

Borderland Conflicts in East Africa: The Unnoticed Wars in the Ethiopia-Kenya Border

Gebre Yntiso*

Abstract

The borderland between Ethiopia and Kenya is considered as a hotbed of interethnic conflicts. The Dassanech and the Nyangatom people in Ethiopia and the Turkana in Kenya are among the hostile groups, who have been fighting unnoticed wars for decades now. Environmental scarcity, which was caused by physical factors and human actions, and a host of other factors seem to interact in fuelling tensions. The cross-border conflicts could not be contained partly for lack of attention from the two states: Ethiopia and Kenya, and partly for other reasons. Historically, the border area inhabited by the three ethnic groups was viewed as remote, inhospitable, and marginal. Since recent years, however, the discovery of oil in Turkana and the agricultural investments in Ethiopia significantly increased the economic attractiveness of the area. However, the new developments failed to translate into opportunities for peace and sharing of benefits by the local pastoralists couldn't be attained easily. Instead, the frequency and severity of violent clashes increased, and the cross-boundary social relations that previously used to prevent intergroup conflicts are weakened. The traditional conflict-handling mechanisms and the formal peace-making efforts by government authorities became ineffective. Based on Thomas Homer-Dixon's (1994) environmental scarcity model, this paper examined the link between environment and conflict. Moreover, Ashutosh Varshney's (2001) perspectives on the role of social capital in preventing conflict and fostering peace has been discussed. Besides presenting the challenges, this paper identified the key areas of interventions for addressing cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland.

Keywords: Environmental scarcity, cross-border conflict, social capital, Dassanech, Nyangatom, Turkana, Ethiopia, Kenya

*Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Department of Social Anthropology, College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa University; Email: gebred@gmail.com

1. Introduction

The Dassanech and the Nyangatom people in Ethiopia and the Turkana in Kenya have been engaged in interethnic cross-border conflicts, which increased in frequency and severity in recent decades (Gebre 2012a: 351; Yonas 2012: 379). The violent clashes peaked between 2008 and 2010. According to the Nyangatom *Woreda*¹ Administration Office, between January 2008 and December 2010, the Turkana perpetrators entered the Nyangatom territory 45 times, killed 35 people, injured 20 more, and raided thousands of livestock (Gebre 2011: 16). The Dassanech *Woreda* Police Department reported that between November 2008 and October 2010, the Turkana attacked the Dassanech 24 times, killed 19 people, injured nine residents, and raided thousands of goats (Gebre 2011: 48). Although concrete data are lacking, informants reported that offensive actions were also taken against the Turkana in retribution. This paper intended to shed light on the causes of conflicts in the Ethio-Kenyan border area.

Environmental scarcity² due to natural factors and human actions, and the consequent competition over resources seem to be at the centre of the conflicts. As often stated in the literature, the restriction of pastoral mobility across borders and the overutilisation of natural resources are among the human actions that contribute to the decrease in resources. In the context of the Turkana Basin conflicts, one may add three recent developments: 1) oil exploration, 2) the expansion of large-scale agriculture, and 3) the involvement of non-pastoral actors in livestock raiding as human actions that led to resource scarcity. The physical factors that contributed to the decline of pasture and water resources include low rainfall, recurrent droughts, and bush encroachment.

Thomas Homer-Dixon's (1994) theoretical approach that explains the occurrence of violent conflict (dependent variable) in terms of environmental scarcity (independent variable) is a useful model to study the conflict dynamics in the Omo-Turkana Basin. However, environmental issues should not be taken as the only factors that cause or escalate violent conflict because they often interact with political, economic, cultural and other variables. Moreover, the involvement of non-pastoral actors in livestock raiding and the actions and inaction of the states in containing

borderland conflicts should also be examined in understanding the conflict dynamics in the area.

Conflict should not be taken as an inevitable consequence of environmental scarcity at least for two reasons. First, critics who argue that resource scarcity could lead to cooperation and that resource abundance could be more linked to conflict have challenged Homer-Dixon's approach. Moreover, there exists another argument that conflict may sometimes act as an independent variable (rather than being dependent) and cause resource scarcity. Hence, although the formulation of the environmental scarcity model still remains powerful, this paper recognises its limitations in capturing complex situations, such as the one in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland.

Second, conflict could be averted through established traditional mechanisms or new approaches. The Dassanech, the Nyangatom, and the Turkana have a history of cooperation. The positive interethnic relations were largely manifested in trade, bond-friendship³, intermarriage, resource-sharing arrangements, and traditional conflict-handling methods, among others (Sagawa 2010; Gebre 2011; Admasu 2014). Based on Ashutosh Varshney's (2001) perspectives on the social capital theory of Robert Putnam (2000), attempts were made to examine the current state of social resources and the chance for their revitalization.

This paper was written based on research undertaken by the author in 2010 and 2011 in Dassanech and Nyangatom *Woredas* on the Ethiopian side of the Ethiopia-Kenya border. In Dassanech, the study was carried out in three sites: Koro, Rate-Borkenech, and Hadho. In Nyangatom, it covered Lokorlam, Napotkoy, and a new settlement established by people who were displaced from Lebere, Natikar, and Kajamakin areas due to conflict with the Turkana. The two *woredas* and the specific research sites were selected because of the long history of conflict between the borderland communities residing in adjacent districts.

The study investigated the lived experiences of informants— locals who lived or witnessed conflict and cooperation with the Turkana people. The nature of the research, therefore, required a thorough understanding of the

informants' narratives, views, and perspectives on the issues under consideration. Methodologically, therefore, a qualitative research approach was employed to allow the administration of open-ended questions, dialogue with the participants, and a cross-examination of facts during the fieldwork.

Data were collected through document reviews, key informant interviews (KIIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs). Relevant materials on the link between environment and conflict, the three ethnic groups covered in the study, and the role of social capital in preventing conflict have been reviewed. A total of 40 local key informants (20 from Nyangatom and 20 from Dassanech) participated in the research. They were selected based on their depth of knowledge and their social and office positions. Snowball sampling approach was employed to identify and recruit the key informants from among community leaders, generation-sets, age-sets, ritual specialists, police officers, judges, and government administrative officials. Three Kenyans (from Turkana) who happened to be in Ethiopia at the time were also interviewed.⁴ A total of 12 FGDs were held with both sexes and different age groups with the objective of validating information obtained through the interviews. Seven of the FGDs were held in Nyangatom and five in Dassanech.

The field data and the review results were translated, transcribed, and organised into themes and categories to facilitate the analysis process. The preliminary writing started during the fieldwork in the form of advanced notes, which were later edited and incorporated into the final paper. The identification of the key themes and concepts based on the original objectives of the study shaped the structure and content of this article, which is written with emic and etic perspectives in mind.

