimes did not worry about their political power; did not fear that they will lose their positions in elections as their powers were not obtained from ballot box. They rarely associated the famines with their own weaknesses, particularly the failure of their respective policies and administrative systems. Therefore, as we can learn from history, it is possible to conclude that some of the political unrests were the outcome of the nature of government reactions to famines. So, policy-makers and practitioners should draw lessons from those historical experiences, success and failures, to come up with possible solutions for the present challenges.

Emperor Menilek II, like his predecessors, claimed that he assumed the position of political power by the will of God. It was only God that would let him lose it. It sounded like the Emperor believed that the famine was not because of his fault or that of his people. He totally ascribed it to God and that was why the first reaction to the famine was “pray for mercy from God”. Then, he was reacting in several ways to save the people. One of his attempts was distributing for the victims, the grains he and his dignitaries had at their disposal.

Emperor Haile Selassie I, who had officially taken the title “elect of God”, claimed that the source of his political power was God. The Emperor considered himself as infallible, who could not commit mistakes in administering the people since, as he claimed, he was ruling by the “spirit of God”. For this reason, he asserted that the cause of the famine was the “laziness” and the “sin” of the peasants. Thus, he argued that, it was natural to be starved for those who did not work hard. Even, the peasants were accused of defaming the dignity of the reputable Emperor. So, this assumption possibly had made the Emperor and his officials to be reluctant to take urgent measures.

For Colonel Mengistu, the source of political power was proper organisation and commitment of a “well organised group.” Apparently, popular consent had minimum or no role to own or to lose the political power. Moreover, his government understood that the famine was caused because of natural disaster. For Mengistu, it was the means for the nature to keep its balance. Thus, he assumed that the reaction was against this “law of nature”. It was because of this fact that he associated the reaction with mechanisms that helped to strengthen his power and weaken that of his opponents. Consequently, he attempted to separate the rebellious group from their source of supply by resettling the people, often against their will, from north to south.

Endnotes

¹Unlike in other disciplines, archival materials like minutes of meetings, reports of one’s eyewitness accounts, memories, and news are identified as primary sources in historical studies. It is the synthesis and reconstruction products of these materials that are identified as secondary sources.

²The book is a translation of Dawit Wolde-Giyorgis, “*Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*”, Red Sea Press, 1989. The present author had access to the Amharic version and that is why only this version is available in the reference list.

³In fact, by the very nature of the discipline, historians cannot be free of bias or subjectivity, absolute neutrality is not human nature. This is also because of the interpretive nature of the analysis in the discipline. It is not reporting results of laboratory output but interpreting one’s perception and understanding of what sources revealed about incidents. So, the basic difference among historians is only the ability and skill to minimise the bias.

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- define the study area and objectives of the study;
- introduce the research questions or hypotheses;
- present adequate review of the literature (both conceptual—including theoretical and conceptual frameworks—and empirical) related to the study;
- do all it should in no more than five pages.

4. Materials and Methods

In here, authors are required to present clear account of:

- 4.1. the methodology, including the philosophical underpinnings, study design, approaches, sampling strategies, and methods of data collection and analysis;
 - Standard methods need only be mentioned, or may be described by reference to the literature as long as it is readily available;
 - Modifications of standard techniques should be described; and
 - If the method is new, it should be described in detail.

- 4.2. If the article results from experimental or quasi-experimental research, the design of the experiment, including the number of replications;
- 4.3. materials used, including:
 - chemicals, laboratory equipment with the necessary technical specifications; standard units of measurement;
 - any plants or animals involved, with exact descriptions of genus, species, strain, cultivar, line, etc.);
- 4.4. justifications as to why the materials and methods used were chosen over others.

5. Results and Discussion

Depending on the craft and choice of authors, as well as on what the subject matter warrants, results and discussion can be either intertwined together or presented under separate sections. In any case, results should:

- 5.1. add new insights to the existing body of knowledge;
- 5.2. be based on data and information scientifically-drawn from sources, but free from authors' personal dispositions and biases.
- 5.3. be simply and clearly stated;
- 5.4. report representative data rather than endlessly repetitive data;
- 5.5. reduce large masses of data to means, along with the standard error or standard deviation;
- 5.6. repeat in the text only the most important findings shown in tables and graphs and instead report repetitive data in tables and graphs;
- 5.7. include negative data—what was not found— if (but only if) they affect the interpretation of results;
- 5.8. give only data that relate to the subject of the paper as defined in the introduction;
- 5.9. refer in the text to every table and figure by number;
- 5.10. include only tables, figures and graphs that are necessary, clear and worth reproducing;
- 5.11. provide adequate answers to all the research questions or pursue all the hypotheses/assumptions made at start of the study;

5.12. include concomitant findings only if they are important.