The paper is divided into six parts. This introduction is followed by section two, which is devoted to conceptual frameworks that outline the environmental scarcity approach and the social capital perspective. Ethnographic accounts of the Dassanech, the Nyangatom and the Turkana are presented in the third section. Section four discusses the causes of interethnic conflict in the Ethiopia-Kenya border in light of Homer-Dixon's environmental scarcity model. Section five identifies other interacting

factors that trigger, escalate and/or perpetuate interethnic pastoral conflicts in the area. The current state of social capital and the effectiveness of peace-making efforts are presented in Section six. The paper ends with concluding remarks.

2. Approaches on Environmental Conflict and Social Capital

2.1. The Link between Environmental Scarcity and Conflict

In the 1970s and 1980s, many writers warned about impending social turmoil and political instability caused by environmental degradation (Ophuls 1977; Ulman 1983; Mathews 1989). In a way that gave scientific validity to these views, Homer-Dixon (1994: 31–32), based on 16 cases of conflicts, explained the link between environmental scarcity and violent conflict as follows.

Decreases in the quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, and unequal resource access act singly or in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population groups, of cropland, water, forests, and fish. This can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger regional and national economies. The affected people may migrate or be expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic conflicts when they move to new areas....

Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen (1998, in Smith 2012: 274) reclassified Homer-Dixon's three sources of scarcity as three dimensions of scarcity: supply-induced scarcity associated with dwindling stocks of environmental resources; demand-induced scarcity created by increased consumption or population pressure; structural scarcity or inequitable distribution of resources. Besides inspiring many researchers, the environmental scarcity approach attracted critics and sceptics who shared exciting perspectives and thoughts. Hence, the last twenty years witnessed major advances in scholarly debate on the environment-conflict link.

Some critics argue that environmental change might lead to cooperation rather than conflict and that resource abundance might be more casually linked to conflict than resource scarcity (Slettebak 2012; de Soysa 2002; Gleditsch 2001 and Wolf 1999 in Mathew *et al.* 2003: 858). Some writers

reported to have found limited empirical support for a direct connection between environmental scarcity and violent conflict (Theisen 2008; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Urdal 2005). While the Homer-Dixon approach treated conflict as a dependent variable, some writers noted how it could act as an independent variable as well (Wilner 2006; Lind 2003). Alexandre Wilner (2006: 185) wrote, “Just as environmental factors may cause conflict, conflict itself may also cause environment degradation, stress, and scarcity.” Jeremy Lind (2003: 317), who studied the Turkana, noted, “The threat of conflict and violence can make movement between key resource areas untenable and the areas themselves inaccessible.” Likewise, the Dassanech abandoned some pasturelands on the Turkana, Hamar, and Nyangatom sides of their common borders for security reasons (Gebre 2012b: 10–12).

In a later publication, Homer-Dixon (2010: 7) stressed the need to understand the contexts of specific conflicts, the relative contribution of environmental scarcity to conflict, and the interaction of the causal factors. He wrote the following:

Environmental scarcity by itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause: there are many conflicts around the world in which environmental scarcity plays little role; and, when it does play a role, it always interacts with other contextual factors – be they physical or social – to generate violence. But this fact should not lead analysts to the conclusion that environmental scarcity is always unimportant. After all, it is hard to identify any cause of violence that is, by itself, either necessary or sufficient; the causes of specific instances of violence are always interacting sets of factors.

In Omo-Turkana Basin, there are at least three interacting factors that trigger and/or escalate violent conflict. These include the commercialisation of livestock raiding and involvement of non-pastoral actors; cultural factors that motivate pastoral youth to engage in offensive actions; and the action and inaction of the two states (Ethiopia and Kenya) in containing conflict and ensuring peace in the border area. Hence, the environmental scarcity model alone cannot be expected to explain the interethnic conflict in the Ethiopia-Kenya border.

2.2. The Social Capital Perspective

Although there is a tendency on the part of many analysts of interethnic

relations to assume that ethnic tensions are pervasive and commonplace (Moynihan 1993 and Horowitz 1985 in Fearon and Laitin 1996: 716), other studies reveal that peaceful and cooperative relations are far more common than incidents of conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Peaceful and cooperative relations between the Turkana and their two neighbours in Ethiopia may be explained in light of Varshney's (2001) perspectives on social capital. Building on Robert Putnam's (2000) social capital theory and based on empirical experiences from India, Varshney argued that social networks tend to contain conflict in ethnically diverse societies.

... there is an integral link between the structure of civil life in a multiethnic society, on the one hand, and the presence or absence of ethnic violence, on the other.... Because they build bridges and manage tensions, inter-ethnic networks are agents of peace.... Civic networks, both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic, can be broken down into two other types: organized and quotidian.... I call the first associational forms of engagement and the second everyday forms of engagement.... Both forms of engagement, if robust, promote peace: contrariwise, their absence or weakness opens up space for ethnic violence (Varshney 2001: 362–363).

Similarly, half a Century ago, Max Gluckman (1956) noted that cross-boundary social relations are used to prevent and/or resolve intergroup conflicts. However, other writers have misgivings about the argument that cross-cutting ties can mitigate intergroup conflict (Harrison 1993 in Sagawa 2010). In the context of pastoral communities, recent writers underline that social capital (called trans-ethnic relations and cross-cutting ties in the older literature) contributes to communal capacities for resilience and survival (Blackburn 2014; Galvin 2008). It has been widely recognised that pastoralists need social ties to access resources and survive environmental stress. The question is whether such networks today mitigate cross-border conflict.

3. The Study Area and the People

The study was undertaken in the Ethiopia-Kenya border, the length of which is estimated at 779 km; and it stretches from the border with South Sudan on the West to the border with Somalia on the East. The three ethnic groups under consideration (Dassanech, Nyangatom, and Turkana) are found in the

Omo-Turkana Basin towards the western end of the common border. The area is characterised by low altitude, low and erratic rainfall, high temperature, droughts, water scarcity, and diminishing pasturelands. Apart from livestock production (the mainstay economy), the nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists in the area engage in other activities, such as flood retreat cultivation, fishing, hunting, and gathering.

The Omo-Turkana Basin represents the least developed area in Ethiopia and Kenya, lacking development activities, infrastructural facilities, social services, and market opportunities (GOK 1998 in Watson and van Binsbergen 2008; Gebre 2011). Thus, over the years, vulnerability and human insecurity increased because of climatic factors and human actions. The following brief ethnographic and historical accounts of the three groups provide the context for understanding the dynamics of inter-ethnic conflict and cooperation.

3.1. The Dassanech

The Dassanech people (also Geleb, Merile, and Gabarich) live in Ethiopia and Kenya on the northern shore of Lake Turkana and further north along the Omo River. The Ethiopian Dassanech (the majority) live in Dassanech *Woreda* (District), South Omo Zone, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR). The population of the Ethiopian Dassanech is estimated at 48,067 (CSA 2008: 84), and the land area of the *Woreda* is 2,575 km². Omorate, the capital of the *Woreda* is located at 852 km southwest of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.

The Dassanech society is largely constituted by migrants from the neighbouring ethnic groups, such as the Oromo, Rendille, Samburu, and Somali. There are eight territorial sections: Shirr (also Inkabelo), Inkoria, Narich, Elele, Riele, Oro, Randal, and Kuoro. The Dassanech raise livestock (the mainstay economy), cultivate crops (sorghum, maize, and beans) on the flooded banks of the Omo River, and practice fishing. The animals raised include cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, and some camels. The Dassanech *Woreda* is one of the food insecure areas where many households have been receiving food aid for decades (Gebre 2012b).

The Dassanech share borders with four neighbouring ethnic groups: the

Turkana (Kenya), the Gabra (Kenya), the Nyangatom (Ethiopia), and the Hamar (Ethiopia). The four neighbours are considered as enemies (Houtteman 2010; Gbere 2011) because of recurrent conflict, livestock raiding, and retaliatory killings. Informants and previous studies revealed that the Dassanech lost part of their pastureland to Turkana (Almagor 1979, 1986) and the British colonial policy in Kenya in the 20th Century contributed to the intensification of interethnic hostility (Mburu 2003; Sagawa 2010). It is equally important to note that the two groups have a long history of amicable and cooperative relations (Sobania 1980 in Sagawa 2010; Gebre 2011).

3.2. The Nyangatom

The Nyangatom people reside in Nyangatom *Woreda*, South Omo Zone, SNNPR, Ethiopia. The population of the Nyangatom is 25,252 (CSA 2008: 85), and the land area of the *Woreda* is estimated at 2,183.6 km². Nyangatomland is divided into seven territorial sections, namely: Ngilingaqol, Ngkapung, Ngsaqol, Ngutokoraman, Ngukumama, Nubune, and Ngarich. Kangaten, the capital of Nyangatom *Woreda*, is located some 848 km southwest of Addis Ababa.

According to oral history, the Nyangatom migrated eastwards from the Karamoja area (Uganda) due to severe droughts. While some of the early migrants settled west of the Kibish River, others later moved further east and settled at Lere, near the Omo River. During their journey eastwards from the Kibish River, in the direction of Mount Kuraz, they are reported to have met the Dassanech people. Today, the territory of the Nyangatom stretches from the Omo River in the east to the Kibish River in the west. Those who live in the west and in central parts of the territory rely heavily on livestock production, while those in the east depend on flood retreat cultivation of sorghum, some maize, cowpeas, and tobacco along the Omo River. Some of those who reside along the river practice fishing as well. Informants reported to have lost much of their territories in the Kibish area to the Turkana due to arbitrary colonial demarcation of the border⁵ and the continued northward expansion of the Turkana.⁶

The Nyangatom are surrounded by eight ethnic groups, namely: the Turkana, Toposa (in South Sudan), Surma, Mursi, Koegu, Kara, Murle, and

Daasanech (in Ethiopia). The Turkana are viewed as enemies who evicted the Nyangatom from the Kibish area in 1988 and continued to displace them ever since. The 1988 incident, the frequency and intensity of later raids, and the brutality of the fights escalated the conflict between the two groups. Importantly, the two groups belong to the Karamojong Cluster (also referred to as the Ateker group); they speak the same language and share a belief system and cultural values/practices. The Turkana are still viewed as fellow Ateker with whom the Nyangatom have a lot in common. Admasu Lokaley (2014) stated that intermarriage still takes place between the two groups during peace times.

Informants were asked whether they grew up in Kibish area experiencing serenity and love or fear and hatred towards the Turkana. The answers were mixed. The elderly recounted positive stories that shaped their dreams to visit Turkana and to establish relationships through intermarriage or bond-friendship. They also remarked that stick-fighting with the Turkana was seen as a sibling rivalry aimed at demonstrating competence. In recent decades, the introduction of modern firearms turned the traditional competitive display of agility into deadly clashes of destruction on both sides. Hence, the younger people who grew up witnessing death, destruction, displacement, loss of land, and loss of livestock have been deeply traumatised.

3.3. The Turkana

The Turkana people are located in Turkana District, North-western Kenya, to the west of Lake Turkana. According to the 2009 Kenyan Population and Housing Census, the population of Turkana is 855,399 (KNBS 2010: 129–131), and the land area is estimated at 77,000 km² (Kiperen 2008 in Admasu 2014:10). Lodwar, the capital of Turkana District, is located at 678 km northwest of Nairobi, the capital of Kenya.

Like the Nyangatom, the Turkana people are thought to have migrated to the present-day Kenya from the Karamoja area of the present-day Uganda. Predominantly, the economy of Turkana is based on livestock production (they raise cattle, camels, donkeys, goats and sheep). Animals are used for milk, meat, blood, and hides, in addition to their saving and symbolic

values. For some residents, fishing represents a source of income and a major activity in Lake Turkana. Likewise, some Turkana practice flood retreat cultivation on the fertile sediments of the Turkwel and Kerio rivers. Droughts caused widespread poverty and prompted huge inflows of international humanitarian aid (Watson and van Binsbergen 2008).

Studies in Turkana District have identified nine ethnic groups allegedly perpetrating transnational raids on the Turkana (Pkalya *et al.* 2003: 35). These include: five groups from Uganda (Dodoth, Jie, Matheniko, Pokot, and Tepeth), two from South Sudan (Didinga and Toposa), and two from Ethiopia (Dassanech and Nyangatom). Ruto Pkalya and associates (2003: 34) explained the livestock raiding incidences in terms of the heroism, retribution, drought, abject poverty, resource depletion, proliferation of firearms, desire to accumulate wealth, and bride price requirements. There is also an argument that the Ethiopia-Kenya border is moving south into Kenya due to the shrinkage of Lake Turkana, and that the Dassanech follow the water.

4. Understanding Causal Factors: Environmental Scarcity

As stated earlier, Homer-Dixon (1994; 2010) argued that conflict might be caused by environmental scarcity, which occurs when resources decline in quantity or quality; when human and animal population growth reduces a resource's per-capita availability; and when resources are unequally distributed to the extent of subjecting certain groups to greater scarcity. The occurrences of the three sources of scarcity and the consequent escalation of conflict are presented in the following sub-section.

4.1. Environmental Change (Decrease in Resources)

Previous studies revealed that both the Dassanech and the Nyangatom lost their traditional pasturelands to the Turkana (Almagor 1979, 1986; de Waal 1991; Mburu 2003; Gebre 2014). Since the colonial period, according to local informants, the Dassanech lost control over such grazing lands as Berbere, Ilam, Herum, Lomodhan, Lumiyana, Narwot, and Neswat (also Todonyang), which are currently controlled by the Turkana. Almagor (1986:98) explained how the British colonial administration in Kenya paved the way for the annexation of Dassanech pastures by the Turkana.

The British administration concluded that the establishment of a no-man's land around the Dassanech was essential if tribal warfare was to be stopped, and they set up a cordon sanitaire to the west in the area known as the Ilemi Appendix. A series of police posts were set up in the Appendix along the Ethiopian border (at Kokuru, Liwan, Lokomarinyang, Kaiemothia and Kibish...), which deprived the Dassanech of their western pastures.