6. The discussion and interpretation of the results should:

- not repeat what has already been said in the review of literature;
- dealt with each of the originally stated objectives in the order they were originally;
- relate the results to the questions that were set out in the introduction;
- show how the results and their interpretations agree, or do not agree with previous findings and their interpretations;
- show implications/significance of the results for existing theoretical and conceptual constellations, policy, practice, and/or further research to follow up the results.

7. Conclusion and/or Recommendation

This is the section where,:

- based on the findings and discussions of their implications, draw logical conclusions about each research question or hypothesis;
- nothing (methods, observations or results) should come as a surprise (should not be mentioned for the first time);
- authors should avoid unnecessary detail or repetition from preceding sections;
- you indicate future courses of action.

8. Citation and Referencing

8.1. All materials, referred to or quoted must be acknowledged. Plagiarism is a serious academic dishonesty, an offence which is illegal and unethical.

EJDR uses the *author-date* system of citations in all of its publications. Thus, authors have to ensure that author-date citations in the text agree exactly with corresponding entries in the reference list and that all the facts are accurate.

The author-date citation in a running text or at the end of a block quotation consists of the author's/editor's last, or family name, and the year of publication. Examples:

- Author, year, page no.: (Johnson 1987, 22–25)
- Two sources, with one author having two works: (Sen 1999; Jenden 1978b)
- More than three authors/editors: (Kassoguè *et al.* 1996)
- Organisation, year, volume, page no.: (World Bank 1988, 2:47)

8.2. Citation and referencing should be complete according to this Style Guide, which is adapted with modifications from the Chicago Manual of Style

8.3. Direct quotations should be as short as possible and should be reproduced exactly in all details (spelling, punctuation and paragraphing).

☞ Short quotes should be placed in quotation marks.

☞ Long quotations should appear indented and centered in the text without quotation marks.

8.4. References in the text should read as follows:

* Brown (1975: 63) has argued that the ...

OR

* One economist (Brown 1975: 63) has argued that...

Use “*et al.*” when citing work by more than two authors.

Example: A new treaties (Goody *et al.* 1976) suggests...

The letters a, b, c, and so on should be used to distinguish citations of different works by the same author in the same year. Example: Brown (1985a, 1985c) insist that...

8.5. Essential additional notes should be indicated by consecutive superscript numbers in the text and collected on a separate page at the end of the text, titled **Notes**. Keep such numbered notes to a minimum. Authors shall not use “foot-notes”, i.e., notes at the bottom of the page, but “**end-notes**” placed at the end of the text but preceding the References.

Numbered notes should be used to make clarifications about the references used, to include points left out in the text, to add some items which readers may want to know. If the citations or references in the text are too long, or consist of more than three names, it may be advisable to put them in the **Notes** at the end.

8.6. All references cited in the text and other supporting material should be listed alphabetically by author in a section titled References and appearing after Notes. Ethiopian authors should be listed alphabetically by first name first. Shiferaw Bekele, for example, should be listed under S and not under B. The same holds for Chinese names. Write out Ethiopian names in full in the Reference list (i.e., first and second names) as they are given in the publications you are citing. Do not abbreviate, for instance, as Shiferaw B. In the text, references may use first names only, or full names. Avoid, as much as possible, using honorific titles such as Ato, Wzro, Dr, etc., in citations or references.

The following are examples of different entries

☞ ***Articles in Journals:***

The full citation should contain: name(s) of author(s) followed by a full stop, year of publication followed by a full stop, title of article referred (in sentence style, Times New Roman) followed by a full stop, name of Journal or serial publication (in title case) followed by a comma, volume number, issue number followed by a colon, page range whereon the article appears.

Alemayegu Lirensu. 1988. Food Aid and Agricultural Production in Ethiopia. *Ethiopian Journal of Development Research*, 10 (1): 59–90. (The last parts of the Journal can also be given as *Ethiopian Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 10, No 1, pp. 59–90.)

Cowley, R. 1967. The Standardization of Amharic Spelling. *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, V. 2: 1–8.

Note: The volume and issue numbers should be entered as they are given in the journals cited, i.e., if the numbers are in Roman or Arabic numerals, they should not be changed.

☞ ***Books***

Bahru Zewde. 1991. *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1955–1974*. London: James Curry.

- Clapham, C. 1988. *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Donham, D. and Wendy James (Eds.). 1996. *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Listing of several works by the same author should be by year of publication, the earlier work preceding the recent. Here is an example:

- Levine, Donald. 1965. *Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- _____. 1974. *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of Multiethnic Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

☞ ***Contributions in books should be given as follows:***

- Wood, Adrian P. 1982, Spontaneous Agricultural Resettlement in Ethiopia, 1950–1974. *In*: J. Clarks and L. Konsinski (Eds.), *Redistribution of Population in Africa*, pp. 1150–82. London: Heinemann.