The Dassanech lost their resources for other reasons as well. For example, pasturelands in Loqongole and Natade areas (around the Dassanech-Turkana border) have been reportedly abandoned due to the on-going conflict with the Turkana, which posed security concerns and vulnerability to livestock raiding.

The Nyangatom informants have also reported having lost land to the Turkana during the colonial period and in recent decades. Historically, the Nyangatom-Turkana relationship worsened after the enclosure of the so-called Ilemi Triangle (also the Ilemi Appendix) in the 1920s and 1930s, and the establishment of the police posts along the Ethiopian border to curtail their movement to their traditional grazing lands. According to Tornay (1979: 103),

The Nyangatom feared the Kenyan police who were stationed 2 km from the Kibish.... They said that if they crossed the river, the police would shoot at them.... They showed me the remains of a settlement, which they said the Kenyan police had destroyed a few years ago, killing the occupants in the process. For their part, the Kenyan police told me that they had orders to make a no-man's land of the Ilemi Triangle.

In 1988, according to Alexander de Waal (1991: 345–6), the Kenyan government attacked the Nyangatom with helicopter gunships and paramilitary forces, killing hundreds of people and destroying at least five villages. Soon after the 1988 Kibish incidence, the Kenyan government strengthened its presence by increasing the police force, establishing a military camp, and reinforcing the district office. According to informants, the Turkana have continued to perpetrate attacks. For example, a large-scale attack in December 2008 on Lebere, Kajamakin, and Natikar villages caused property destruction and a massive displacement of people.

Evidently, environmental change is a function of physical factors as well.

Although adequate meteorological records are lacking to support arguments, global climate change may have contributed to the frequent droughts and erratic rainfall that caused scarcity of water and pasture. The Nyangatom experienced severe drought incidences in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2008. In Turkana, the most devastating droughts occurred about every ten years: 1952, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 (Notenbaert *et al.* 2007: 4). The authors further noted that droughts became more common from the late 1970s onwards. Watson and van Binsbergen (2008:3) also noted that droughts have placed significant pressure on the livelihoods of the Turkana and caused catastrophic losses of livestock.

Bush encroachment, especially rapid expansion of the invasive thorny tree species called *Prosopis juliflora*, has become a serious concern among the Nyangatom (Gebre 2011) and the Turkana (Avery 2012) because it overruns pastures and displaces the indigenous vegetation. This invasive alien plant is suspected to lead to a loss of ground water as well.

4.2. Human and Livestock Population Increase

There exists concrete evidence that the three ethnic groups under consideration have experienced significant increase in human and livestock populations. According to the national census reports of Ethiopia, the population of the Dassanech increased from 32,629 in 1984 (CSA 1984: 44) to 48,067 in 2007 (CSA 2008:84). The size of the Nyangatom population increased from 6,087 in 1984 (CSA 1984:45) to 25,252 in 2007 (CSA 2008:85). Similarly, the national census reports of Kenya reveal that the population of Turkana District increased from 184,060 in 1989 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1994:1–146) to 855,399 in 2009 (KNBS 2010:129–131). From these data, it is apparent that the Omo-Turkana Basin witnessed an unprecedented rise in human populations. In a period of about 30 years, the Dassanech group increased by one-third; the Nyangatom and the Turkana groups increased by more than fourfold.

The size of livestock population has also been on the rise in the Ethiopia-Kenya border area. Informants in the Dassanech and the Nyangatom communities indicated that the number of all types of livestock has significantly increased over the years. The increment in the livestock size is causally linked to the increment in human populations because high

economic and cultural values are attached to animals. The official livestock census and survey reports (Table 1) support the informants' claims that the size of livestock has been increasing (although the number of donkeys decreased).

Table 1. Livestock increase in Dassanech and Nyangatom *Woredas*

Year	<i>Woredas</i>	Livestock Types			
		Cattle	Goats	Sheep	Donkeys
2001/02	Kuraz <i>Woreda</i> ⁷	835,895	590,172	608,214	39,124
2013/14	Dassanech and Nyangatom	948,798	1,450,325	835,094	29,092

SOURCE: CSA (2003) and CSA (2014)

The livestock data from the Turkana point to a similar trend. The number of animals (except cattle) steadily increased between 1995 and 2005 (Watson and van Binsbergen 2008:10). The number of cattle increased from 198,000 in 1995 to 234,420 in 1999 before dropping to 197,900 in 2005 (Table 2).

Table 2. Livestock increase in Turkana District

Year	Livestock Types			
	Cattle	Goats	Sheep	Camels
1995	198,000	1,704,000	862,000	112,800
2005	197,900	2,021,000	1,054,400	172,400

SOURCE: Watson and van Binsbergen (2008)

4.3. Unequal Distribution of Resources

Between and within pastoral groups in the Omo-Turkana Basin, access to pastureland has increasingly been determined by power. As stated above, through military might and with the help of the Kenyan government, the Turkana people seem to have expanded their territory by annexing the lands of their northern neighbours. The Turkana also dominated the use of the Lake for fishing. Highly armed fishermen from Turkana, who use fast motorboats reportedly attacked the Dassanech fishermen, who use traditional wooden canoes. The ability of the Turkana to maintain control over land and water by force reveals a power imbalance emanating from Turkanan dominance in the use of vital resources in the border area.

On the Ethiopian side of the border, efforts to control resources to the exclusion of others have led to scarcity-induced conflict. The Nyangatom

people, who were forced to leave the Kibish area partly due to conflict with the Turkana, migrated to the east and settled on the banks of the Omo River. The arrival of the migrants overwhelmed the local Kara people and violent interethnic conflict occurred between the two groups (Girke 2008). Other Kibish displacees migrated north and clashed with the local Surma people residing in the Naita Mountains (Abbink 1993, 2009). Resource scarcity in Dassanech has also caused deadly intra-ethnic conflict, apparently for the first time in their history. Traditionally, access to pasture and water was never denied, and killing fellow Dassanech was considered as *nyogich* (pollution). Since the late 1980s, however, reluctance to share resources and attempts to establish exclusive claims over pastureland led to incidences of deadly intra-ethnic conflict (Gebre 2012b).

To sum, although it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between environmental scarcity and specific conflict incidents, it cannot be coincidental that violent conflict in the Omo-Turkana Basin increased when environmental scarcity was looming. Therefore, it can be stated that the depletion/loss of pastureland and water points, the increase in human and livestock populations, and unequal distribution of resources partly contributed to the escalation of violent conflicts in the area.

5. Interacting Factors

Environmental scarcity has never been a sole factor in causing or escalating conflict in the Omo-Turkana Basin. As Wilner (2006:181) rightly observed, environmental factors interact with other political, economic, and cultural variables in causing violent conflict. The involvement of non-pastoral actors in livestock raiding and certain cultural factors may have triggered conflicts or contributed to their escalation. Moreover, the failure to contain conflict and ensure peace in the border area may be explained in relation to the actions and inaction of the two states: Ethiopia and Kenya.

5.1. Involvement of Non-pastoral Actors

The Dassanech and Nyangatom informants underlined that the cross-border conflict has taken a new form in that the fighters/raiders coming from the Turkana side are highly sophisticated and allegedly supported by certain interest groups. Informants reported that some of the new livestock raiders

were using trucks to load the stolen animals, advanced weapons to outgun their opponents, communication equipment, etc. Studies conducted on the Kenyan side of the border pointed to the presence of commercial interests and the involvement of organised non-pastoral actors behind livestock raiding (Hendrickson *et al.* 1998; Lind 2003; Leff 2009; Omolo 2011) and conflict in fishing areas. Nancy Omolo (2011:88) wrote,

The challenging problem is the way in which livestock raiding has been transformed over the years, from a cultural practice/redistributive raiding into a more predatory activity/commercial activity.... In Turkana, the increase in 'commercial' raiding includes cases of 'sponsored' raiding where guns are provided to young men by wealthy people who wish to acquire livestock for sale.

There are also allegations on the part of informants on the Ethiopian side of the border that corrupt officials and elements of the Kenyan security forces conspired and/or coordinated with the predatory commercial raiders. According to Lind (2003:329),

"The Nation [Kenya's leading daily newspaper] reported in July 1999 that a criminal cartel including well-connected traders, politicians and officials from the provincial administration was coordinating raids in Turkana and surrounding districts ostensibly to obtain livestock to sell to abattoirs in Nairobi and other urban centres."

5.2. Cultural Factors

Rites of passage, warrior ethos, hero cults, and the culture of reprisal have complicated pastoral conflict in the Ethiopia-Kenya border area. In Nyangatom and Dassanech societies, age-mates willing to be initiated into a new age-set have to demonstrate their readiness by participating in offensive and defensive actions. In other words, killing of members of other ethnic groups allow the killer to perform rituals and scarification to earn greater reputation, receive killer names, and improve their social statuses (Houtteman 2010; Gebre 2011). Although the offenders are not subjected to negative sanctions, retribution from the victim's group is likely to follow.

Livestock and guns are highly valued assets among pastoral communities. In most cases, these assets are acquired through personal efforts (hard work), inheritance, and gifts from friends and relatives. Sometimes, they are

obtained through theft and acts of violence against members of other ethnic groups. Admasu (2014) reported that the bride wealth demands among the Nyangatom and the Turkana put some pressure on the youth to engage in raiding. Although such acts are culturally appreciated (rather than condemned), they often ignite animosity and invite revenge.

When a group loses a person or property to members of another group, the blame is laid not on the individual perpetrators, but rather on the larger group to which the offenders belong. Hence, the immediate family and friends of the victim will target for revenge any member of the perpetrator's group. Women and girls who have lost family members or property are reported to agitate or encourage men to demonstrate their masculinity and bravery, and praise them through songs and gift-giving when the men return home victorious. Referring to such practices among the Dassanech, Houtteman (2010:140) wrote, "The girls of the village, especially those who triggered the anger (*izane*) of the killer and made his heart tremble before he went off to raid offer him pieces of their necklaces."

5.3. Actions and Inaction of the States

In the past, the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland was a remote and inaccessible location perceived to have negligible economic importance. Hence, the pastoral communities in the area experienced socio-economic and political marginalisation, and the cross-border interethnic conflicts received inadequate attention from the two states. In recent years, the attractiveness of the area has increased due to the discovery of oil in Turkana and the growing demand for large-scale irrigated agriculture in Ethiopia. Oil exploration has also been underway on the Ethiopian side. Unfortunately, the attraction of the area has failed to translate into shared opportunities and benefits for addressing cross-border interethnic conflicts.

According to local informants, the Dassanech and the Nyangatom lost part of their pasturelands to private agricultural investors. In Dassanech, five different tracts of land (including the former Ethio-Korean state farm) have been given to private investors. In Nyangatom, three agricultural investors have been given 10,000 hectares of land to grow cereals, sesame, cotton, and vegetables. Neither irrigation schemes nor grazing lands have been

developed for the pastoralists to compensate for their losses.

The Omo Kuraz Sugar project (that involves large-scale irrigation for sugarcane plantation), which started further north in the territory of the Bodi people, is expected to expand southward and reach the Nyangatom and Dassanech territories in the future. If this happens, the sugarcane plantation may lead to the displacement and resettlement (sedentarisation) of some pastoral communities. Moreover, the inevitable disruption of the Omo River's annual downstream flood due to the construction of Gibe III Dam⁸ and the Omo Kuraz Sugar project is feared to have negative effects on downstream communities and complicate the fragile relationships between the groups already on the edge. Unless appropriate measures are taken to address the resource decline, interethnic conflict may continue escalating in the decades to come.

According to Mkutu and Lokwang (2016), Turkana is one of the most marginalised and least developed areas in Kenya. The authors further noted that although the colonial and postcolonial governments failed to adequately articulate pastoralist issues in national strategy, recent developments (e.g., the discovery of oil, plans for various infrastructural development, etc.) have raised the stakes for power and control in the county, increased the number of stakeholders, and created new sources of conflict. The authors indicated how resource and investment, which are supposed to benefit the local communities, have brought tension and conflict due to inequalities and increased competition for local resources such as pasture and water.

The Kenyan side of the border seems to be better protected by the General Service Unit (GSU), regular police, the Kenyan Reserve Police (KPR), and the local militia. The Kenyan forces seem to have the capacity to monitor movements on the Ethiopian side of the border and alert the Turkana through radio services. However, the failure to prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts in the border area raises questions about the efficiency of the security forces. The local informants alleged that elements of the Kenyan forces were sometimes involved in raids, particularly by giving protection to the Turkana attackers. Some participants of a focus group discussion held at Lokorlam reported to have witnessed GSU members firing at Nyangatom men in hot pursuit of Turkana raiders. The

Dassanech informants also recounted numerous encounters with the elements of the Kenyan security forces allegedly defending the Turkana perpetrators.

The border police units on the Ethiopian side lack the capacity and resources to monitor the border and protect the residents. In Nyangatom, during the research period, there were only two police posts located around the border. In Dassanech, the number of border police posts recently increased from one to six. However, according to local informants, these police posts are inadequately staffed and poorly equipped to detect and repel organised attacks from the Kenyan side of the border.

6. Opportunities for Interethnic Cooperation

The tendency to assume ethnic tensions as commonplace has been challenged because cooperation is more common than conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Lind (2003:323) noted, “Conflict and competition were indisputably an important part of ...the control of resources.... However, cooperation and reciprocity were also important to pastoralist strategies for negotiating the patchy availability of key resources.” Homer-Dixon (1994) indicated that environmental scarcity-induced social turmoil could be avoided through the use of social and technical ingenuity. With the above pragmatic remarks in mind, this section attempts to examine the state of social capital and the effectiveness of the existing conflict-handling mechanisms.