☞ ***Contributions in Proceedings:***

- Taddesse Tamirat. 1984. Feudalism in Heaven and on Earth: Ideology and Political Structure in Mediaeval Ethiopia. *In*: *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, University of Lund 26-29 April 1982*, pp. 195–200, Edited by S. Rubenson. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies.

☞ ***Conference Papers:***

- Hyden, H. 1990. ‘Ideology and the Social Sciences: The African Experience’. Paper presented at the OSSREA Social Science Conference, 8–10 May, Kampala, Uganda.

☞ ***Unpublished Works:***

- Messing, S. 1957. ‘The Highland-Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia’. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
- Alula Abate, *et al.* [these should be listed]. 1986. Evaluation of the Impact of UNICEF-Assisted Water Supply Projects in Bale, Harerge, Shewa and Wello - Ethiopia. Programme Cycle 1980–1983. *Research Report No. 30*, Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa.

☞ **Official Publications:**

- Central Statistical Office. 1975. *Results of the National Sample Survey Second Round, Vol. V. Land Area and Utilization*. Addis Ababa: CSA.
- World Bank. 1973. 'Agricultural Sector Survey, Vol. I, The General Report. Report No. PA-143a.' Washington: World Bank [Note: this is a report, not a book, so the title is not underlined].
- _____. 1989. *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington: World Bank.

☞ **On-line Sources**

Further to the details in the above categories, include the date of access and the URL of the site whereat the material was accessed.

9. Format

A4 paper size with 2.5cm margins shall be the standard paper size.

9.1. Title

Titles should be set in title case, NOT in all caps.
Should not contain acronyms and abbreviations.

9.2. Endnotes

Authors are advised to use endnotes rather than footnotes.

Endnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout each chapter or article, and placed at the end of a work, in a section titled "Notes", after any appendix and before the reference list.

9.3. Acknowledgements

These should be placed at the end of the text next to the appendix but before the endnotes.

9.4. Headings

Major chapter headings must be in Title Case and centered on the page. Sub-headings must also be in Title case but aligned with the left margins.

If a manuscript has subsections, the following decimal notation should be used for numbering the headings and subheadings:

1.	2.	3.
1.1	2.1	3.1
1.2	2.2	3.2

However, authors are advised to avoid using more than three *levels* of subheadings unless the complexity of the argument warrants it. Preceded by the decimal notations indicated above,

1st level titles should be set in Times New Roman 14pts, bold;

2nd level titles should be set in Times New Roman 12pts, bold;

3rd level titles should be set in Times New Roman 12pts, bold-italics, run-on with text;

9.5. Text

Text should be set in Times New Roman, 12pt font size, double-spaced.

Block quotes should be indented from both sides and set in 11pt font.

9.6. Tables and Figures:

- Tables should be used only where the data requires at least 2 rows/columns by 3 rows/columns. Details shorter than this shall be presented in text form.
- Should be consecutively numbered and referred at the right place in the text;
- Should have short titles;
- Each column and row of a table should bear proper titles;
- All footnotes to and all sources of tables should be placed under the tables.
- Also captions to figures should be placed immediately below the figures, followed by source information and Notes on some variables in the tables/figures.
- Keys to the different components of figures or graphs shall be placed at upper right corner within the boundary of the figure.
- Tables and figures should be used to supplement the text but not to duplicate it. Unnecessary and lengthy tables and figures are discouraged.

9.7. Abbreviations:

Avoid use of dots in all familiar abbreviations, such as CSA, EEC, FAO, UNESCO, USA. But dots should be placed at the end of the followings: e.g., etc., *et al.*,

9.8. *Language & Spelling Rules:*

- English is the Languages of the Journal. Use one form of spelling, preferably the UK English, throughout the text. This should either be American (i.e., according to, for example, WEBESTER's dictionary) or British spelling (i.e., according to the OXFORD dictionary). Do not mix the two.
- All authors must avoid sexist and racist language.
- Use of discriminatory, inflammatory, and unethical expressions (derogatory, inciting, defamatory, etc.) language is unacceptable.

9.9. *Responsibility for Views:*

Any statement in an article accepted for publication remains the sole responsibility of the author and should in no way be perceived as reflecting the opinions of the Editors or the Publisher.

9.10. *Copyright:*

Authors submitting manuscripts do so on the understanding that if they are accepted for publication, copyright of the articles shall be assigned exclusively to the Publisher, which is CDS.