6.1 Social Capital

Informants in Dassanech and Nyangatom reported to have had positive interethnic relations (bond-friendships, intermarriage, trade relations, reciprocity, and sharing of grazing lands and water points) with each other and with the Turkana people. In the past, people commonly used such social resources and networks to deal with environmental shocks, outbreak of human and livestock diseases, interethnic conflict, and other major setbacks.

The residents of two territorial sections of the Nyangatom (called Ngilingaqol and Ngikapung) living along the common border have a history of cooperation, especially with their in-laws and bond-friends in Turkana.

The Dassanech people residing in such territorial sections as Shirr, Elele, Randal, and Riele have been experiencing similar positive encounters with the Turkana. Sagawa (2010:103–109) provided a detailed account of co-residence, trade, bond-friendship, and kinship relations between the Dassanech and their neighbours, such as the Turkana.

Unfortunately, the social networks have been declining for various reasons. Watson and van Binsbergen (2008:4) noted that the restriction of livestock migration, severe droughts, encroachment onto pasture, and the growing human and livestock populations have led to increased competition and decreased cooperation between neighbouring groups in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. The recurrent droughts that hit wide geographic areas made all groups victims and eroded the capacity of people to support others. The flow of international humanitarian aid in pastoral areas and the availability of purchasable goods in the shops of emerging rural towns may have contributed to the reduction in the importance of trade networks and bond-friendships. The restrictive policies of border enforcement and the steady rangeland degradation obviously reduced pastoral mobility and the culture of resource sharing. The involvement of non-pastoral actors in livestock raiding increased animosity.

At times of peace, individuals cross the international border to visit their friends and relatives, exchange goods, e.t.c. In 2010, the author of this paper met a female Turkana trader from Kibish town (Kenya) in Kanganen town and two Turkana traders (young men riding motorbikes) in Omorate town. Sagawa (2010) and Admasu (2014) also pointed out that individual interactions often continue in peace times. However, the relationship between the three contending groups is far from smooth and cooperative. The intensity of human interaction, intermarriage, and the level of interdependence has decreased. The inability of authorities to control cross-border conflict has made the prospect for peace and cooperation rather bleak. In the past, the social networks were taken for-granted, and have rarely been nurtured and promoted. It is important to reverse the alarming decline in social capital through concerted efforts.

6.2. Conflict-handling Approaches

Historically, the three ethnic groups in the Omo-Turkana Basin have experienced brief conflicts that occurred intermittently and enjoyed moments of peace that lasted for years. Despite the unprecedented rise in the cycle of violence in recent decades, the Nyangatom informants reported to have initiated repeated peace agreements, which were violated one after the other. For example, in 1998, ten years after the Kibish massacre of 700 people, the Nyangatom elders reached out to the Turkana elders and performed reconciliation rituals at Lokiriyama, Kenya. To the embarrassment of the Nyangatom negotiators, an organised attack was launched from the Turkana side on the very day of the Lokiriyama peace deal.

In 2004, elders from the two ethnic groups met at Kibish, Kenya, and swore not to attack and raid each other. Once again, according to Nyangatom informants, the Turkana violated the deal by launching an attack shortly after the meeting. In 2006, the Nyangatom *Woreda* Administration sent a delegation to Lokitang, Kenya, to initiate peace talks. This initiative led to the January 2007 initial meeting at Kangaten, Ethiopia, and the March 2007 Peace Conference at Kibish, Kenya. During this conference, elders of the Nyangatom and the Turkana signed a comprehensive peace agreement, which was violated in January 2008. The Dassanech informants, who witnessed ten peace meetings with the Turkana between 2006 and 2010, reported that all the ten agreements were violated. One elderly informant was rather nostalgic about a certain successful peace ceremony held in the past at Todonyang, Kenya.

It was held in Todonyang. Ministers came from Ethiopia and Kenya. The youth, the elders, the women, all came. Local leaders and people with ritual power also participated. The participants passed through a structure made of fresh grass and were showered with butter and water to be cleansed of their sins. Issues were discussed openly. We all swore not to attack each other anymore. The peace rituals of breaking and burying weapons were performed. After the reconciliation, we started getting married. The Turkana brought lost livestock back to us and we returned theirs too. The peace lasted for seven years.

Bilateral Border Commission meetings represent another peace-making effort made in the Ethiopia-Kenya border area. The Governments of Ethiopia and Kenya had organised high-level meetings through joint border commissions. However, the local actors often violated the decisions of the border commissions. Two meetings held in October 2009 at Nakuru (Kenya) and November 2009 at Hawassa (Ethiopia) focused on improving relationships between the Turkana and their neighbours in Ethiopia (the Dassanech and the Nyangatom). During these meetings, an agreement was reached on the retrieval of livestock (IGAD-CEWARN 2009). However, the decisions could not be implemented when the ‘Turkana insisted that they could not return the livestock because they had since died due to disease or had been raided by other communities’ (IGAD-CEWARN 2009:9). Local authorities in Ethiopia noted that the Turkana side not only refused to honour the Joint Border Commission’s decision but also derailed the peace process by launching fresh attacks on the Nyangatom shortly after the Hawassa meeting. On the whole, both the traditional and formal peace efforts have failed to bring lasting solutions, and this warrants the need to re-evaluate the existing approaches.

7. Conclusion

This paper was written with two issues in mind: 1)the on-going debate on the link between environment and conflict, and 2)the effectiveness of social capital in containing the latter. While Homer-Dixon (1994, 2010) argued that environmental scarcity could lead to violent conflicts, critics and sceptics challenged this approach on a number of accounts. Based on the conflict experiences of three ethnic groups in East Africa (Dassanech, Nyangatom, and Turkana), this paper revealed that the escalation of violent interethnic clashes in the Ethiopia-Kenya border has to do with complex and interacting causal factors, far and beyond the environmental variables. The study also points to the erosion of the social capital and the ineffectiveness of the formal and informal conflict-handling mechanisms.

The conflict dynamics in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland is partly consistent with the environmental scarcity model. The unprecedented surge in human and livestock populations has led to an increment in the consumption levels,

which has in turn reduced the per-capita availability of resources. Land alienation, mobility restriction, and overgrazing (all human actions) have contributed to the decline of resources. Moreover, physical factors, such as frequent droughts, erratic rainfall, and bush encroachment have exacerbated the process of resource depletion. Efforts by some groups to control resources to the exclusion of others have contributed to structural inequality. The decline of vital resources, the growing demands for them, and the efforts to protect group claims through the use of force have contributed to the escalation of cross-border conflicts.

However, the environmental scarcity model does not capture conflicts caused by non-environmental factors. Hence, it is important to recognise the role of other interacting variables in triggering or perpetuating cross-border interethnic discord. In this regard, it can be argued that the commercialisation of livestock raiding, the offensive actions associated with cultural practices (e.g., rites of passage), and the failure of the two states (Ethiopia and Kenya) to contain conflict and ensure peace in the border area have contributed to the continuation of conflict. The emerging investment attraction to the Omo-Turkana basin is feared to exacerbate community conflicts over resources. It is incumbent on the two states to maintain order, protect the rights of communities, and ensure their entitlement to economic benefits generated in the area.

The Ethiopia-Kenya border is known for the frequent violation of peace accords. Why are the peace deals violated? First, the pastoral communities are sometimes presented as scapegoats for attacks committed by criminal gangs and commercial raiders deployed by non-pastoral actors. Hence, it becomes difficult for herders to accept responsibility and honour agreements reached under pressure. Second, in most cases, the Border Commission (constituted by high-level government officials) made decisions without consulting the pastoralists. The local-level authorities find it difficult to convince the local actors and implement such decisions. Third, sometimes elders without clout were co-opted by government authorities to participate in local peace deals. Agreements reached in the absence of respected negotiators and without thorough deliberations were often ignored for lack of a trust and confidence. Fourth, women and the youth play roles in conflict

in terms of instigation and execution, respectively. However, they have rarely been part of the peace-making efforts. The above challenges need to be addressed to improve the effectiveness of peace accords.

The study revealed that the instrumentality of social capital in preventing conflict has been seriously constrained. However, cooperation and the sense of interdependence may be restored through planned interventions that foster mutual benefits. First, given the decline of resources, there is a need to enhance the productivity of the pastoral economy. The development of pastures and water points through irrigation schemes would reduce pressure on existing resources. Second, diversification of livelihood options would reduce heavy dependence on livestock production. In this regard, expansion of irrigable agriculture, expansion of modern education, and support for the youth to work in the emerging economic sectors (oil industry, plantations, and factories) would enable some members of the pastoral communities to engage in different activities. Third, promoting the local market would foster social interaction, exchange of goods and services, and the diversification of pastoral incomes. Social interactions and economic transactions may be facilitated through infrastructural developments, such as road networks. On the whole, the relationship between the contending groups could be cemented through the establishment of common schemes, such as schools, health centres, veterinary medicine, and extension services.

Acknowledgements

This article was produced in the context of a project titled '*Borderland Dynamics in East Africa: A Network Program for Capacity Building within departments of Social Anthropology in East African Universities.*' The project, to which the Department of Social Anthropology (SOAN) at Addis Ababa University is party, is supported by the Norwegian Program for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development (NORHED). Acknowledgements are due to NORHED and the Department of SOAN for availing the opportunity and the support in producing this article. I want to thank the local informants, the research assistants (Abebe Yermote, Kogna Nyeremata, Lobuwa Kakuata, and Willimam Achuka), and government institutions for their unreserved cooperation during the fieldwork. The two anonymous reviewers also deserve appreciation for their constructive comments that enriched this article.

End Notes

¹Woreda is the second lowest level on the administrative tire/structure in Ethiopia.

²Environmental scarcity is defined as a situation that results from decrease in resources, increase in human and livestock populations, and unequal distribution of resources (Homer-Dixon 1994: 31–32).

³Bond-friendship refers to alliance between individuals or families belonging to different groups.

⁴ The participation of the Kenyans in the field research was obviously inadequate. There was no plan, budget and research clearance to undertake the study on the Kenyan side of the border. In order to fill the information gap, the relevant ethnographic accounts on the Turkana people have been extensively reviewed and incorporated in the paper.

⁵ Part of the Nyangatom land lays in the so-called Ilemi Triangle, which has been a disputed territory claimed by Ethiopia, Kenya, and the former Republic of Sudan for more than a century now.

⁶ The local narrative about the northward expansion of the Turkana is consistent with the reports of Alex de Waal (1991) and Nene Mburu (2003) that the boundary of Turkana grazing and the limits of Kenyan administration has moved north over the years.

⁷ In 2006, the former Kuraz *Woreda* was split into Dassanech and Nyangatom *Woredas*. The figures for 2001/02 came from a national livestock census, while the *Woreda* estimates for 2013/14 are computed from the 2001/02 census and the 2013/14 zonal level sample survey.

⁸The Gibe III Dam on the Omo River in Ethiopia has become a controversial project. The country has launched the dam in 2006 with the intention to export electricity to its neighbors, diversify and develop its economy, extend electricity to its population, reduce dependency on firewood, and protect the environment. On the other hand, critics contend that the dam will reduce the water flow and disrupt the lives of downstream communities relying on flood retreat cultivation, affect the fish population along the river, reduce the depth of Lake Turkana, and increase salinity of the Lake. The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya are reported to have discussed on the benefits and impacts of the dam.

References

- Abbink, John. 2009. Conflict and social change on the south-west Ethiopian frontier: An analysis of Suri society. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 3(1): 22–41.
- . 1993. Famine, gold, and guns: The Suri of south-west Ethiopia, 1985–1991. *Journal of Disasters*, 17(3): 219–225.

- Admasu Lokaley. 2014. The complex interethnic interactions along the Ilemi Triangle: The case of Nyangatom, Toposa, and Turkana. MA thesis, Addis Ababa University.
- Almagor, Uri. 1986. Institutionalizing a fringe periphery: Dassanetch-Amhara relations," *In: The southern marches of Imperial Ethiopia*, edited by Donald Donham and Wendy James, pp. 96–115. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1979. Raiders and elders: A confrontation of generations among the Dassanetch," *In: Warfare among East African Herders*, Katsuyoshi Fukui and David Turton (Eds.), pp. 119–145. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Avery, Sean. 2012. Lake Turkana and the Lower Omo: Hydrological impacts of Gibe III and Lower Omo Irrigation Development. African Studies Centre, Volumes I and II.
<http://www.africanstudies.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/Executive%20Summary%20%26%20Introduction.pdf>. Retrieved on 25 April 2016.
- Blackburn, Morgan, Guzman, Alejandro, Lieberman, Jeff, , and Sprinkel, Anne. 2015. Assessing the role of social capital in agro-pastoral resilience in the Sahel.
<https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/ids/Mercy%20Corps%20Final.pdf>. Retrieved on 10 April 2015.
- Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) [Kenya], Ministry of Planning and National Development. 1994. *Kenya Population Census, 1989. Vol. 1*. Nairobi: CBS. Central Bureau of Statistics.
- CSA (Central Statistical Authority). 2014. Agricultural Sample Survey 2013/2014. Volume II, Report on Livestock and Livestock Characteristics. *Statistical Bulletin*, 573. Addis Ababa: CSA.
- . 2008. *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population size by age and sex*. Addis Ababa: CSA.
- . 2003 (1995 EC). Livestock characteristics survey of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region. Addis Ababa: CSA.
- . 1984. *The 1984 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Analytical report at national level*. Addis Ababa: CSA.
- de Soysa, Indra. 2002. Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989–99. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(4): 395–416.

- de Waal, Alex. 1991. *Evil days: Thirty years of war and famine in Ethiopia*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Fearon, James and Laitin, David. 1996. Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American Political Science Review*, 90(4): 715–735.
- Galvin, Kathleen. 2008. ‘Responses of pastoralists to land fragmentation: Social capital, connectivity, and resilience.’ *In: Fragmentation in Semi-Arid and Arid landscapes: Consequences for human and natural systems*, edited by Kathleen Galvin, Robin Reid, Roy Behnke, and Thompson Hobbs, pp. 369–389. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Gebre Yntiso. 2014. ‘The Nyangatom circle of trust: Criteria for ethnic inclusion and exclusion.’ *In: Creating and crossing boundaries in Ethiopia: The dynamics of social categorization and differentiation*, edited by Eppele, Susanne, pp. 49–71. Muenster: LIT.
- . 2012a. ‘Inter-Ateker discord: The case of the Nyangatom and the Turkana.’ *In: Climate change and pastoralism: Traditional coping mechanisms and conflict in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Mulugeta Gebre-Heiwot and Jean Busco Buthera, pp. 351–374. Addis Ababa: Institute and Pease and Security Studies.
- . 2012b. Environmental change, food crises and violence in Dassanech, Southern Ethiopia. *Research report series no. 1, Peace and Conflict Studies*, Free University Berlin.
- . 2011. *Understanding the dynamics of pastoral conflict in Lower Omo Valley: The case of the Dassanech and the Nyangatom groups in Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: Inter Africa Group.
- Girke, Felix. 2008. ‘The Kara-Nyangatom War of 2006–2007: Dynamics of escalating violence in the tribal zone.’ *In: Hot spot Horn of Africa revisited: Approaches to make sense of conflict*, edited by Eva Maria Bruchhaus and Monika Sommer, pp. 192–2007. Münster: LIT.
- Gluckman, Max. 1951. *Custom and conflict in Africa*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1956. Gulliver, Philip. Towards a theoretical approach to the study of cross-border cooperation. *Perspectives*, 17: 5–13.
- Hendrickson, Dylan, Armon, Jeremy and Mearns, Robin. 1998. The changing nature of conflict and famine vulnerability: The case of livestock raiding in Turkana District, Kenya. *Disasters*, 22(3):185–199.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2010. *Environment, scarcity, and violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- . 1994. Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: Evidence from cases. *International Security*, 19(1): 5–40.
- Houtteman, Yvan. 2010. ‘Murder as a marker of ethnicity: Ideas and practices concerning homicide among the Daasanech.’ *In: To live with others: Essays on cultural neighborhood in southern Ethiopia*, edited by Gabbert, Echi and Thubauville, Sophia, pp. 128–156. Köln: Rüdiger Köppe.
- KNBS (Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics). 2010. The 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume IC. *Population distribution by age, sex and administrative units*. Nairobi: KNBS.
- Leff, Jonah. 2009. Pastoralists at war: Violence and security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda border region. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 3(2): 188–203.
- Lind, Jeremy. 2003. Adaptation, conflict and cooperation in pastoralist East Africa: A case study from South Turkana, Kenya. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 3(3): 315–334.
- Mathew, Richard, Gaulin, Ted, and McDonald, Bryan. 2003. ‘The elusive quest: Linking environmental change and conflict.’ *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 36(4):857–878.
- Mathews, Tuchman. 1989. Redefining security. *Foreign Affairs*, 68:162–77.
- Mburu, Nene. 2003. Delimitation of the Ilemi triangle: A history of abrogation of responsibility. *African Studies Quarterly*, 6(4). <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i1a2.htm>. Retrieved on 01 February 2016.
- Mkutu, Kennedy and Lokwang, Augustine Ekitela. 2016. New challenges for African potentials in mediating conflicts: The case of Turkana, Northwestern Kenya. A paper presented at the international symposium entitled, “*African Potentials 2016: Conflict Resolution and Co-existence*”, held 22–24 January 2016 in Kyoto, Japan.
- Notenbaert, An, Thornton, Philip, and Herrero, Mario. 2007. Livestock development and climate change in Turkana District, Kenya. *Discussion Paper No. 7*. http://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/575/turkana_discussionpaper_7.pdf? Retrieved on 17 January 2016.
- Omolo, Nancy. 2011. Gender and climate-change-induced conflict in pastoral communities: Case study of Turkana in north-western Kenya. <http://www.foresightfordevelopment.org/sobi2/Resources/Gender-and->

climate-change-induced-conflict-in-pastoral-communities-Case-study-of-Turkana-in-northwestern-Kenya. Retrieved on 20 January 2016.

- Ophuls, William. 1977. *Ecology and the politics of scarcity*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- Pkalya, Ruto, Adan, Mohamud and Masinde, Isabella. 2003. Conflict in Northern Kenya: A focus on the internally displaced conflict victims in northern Kenya.
https://practicalaction.org/docs/region_east_africa/conflict_in_northern_kenya.pdf.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Raleigh, Clionadh and Urdal, Henrik. 2007. Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict. *Political Geography*, 26(6): 674–694.
- Slettebak, Rune. 2012. Don't blame the weather! Climate-related natural disasters and civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 49:163–176.
- Smith, Todd. 2012. 'Fighting in the rain: Monthly rainfall extremes and civil unrest in Africa.' *In: Climate change and pastoralism: Traditional coping mechanisms and conflict in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Mulugeta Gebre-Heiwot and Jean Busco Buthera, pp. 271–306. Addis Ababa: Institute and Peace and Security Studies.
- Sagawa, Toru. 2010. 'Local potential for peace: Trans-ethnic cross-cutting ties among the Daasanach and their neighbours.' *In: To live with others: Essays on cultural neighborhood in southern Ethiopia*, edited by Echi Gabbert and Sophia Thubauville, pp. 99–127. Köln: Rüdiger Köppe.
- Theisen, Ole Magnus. 2008. Blood and soil? Resource scarcity and internal armed conflict revisited. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(6): 801–818.
- Tornay, Serge. 1979. 'Armed conflicts in the Lower Omo Valley, 1970–1976: An analysis from within Nyangatom society.' *In: Warfare among East African herders*, edited by Fukui, Katsuyoshi and Turton, David, pp. 97–117. Osaka: The National Museum of Ethnology.
- Ulman, Richard. 1983. Redefining security. *International security*, 8: 129–53.
- Urdal, Henrik. 2005. People vs. Malthus: Population pressure, environmental degradation, and armed conflict revisited. *Journal of Peace Research*, 42(4): 417–434.

- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and beyond. *World Politics*, 53: 362–98.
- Watson, David and van Binsbergen, Joep. 2008. Livestock market access and opportunities in Turkana, Kenya. *ILRI Research Report 3*. Nairobi: International Livestock Research Institute.
- Wilner, Alexandre. 2006. The environment-conflict nexus: Developing consensus on theory and methodology. *Natural Resources and Conflict*, 62(1):169–188.
- Yonas Ashine. 2012. 'New regionalism as a response to environmental conflicts among pastoralists of the Horn of Africa: The case of IGAD/CEWARN.' *In: Climate change and pastoralism: Traditional coping mechanisms and conflict in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Mulugeta Gebre-Heiwot and Buthera, Jean Busco, pp. 375–398. Addis Ababa: Institute and Peace and Security Studies.